Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co.

91 F. 202, 12 Ohio F. Dec. 271, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2610
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Ohio
DecidedDecember 14, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 91 F. 202 (Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 91 F. 202, 12 Ohio F. Dec. 271, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2610 (circtsdoh 1898).

Opinion

TAFT, Circuit Judge.

The receiver appointed under the general creditors’ bill herein has been operating the railroad of the defendant company since March 18, 1893. By the 12th of January, 1899, when he pays the quarterly rental due at that time, he will have paid in money into the treasury of the city of Cincinnati $5,970,000, and to the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Bailway $72,000, or $6,042,000 in all. Nothing will then be due for rent from the defendant company to the city. In addition to this, he has expended ‘large sums from his earnings in improving the condition of the [203]*203railroad, in accordance witli the obligations of the lease. In October of this year he reported to the court that after deducting from the funds in his hands what was then due the city for rent on October 12ih, and what was due to creditors of the receiver for current debts contracted in his operation of the road, he would have on hand $90,000 surplus for distribution to creditors of the defendant company, as the court might order. I am glad to be able to say that I am now advised by the receiver that upon January 1st next he will increase this surplus by $110,000, making a fund of $200,000 for distribution to other creditors; and the question is: How shall this fund be distributed? I have discussed, in considering the exceptions to the master’s report, how the proceeds of the sale of the leasehold a,nd the rolling stock of the defendant company must be distributed; but it remains to- be decided whether a different rule shall be followed in distributing the net earnings.

It is contended that the net earnings must be distributed equally between all the creditors. It is said that there is a marked difference between the distribution of the proceeds of sale of all the property of the defendant company, and of the present fund, in that here the trustees are making no claim for rent under their mortgage, or their leasehold lien. It is argued that neither the eleventh section of the Kentucky enabling act of February 13, 1872, nor the general Tennessee railroad act of March 24, 1877 (upon' which the judgment creditors of Kentucky and Tennessee found their claim of priority, and which I have set forth and discussed in an opinion filed to-day [91 Fed. 195] upon the master’s report), secures to the judgment creditors of the class therein favored any specific lien; that these- acts only postpone or invalidate mortgage priorities asserted; and that, when no mortgage priority is asserted, then there is nothing upon which such judgments may be preferred to other claims, whether in judgment or not. It is further contended that the benefit secured to judgments of the favored class by these acts is only to be enjoyed after such judgments have been made effective liens by the levy of execution and that not until then caK mortgagees and other creditors be postponed to such judgments.

At the hearing I was much impressed with the weight of these suggestions, and was inclined to order an equal distribution. I was the more persuaded of the correctness of these arguments because the court of appeals of this circuit had expressly decided that the Tennessee act of March 24, 1877 (and the Kentucky act is quite similar in this respect), does not give to judgments of the favored class such a lien, attaching to the property of the railroad company, as to follow it into the hands of a grantee for value without notice. Railroad Co. v. Evans, 31 U. S. App. 432, 14 C. C. A. 116, and 66 Fed. 809; Guarantee Co. v. Hofstetter, 29 C. C. A. 35, 85 Fed. 75. On careful reflection I am convinced that my first impression was wrong, and that the judgments favored by the Kentucky and Tennessee laws must be first paid in full out of this net-earning fund. There is nothing in the decisions of the court of appeals referred to from which it is to be inferred that the priority over mortgage liens accorded to such judgments may not operate in the distribution of the assets of a rail[204]*204way corporation upon a general creditors’ bill, in which such judgments and mortgage debts are both set v. with precisely the same effect as if the statute had given a specific lien. But for this general creditors’ bill, these judgments in Tennessee might have been enforced by execution and sale of the rolling stock in that state, and, if the rolling stock did not suffice, then by execution and sale of so much of the leasehold interest as has a situs there; and such sales would have been free from any mortgage or other lien of the trustees for rent. The Tennessee proportion of the rolling stock and leasehold I have already found in a former opinion to be 137/sss of the whole. In Kentucky the favored judgments might have been enforced by execution and sale of the rolling stock in the state, free from any mortgage or other lien of the trustees for rent. The Kentucky proportion of the rolling stock I have already found to be 19 7/33 s of the whole.

Now, a creditors’ bill is merely an equitable levy and execution, for the benefit of all creditors, secured and unsecured, and the question of priority is to be settled in the same manner as if execution at law had been levied, at precisely the same time, as upon judgments duly rendered, for all claims found by the court to be just. By such an equitable levy and execution as the filing of this bill and the seizure of the property, therefore, the judgments in Tennessee and Kentucky of the favored class are given a priority, very like that of a senior lien, over the trustees’ lien, upon the property of the defendant company in those states, and the trustees have a lien prior to the lien of all the other creditors. The surplus of earnings from the operation of the railroad property, over and above the cost of operating, belongs to the creditors for whose benefit the creditors’ bill has been filed, in the same order of priority as must be preserved upon principles of equity in the distribution of the proceeds of the property operated upon sale. This must be so. Otherwise, the operation of the property could not be for the equal benefit of all creditors.

It follows, therefore, that' because, out of the proceeds of sale of 187/33s of the leasehold and roiling stock of the defendant company, the Tennessee creditors must be paid, prior to mortgage or lien claims of the trustees for rent and to all other claims, they must be accorded the same priority in respect of that same proportion of the net earnings. Now, the net earnings of this property have approximated $6,000,000 since the receivership began. The trustees have been paid their rent out of this, it is true; but, in considering the equities of the present distribution, we must assume the amounts already paid for rent as part of the fund here for distribution. The Tennessee judgment creditors of the favored class are entitled to have appropriated, out of this fund of $6,000,000, 137/s3s of the same to pay their claims. As the claims amount only to a little more than $12,000, this would certainly satisfy their claims in full. Without withholding any rent from the trustees, this can be paid out of the $200,000 now on hand for distribution. The judgment claims must be paid, with interest down to the date of distribution, which, for convenience, will be fixed as of January 3, 1899.

The distribution to the Kentucky judgment creditors of the favored •class is the same, though the question as to them is a little different, [205]*205in this: Their priority extends only to the rolling stock, and not also to the leasehold estate, as did the priority of the Tennessee judgments. Upon the leasehold in Kentucky the trustees have a first and best lien for their rent.

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Bluebook (online)
91 F. 202, 12 Ohio F. Dec. 271, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2610, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-cincinnati-n-o-t-p-ry-co-circtsdoh-1898.