The opinion of the court was delivered by
Nuss, J.:
This case concerns a dispute about automobile liability insurance. While fleeing police, Melissa Gutierrez lost control of the car she was driving at a high rate of speed, killing her and passenger Ramon Sanchez and injuring passenger Victor Reyes. In a declaratory judgment action, Reyes and Rene Thomas, as parent and natural guardian of minors and heirs at law of Sanchez, sought a ruling that Gutierrez’ Benchmark Insurance Company policy provided coverage. The district court entered summary judgment against Benchmark; a divided panel of our Court of Appeals reversed in Thomas v. Benchmark Ins. Co., 36 Kan. App. 2d 409, 140 P.3d 438 (2006). We granted review; our jurisdiction is pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(b).
The issues on appeal, and our accompanying holdings, are as follows:
1. Does the policy’s intentional act exclusion bar coverage? Yes.
2. Does the illegal act exclusion bar coverage? Moot.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed; the judgment of the district court is reversed.
FACTS
On November 8, 2003, Victor Reyes, Ramon Sanchez, and Melissa Gutierrez entered a pub in Overland Park. After consuming alcohol, Reyes and Sanchez became involved in a fight that moved [920]*920outside. Eventually, Sanchez and Reyes got into Gutierrez’ car, with Sanchez in the front passenger seat and Reyes in the back. Sanchez then pulled a handgun and, when the car was moving, fired approximately 10 times in the general direction of a group of six or seven people. Once Sanchez’ gun was empty, Gutierrez drove away.
A police officer observed the car traveling north on Interstate 35 in excess of 80 miles per hour. While attempting to catch the car, the officer next spotted it on Interstate 635. After the officer activated his lights, Sanchez threw the gun out of the car. Eventually, Gutierrez pulled onto the highway shoulder. After the officer stopped and backup arrived, both officers exited their cars. But before Gutierrez could be ordered from the car, she drove away. According to Reyes, Gutierrez took off despite protest from both passengers.
The officer lost sight of Gutierrez’ car as it exited Interstate 635 onto Shawnee Drive. While proceeding on Shawnee Drive, Gutierrez lost control; her car flipped several times and Sanchez was thrown from the car. Gutierrez and Sanchez died, and Reyes, who was wearing a seatbelt, survived with several injuries.
Reyes and Rene Thomas (Plaintiffs) filed a declaratory judgment action against Benchmark Insurance Company seeking a determination of the parties’ rights under the automobile liability policy issued to Gutierrez. Benchmark responded that insurance coverage was barred due to (1) the criminal conduct of the driver and passengers—the “illegal act exclusion”—and (2) the intentional conduct of Gutierrez—the “intentional act” exclusion.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The parties later stipulated to the facts as provided in the police records, which included a statement given by Reyes to police in the early morning hours of November 9, 2003, for the limited purpose of the summary judgment motion.
After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs. The court concluded that the illegal act exclusion did not apply but did not address the intentional act exclusion.
A majority panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that Gutierrez’ excessive speeding prohibited recov[921]*921eiy under the intentional act exclusion. Thomas v. Benchmark Ins. Co., 36 Kan. App. 2d 409, 421, 140 P.3d 438 (2006). The majority also agreed with the district court that the policy’s “illegal act” exclusion did not apply. Judge Bukaty dissented from the majority’s conclusion that Gutierrez’ intentional conduct precluded coverage under the policy. 36 Kan. App. 2d at 426-31.
Plaintiffs petitioned for review, and Benchmark cross-petitioned; this court granted review. More facts will be provided as necessary to the analysis.
ANALYSIS
Issue 1; The intentional act exclusion bars coverage.
Standard of Review
The parties stipulated to the facts as provided in the police records for the limited purpose of the summary judgment motion. Moreover, we must interpret the insurance contract. Our review is therefore de novo. See Roy v. Young, 278 Kan. 244, 247, 93 P.3d 712 (2004) (Where there is no factual dispute, appellate review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.); see Marshall v. Kansas Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 276 Kan. 97, 111, 73 P.3d 120 (2003) (Review of the interpretation of insurance contracts is unlimited.).
Arguments
According to the Benchmark policy’s initial grant of coverage, Benchmark agreed to pay: “damages for bodily injury or property damage for which you or any family member becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.” The policy defined an auto accident as “an unexpected and unintended event that causes bodily injury or property damage and arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an auto or other motor vehicle.”
