Thompson v. Murray

84 F.2d 202, 23 C.C.P.A. 1281, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 132
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 17, 1936
DocketNo. 3639
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 84 F.2d 202 (Thompson v. Murray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Murray, 84 F.2d 202, 23 C.C.P.A. 1281, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 132 (ccpa 1936).

Opinion

Hatfield, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal in an interference proceeding from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the decision of. the Examiner of Interferences awarding priority of invention to appellee.

The invention relates to a self-energizing synchronizer for use in transmissions, particularly automobile transmissions.

[1282]*1282In his decision, the Examiner of Interferences described the invention as follows:

The devices of both parties perform the function of synchronizing the transmission gears prior to their positive engagement, in order to facilitate such engagement and to prevent clashing. Two types of synchronizers are disclosed by the parties. Thus in the Murray application 614,502 and the Thompson application 667,478 are disclosed devices adapted to synchronize a pair of gears prior to their engagement, while in the Murray application 50,279 and in the Thompson application 302,228 are disclosed devices adapted to synchronize co-axial positive clutches prior to their engagement.
In both types the synchronization is achieved by first connecting the members which are to be meshed through a friction clutch, which brings them to the desired relative speed. The members are then meshed in the usual manner. This principal is old in itself and the issue here is limited to a self-energizing synchronizer, namely one in which the axial pressure between the friction clutch members is due to, or augmented by, the rotation of the parts which are to be synchronized.

At the time of the oral arguments in this court, counsel for appellant moved, to dismiss the appeal as to counts 13 to 21, inclusive. The motion is granted.

Of the remaining counts, 1 to 12, inclusive, counts 1, 4, and 12 are illustrative. They read:

Count 1. In combination, a pair of members capable of having relative rotary movement about a common axis, synchronizing means for causing the members to approach a common speed, said means including a clutch for fractionally connecting- said members through said synchronizing means and thus cause them to approach the same speed, said clutch including a shiftable element movable parallel to said axis manually actuated means for shifting the movable clutch element into a relatively light clutching condition, and camming means connected to be operably responsive to any subsequent relative movement of said members when in said clutching position for shifting- said clutch element axially into a more intense clutching position and thus cause the clutch to function by virtue of the relative movement of said members.
Count 4. The combination in a power transmission including a pair of shafts, gears on said shafts adapted to establish a drive between the shafts, means including an axially shiftable member for connecting and disconnecting said drive, of synchronizing means for establishing the desired speed relation between the shafts before the drive is connected, said synchronizing means comprising- a friction clutch and means for effecting- thrust against said clutch to cause its frictional engagement, said means adapted to augment said thrust by the rotation of the gearing, and means for operating the shiftable member and synchronizing means.
Count 12. A synchronizer for causing a pair of power gears to approach the same speed before being moved into meshing relation, said synchronizer including- actuating means adapted to be operatively connected to one of the power gears to be synchronized and supplied by said power gear with the energy necessary to effect an actuation of said synchronizer and a manual control for governing the operative relation of said means with the power gear.

[1283]*1283A considerable portion of the evidence set forth in the voluminous record before us, has to do with matters with which we are not concerned.

That the issues involved are complicated, is apparent from the decisions of the tribunals below, and from the briefs of counsel in the case.

The involved testimony is set forth and carefully analyzed in the lengthy decision of the Examiner of Interferences.

The Board of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Examiner of Interferences, although it did not agree in every particular therewith.

It is, in effect, conceded by counsel for appellant that, as held by the tribunals of the Patent Office, appellee was the first to conceive the involved invention. It is contended, however, by counsel for appellant, that appellee was not diligent in reducing the invention to practice, and that, although appellant was the last to conceive, he was the first to reduce the invention to practice, and is, therefore, entitled to an award of priority.

Appellant relies upon an installation of a transmission in a Buick car during the year 1917, and another in a Cadillac car in October, 1922. Counsel' for appellant contend that those transmissions corresponded to the counts in issue. The Examiner of Interferences was of opinion, however, that they did not, and with regard thereto, among other things, said:

When the Thompson application 667,47S was filed it contained no suggestion that the synchronizer therein was self-energizing, or even that the power of the gears to be meshed assisted such synchronization in any way. Moreover, there was no suggestion of self-energization inserted in the Thompson application until the amendment of May 12, 1928. This, however, was subsequent to the time that Thompson admits he learned of Murray’s self-energiziiig syn-chronizer (see Thompson testimony, pages 182-184), and subsequent to the time that Murray had supplied the General Motors Company, assignee of Thompson, with a copy of his application 614,502, here involved. These are rather significant indications that Thompson never appreciated the existence of any self-energizing characteristics in his synchronizer until after he learned of Murray’s invention. These facts were not before the Board of Appeals when it rendered its interlocutory decision in this case.
It is now contended, however, that the intermediate synchronizer of the Thompson application inherently embodies the self-energizing feature.
Accordingly it is held that according to Thompson’s own admissions neither his application disclosure, nor the synchronizer built in accordance therewith, is completely self-energizing, and that at least eighty per cent of the actuating force must be applied manually. Under these circumstances, it must be held that Thompson cannot make counts 5-12.

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Bluebook (online)
84 F.2d 202, 23 C.C.P.A. 1281, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-murray-ccpa-1936.