Thompson v. Grieco

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 28, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-05013
StatusUnknown

This text of Thompson v. Grieco (Thompson v. Grieco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Grieco, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RONALD THOMPSON, JR. ALSO KNOWN AS CURTIS JACKSON, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-5013 (LTS) MATTHEW V. GREICO BRONX BOOKING JUDGE; CARMEN A. GREICO BRONX ORDER OF DISMISSAL BOOKING JUDGE; EUGENE D. BOWEN WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD BRONX BOOKING JUDGE; YADHIRA TAYLOR GONZALEZ BRONX BOOKING JUDGE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federally protected rights. By order dated July 2, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). BACKGROUND The filed this complaint against four state-court “booking judges.” (ECF 1.) The complaint contains the following allegations:2

After my arrest and on several priors I Curtis Jackson/Ronald Thompson Jr. made a verbal claim of ownership to numerous Buiseness establishments of which management is unaware of or ignorrent to the fact. A Doctoral pager is in order yet I have been mentally evaluated for over ninety days. There were ROR adjournments and yet no investigation on behalf of my claim. (Id. V.) With respect to the relief Plaintiff seeks, he states, “stander or agreed upon.” (Id. ¶ VI.) DISCUSSION Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be

2 The Court quotes verbatim from Plaintiff’s complaint. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants acted beyond the scope of their judicial responsibilities or outside their jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. Because

Plaintiff sues judges for “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before” them, they are immune from suit for such claims for damages. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. By contrast, “a judge is not absolutely immune . . . . from a suit for prospective injunctive relief.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10, n.1 (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-543 (1984)); Shtrauch v. Dowd, 651 F. App’x 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar a claim for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”) (summary order). Nevertheless, a court’s ability to award injunctive relief against a judicial officer under Section 1983 is strictly limited. As amended in 1996, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. “A plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.” Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998); Shtrauch, 651 F. App'x at 74 (affirming that plaintiff was not entitled to declaratory relief against judicial officer where plaintiff “alleges only past conduct and does not seek to prevent an ongoing or future violation of federal law”). Plaintiff makes no argument that a declaratory decree was violated, that an appeal from any of the judges’s orders was unavailable, or that he is entitled to declaratory relief based on some prospective future harm. See, e.g., Davis v. Campbell, No. 3:13-CV-0693, 2014 WL 234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (“[D]eclaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within his or her judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the judge’s order.”); Brik v. Brodie, No. 23-CV-4330, 2023 WL 4373557, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against judge, inter alia, because plaintiff “does not seek to

remedy a harm that is truly prospective, [and plaintiff] does show any entitlement to declaratory relief” based on the judge’s past conduct). Accordingly, injunctive relief against the judges named as defendants cannot be granted in an action against them under Section 1983. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are therefore dismissed in their entirety, based on absolute juridical immunity as to the claims for damages, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and because, on the facts presented, Plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief. LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Stump v. Sparkman
435 U.S. 349 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Pulliam v. Allen
466 U.S. 522 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Bliven v. Hunt
579 F.3d 204 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Shtrauch v. Dowd
651 F. App'x 72 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Thompson v. Grieco, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-grieco-nysd-2024.