After the policy’s initial grant of coverage, it excluded, among other things, “bodily injury caused intentionally by you or any family member or at your or any family member’s direction.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs argue that the Court of Appeals majority erred in reversing the district court’s summary judgment order on the basis of this intentional act exclusion. While they admit [922]*922Gutierrez drove recklessly or wantonly and at excessive speeds, they assert that her loss of vehicle control was not intentional. Plaintiffs claim that under the majority’s rationale, an insurance company could simply deny coverage any time a wreck occurred if the driver committed a traffic violation, e.g., speeding.
As we understand Benchmark’s response, it takes no issue with the initial grant of coverage; rather, it simply argues that this intentional act exclusion barred coverage otherwise existing because the wreck and injuries were “natural and probable consequences” of Gutierrez’ intentional act of driving at an excessive rate of speed. It cites, inter alia, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Falley, 23 Kan. App. 2d 21,926 P.2d 664 (1996), rev. denied 261 Kan. 1086 (1997). Benchmark has the burden to demonstrate that the exclusion applies. See Buchanan v. Employer’s Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 201 Kan. 666, Syl. ¶ 2, 443 P.2d 681 (1968).
Relying upon its interpretation of this court’s prior decisions, the Court of Appeals majority felt obligated to apply the natural and probable consequences test. It determined that the injuries were intentionally caused and therefore excluded coverage. 36 Kan. App. 2d at 418. The dissent essentially urged application of a test that required Gutierrez to have intended both the act and to cause some kind of injuiy or damage.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a review is in order.
Review
Kansas public policy prohibits insurance coverage for intentional acts: “[A]n individual should not be exempt from the financial consequences of his own intentional injury to another.” Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17, 28, 804 P.2d 1374 (1991); see Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 686, 512 P.2d 403 (1973)-. Consequently, die legislature has authorized motor vehicle liability insurers to exclude coverage “for any damages from an intentional act.” See K.S.A. 40-3107(i)(6). Such exclusionary clauses should be narrowly construed against the insurer. See Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 Kan. 317, 327, 961 P.2d 1213 (1998).
[923]*923“In a certain sense, all acts are intentional, save perhaps for involuntary muscle spasms.” Dykes, Occurrences, Accidents, and Expectations: A Primer of These (and Some Other) Insurance-Law Concepts, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 831, 846-47 (2003). See Falk v. Whitewater, 65 Wis. 2d 83, 221 N.W.2d 915 (1974) (Almost ah negligent conduct is composed of individual intentional components.). Accordingly, a distinction is drawn between intentional acts and the intent to cause injury. See Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co., 89 Wis. 2d 703, 278 N.W.2d 898 (1979) (An intentional act is a separate legal consideration and must be distinguished from the intent to cause injury.) (citing Falk v. Whitewater, 65 Wis. 2d 83, 221 N.W.2d 915 [1974]). Kansas recognizes, for example, that an intentional act may nevertheless result in unintended injury. See Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. at 687.
The parties agree upon Gutierrez’ intentional acts, e.g, driving her car at an excessive speed. Accordingly, we are concerned with the second step of the Kansas intentional act exclusion analysis: whether, through her intentional acts, she intentionally caused the injuries. If so, coverage is excluded. Short of direct evidence of Gutierrez’ intent to cause injury, i.e., through her testimonial admission, her intent to cause injury may be inferred. In Kansas, intent to cause injury may be inferred if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of her intentional acts. Particularly because the facts are stipulated to, we may make this intentional injury determination as a matter of law. See Roy v. Young, 278 Kan. at 247 (where there is no factual dispute, appellate review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo); Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991) (whether defendant intended to injure plaintiff is matter of law based upon undisputed facts).
In Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 554, 867 P.2d 325 (1994), we stated that the natural and probable consequences approach had been developed in a series of cases, beginning with Rankin v. Farmers Elevator Mutual Insurance Company, 393 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1968). In Rankin, the driver of a pickup truck, after unsuccessfully trying to stop a motorcyclist traveling alongside, inten[924]*924tionally turned his truck into the motorcyclist. The trucker argued that his insurance carrier’s coverage for the motorcyclist’s injuries was not excluded by a clause whose operative language was virtually identical to the instant case: excluding liability for “bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.” 393 F.2d 719. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, stating:
“Here the driver of a track, while traveling at a speed of fifty miles an hour alongside of a motorcycle going in the same direction at the same speed, deliberately and purposefully threw his truck against the motorcycle and its rider. Persons are presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts. State v. Gordon, 151 Kan. 932, 101 P.2d 888 [1940].” (Emphasis added.) 393 F.2d at 720.
