MEMORANDUM OPINION
ELLIS, District Judge.
I.
This case represents the second phase of summary judgment in a suit originally
brought by seventy eight (78)
present and former lieutenants of the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department (the “Department”) seeking compliance with the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq.
(“FLSA” or the “Act”). Plaintiffs claim they are nonexempt employees under the Act and are thus entitled to premium compensation for hours worked in excess of the statutory standards.
In response, defendant, Fair-fax County (“County”), claims that plaintiffs are executive employees exempt from the Act’s overtime requirements.
See
29 U.S.C. § 213; 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.0 to 541.119 (1990).
This matter initially came before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. In
Curtis G. Thomas et al. v. County of Fairfax,
758 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Va.1991) (hereafter
“Thomas
/”) the Court ruled that plaintiffs were not exempt executive employees under the County’s pre-August 24, 1990 payment scheme because they were paid on an hourly, rather than a salary, basis. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs’ motion as to the pre-August 24, 1990 period and denied the County’s motion. The matter is now before the Court with respect to the post-August 24, 1990 period.
For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are not exempt employees because they are not paid on a salary basis under the County’s new payroll system.
II.
Much of the relevant factual background relating to the nature of plaintiffs’ employment relationship with the County is set forth in the Court’s opinion in
Thomas I
and will not be restated here.
See
758 F.Supp. 353. The County’s new payment scheme, however, warrants description. On August 24, 1990, Fairfax County implemented a new county-wide payroll system, the Personnel Resource Information System (“PRISM”) to replace the system previously reviewed by the Court. Under PRISM, each 28-day pay cycle for shift firefighters is broken down into two, biweekly pay periods. In the first biweekly pay period, plaintiffs receive a fixed amount corresponding to payment for 106 hours regardless of the number of hours in “pay status” for that pay period.
But plaintiffs receive this fixed amount only if they do not miss one or more entire 24-hour shifts during this period. If plaintiffs miss one or more entire shifts in the first biweekly pay period, they are paid an amount that equals the number of hours in pay status multiplied by their hourly rate. This means that a lieutenant scheduled for 96 hours (4 shifts), who works all four shifts, is paid the fixed amount, namely 106 hours times the lieutenant's hourly rate.
But a lieutenant who is scheduled to work 96 hours and yet misses a 24-hour shift,
thus working only 72 hours, is only paid for the 72 hours.
In the second biweekly pay period, plaintiffs do not receive a fixed amount. Rather, plaintiffs receive an amount that fluctuates depending on the number of scheduled hours
actually
spent in pay status during the first pay period
and
the number of scheduled hours spent in pay status in the second pay period.
In essence, the County, in the second pay period, simply recoups any overpayment from the first pay period if any plaintiff works fewer than 106 hours or makes up the deficiency from the first pay period if which a plaintiff works more than 106 hours.
PRISM, however, makes no change in plaintiffs’ shift schedules, the calculation of leave benefits, or the method of overtime payment.
See
758 F.Supp. at 364-66. Under PRISM, as under the predecessor system, plaintiffs receive overtime compensation on an hourly basis for hours worked in excess of
scheduled
work hours. As such, if a lieutenant was scheduled for
96 hours in the first pay period, but worked 120 hours, the County would recoup in the second paycheck overpayment for the ten hours paid over the 106 hour fixed level (106-96). Plaintiffs would still receive, however, an overtime payment in the
first paycheck
for the 12 hours of overtime (120-106) worked in this first pay period.
III.
Federal regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) provide a “long” and “short” test for determining whether an employee is a “bona fide executive employee” who is exempt from the overtime provisions of the Act.
See
29 C.F.R. § 541.1. The long test includes five requirements and is designed to apply to employees who earn at least $155 per week.
The short test has fewer requirements and is designed for use with a smaller group of employees, namely those who earn at least $250 per week.
Because it is undisputed that plaintiffs are paid more than $250 a week, the short test applies here. This test provides that employees are bona fide executives if (1) they are compensated for their services on a “salary basis” of $250 or more per week; and (2) they are employed in a managerial capacity — i.e., their primary duty consists of management of the enterprise in which the employees are employed, and they customarily direct the work of two or more other employees.
See 29
C.F.R. § 541.-119(a). Employees are not exempt executives unless it is shown that they fit all of the requirements of this test.
See
758 F.Supp. at 358-59. The Court based its ruling in
Thomas I
chiefly on an examination of the “salary basis” requirement.
