NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3116-23
THOMAS RICCHIUTI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF MONMOUTH and VANESSA HOWARD,
Defendants-Respondents. ___________________________
Submitted June 3, 2025 – Decided June 25, 2025
Before Judges Firko and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-3437-23.
Law Offices of Lawrence W. Luttrell, attorneys for appellant (Lawrence W. Luttrell, on the briefs).
Birdsall, Laughlin & Clark, LLC, attorneys for respondent County of Monmouth (David A. Laughlin, of counsel and on the brief; Robert M. Ford, on the brief).
Macnow & Papaleo, attorneys for respondent Vanessa Howard (Russell Macnow, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this employment action, plaintiff Thomas Ricchiuti appeals from two
April 26, 2024 Law Division orders dismissing with prejudice his first amended
complaint against defendants County of Monmouth (County) and Vanessa
Howard (collectively defendants) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).1 Because plaintiff's first amended
complaint adequately sets forth the fundaments of viable causes of action, we
reverse and vacate both orders and remand.
I.
We summarize the facts alleged, giving plaintiff the benefit of every
reasonable inference. See Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157,
171 (2021). Plaintiff was employed by the County as a corrections officer and
served for twenty-two years. Howard was plaintiff's supervisor and a
corrections officer with a sergeant rank. In April 2022, while plaintiff and
Howard were on duty at the Monmouth County Correction Institute (MCCI), an
inmate suffered cardiac arrest from an apparent drug overdose.
1 The court noted in its order that Howard filed a motion for summary judgment in lieu of filing an answer. However, the record shows the court treated Howard's summary judgment motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), and applied the motion to dismiss standard in its decision. A-3116-23 2 The inmate required immediate medical assistance from paramedics who
arrived on the scene. While the paramedics were treating the inmate, who was
lying unconscious on a gurney, they asked plaintiff to assist them in moving the
inmate down the stairs so they could transport him to a hospital without having
to stop cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). The inmate was obese and unable
to be safely lowered down the stairs while on a gurney without the assistance of
two adults.
When plaintiff attempted to comply, Howard ordered him not to do so.
According to plaintiff, Howard used her arm to block plaintiff and told the
paramedics, "[w]e don't do that here." Consequently, the paramedics stopped
administering CPR to the inmate during the time they transported him down the
stairs. Plaintiff alleges the inmate passed away later that day as a result of the
alleged incident.
After the incident, plaintiff filed a written report 2 summarizing the events
of the day. Plaintiff claims he authored the report because he reasonably
believed that Howard's conduct violated a law, rule, regulation, or public policy.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants began retaliating against him after he reported
the events from April 2022.
2 Plaintiff's written report is not contained in the appendix. A-3116-23 3 By way of example, in October 2022, plaintiff claims that Howard ordered
him to place a personal protective equipment (PPE) mask over his face even
though he was not required to do so under MCCI's policy at the time. Plaintiff
complied with Howard's request, but she nonetheless wrote him up for
insubordination.
Plaintiff alleges the County then gave him an "ultimatum" to either agree
to retire or else he would be immediately terminated based on the
insubordination charge. Plaintiff requested to review Howard's report
concerning the insubordination charge, but the County denied his request. In
addition, plaintiff contends the County informed him that its offer to allow him
to retire would be rescinded, and he would be terminated immediately, if he was
provided with Howard's report.
Plaintiff requested permission from the County to consult with an
attorney, but claimed the County refused to allow him the opportunity to do so.
Plaintiff alleged the County advised him that if he left its office or called an
attorney before accepting the ultimatum, its offer would be rescinded, and he
would be terminated. Plaintiff further alleges he was required to sign a
Separation Agreement and Complete Release (Agreement), waiving any claims
against defendants without the advice of counsel.
A-3116-23 4 On October 20, 2022, plaintiff and the County entered into the Agreement,
which states in relevant part:
...