The Tenth Circuit concluded:
“The serious injury of the rider of the motorcycle was a consequence of the deliberate collision and should have been expected and hence intended.
“. . . Where an intentional act results in injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of the act, the injuries, as well as the act, are intentional. See Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., La. App., 169 So. 2d 170 [1964].” (Emphasis added.) 393 F.2d at 720.
Since the Rankin decision in 1968, Kansas appellate courts have faithfully applied its “natural and probable consequences” test to various “intentional act exclusions” and have usually excluded coverage. One frequently addressed clause has provided exclusion from liability for “bodily injury . . . which is either expected or intended from tire standpoint of the insured.” (Emphasis added.) Apparently, the first Kansas appellate decision to apply the Rankin test to this particular exclusion was Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Thomas, 7 Kan. App. 2d 718, 647 P.2d 1361, rev. denied 231 Kan. 799 (1982). There, a homeowner shot a partygoer in the face at close range with a pistol. After reviewing the arguments, the Thomas court held that “[t]he better rule is found in Rankin, where it was held that where an intentional act results in injuries which are a natural and probable result of the act, the injuries are intentional.” It excluded tire plaintiff s injury from coverage. 7 Kan. App. 2d at 721.
[925]*925Similarly, the following year in Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461, 674 P.2d 468 (1983), this court excluded coverage under this same “expected or intended” clause because the injury to the plaintiffs eye was the “natural and probable consequence” of playing a game where a playmate repeatedly shot at him with a BB gun. Relying upon Thomas, which in turn relied upon Rankin, the court held at 234 Kan. 461, Syl. ¶ 2: “[W]here an intentional act results in injuries which are a natural and probable result of the act, the injuries are intentional.” See Spivey v. Safeco Ins. Co., 254 Kan. 237, 865 P.2d 182 (1993) (test applied to claims of assault, battery, and infliction of emotional distress and bodily harm; coverage excluded under same clause); Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 867 P.2d 325 (1994) (test applied to shooting shotgun at occupied cab of pickup; coverage excluded under same clause); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17, 28, 804 P.2d 1374 (1991) (jury instructions not clearly erroneous in school shooting case that provided shooter “would be presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions”); see also First Financial Ins. Co. v. Bugg, 265 Kan. 690, 704, 962 P.2d 515 (1998) (Kansas has “adopted the natural and probable consequences test.”). In none of these cases did this court address whether there is a distinction between these two terms contained in the intentional act exclusion clause—“expected” or “intended.”
Another “intentional act” exclusion clause has excluded liability for “any damages arising from an intentional act.” In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Falley, 23 Kan. App. 2d 21, 926 P.2d 664 (1996), rev. denied 261 Kan. 1086 (1997), the court addressed this particular clause and held that the Rankin natural and probable consequences test should be applied to determine whether coverage was excluded, i.e., because the plaintiffs injury was the “natural and probable consequence” of the insured’s intentionally driving his car with the plaintiff spread-eagled on the hood.
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed yet another “intentional act” exclusion clause in Freightquote v. Hartford Cas. Ins., 397 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2005). That particular clause excluded coverage for “ ‘[pjersonal and advertising injury arising out of an offense committed by, at the direction of or with the [926]*926consent or acquiescence of the insured with the expectation of inflicting personal and advertising injury’ (the intentional act exclusion clause).” (Emphasis added.) 397 F.3d at 891. Citing Spivey and Harris—“ ‘[w]here an intentional act results in injuries which are a natural and probable result of the act, the injuries are intentional’ ”—the court applied Rankins test to a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations and excluded coverage. 397 F.3d at 893-94.
The Rankin test represents a minority approach. As the Court of Appeals majority in the instant case suggests, citing Jeriy, Understanding Insurance Law § 63C (3d ed. 2002), three different views regarding intent have developed. Under one minority view (“minority view—negligence”), the classic tort doctrine of looking to the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s act determines intent. As Jerry explains, if the intentional act by the insured results in injuries or damage that are a natural and probable result of the act, the loss is intentional for purposes of the exclusion and no coverage exists. This approach, the Kansas approach, yields the narrowest coverage and the most pro-insurer results. See Understanding Insurance Law, § 63C, p. 483; 36 Kan. App. 2d at 417.
