Thomas v. Susquehanna Collieries Co.

25 A.2d 98, 148 Pa. Super. 161, 1942 Pa. Super. LEXIS 29
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 12, 1941
DocketAppeal, 211
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 25 A.2d 98 (Thomas v. Susquehanna Collieries Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 25 A.2d 98, 148 Pa. Super. 161, 1942 Pa. Super. LEXIS 29 (Pa. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

Opinion by

Cunningham, J.,

This is another -workmen’s compensation case in which the appellant-employer unsuccessfully sought to have an unappealed from award of compensation for total disability modified into one for partial, upon a 25% disability basis. By this appeal we are asked to reverse the unanimous conclusions of the referee, board, and court below. The judgment will be affirmed.

The underlying facts are not in dispute; the only factual controversy arises out of “hair-splitting” differences in the professional opinions expressed by the respective medical experts of the parties.

An examination of the record discloses these basic facts. The employee, James Thomas, had been in the employ of the appellant coal company as a miner for some years prior to March 16, 1936, the date of his admittedly accidental injury. He testified he was then about fifty-eight years of age, “was a strong man,” and had worked regularly. Following the hearing upon his claim-petition,, filed November 16, 1936, the referee made, inter alia, these findings of fact:

“On March 16, 1936, the claimant while in the course of his employment for the defendant company was struck on the right leg by a piece of sheet iron and sustained a cut. from which an infection set in and later erysipelas developed. The claimant has been totally disabled from that date, ------- as the result of [that] untoward happening.’’

An award for total disability was accordingly made on January 23, 1937, at the rate of $15 per week from March 23, 1936, to continue, within the limitations of the statute, until disability changed or ceased. The employer did not appeal from that award. Payments were made under it up to February 15, 1938, when, as *163 we understand the record, the weekly payments were reduced to $6.92, upon the theory that appellant was prepared to prove that so much of the employee’s disability as it was responsible for had decreased to such an extent that it did not affect his earning power more than $10.64 per week — thereby reducing its liability to 65% of that amount, or $6.92. Appellee’s weekly wage rate at the time of his injury was $42.54.

Appellant promptly filed its petition, under the second paragraph of Section 413 of the Workmen’s .Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, as reenacted and amended by the Act of June 4, 1937, P. L. 1552, 77 PS §772, for a modification of the award of January 23, 1937, into an award for partial disability calculated upon a 25% disability basis. Appellee an.swered that he was still “totally disabled as a result of the injury sustained.”

When the matter came on for hearing before a referee it was not disputed that appellee’s physical condition was worse than it had been at the time of the original hearing. Appellant did not undertake to show that appellee had any earning power whatever, but sought modification upon the theory that not more than 25% of his conceded total disability was attributable to the leg injury for which it was liable — the remainder being due, as it asserted, to a preexisting “marked pulmonary involvement from coal dust deposits as a result of his occupation.” Doctor E. B. Bast, who had attended appellee ever since the accident, conceded he had a preexisting, but not disabling, asthmatic condition, but expressed his positive professional opinion that this lung condition had been so aggravated by the accidental leg injury and resulting infection as to cause total disability.

As a result of his consideration of all the testimony, the referee made, inter alia, these findings:

“4. The claimant has a scar over the tibia approximately three fingers in length and a little wider than *164 ¿he width of a thumb. The right foot is edematosed, the thigh and calf are atrophied and the patellar reflexes are very slow. He has harsh breathing over all parts of the chest. He also has an asthmatic condition of the chest and his heart sounds are rather weak.

“5. We find that the accidental injury suffered by the claimant on March 16, 1936, was a contributory factor in bringing about the conditions from which the claimant is suffering and which now totally disable him.” (Italics supplied.)

An order was entered dismissing the petition for modification and directing the employer to pay such additional amounts as would be due under the award as originally entered down to July 13, 1938, and to continue, within the limitations of the statute, at the rate of $15 per week, until disability changed or ceased.

The board, upon the employer’s appeal to it, affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, of the referee; the court below entered judgment upon the award; the present appeal is from that judgment.

Our only question of law is whether the findings adopted by the board are supported by substantial competent evidence.

The argument in behalf of appellant seems to overlook several important principles of law applicable to this case. As early as 1919, it was decided by the Supreme Court in Clark v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 264 Pa. 529, 107 A. 858, that the fact an employee had an ailment which rendered him more susceptible to the effects of an accidental injury than an entirely healthy person would have been does not defeat his right to compensation. A list of cases in which compensation was allowed for the aggravation of a preexisting chronic ailment by an external accident will be found under the second classification in Royko v. Logan Coal Co. et al., 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 449, 22 A. 2d 434.

Again, the employee did not have the burden of proof here, as asserted in appellant’s brief. Appellant’s *165 failure to appeal from the original award and its making of payments thereunder for more than a year amounted to an admission that appellee had been totally disabled by his leg injury for a period of approximately two years. When appellant, under such circumstances, undertook to disassociate appellee’s leg injury from his lung condition and assign 25% of his disability to the former and 75% to the latter, and forthwith reduced his compensation accordingly, it assumed a heavy burden of proof. In support of its petition appellant called Doctors C. H. Weimer, Guy Robinhold and G. M. Simmonds. The following question to and answer by Doctor Simmonds illustrates the tenor of their testimony: “Q. Doctor, as a result of this examination do you have any opinion as to whether this man has a disability due to the injury to his right lower extremity? A. As a result of this examination it is my opinion this patient is about twenty-five per cent disabled in the use of his right lower extremity due to the original injury and secondary infection. He is totally incapacitated from work due to his general constitutional debility which is no doubt caused by his advanced age and marked pulmonary involvement from coal dust deposits as a result of his occupation and which is not in any way related to the original injury.”

The question of burden of proof is- not directly involved upon this appeal. The findings of the compensation authorities are not based upon the weakness of the evidence for appellant, but upon the weight, credibility, and reasonableness of the testimony of appellee’s opposing expert, Doctor Bast. See

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
25 A.2d 98, 148 Pa. Super. 161, 1942 Pa. Super. LEXIS 29, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-susquehanna-collieries-co-pasuperct-1941.