WHEREAS, on October 2, 2022 an incident occurred between [plaintiff] and a supervisor that is currently under review by the management of the MCCI for the potential imposition of disciplinary action, although no final determination has yet been reached on the filing of any disciplinary charges or if such charges were to be filed, the proposed penalty for same; and,
WHEREAS, during the course of the aforementioned review of the October 2, 2022 incident, [plaintiff] advised the County of his desire to separate from his County service, and under the circumstances the County agrees that a prompt and amicable separation from service is the most appropriate resolution to this matter, provided it is subject to the terms set forth in the Agreement; and,
WHEREAS, by taking this action, [plaintiff] is not admitting in any way that disciplinary action whatsoever is warranted relating to the October 2, 2022 incident, but rather, given his age and time in service he is eligible to apply for retirement with the New Jersey Police and Firemen's Retirement System ("PFRS") and desires to do so effective November 1, 2022; and,
WHEREAS, given the outstanding employment matter referenced above, the parties believe it is in their mutual best interest to fully and finally resolve all outstanding issues with respect to [plaintiff]'s County employment via a negotiated agreement.
A-3116-23 5 ....
In addition, plaintiff agreed to the following terms and conditions set forth
in the Agreement:
1. RESIGNATION OF [PLAINTIFF]; TERMS AND CONDITIONS.
....
a. [Plaintiff] agrees that his execution of this Agreement shall represent his irrevocable resignation from employment with [the] County, effective at the close of business on Monday, October 31, 2022. No further documents shall need to be executed in order to effectuate [plaintiff's] resignation. This resignation shall be recorded as a "resignation in good standing" as established by the regulations of the Civil Service Commission as set forth at [N.J.A.C.] 4A:2-6.3.
c. It is understood that [plaintiff] is eligible for [and] intends to apply for retirement from PFRS, effective November 1, 2022.
f. Based upon [plaintiff's] decision to conclude his . . . employment pursuant to the Agreement, [the] County agrees to administratively close the ongoing review of the October 2, 2022 incident without making any final determination as to
A-3116-23 6 whether any disciplinary action was warranted, or if so, the appropriate penalty for same. [Plaintiff] acknowledges that [the] County had reasonable and sufficient cause to initiate a review of his actions on that date and its decision to do so was made in good faith and not for any improper purpose. However, by executing the Agreement, he is not admitting in any way that his conduct justified the imposition of any disciplinary action against him.
2. COMPLETE RELEASE AND RELINQUISHMENT OF CLAIMS.
In consideration of the settlement hereinabove, . . . [plaintiff], along with his successors, assigns, heirs, representatives and estates, agrees to irrevocably and unconditionally relinquish any and all causes of [a]ction, demands or claims, including claims for attorney's fees and costs, [plaintiff] had, has or may have from the beginning of time up to the date this Agreement is executed against the County . . . regardless of whether such claims are presently known or unknown to [plaintiff]. This full and unconditional relinquishment and release of claims includes, but is not limited to, any causes of action, demands or claims relating in any way to [plaintiff's] employment with [the] County, including the events, information, or disputes giving rise to this matter, or the Agreement.
A-3116-23 7 This full release also specifically includes, but is not limited to, matters arising under federal, state or local laws, statutes, regulations, ordinances, orders or policies, including, but not limited to, . . . the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), [N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14], the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), [N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to - 50], . . . and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act [(NJCRA)], [N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2].
The Agreement also contains an "Acknowledgment," which states
plaintiff had the right to discuss all aspects of the Agreement "with his chosen
representation," and that he is "entering into this Agreement knowingly and
voluntarily . . . ." Plaintiff also acknowledged in the Agreement that he was
given "a reasonable and sufficient amount of time" to consider the Agreement
before signing it.
The Agreement states the following at paragraph 18(a) through (c):
(a) [Plaintiff] agrees and acknowledge[s] that [he] was represented by and consulted with representation of [his] choosing throughout the negotiation [and] execution of this Agreement and Release. [He] further acknowledge[s] and agree[s] that he was given a reasonable and sufficient amount of time within which to consider the Agreement and Release before signing it.
A-3116-23 8 (b) [Plaintiff] agrees and acknowledges that [he] [has] the right to reflect upon this Agreement and Release for a period of twenty-one . . . days before executing it, and [he] will have an additional period of seven days after executing the Agreement and Release to revoke it . . .