See 29
C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1990). As a result, the Court did not reach the sharply disputed question whether the other requirements of the “short test” had been met, namely whether the lieutenant’s job duties were primarily managerial. A similar analysis obtains here.
The central question is whether PRISM provides for plaintiffs to be paid on a “salary basis.”
The pertinent regulation provides, in part, that:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ELLIS, District Judge.
I.
This case represents the second phase of summary judgment in a suit originally
brought by seventy eight (78)
present and former lieutenants of the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department (the “Department”) seeking compliance with the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq.
(“FLSA” or the “Act”). Plaintiffs claim they are nonexempt employees under the Act and are thus entitled to premium compensation for hours worked in excess of the statutory standards.
In response, defendant, Fair-fax County (“County”), claims that plaintiffs are executive employees exempt from the Act’s overtime requirements.
See
29 U.S.C. § 213; 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.0 to 541.119 (1990).
This matter initially came before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. In
Curtis G. Thomas et al. v. County of Fairfax,
758 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Va.1991) (hereafter
“Thomas
/”) the Court ruled that plaintiffs were not exempt executive employees under the County’s pre-August 24, 1990 payment scheme because they were paid on an hourly, rather than a salary, basis. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs’ motion as to the pre-August 24, 1990 period and denied the County’s motion. The matter is now before the Court with respect to the post-August 24, 1990 period.
For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are not exempt employees because they are not paid on a salary basis under the County’s new payroll system.
II.
Much of the relevant factual background relating to the nature of plaintiffs’ employment relationship with the County is set forth in the Court’s opinion in
Thomas I
and will not be restated here.
See
758 F.Supp. 353. The County’s new payment scheme, however, warrants description. On August 24, 1990, Fairfax County implemented a new county-wide payroll system, the Personnel Resource Information System (“PRISM”) to replace the system previously reviewed by the Court. Under PRISM, each 28-day pay cycle for shift firefighters is broken down into two, biweekly pay periods. In the first biweekly pay period, plaintiffs receive a fixed amount corresponding to payment for 106 hours regardless of the number of hours in “pay status” for that pay period.
But plaintiffs receive this fixed amount only if they do not miss one or more entire 24-hour shifts during this period. If plaintiffs miss one or more entire shifts in the first biweekly pay period, they are paid an amount that equals the number of hours in pay status multiplied by their hourly rate. This means that a lieutenant scheduled for 96 hours (4 shifts), who works all four shifts, is paid the fixed amount, namely 106 hours times the lieutenant's hourly rate.
But a lieutenant who is scheduled to work 96 hours and yet misses a 24-hour shift,
thus working only 72 hours, is only paid for the 72 hours.
In the second biweekly pay period, plaintiffs do not receive a fixed amount. Rather, plaintiffs receive an amount that fluctuates depending on the number of scheduled hours
actually
spent in pay status during the first pay period
and
the number of scheduled hours spent in pay status in the second pay period.
In essence, the County, in the second pay period, simply recoups any overpayment from the first pay period if any plaintiff works fewer than 106 hours or makes up the deficiency from the first pay period if which a plaintiff works more than 106 hours.
PRISM, however, makes no change in plaintiffs’ shift schedules, the calculation of leave benefits, or the method of overtime payment.
See
758 F.Supp. at 364-66. Under PRISM, as under the predecessor system, plaintiffs receive overtime compensation on an hourly basis for hours worked in excess of
scheduled
work hours. As such, if a lieutenant was scheduled for
96 hours in the first pay period, but worked 120 hours, the County would recoup in the second paycheck overpayment for the ten hours paid over the 106 hour fixed level (106-96). Plaintiffs would still receive, however, an overtime payment in the
first paycheck
for the 12 hours of overtime (120-106) worked in this first pay period.
III.
Federal regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) provide a “long” and “short” test for determining whether an employee is a “bona fide executive employee” who is exempt from the overtime provisions of the Act.
See
29 C.F.R. § 541.1. The long test includes five requirements and is designed to apply to employees who earn at least $155 per week.
The short test has fewer requirements and is designed for use with a smaller group of employees, namely those who earn at least $250 per week.
Because it is undisputed that plaintiffs are paid more than $250 a week, the short test applies here. This test provides that employees are bona fide executives if (1) they are compensated for their services on a “salary basis” of $250 or more per week; and (2) they are employed in a managerial capacity — i.e., their primary duty consists of management of the enterprise in which the employees are employed, and they customarily direct the work of two or more other employees.
See 29
C.F.R. § 541.-119(a). Employees are not exempt executives unless it is shown that they fit all of the requirements of this test.
