Mr. Justice Day
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents a singlé question, which is involved in the construction of the statutes governing the District of Columbia. That question is, Under those statutes may a wife bring an action to recover damages for an assault and battery upon her person by the husband?
The declaration of the plaintiff is in the ordinary form, and in seven counts charges divers assaults upon her person by her husband, the defendant, for which the wife seeks to recover damages in the sum of $70,000. An issue of law being made by demurrer to the defendant’s pleas, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held that such action would not lie under the statute. Upon writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia the judgment of the Supreme Court wa§ affirmed. 31 App. D. C. 557.
At the common law the husband and wife were regarded as one. The legal existence of the wife during coverture was merged in that of the husband, and, generally speaking, the wife was incapable of making contracts, of ac[615]*615quiring property or disposing of the same without her husband’s consent. They could not enter into contracts with each other, nor were they liable for torts committed by one against the other. In pursuance of a more liberal policy in favor of the wife, statutes have been passed in many of the States looking to the relief of a married woman from the disabilities imposed upon her as a femme covert by the common law. Under these laws she has been empowered to control and dispose of her own property free from the constraint of the husband, in many instances to carry on trade and business, and to deal with third persons as though she were a single woman. The wife has further been enabled by the passage of such statutes to sue for trespass upon her rights in property and to protect the security of her person against the wrongs and assaults of others.
It is unnecessary to review these statutes in detail. Their obvious purpose is, in some respects, to treat the wife as a femme sole, and to a large extent to alter the common law theory of the unity of husband and ' wife. These statutes, passed in pursuance of the general policy of emancipation of the wife from the husband & control,. differ in terms and are tobe construed with a view to effectuate the legislative purpose which led to their enactment.
It is insisted that the Code of the District of Columbia has gone so' far in the direction of modifying the common law relation of husband, and wife' as to give to her an action against him for torts committed by him upon.her person or property. The answer to this contention depends upon a construction of § 1155 of the District of Columbia Code, 31 Stat. 1189,1374, March 3,1901. That section provides:
“Sec. 1155. Power of Wife to Trade and Sue and be Sued. — Married women shall have power to engage in any business, and to contract, whether engaged in business or not, and to sue separately upon their contracts, and also [616]*616to sue separately for the recovery, security, or protection of. their property, and for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried; contracts may also be made with them, and they may also be sued separately upon their contracts, whether made before or during marriage, and for wrongs, independent of contract committed by them before or during their marriage, as fully as if they were unmarried, and upon judgments recovered against them execution may be issued as if they were unmarried; nor shall, any husband be liable upon any contract made by his wife in her own name and upon her own responsibility, nor for any tort committed separately by her out of his presence without his participation or sanction: Provided, That no married woman shall have power to make any contract as surety or guarantor, or as accommodation •drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser.”
In construing a statute the courts are to have in mind the old law and the change intended" to be effected by the passage of the hew. Reading this section, it is apparent that its purposes, among others, were to enable a married woman, to engage in business and to make contracts free from the intervention or control, of the husband, and to maintain actions separately for the recovery, security and protection of her property. At the common law, with certain exceptions not necessary.to notice in this connection, the wife could'not maintain an action at law except she be joined by her husband. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 589. For injuries suffered by the wife in her person or property, such as would give rise to a cause off action in favor of. a -fetnme sole, a suit could be instituted only in the joint name of herself and husband. 1 Cooley on Torts, 3d. edition, 472, and dases cited in the note.
By this District of Columbia statute the common law was changed, and, in view of the additional rights conferred upon married women in § 1155 and other sections of the Code, she is given the right to sue separately for [617]*617redress of wrongs concerning the same. That this was the purpose of the statute, when attention is given to the very question, under consideration, is apparent from the consideration of its terms. 'Married women are authorized to sue separately for “the recovery, security or protection of their property, and for torts committed against her as fully and freely as if she were unmarried.” That is, the limitation upon her right of action imposed in the requirement of the common law that the husband should join her Was' removed by the statute, and she was permitted to recover separately for such torts, as freely as if she were still unmarried. The statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which at common law must be brought in the joint names of herself and husband.