(c) [Plaintiff] understand[s] and acknowledge[s] that if [plaintiff] sign[s] this Agreement and Release along with the waiver attached hereto, prior to the expiration of . . . twenty-one-day review, [plaintiff is] voluntarily and knowingly waiving the twenty-one-day review ....
Plaintiff claims he was required to sign the Agreement under duress, 3 out
of fear he would be terminated without pay. He did not consult with an attorney
before signing the document. Thus, plaintiff alleged he received a significantly
lower monthly pension than he would have received had he waited three more
years to retire, was denied the opportunity to earn overtime pay, apply for a
promotion, and lost medical benefits for himself and his family. Due to
defendants' actions, plaintiff alleged he was subjected to humiliation, severe
mental and emotional distress, and embarrassment among his co-workers.
On November 1, 2023, plaintiff was separated from his employment with
the County. On January 30, 2024, he filed a notice of tort claim with the County.
3 We use the terms "duress" and "economic duress" interchangeably in our opinion.
A-3116-23 9 On October 31, 2023, plaintiff filed an initial complaint alleging
violations of CEPA (count one); NJLAD (count two); the NJCRA (count three);
and declaratory relief to set aside the Agreement (count four). The next day, on
November 1, 2023, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint—the operative
pleading here—alleging the same four counts. 4 The County moved to dismiss
in lieu of filing an answer to the first amended complaint, and Howard moved
for summary judgment, which as stated, was treated by the court as a motion to
dismiss.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the County argued plaintiff failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Agreement was the product of
duress. The County contended that plaintiff failed to identify a wrongful or
unlawful act or threat, and he was not deprived of his "unfettered will." The
County asserted that plaintiff initialed every page of the Agreement and signed
it, acknowledging he was giving up certain rights, including the opportunity to
have the Agreement reviewed by his union representative and an attorney of his
choosing. The County argued the Agreement was supported by consideration
4 The first amended complaint revised the years pertaining to the alleged incident involving the inmate and alleged retaliation. Plaintiff also added references to the New Jersey Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:2-13, and portions of the collective bargaining agreement between himself and the County. A-3116-23 10 because the County agreed to administratively dismiss the insubordination
charge in exchange for plaintiff's retirement and his release of any claims.
The County pointed out that the Agreement provided plaintiff with the
"unilateral option" to revoke the Agreement for a period of seven days after
signing, which he did not do. The County argued that plaintiff's claim of duress
lacked merit because he did not revoke the Agreement within seven days after
executing it.
Howard argued that the Agreement was enforceable as a matter of law
warranting dismissal of the first amended complaint. Howard contended that
plaintiff voluntarily agreed to terminate his position as a corrections officer and
not pursue legal action against her or the County in exchange for the County not
pursuing the insubordination charge. Howard asserted that plaintiff's claim of
duress contravenes the plain language of the Agreement, which provided he had
the "right and opportunity to discuss all aspects of this Agreement with his
chosen representation prior to entering into it." Howard argued the Agreement
also states plaintiff represented that he "in fact [had] consulted with an attorney ,"
and no duress or undue influence was brought on him by the County.
Plaintiff opposed both motions. In his counter-statement of material facts,
plaintiff claimed he was "forced" to retire due to defendants' actions. Plaintiff
A-3116-23 11 also submitted a certification in opposition to Howard's motion stating that at
the time the County made its "ultimatum" to him, the County "refused" his
request "for permission to consult with legal counsel."
Plaintiff also certified the County advised him that "if he left the office or
called a lawyer before accepting [its] ultimatum, that the offer to allow [him] to
retire was off the table," and he would be "terminated from employment
immediately." Plaintiff certified he signed the Agreement based on the
ultimatum, and under "duress" caused by defendants, "without the benefit of
legal counsel beforehand." Plaintiff stated he did not draft any part of the
Agreement or negotiate any of its terms. Plaintiff certified that the Agreement
was procured by the County through "coercion, deception, fraud, undue
pressure, or unseemly conduct," or other circumstances created by the County.
