Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00044-CR
Thomas Rodgers, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On appeal from the 87th District Court of Freestone County, Texas Judge Amy Thomas Ward, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 23-091CR
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Thomas Rodgers appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. Rodgers pleaded guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to two
years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — State Jail
Division, probated for five years. In his sole issue, Rodgers contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm. BACKGROUND
In February 2023, officers with the Freestone County Sheriff’s office
attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Jonathan Davis. He was not at the
address where they believed him to be residing. A resident at that home told
the officers that Davis was staying at a nearby LaQuinta Inn where he worked
as a maintenance man.
When they arrived at the hotel, the officers spoke to a clerk at the front
desk, inquiring as to Davis’s location. Sergeant Mike Darby testified that they
asked for Jonathan Davis, the maintenance man. Deputy Robert Willis
testified that they may have just asked for the maintenance man, rather than
asking for Jonathan Davis by name, but they believed Davis was the
maintenance man. Sergeant Darby’s body camera footage showed the officers’
interaction with the clerk, but audio did not pick up what they asked the clerk.
However, the clerk responded by directing them to room 101.
When the officers knocked on the door of room 101, Rodgers opened the
door. Room 101 was comprised of a living room, a separate bedroom, a
bathroom, and a kitchen area. It was not possible to see the entire space from
the doorway. The officers detained Rodgers while looking around the room for
Davis. Deputy Willis testified that they knocked on the door, Rodgers opened
Rodgers v. State Page 2 it, they stepped in to identify him, and the deputy saw methamphetamine in
plain view on a nearby table.
Rodgers was a maintenance man at the hotel. He explained that Davis
was there “doing little odd jobs that [he] didn’t have the knowledge to do.”
Rodgers eventually told the officers that Davis was in a different room in the
hotel. The officers arrested Rodgers for possession of a controlled substance.
Rodgers filed a motion to suppress statements and evidence resulting
from what he termed an illegal arrest, made without a search or arrest
warrant. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter,
Rodgers pleaded guilty. The trial court, pursuant to a plea bargain, sentenced
him to two years of confinement in a State Jail facility, probated for five years,
and a fine of $1,500.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole issue, Rodgers contends the entry into his hotel room,
supported only by an arrest warrant for a third party, was unlawful. He argues
that law enforcement cannot rely on a reasonable but mistaken belief that
Davis was in the searched room. Alternatively, he asserts that law
enforcement’s entry into his room was not reasonable because they did not take
steps to reasonably ensure not to enter the wrong room. In making this
argument, he contends that “reasonable belief” is synonymous with “probable
Rodgers v. State Page 3 cause.” Therefore he argues, the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence obtained during his arrest.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d
735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We afford almost total deference to the trial
court's express or implied determination of historical facts and the trial court's
rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, especially when those
determinations are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor. Id;
State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We review pure
questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on
an assessment of credibility and demeanor, on a de novo basis. Torres, 666
S.W.3d at 740-41. Thus, we review de novo the trial court's application of the
law of seizure to the facts. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590.
The trial court is the sole factfinder at a suppression hearing, and it may
believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Amador v. State,
275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court may make
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. Id. We view the record in
the light most favorable to the trial court's conclusion and reverse only if the
trial court's decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone of
Rodgers v. State Page 4 reasonable disagreement. State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 689 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2024); Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590. We will sustain the trial court's ruling
if it is supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to
the case. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590. When the trial court does not make
explicit findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court's ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact
supported by the record. See Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018).
Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall under one of a few exceptions,
including seizing contraband in plain view. State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “A seizure of an object is lawful under the plain view
exception if three requirements are met. First, law enforcement officials must
lawfully be where the object can be ‘plainly viewed.’ Second, the ‘incriminating
character’ of the object in plain view must be ‘immediately apparent’ to the
officials. And third, the officials must have the right to access the object.”
Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Rodgers v. State Page 5 Discussion
For Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it limited authority of officers to enter a
dwelling if they have reason to believe that the residence is the suspect’s
dwelling, and the suspect is in that dwelling. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 602 (1980). The Supreme Court has not defined the “reason to believe”
standard. A small minority of federal circuit courts have held that reasonable
belief in the Payton context “embodies the same standard of reasonableness
inherent in probable cause.” United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467,
480 (3rd Cir.
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00044-CR
Thomas Rodgers, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On appeal from the 87th District Court of Freestone County, Texas Judge Amy Thomas Ward, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 23-091CR
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Thomas Rodgers appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. Rodgers pleaded guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to two
years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — State Jail
Division, probated for five years. In his sole issue, Rodgers contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm. BACKGROUND
In February 2023, officers with the Freestone County Sheriff’s office
attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Jonathan Davis. He was not at the
address where they believed him to be residing. A resident at that home told
the officers that Davis was staying at a nearby LaQuinta Inn where he worked
as a maintenance man.
When they arrived at the hotel, the officers spoke to a clerk at the front
desk, inquiring as to Davis’s location. Sergeant Mike Darby testified that they
asked for Jonathan Davis, the maintenance man. Deputy Robert Willis
testified that they may have just asked for the maintenance man, rather than
asking for Jonathan Davis by name, but they believed Davis was the
maintenance man. Sergeant Darby’s body camera footage showed the officers’
interaction with the clerk, but audio did not pick up what they asked the clerk.