This construction we think is obvious, from a reading of the statute in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished. It gives.a reasonable effect to. the terms used, and accomplishes, as we believe, the legislative' intent, which is the primary object of all construction of statutes.
It is suggested that the liberal construction insisted for in behalf .of the defendant in error in this case might well be given, in view of the. .legislative intent to provide remedies for grievous wrongs to the wife; arid an instance is suggested in the wrong to a wife rendered unable to follow the avocation of a seamstress by a cruel assault which might destroy the use of hand or arm; and the justice is suggested of giving a. remedy to, an artist who might be maimed and suffer great pecuniary damages as the result of injuries inflicted by a brutal husband.
Apart from the consideration that the-perpetration of such atrocious wrongs affords adequate grounds for relief under the statutes of divorce and alimony, this construction would at the same time open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other, [618]*618and bring into public notice complaints for assault, slander and libel, and alleged injuries to property of the oné or ,the other, by husband against wife or wife against husband. Whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would be pro-motive of the public welfare and domestic harmony is at least a debatable question. The possible evils of such legislation might well make the lawmaking power hesitate to enact it.
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Mr. Justice Day
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents a singlé question, which is involved in the construction of the statutes governing the District of Columbia. That question is, Under those statutes may a wife bring an action to recover damages for an assault and battery upon her person by the husband?
The declaration of the plaintiff is in the ordinary form, and in seven counts charges divers assaults upon her person by her husband, the defendant, for which the wife seeks to recover damages in the sum of $70,000. An issue of law being made by demurrer to the defendant’s pleas, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held that such action would not lie under the statute. Upon writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia the judgment of the Supreme Court wa§ affirmed. 31 App. D. C. 557.
At the common law the husband and wife were regarded as one. The legal existence of the wife during coverture was merged in that of the husband, and, generally speaking, the wife was incapable of making contracts, of ac[615]*615quiring property or disposing of the same without her husband’s consent. They could not enter into contracts with each other, nor were they liable for torts committed by one against the other. In pursuance of a more liberal policy in favor of the wife, statutes have been passed in many of the States looking to the relief of a married woman from the disabilities imposed upon her as a femme covert by the common law. Under these laws she has been empowered to control and dispose of her own property free from the constraint of the husband, in many instances to carry on trade and business, and to deal with third persons as though she were a single woman. The wife has further been enabled by the passage of such statutes to sue for trespass upon her rights in property and to protect the security of her person against the wrongs and assaults of others.
It is unnecessary to review these statutes in detail. Their obvious purpose is, in some respects, to treat the wife as a femme sole, and to a large extent to alter the common law theory of the unity of husband and ' wife. These statutes, passed in pursuance of the general policy of emancipation of the wife from the husband & control,. differ in terms and are tobe construed with a view to effectuate the legislative purpose which led to their enactment.
It is insisted that the Code of the District of Columbia has gone so' far in the direction of modifying the common law relation of husband, and wife' as to give to her an action against him for torts committed by him upon.her person or property. The answer to this contention depends upon a construction of § 1155 of the District of Columbia Code, 31 Stat. 1189,1374, March 3,1901. That section provides:
“Sec. 1155. Power of Wife to Trade and Sue and be Sued. — Married women shall have power to engage in any business, and to contract, whether engaged in business or not, and to sue separately upon their contracts, and also [616]*616to sue separately for the recovery, security, or protection of. their property, and for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried; contracts may also be made with them, and they may also be sued separately upon their contracts, whether made before or during marriage, and for wrongs, independent of contract committed by them before or during their marriage, as fully as if they were unmarried, and upon judgments recovered against them execution may be issued as if they were unmarried; nor shall, any husband be liable upon any contract made by his wife in her own name and upon her own responsibility, nor for any tort committed separately by her out of his presence without his participation or sanction: Provided, That no married woman shall have power to make any contract as surety or guarantor, or as accommodation •drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser.”
In construing a statute the courts are to have in mind the old law and the change intended" to be effected by the passage of the hew. Reading this section, it is apparent that its purposes, among others, were to enable a married woman, to engage in business and to make contracts free from the intervention or control, of the husband, and to maintain actions separately for the recovery, security and protection of her property. At the common law, with certain exceptions not necessary.to notice in this connection, the wife could'not maintain an action at law except she be joined by her husband. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 589. For injuries suffered by the wife in her person or property, such as would give rise to a cause off action in favor of. a -fetnme sole, a suit could be instituted only in the joint name of herself and husband. 1 Cooley on Torts, 3d. edition, 472, and dases cited in the note.
