Thompson v. Shartle

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 19, 2012
DocketCivil Action No. 2012-0987
StatusPublished

This text of Thompson v. Shartle (Thompson v. Shartle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Shartle, (D.D.C. 2012).

Opinion

FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUN 1 9 2012 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Columbia Ricardo C. Thompson, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) Civil Action No. 12 0987 J.T. Shartle, Warden, ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner, a District of Columbia prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Correctional

Institution in Fairton, New Jersey, has submitted a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

application to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the

application to proceed in forma pauperis and will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner invokes both 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but the petition is

premised solely on the alleged ineffectiveness of petitioner's trial counsel during criminal

proceedings in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See Pet.~~ 7, 10. Petitioner's

recourse lies, if at all, in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110. See Blair-Bey v. Quick,

151 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing§ 23-110 as "a remedy analogous to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 for prisoners sentenced in D.C. Superior Court who wished to challenge their

conviction or sentence"); Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-3 7 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Since passage

of the Court Reform Act [in 1970], [] a District of Columbia prisoner seeking to collaterally

attack his sentence must do so by motion in the sentencing court-the Superior Court-pursuant to

D.C. Code§ 23-110."); see also Reyes v. Rios, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006) ("Section

23-110 provided the petitioner with a vehicle for challenging his conviction based on the alleged

/

/ {' 3 ineffectiveness ofhis trial counsel."); Garmon v. U.S., 684 A.2d 327,329 n.3 (D.C. 1996) ("A

motion to vacate sentence under section 23-110 is the standard means of raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.) (citation omitted).

Section 23-110 states:

[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by ... any Federal ... court if it appears ... that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

D.C. Code §23-11 O(g). Absent a showing of an inadequate or ineffective local remedy, then, "a

District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum." Garris v. Lindsay,

794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986) (internal footnote

omitted). Because petitioner has not shown that his local remedy is inadequate to address his

ineffective assistance claim, the Court will dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction. A separate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

~/c cl HW<-_ United States District Judge

DATE: June I :A, 2012

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Related

Garmon v. United States
684 A.2d 327 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1996)
Reyes v. Rios
432 F. Supp. 2d 1 (District of Columbia, 2006)
Blair-Bey v. Quick
151 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Circuit, 1998)

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Thompson v. Shartle, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-shartle-dcd-2012.