Under the majority view, the insured must have intended both the act and to cause some kind of injury or damage. Intent can be actual, or intent to cause the injury or damage can be inferred from the nature of the act and the foreseeability that harm would result. It is not essential, however, that the harm be of the same character and magnitude as that intended. See Understanding Insurance Law, § 63C, p. 483; 36 Kan. App. 2d at 417.
A third, minority approach (“minority view—intent”) provides the broadest coverage and the fewest pro-insurer results and represents the opposite end of the continuum from the Kansas approach. Under this view, for the exclusion to apply the insured must have had the specific intent not only to injure but also to cause the particular type of injury suffered. See Jerry, § 63C, p. 483; 36 Kan. App. 2d at 417. Kansas has expressly rejected the “specific intent” approach. See Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. at 555.
Critique of the Rankin test
Kansas’ minority approach started with Rankin, which was based upon a 1940 Kansas criminal case, State v. Gordon, 151 Kan. 932, [927]*927101 P.2d 888 (1940), and a 1964 Louisiana case, Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 170 (La. 1964). Gordon, a manslaughter case, is of marginal support. It simply addressed the difference between “design” and “intent” in a criminal context, holding that design carries with it an idea of a plan, a scheme, or deliberate purpose, while intent does not necessarily do so. Accordingly, die court held: “While persons of sound mind are ordinarily presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts, it does not follow that design to effect the result is thereby presumed to exist.” 151 Kan. at 932.
In Wigginton, an angry Louisiana driver revved his car engine and backed into a taxicab parked behind him, injuring the cab driver s hand. Although as a civil case it may be more relevant than the Gordon criminal case, Wigginton is also marginally supportive because the court made no mention of “natural and probable consequences.” It merely held that “[ujnder the facts disclosed by evidence in this case there is no question but that the injury was caused intentionally by the insured Millard. He knew the car was back of him and he chose to deliberately back into it.” Gordon, 169 So. 2d at 171. Accordingly, the court held that the following policy exclusion barred coverage: “ ‘[T]o bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.’ ” Gordon, 169 So. 2d at 171.
In Rankin itself, the truck driver’s conduct was clearly intentional, and the chances of it causing injury were virtually certain: swerving a truck into a motorcycle while both vehicles are moving at 50 m.p.h. The lowest of the three standards discussed by Jerry to be met by an insurance company to exclude coverage for an intentional injury—“natural and probable consequences” of the act—was therefore easily met. When measured against this lowest standard, the same can be said for the shootings in Williams— where a rifle and pistol-wielding student shot and killed a principal and wounded several others in school—and probably said for the shootings in Thomas, Bell and Harris. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has found that similar shootings have met that court’s higher “intentional injury” standard: “when the nature and circumstances of the insured’s act [are] such that harm [is] substantially [928]*928certain to result.” See Woida v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1981) (court inferred intent to cause injury where the insured made a plan with others to fire shots at a truck he knew to be occupied and fired several shots at the truck with a rifle).
In short, aside from the possible exception of Spivey, this court has rarely, if ever, been faced with “less severe” facts than the shootings in Thomas, Bell, Harris, and Williams. Accordingly, this court has not really needed to consider alternative approaches to Rankin’s natural and probable consequences test for determining whether an injuiy was intentionally caused.
In our view, the present facts clearly are less severe than the actions of truck driver Rankin and the 14-year-old shooter in Williams who shot at least three people in his school hallway. They are arguably less severe than the shootings in Thomas, Bell, and Harris. As a result, we have been presented with an opportunity to consider the continued efficacy of the Rankin natural and probable consequences test.
We begin by observing that in another context, this court has defined “natural and probable consequences” as follows:
“Natural and probable consequences are those which human foresight can anticipate because they happen so frequently they may be expected to recur, while possible consequences are those which happen so infrequently that they are not expected to happen again.” (Emphasis added.) Rowell v. City of Wichita, 162 Kan. 294, 302, 176 P.2d 590 (1947).
We next observe that the possibility of confusion exists because “natural and probable consequences” is a phrase used to describe not only our test for determining whether an injury is intentional, but also, as in Rowell, to determine proximate cause in the simple negligence context:
“A rule often stated is that the test of proximate cause is that which determines an injury to be the proximate result of negligence only where the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act, an additional condition sometimes stated being that it must appear the injury was anticipated or that it reasonably should have been foreseen by the person sought to be charged with liability. [Citations omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) Rowell, 162 Kan. at 302.