By this District of Columbia statute the common law was changed, and, in view of the additional rights conferred upon married women in § 1155 and other sections of the Code, she is given the right to sue separately for [617]*617redress of wrongs concerning the same. That this was the purpose of the statute, when attention is given to the very question, under consideration, is apparent from the consideration of its terms. 'Married women are authorized to sue separately for “the recovery, security or protection of their property, and for torts committed against her as fully and freely as if she were unmarried.” That is, the limitation upon her right of action imposed in the requirement of the common law that the husband should join her Was' removed by the statute, and she was permitted to recover separately for such torts, as freely as if she were still unmarried. The statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which at common law must be brought in the joint names of herself and husband.
This construction we think is obvious, from a reading of the statute in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished. It gives.a reasonable effect to. the terms used, and accomplishes, as we believe, the legislative' intent, which is the primary object of all construction of statutes.
It is suggested that the liberal construction insisted for in behalf .of the defendant in error in this case might well be given, in view of the. .legislative intent to provide remedies for grievous wrongs to the wife; arid an instance is suggested in the wrong to a wife rendered unable to follow the avocation of a seamstress by a cruel assault which might destroy the use of hand or arm; and the justice is suggested of giving a. remedy to, an artist who might be maimed and suffer great pecuniary damages as the result of injuries inflicted by a brutal husband.
Apart from the consideration that the-perpetration of such atrocious wrongs affords adequate grounds for relief under the statutes of divorce and alimony, this construction would at the same time open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other, [618]*618and bring into public notice complaints for assault, slander and libel, and alleged injuries to property of the oné or ,the other, by husband against wife or wife against husband. Whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would be pro-motive of the public welfare and domestic harmony is at least a debatable question. The possible evils of such legislation might well make the lawmaking power hesitate to enact it. But these and kindred considerations are addressed to the legislative, not the judicial branch of the Government. In cases like the present, interpretation of the law is the only function of the courts.
An examination of this class of legislation will show that it has gone much further in the direction of giving rights to the wife in the management and control of her separate property than it has in giving rights of action directly against the husband. In no act called to our attention has the right of the wife been carried to the extent of opening the courts to complaints of the “character of the one here involved.
It must be presumed that the legislators who enacted this statute were familiar with the long-established policy of the cottimon law, and were not unmindful of the radical changes in the policy of centuries which such legislation, as is herq suggested would bring about. Conceding it to be within the power of the legislature to make this alteration in the law, if it saw fit to do so, nevertheless such radical and far-reaching changes should only be wrought-by language' so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evi-. dence of the legislative intention. Had it been the legislative purpose not only to permit the wife to bring suits free from her husband’s participation and control, but to bring actions against him also for injuries to person or property as though they were strangers, thus emphasizing' and publishing differences which otherwise might not be serious, it would have been easy to have expressed that, intent in terms of irresistible clearness.
[619]*619We can but regard this case as another of many attempts which have failed, to obtain by construction radical and far-reaching changes in the policy of the common law not declared in the terms of the legislation under consideration.
Some of the cases of that character are: Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Michigan, 80; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Maine, 304; Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644; Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barbour, 641; Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa, 182.
Nor is the wife left without remedy for such wrongs. She may resort to the criminal courts, which, it is tó be presumed, will inflict punishment commensurate with the offense committed. She may sue for divorce or separation and for alimony. The court in protecting her rights and awarding relief in such cases may consider, and, so far as possible, redress her wrongs and protect her rights.
She may resort to the chancery court for the protection of her separate property rights. 21 How. 582, 590. Whether the wife alone may now bring actions against the husband to protect her separate property, such as are cognizable in a suit in equity when brought through the medium of a next friend (21 How., supra), is a question not made or decided in this case.
We do not believe it was the intention of Congress, in the enactment of the District of Columbia Code, to revolutionize the law governing the relation of husband and wife as between themselves. We think the construction we have given the statute is in harmony with its language and is the only one consistent with its purpose.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia will be
Affirmed.