See
758 F.Supp. at 358-59. The Court based its ruling in
Thomas I
chiefly on an examination of the “salary basis” requirement.
See 29
C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1990). As a result, the Court did not reach the sharply disputed question whether the other requirements of the “short test” had been met, namely whether the lieutenant’s job duties were primarily managerial. A similar analysis obtains here.
The central question is whether PRISM provides for plaintiffs to be paid on a “salary basis.”
The pertinent regulation provides, in part, that:
An employee will be considered to be paid “on a salary basis” within the meaning of the regulations if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. Subject to specified exceptions, the employee must receive the full salary for any week in which any work is performed without regard to the number of. days or hours worked, subject also to the general rule that an employee need not be paid for any workweek in which no work is performed.
29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a). The exceptions noted in this definition permit salary deductions:
(1) when the employee absents himself from work for a day or more for personal reasons, other than sickness or accident, 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(2);
(2) for absences of a day or more occasioned by sickness or disability ... if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy, or practice of providing compensation for loss of salary occasioned by both sickness and disability, 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(3); and
(3) for penalties imposed in good faith for major safety violations, 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(5).
But deductions are not permitted for “absences occasioned by the employer or by the operating requirements of the business.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(4).
In
Thomas I,
the Court interpreted this regulation to mean, at a minimum, that á FLSA-exempt executive’s pay must not bear a direct causal relationship to the quality or quantity of the work performed. More specifically, “[i]n the context of the present case, 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) means simply that a lieutenant’s biweekly pay may not be a function of hours worked if it is to fit within the regulation.” 758 F.Supp. at 360.
To be sure, plaintiffs, if
they do not miss one or more shifts, are paid a fixed amount in the first biweekly pay period. Accordingly, there is no direct correlation between hours worked and plaintiffs’ paychecks in this first pay period.
But to look only at the first pay period is too narrow a focus; it is only half the picture and does not tell the full story. The full picture, and a markedly different story, appears when the focus is broadened to include the second pay period. As already noted, a lieutenant’s pay fluctuates in the second pay period depending on the number of hours a lieutenant spent in pay status in
both
the first and second pay periods. There is, therefore, with PRISM as with its predecessor, a fatal causal relationship between hours worked and pay. Nor does it matter that this causal relationship results only from the second biweekly pay period; section 541.118(a) requires that pay be unrelated to quantity of work in “each,” i.e., every, pay period.
In fact, examination of the stipulated examples provided by the parties reveals that plaintiffs’ pay for the
entire
28-day pay cycle can be readily calculated by multiplying the actual number of hours spent in pay status by the hourly rate of pay.
See
Table I,
supra,
note 8. This is a clear indication that plaintiffs pay is causally connected to, and' varies with, the number of hours worked. Thus, the County ultimately fails to demonstrate that under PRISM plaintiffs are “plainly and unmistakably within [the] terms and spirit” of the executive exemption. .
See Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc.,
361 U.S. 388, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960);
Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co.,
359 U.S. 290, 295-96, 79 S.Ct. 756, 759, 3 L.Ed.2d 815 (1959).
This conclusion is not undermined by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, Local
134
v. Atlanta,
920 F.2d 800 (11th Cir.1991). There, the court held that fire captains paid on a cyclical basis were salaried, and thus qualified for the Act’s administrative overtime pay exemption. The County argues that because the payment scheme at issue in that case is analytically indistinguishable from the County’s pre-August 24, 1990 system, plaintiffs must,
a fortiori,
be held to be paid on a salary basis under PRISM. This argument is unconvincing.
To be sure, the pay schemes at issue in
Atlanta Professional Firefighters
and in.
Thomas I
both involve systems in which firefighters are paid for scheduled hours worked each pay period plus overtime at an hourly rate for hours worked in
excess of scheduled hours. But while the court in
Atlanta Professional Firefighters
quotes the “salary basis” definition set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a), it ignores all relevant authority and offers no analysis of why the fire captains’ fluctuating pay was not “subject to reduction” because of variations in the number of hours worked. Instead, the entire salary basis portion of the opinion is based on the following statement:
As the district court noted, however, the Union presented no evidence to prove that any captain ever suffered a reduction in pay for any of the reasons stated. Accordingly, we conclude that the City has demonstrated that a captain’s pay is not subject to reduction because of the quality or quantity of work.