[929]*929A closely related problem with the natural and probable consequences approach for determining whether an injury was intentionally caused is its confusion with the concept of foreseeability: “[njatural and probable consequences are those which human foresight can anticipate” or “should have been foreseen.” 162 Kan. at 302. If foreseeability of injury alone were enough to activate the policy exclusion, then many acts of mere negligence would be excluded. We should hesitate to read “intentional act exclusion” clauses to exclude both intentional and negligent acts, or else virtually all insurance coverage would be excluded. Cf. Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Tool, 309 Minn. 169, 176, 244 N.W.2d 121 (1976) (Defining exclusionary clause’s “expected injury” as a foreseeable injury would have the effect of unduly hmiting coverage under a liability insurance policy since foreseeability is generally an essential element in establishing liability. Foreseeability could include an injury resulting from simple negligence. Therefore, “ ‘an expected injury’ as that term is used in an insurance exclusionary clause cannot be equated with foreseeable injury.”); cf. Poston v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 107 Wis. 2d 215, 222, 320 N.W.2d 9 (1981) (same) (If foreseeability of injury alone were enough to activate the policy exclusion, then many acts of mere negligence would be excluded. To so broaden the exclusion to exclude foreseeable injuries is unjustified.).
As one commentator has elaborated upon the problems:
“In a certain sense, all acts are intentional, save perhaps for involuntary muscle spasms. Thus, if taken literally, a proscription against coverage for the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s acts would eliminate almost all insurance coverage, because an ‘act’ (inadvertently leaving a candle burning at a neighbor’s home while house-sitting) can be negligent, and the ‘natural and probable consequences’ (the resulting house fire) are just what insurance is supposed to protect against. An older string of disconcerting Tenth Circuit cases shows how far afield a literal application of the ‘natural and probable consequences’ test can take us from the purpose of the insurance bargain.” (Emphasis added.) Dykes, Occurrences, Accidents, and Expectations: A Primer of These (and Some Other) Insurance-Law Concepts, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 831, 846-47 (2003).
In one decision from the “older string of disconcerting Tenth Circuit cases,” that court candidly discusses the confusion caused by its past approach to identifying accidents which was “based upon [930]*930the underlying maxim that everyone is constructively held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts; and, that which is intended or anticipated cannot be accidental.” Hutchinson Water Co. v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1957). Under this rationale, if the damage was the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, then the damage was foreseeable, and therefore not accidental. On the other hand, if the damage was the unexpected, hence unforeseen result of the negligent act, it may have been an accident, but there was no liability under the policy for the negligence. The court conceded the problem its approach created: “In either instance, the insurer would be free of coverage and the policy would be rendered meaningless.” 250 F.2d at 894.
Modifying Rankin
The time has come to begin moving away from the problems caused by the Rankin test’s consideration of all injuries which are the “natural and probable” result of any intentional act as being “intentional” and therefore barred by “intentional act” or “intentional injuiy” exclusions.
With this mission in mind, we observe that this court has previously used language which places a higher burden on the insurance company attempting to meet the intentional act exclusion. In Bell v. Tilton, our first decision which appeared to adopt the Rankin natural and probable consequences test (see 234 Kan. 461, Syl. ¶ 2), the body of the opinion actually stated as follows:
“[I]t was not necessaiy for the garnishee insurance company to show [the shooter] specifically intended to strike [the victim] in the eye with a BB pellet in order to deny liability. Rather, if from the acts, circumstances and inferences of the case, it appeared [the shooter] had [1] the desire to cause the consequences of his acts or [2] he believed the consequences were substantially certain to result, his conduct was intentional and the policy exclusion was operative.” (Emphasis added.) 234 Kan. at 472.
Although Bell cited no reference for this holding, the language is virtually identical to that contained in § 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) to define “intent”:
[931]*931“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote that the actor [1] desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that [2] he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result in it.”
Comment a to § 8A provides:
“ ‘Intent,’ as it is used throughout the Restatement of Torts, has reference to the consequences of an act rather than the act itself. When an actor fires the gun in the midst of the Mojave Desert, he intends to pull the trigger; but when the bullet hits a person who is present in the desert without the actor’s knowledge, he does not intend that result. ‘Intent’ is limited, where it is used, to the consequences of the act.”
Comment b provides further:
“All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended, as the word is used in this Restatement. Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.
