Thomas v. New York City Department of Education

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Thomas v. New York City Department of Education

2017 NY Slip Op 4360, 151 A.D.3d 412, 52 N.Y.S.3d 855

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 1, 2017

Docket3817 100956/15

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 4360 (Thomas v. New York City Department of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Thomas v. New York City Department of Education, 2017 NY Slip Op 4360, 151 A.D.3d 412, 52 N.Y.S.3d 855 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lynn R. Kotler, J.), entered April 15, 2016, which granted defendants-respondents’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this taxpayer action, plaintiff Michael P. Thomas, alleges, among other things, that defendant Department of Education (DOE) and defendant Chancellor Farina engaged in fraudulent and/or wasteful acts in connection with defendant Communications Workers of America District One’s (CWA) use of public school property to host a meeting with Mayor Bill de Blasio, and that the Office of the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District (SCI) fraudulently concealed such conduct.

*413 Plaintiff does not deny that CWA was charged, and paid, the customary fees set by the DOE for use of public school premises, including custodial and security costs. Accordingly, the grant of use of the school premises to CWA does not constitute a gift of money in violation of the New York State Constitution (see NY Const, art VIII, § 1). Moreover, because no expenditure was accompanied by fraud or for an entirely illegal purpose, no cause of action lies under General Municipal Law § 51 (see Godfrey v Spano, 13 NY3d 358, 373 [2009]). In addition, plaintiff may not use a taxpayer action to correct technical or procedural irregularities by the DOE or to review determinations allegedly made in violation of law (see Beresford Apts. v City of New York, 238 AD2d 218, 219 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 815 [1997]).

Plaintiff, who failed to allege an intent to deceive, has not pleaded a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation or bad faith against SCI (see Guberman v Rudder, 85 AD3d 683, 684 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421 [1996]), and his conclusory allegations lack the requisite specificity (see CPLR 3016 [b]).

We have considered plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Richter, Feinman, Gische and Gesmer, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lynn R. Kotler, J.), entered April 15, 2016, which granted defendants-respondents’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this taxpayer action, plaintiff Michael P. Thomas, alleges, among other things, that defendant Department of Education (DOE) and defendant Chancellor Farina engaged in fraudulent and/or wasteful acts in connection with defendant Communications Workers of America District One’s (CWA) use of public school property to host a meeting with Mayor Bill de Blasio, and that the Office of the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District (SCI) fraudulently concealed such conduct.

*413 Plaintiff does not deny that CWA was charged, and paid, the customary fees set by the DOE for use of public school premises, including custodial and security costs. Accordingly, the grant of use of the school premises to CWA does not constitute a gift of money in violation of the New York State Constitution (see NY Const, art VIII, § 1). Moreover, because no expenditure was accompanied by fraud or for an entirely illegal purpose, no cause of action lies under General Municipal Law § 51 (see Godfrey v Spano, 13 NY3d 358, 373 [2009]). In addition, plaintiff may not use a taxpayer action to correct technical or procedural irregularities by the DOE or to review determinations allegedly made in violation of law (see Beresford Apts. v City of New York, 238 AD2d 218, 219 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 815 [1997]).

Plaintiff, who failed to allege an intent to deceive, has not pleaded a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation or bad faith against SCI (see Guberman v Rudder, 85 AD3d 683, 684 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421 [1996]), and his conclusory allegations lack the requisite specificity (see CPLR 3016 [b]).

We have considered plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Richter, Feinman, Gische and Gesmer, JJ.

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2017 NY Slip Op 4360, 151 A.D.3d 412, 52 N.Y.S.3d 855, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-new-york-city-department-of-education-nyappdiv-2017.

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