920 F.2d at 805. This is unpersuasive. To begin with, the court’s conclusion is inconsistent with the plain language of § 541.-118(a), which simply provides that an employee is not salaried if his or her salary is
“subject to
reduction” because of variations in the quality or quantity of work. The regulation does not require an employee to show any
actual
reduction. For this reason,
Atlanta Professional Firefighters
is contrary to the express terms of the regulation and the clear weight of authority. For example, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that
The dispositive factor is that under the County’s policy, the employee’s pay is at all times
“subject to
” deductions for tardiness or other occurrences____ Section 541.118(a) does not require that a deduction for an absence of less than a day
actually
have been made, but only that an employee’s pay be
“subject to
” such a deduction.
Abshire v. County of Kern,
908 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir.1990) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted),
cert. denied,
— U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 785, 112 L.Ed.2d 848 (1991).
See also Banks v. North Little Rock,
708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no showing of actual deductions needed);
Hawks v. Newport News,
707 F.Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.Va.1988) (fact that policy of reducing pay is not applied to plaintiffs does not alter policy itself);
Persons v. Gresham,
704 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D.Or.1988) (fact that employees did not allege actual instances of pay reduction does not alter fact that pay was “subject to” such deductions);
D’Camera v. District of Columbia,
693 F.Supp. 1208, 1212 (D.D.C.1988) (test is whether pay is “subject to” a deduction, not the frequency with which pay is actually reduced);
Knecht v. Redwood City,
683 F.Supp. 1307 (N.D.Cal.1987) (same).
Here, as was the case in
Thomas I,
plaintiffs’ paychecks are clearly “subject to reduction” in variation with the number of hours worked.
As a result, neither PRISM nor its predecessor pays plaintiffs on a “salary basis” as defined by § 541.-118(a).
Significantly, nothing inherent in the nature of firefighting precludes firefighters from being paid an equal, fixed amount every pay period.
See e.g., Keller v. City of Columbus, Ind.,
778 F.Supp. 1480 (S.D.Ind.1991) (holding that firefighters paid on “salary basis” where paychecks determined by dividing yearly salary by number of pay periods). Given this, PRISM, because it makes total pay a function to some extent of total hours worked, invites the inference that the County seeks to encourage plaintiffs’ attendance on their shifts by correlating their total pay with scheduled hours worked. This is in sharp contrast, for example, to paying plaintiffs twenty six equal biweekly paychecks per year. Neither of the parties, despite being accorded several opportunities to do so, has offered any other persuasive rationale that explains PRISM.
While both the pre-August 24, 1990 and PRISM systems may provide an additional stimulus for the lieutenants’ attendance during their shifts, this stimulus is antithetical to the concept of a bona fide executive. The Third Circuit reached precisely this conclusion in
Brock.
That case involved a payment scheme that provided a guaranteed minimum payment plus “additional" compensation that varied with the number of hours worked. The court stated that the additional compensation,
If an incentive at all, ... does not encourage the [employee] to make better use of his time, but only to work more hours. Such encouragement is inconsis
tent both with salary payment and executive employment.
846 F.2d at 185.
The County’s shift to PRISM also fails to provide a convincing basis on which to conclude that plaintiffs are paid on a salary basis because the parties agree that PRISM made no change in most aspects of the County’s pay system. In
Thomas I,
the Court noted that the obvious inference to be drawn from the variations in the lieutenants’ biweekly paychecks was supplemented by several indicia of hourly status, including (i) the fact that the County schedules plaintiffs for a fixed annual number of work hours, (ii) the County’s practice of providing plaintiffs with “overtime” pay at an hourly rate for hours worked beyond their regularly scheduled time, and (iii) the County’s practice of docking certain lieutenants one hour of leave during the transition to daylight savings time.
See
758 F.Supp. at 364-66. The PRISM system eliminates none of these supplemental factors. As the Court noted in
Thomas I,
these features, while not alone determinative, are inconsistent with payment on a “salary basis.”
Id.
V.
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are not paid on a “salary basis” and therefore are not subject to the bona fide executive exemption under the FLSA. Although PRISM comes closer than its predecessor in paying plaintiffs on a salary basis, it still fails to satisfy the County’s burden of rebutting the “presumption of coverage” established by the FLSA.
See Schultz v. W.R. Hartin & Son, Inc.,
428 F.2d 186, 189 (4th Cir.1970);
see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 188, 196-97, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2229, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (burden of proving exemption’s application on employer);
Powell v. United States Cartridge Co.,
339 U.S. 497, 516, 70 S.Ct. 755, 765, 94 L.Ed. 1017 (1950) (“breadth of coverage” is “vital to [the Act’s] mission”). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and awards retroactive overtime pay for the post-August 24, 1990 period.
An appropriate order will issue.