“As the probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor’s conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness, as defined in § 500. As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence, as defined in § 282. All three have their important place in the law of torts, but the liability attached to them will differ.” (Emphasis added.)
Other courts have adopted approaches consistent with § 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. When considering intentional act exclusions of a liability policy in Minnesota,
“die intent to injure may be established: (1) by proof of an actual intent to injure or (2) by inferring intent as a matter of law. . . . The general rule is that intent is inferred as a matter of law ‘when the nature and circumstances of the insured’s act [are] such that harm [is] substantially certain to result.’ ” (Emphasis added.) B.M.B. v. State Farm Fire and Cos. Co., 664 N.W.2d 817, 821-22 (Minn. 2003).
The Minnesota court has correctly acknowledged that its “substantial certainty” is a higher standard than “natural and probable consequence.” As it stated in American Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 613 (Minn. 2001): “The mere fact that the harm was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the insured’s action is not enough to infer intent to injure.” See also Lewis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 730 So. 2d 65, 68 (Miss. 1998) (When addressing whether an intentional acts exclusion precludes coverage, “[i]n Mississippi, [932]*932‘[an] act is intentional if the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.’ ”); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Muff, 851 A.2d 919, 927-28 (Pa. Super. 2004) (For purposes of an exclusionary clause’s “ ‘expected or intended’ provision, ‘an insured intends an injury if he desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowing that such consequences were substantially certain to result.’ ”); Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 460 (3d Cir. 1993) (same).
Similarly, in Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150, 168-69, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991), the Wisconsin Supreme Court used language reminiscent of this court’s language in Bell when it stated:
“In Wisconsin, an intentional-acts exclusion precludes insurance coverage only where the insured acts intentionally and intends some harm or injury to follow from the act. [Citations omitted.] An insured intends to injure or harm another if he ‘intend[s] the consequences of his act, or belieoe[s] that they are substantially certain to follow.’ Pachucki [v. Republic Ins. Co.,] 89 Wis. 2d [703] at 710, 278 N.W.2d 898 [1979] (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 8A at 15 [1965]). In other words, intent may be actual (a subjective standard) or inferred by the nature of the insured’s intentional act (an objective standard). Pachucki, 89 Wis. 2d at 709. Therefore, an intentional-acts exclusion precludes insurance coverage where an intentional act is substantially certain to produce injury even if the insured asserts, honestly or dishonestly, that the did not intend any harm. [Citation omitted.] As Professor Prosser commented:
‘Intent, however, is broader than a desire to bring about physical results. It must extend not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what he does. . . . The man who fires a bullet into a dense crowd may fervently pray that he will hit no one, but since he must believe and know that he cannot avoid doing so, he intends it. The practical application of this principle has meant that where a reasonable man in the defendant’s position would believe that a particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with by the jury, or even by the court, as though he had intended it.’ [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.)
The Loveridge court continued with a reference to its Pachucki decision, also reminiscent of our Bell decision:
“Furthermore, the exclusion precludes coverage even if the harm that occurs is different in character or magnitude from that intended by the insured. [Citations omitted.] For example, in Pachucki, we held that an intentional-acts exclusion precluded insurance coverage for severe eye injuries even though the insured subjectively intended only to sting the plaintiff by firing a greening pin [similar to [933]*933shooting paper clips with rubber bands] at his body. Pachucki, 89 Wis. 2d at 712.” 161 Wis. 2d at 169.
In Bell, plaintiff argued that because the shooter testified he did not have the specific intent to injure plaintiff s eye when he fired die BB gun at plaintiff s face, then the injuiy was not intentional. In rejecting this argument, this court stated: “[T]he act of shooting another in the face with a BB pellet is one which is recognized as an act so certain to cause a particular kind of harm it can be said an actor who performed the act intended the resulting harm, and his statement to the contrary does nothing to refute that rule of law.” 234 Kan. at 471.
Finally, the Loveridge court fully acknowledged the lack of scientific precision with this approach:
“There is no bright-line rule to determine when intent to injure should be inferred as a matter of law. Rather, each set of facts: ‘must be considered on a case-by-case basis; the more likely harm is to result from certain intentional conduct, the more likely intent to harm may be inferred as a matter of law.’ [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) 161 Wis. 2d at 169-70.
