Olsweski v. Lehigh Navigation Coal Co.

20 A.2d 874, 145 Pa. Super. 193, 1941 Pa. Super. LEXIS 316
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 5, 1941
DocketAppeal, 140
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 20 A.2d 874 (Olsweski v. Lehigh Navigation Coal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Olsweski v. Lehigh Navigation Coal Co., 20 A.2d 874, 145 Pa. Super. 193, 1941 Pa. Super. LEXIS 316 (Pa. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

Cunningham, J.,

Opinion by

It is not controverted in this workmen’s compensation case that the direct cause of the death of claimant’s husband, Joseph Olsweski, an employee of the defendant company, on March 3, 1937, was “influenza and broncho-pneumonia,” which illness began February 23d of that year. The issue, relative to the alleged right of his widow to be compensated for his death, arose under a claim petition filed by her and the employer’s answer thereto. In her petition she averred her husband died “as the result of an accident occurring [December 21, 1934] in the course of his employment.” The employer answered that his death “was in no way related to [his accidental] injury” but was “brought on by natural causes.”

These additional undisputed facts appear of record. More than two years prior to the onset of the fatal influenza and broncho-pneumonia the decedent was accidentally and severely injured in one of the defendant’s mines; under an open agreement for compensation for total disability payments were made to him up to the date of his death. The description of the accident and injury as set out in that agreement reads: “Piece of coal slid from Tace’ and struck back and neck, resulting in posterior dislocation of 4th cervical vertebra, fracture óf 5th with slight displacement. Partial paralysis of both arms.”

The referee made and the board affirmed an award to claimant, under Section 307 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, as amended *195 April 26,1929, P. L. 829, 77 PS §512, for the remainder of the 300 week period ensuing the accident; upon the employer’s appeal to the court below, that tribunal set aside the award and, in effect, entered judgment in its favor; from that judgment the claimant now appeals.

Under the pleadings, and in view of the long period of time which elapsed between the date of the accident and the onset of the influenza, claimant clearly had the burden of establishing, by expert medical testimony, a causal connection between the accident and the death of her husband: Bunnell v. State Workmen’s Insurance Fund et al., 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 171, 188 A. 411, and cases there cited.

The standards by which the adequacy of the proofs in cases of this kind is to be measured have been established by a number of decisions of our Supreme Court and of this court. It is not questioned that decedent had a typical case of infection by influenza germs'with inflammation spreading down through the bronchial tubes to the lungs.

In Anderson v. Baxter, 285 Pa. 443, 117, 132 A. 358, the Supreme Court said: “To be compensable, under the statute, the injury must be the direct or super-inducing cause of the death or disability in question. There is a cardinal difference between lowering vitality and causing pneumonia, which is a germ disease.” Morgan v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 273 Pa. 255, 116 A. 891, was a case in which an employee died of bronchial pneumonia six weeks after an accidental injury and his physician stated he thought the injuries received were “indirectly responsible” for the pneumonia but admitted it might have come from some other cause. In setting aside an award the Supreme Court said (page 258): “The testimony did not support the conclusion that the pneumonia was traceable back to the accident as a natural result therefrom. ......In eases such as this, there must be a probable, direct relation shown between the injury and the dis *196 ease resulting in death, otherwise liability would be fixed by surmise.”

In Bunnell v. State Workmen’s Insurance Fund et al., supra, the deceased employee had suffered a back injury some three years prior to his fatal attack of lobar pneumonia. We there said: “The injury may have contributed to the gradual decline of the deceased at his age; it may have lowered his vitality and resistance; he may have become thereby more susceptible to infection; nevertheless, there must be a direct expression of professional opinion that deceased’s death from lobar pneumonia came, or did in fact result, from the remote accidental injury to his back.” (Italics supplied.)

When the medical testimony upon this record is examined in the light of the above principles the only conclusion at which we can arrive is that the judgment in favor of the defendant employer must be affirmed. The sole effort made by claimant to support the burden of proof resting upon her upon this branch of the case was the presentation of a certified copy of the certificate of the death of her husband filed in the Bureau of Vital Statistics. The portion thereof entitled “Medical Certificate of Death” was signed by Dr. J. J. Corrigan who had attended the decedent from the time he left the hospital in February, 1935, until his death. The ' principal and related causes of death were thus stated: “The principal cause of death and related causes of importance were as follows: Influenza and Broncho-pneumonia. Date of onset 2-23-37. Other contributory causes of importance: Fracture cervical vertebrae. Mine accident Cranberry Creek Coal Co., Cranberry Colliery. Date of onset 12-31-34.”

Over the objection of counsel for the employer, the referee admitted the certificate “as prima facie evidence.” We need not here consider whether it was admissible, for any purpose other than to show the fact and date of death, because the employer called Dr. Corrigan as its only medical witness and the certificate *197 must, in any event, be read in connection with his oral testimony before the referee.

The decedent was fifty-nine years of age at the time of his death and had been in good health prior to his accidental injury in December, 1934, but subsequent thereto had been unable to do any work. When asked whether his condition had improved between the time of his discharge from the hospital and the attack of influenza, Dr. Corrigan replied: “A. Yes, his general condition improved. When he was discharged from the hospital he was suffering from the debility and exhaustion shock from the accident, and he had an almost complete paralysis of both arms and muscles of the shoulders, upper part of the chest. Q. What change in the condition if any occurred after he got home? A. He was — Oh I would say he had recovered perhaps 75 percent of the use of his arms and his neck and head. He was unable to move his head in any direction when he came home first.” The witness further stated that decedent contracted influenza “about two weeks before [his] death” which developed into broncho-pneumonia “probably three or four days later,” because the “onset in those cases is usually gradual and don’t come on suddenly like it does in the lobar pneumonia.” With special reference to his statements in the death certificate he then testified: “Q.......In what way did that mine accident contribute to the death or the development of the influenza. A. Well it lowered his resistance to the disease, his general condition immediately after 'the accident and for some months after he was unable to take the proper nourishment and he suffered from the nerve shock of the accident, and it lowered his resistance very much. Q. It didn’t contribute in any other way except the lowering of the resistance Doctor? A. No, I wouldn’t say it .did. Q.

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Bluebook (online)
20 A.2d 874, 145 Pa. Super. 193, 1941 Pa. Super. LEXIS 316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/olsweski-v-lehigh-navigation-coal-co-pasuperct-1941.