However, the clerk responded by directing them to room 101.
When the officers knocked on the door of room 101, Rodgers opened the
door. Room 101 was comprised of a living room, a separate bedroom, a
bathroom, and a kitchen area. It was not possible to see the entire space from
the doorway. The officers detained Rodgers while looking around the room for
Davis. Deputy Willis testified that they knocked on the door, Rodgers opened
Rodgers v. State Page 2 it, they stepped in to identify him, and the deputy saw methamphetamine in
plain view on a nearby table.
Rodgers was a maintenance man at the hotel. He explained that Davis
was there “doing little odd jobs that [he] didn’t have the knowledge to do.”
Rodgers eventually told the officers that Davis was in a different room in the
hotel. The officers arrested Rodgers for possession of a controlled substance.
Rodgers filed a motion to suppress statements and evidence resulting
from what he termed an illegal arrest, made without a search or arrest
warrant. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter,
Rodgers pleaded guilty. The trial court, pursuant to a plea bargain, sentenced
him to two years of confinement in a State Jail facility, probated for five years,
and a fine of $1,500.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole issue, Rodgers contends the entry into his hotel room,
supported only by an arrest warrant for a third party, was unlawful. He argues
that law enforcement cannot rely on a reasonable but mistaken belief that
Davis was in the searched room. Alternatively, he asserts that law
enforcement’s entry into his room was not reasonable because they did not take
steps to reasonably ensure not to enter the wrong room. In making this
argument, he contends that “reasonable belief” is synonymous with “probable
Rodgers v. State Page 3 cause.” Therefore he argues, the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence obtained during his arrest.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d
735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We afford almost total deference to the trial
court's express or implied determination of historical facts and the trial court's
rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, especially when those
determinations are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor. Id;
State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We review pure
questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on
an assessment of credibility and demeanor, on a de novo basis. Torres, 666
S.W.3d at 740-41. Thus, we review de novo the trial court's application of the
law of seizure to the facts. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590.
The trial court is the sole factfinder at a suppression hearing, and it may
believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Amador v. State,
275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court may make
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. Id. We view the record in
the light most favorable to the trial court's conclusion and reverse only if the
trial court's decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone of
Rodgers v. State Page 4 reasonable disagreement. State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 689 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2024); Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590. We will sustain the trial court's ruling
if it is supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to
the case. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590. When the trial court does not make
explicit findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court's ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact
supported by the record. See Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018).
Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall under one of a few exceptions,
including seizing contraband in plain view. State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “A seizure of an object is lawful under the plain view
exception if three requirements are met. First, law enforcement officials must
lawfully be where the object can be ‘plainly viewed.’ Second, the ‘incriminating
character’ of the object in plain view must be ‘immediately apparent’ to the
officials. And third, the officials must have the right to access the object.”
Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Rodgers v. State Page 5 Discussion
For Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it limited authority of officers to enter a
dwelling if they have reason to believe that the residence is the suspect’s
dwelling, and the suspect is in that dwelling. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 602 (1980). The Supreme Court has not defined the “reason to believe”
standard. A small minority of federal circuit courts have held that reasonable
belief in the Payton context “embodies the same standard of reasonableness
inherent in probable cause.” United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467,
480 (3rd Cir. 2016); United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir.
2002). Rodgers would have us follow those courts and require a showing of
probable cause to support the officers’ entry into his room. We are more
inclined to agree with the Fifth Circuit, which held that:
[r]easonable belief embodies the same standards of reasonableness [as probable cause] but allows the officer, who has already been to the magistrate to secure an arrest warrant, to determine that the suspect is probably within certain premises without an additional trip to the magistrate and without exigent circumstances.
United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 501 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
State v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1977)). We will review the
reasonableness of the officers’ judgment. Id. An officer’s assessment of a
Rodgers v. State Page 6 suspect’s whereabouts does not need to be correct, but merely grounded on the
reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the dwelling and is currently
there. See Green v. State, 78 S.W.3d 604, 612 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no
pet.).
Here, the officers had an arrest warrant for Davis and were told Davis
was a maintenance man at the LaQuinta Inn, and he could be found in room
101. Thus, the evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that the
officers had reason to believe Davis was in room 101. See Payton, 445 U.S. at
602; Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190. Therefore, they were lawfully in a place where
the methamphetamine could be plainly viewed. See Keehn, 279 S.W.3d at 334.
Deputy Willis testified that he had worked in the narcotics division since 2001
and can identify most narcotics on sight. He recognized the methamphetamine
that was sitting in the open on a table in Rodgers’s room. This satisfies the
requirements that must be met to justify seizure of an object in plain sight.
See id. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of Rodgers’s motion to suppress
was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. See Heath, 696 S.W.3d at 689. We overrule Rodgers’s sole issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rodgers v. State Page 7 STEVE SMITH Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: April 10, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirm Do not publish CR25
Rodgers v. State Page 8