Based upon these authorities, we conclude that the “intentional act” or “intentional injuiy” exclusion test in Kansas should be as follows:
The insured must have intended both the act and to cause some kind of injuiy or damage. Intent to cause the injury or damage can be actual or it can be inferred from the nature of the act when the consequences are substantially certain to result from the act.
It is not essential, however, that the harm be of the same character and magnitude as that intended. See Understanding Insurance Law, § 63C p. 483; Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150 (exclusion precludes coverage even if the harm that occurs is different in character or magnitude from that intended by the insured); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461 (shooter argued that because he testified he did not have the specific intent to injure plaintiff s eye when he fired the BB gun at plaintiff s face, then injury was not as a matter of law “intentional”; court held it was not necessary for insurance company to show the shooter specifically intended to strike the victim in the eye with a BB pellet, if from facts it [934]*934appeared shooter believed consequences were substantially certain to result).
This revised test for intentional injury places Kansas more in line with the majority view. See 31 ALR 4th 957, § 5[a],[b],[c]; Understanding Insurance Law, § 63C p. 483 and nn.305 and 306 (“Under the majority view . . . the insured must have intended both the act and to cause some kind of injury or damage. Intent can be actual, or intent to cause the injury or damage can be inferred from the nature of the act and the foreseeability that harm would result. It is not essential, however, that the harm be of the same character and magnitude as that intended.”).
This revised test for intentional injury also helps reduce some of the confusion associated with using “natural and probable consequences” in other contexts, e.g., determining proximate cause in simple negligence. It further helps to put “intentional” injury in its rightful place on the scale for measuring severity of conduct. See Comment b to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (“If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. As the probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor s conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recldessness, as defined in § 500. As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence, as defined in § 282.”); cf. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1045, 127 S. Ct 2201 (2007) (recklessness, a lesser standard of conduct than intentional, requires running a risk substantially greater than the risk making the conduct merely negligent or careless, citing, inter alia, Restatement [Second] of Torts § 500, p. 587 [1963-1964]).
Having revised the test, we now apply it to the specific facts of this case. The Court of Appeals noted that Gutierrez was driving 100 m.p.h. “ ‘down Shawnee Drive all the way down to Maplehill Cemetery’ ” where the wreck occurred. Reyes indicated that when Gutierrez left Interstate 635 to eventually enter Shawnee Drive, she pulled into the lane of oncoming traffic—apparently driving [935]*935against the traffic entering the interstate on an approach ramp— and then failed to stop at the end of the ramp before entering Shawnee Drive. She then drove down this street, which was a two-lane road, until the wreck occurred at the cemetery. Reyes indicated that the wreck occurred when Gutierrez, who was traveling 100 m.p.h., bottomed out at an intersection marked by a stop sign. It also noted that Reyes testified that he had warned Gutierrez of this very scenario:
“[Q:] She was going 100 miles an hour through that intersection?
“[A:] Yeah. We was flooring it all the way down until I told her—my last words to everybody in the car was we’re going to bottom out once we hit the stop sign.
“[Q:] At what intersection?
“[A:] . . . 38th and Shawnee Drive.
“[Q:] 38th and Shawnee Drive? Okay.
“[A:] And I thought we were going to bottom out and the next thing I know we bottomed out the car, slides—bottoms out and comes my way and really starts going backwards. And we hit the ditch and popped up . . . .” 36 Kan. App. 2d at 421.
Accordingly, even under this higher standard for Benchmark to meet, we conclude it has nevertheless met its burden demonstrating application of the intentional act exclusion. Simply put, injury was substantially certain to result under these circumstances: driving the wrong way against traffic, failing to stop at a stop sign, and driving at 100 m.p.h. through neighborhoods. And as Benchmark points out, Reyes correctly predicted, and warned Gutierrez against, the precise consequence of her act—bottoming out at the approaching intersection—shortly before it happened. Cf. Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Tool, 244 N.W.2d 121, 122-23 (Minn. 1976) (intent to cause bodily injury could be inferred where insureds had planned armed robbery at a bowling alley and knew that their weapons were loaded and that someone might be harmed or killed, even though they did not specifically intend to shoot anyone during the robbery).
Issue 2: Whether the illegal act exclusion bars coverage is moot.
Benchmark argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the “illegal act” exclusion was not applicable. Given our ruling [936]*936that the intentional act exclusion bars coverage, our consideration of this issue is unnecessary. The issue is moot.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the district court is reversed.
Johnson, J., not participating.
Lockett, J., Retired, assigned.