Plaintiff retained counsel after his separation from employment.
On April 26, 2024, the court conducted oral argument on defendant's
motions to dismiss. In an oral opinion following argument that day, the court
granted both motions. The court found plaintiff was not "being disciplined for
what happened with the inmate" back in April 2022, but for his "insubordination
for failing to put on [PPE]."
A-3116-23 12 The court determined plaintiff could not establish duress based on the
allegations in the first amended complaint. The court reasoned that plaintiff's
alleged conduct in the first amended complaint "doesn't make sense as to why
he would have felt compelled to sign [the Agreement] under duress," because
he had twenty-one days to sign it and seven days to revoke it.
The court stated there was adequate consideration in the Agreement
between plaintiff and the County because the County administratively closed
out the ongoing review of the October 2, 2022 incident without making a final
determination in exchange for plaintiff ending his employment. The court
determined that plaintiff reviewed the Agreement because "he initialed every
single page" and "then signed it at the end." In addition, the court found there
was no assertion in the first amended complaint that plaintiff "didn't know how
to read" or "lacked the capacity to understand what he was signing."
The court determined that plaintiff's execution of the Agreement meant
that he was advised by his union representative and counsel of his choosing as
stated in the Agreement. The court found plaintiff was given "reasonable and
sufficient" time to consider the Agreement before signing it based on terms set
forth in the Agreement. In addition, the court held by signing the Agreement,
plaintiff released the County from "statutory provisions," including his CEPA
A-3116-23 13 and NJLAD claims. Two memorializing orders were entered. This appeal
followed.
Before us, plaintiff primarily makes two arguments. First, plaintiff
contends the court erred in granting defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule
4:6-2(e) because the court considered facts beyond the first amended complaint
and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
Second, plaintiff argues that even if the court had treated the motions to
dismiss as motions for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2, his first amended
complaint should have survived dismissal as there are genuine issues of material
fact. Plaintiff contends the Agreement is unenforceable because it lacks
consideration, he signed it under economic duress, and he never ratified it or
waived any claims against defendants.
II.
A.
We begin our discussion with a review of the principles governing our
analysis. Rule 4:6-2 provides:
Every defense, legal or equitable, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any complaint, counterclaim, cross- claim, or third-party complaint shall be asserted in the answer thereto, except that the following defenses, . . . may at the option of the pleader be made by motion,
A-3116-23 14 with briefs: . . . (e) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .
[R. 4:6-2(e).]
"Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted are reviewed de novo." Baskin, 246 N.J. at 171 (citing
Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237
N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). Thus, "we owe no deference to the trial judge's
conclusions." State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc.,
439 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v.
Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011)).
"At this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt is not concerned
with the ability of [a] plaintiff[] to prove the allegation contained in the
complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746
(1989) (citing Somers Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 198 F.Supp. 732, 734 (D.N.J.
1961)). "For purposes of analysis [a] plaintiff [is] entitled to every reasonable
inference of fact." Ibid. (citing Indep. Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers
Loc. 680, 23 N.J. 85, 89 (1956)). "The examination of a complaint's allegations
of fact . . . should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a
generous and hospitable approach." Ibid.
In undertaking our review,
A-3116-23 15 it is essential to canvass the complaint to determine whether a cause of action can be found within its four corners. In so doing, we must accept the facts asserted in the complaint as true. A reviewing court must search[] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary. Accordingly, all reasonable inferences are given to plaintiff. Courts should grant these motions with caution and in the rarest instances.
[Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 311 N.J. Super. 317, 321-22 (App. Div. 1998) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).]
We apply these well-established principles to the matter before us.
B.
Plaintiff argues the court erred in finding his allegations were insufficient
to support his claim of economic duress and lack of consideration. Plaintiff
contends the court misapplied Rule 4:6-2(e) because it relied on alleged facts
outside the "four corners" of the first amended complaint and failed to draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor. In particular, plaintiff asserts defendants
went outside the pleadings by introducing the terms of the "purported release
and waiver of claims," which is contained in the Agreement prepared by the
County. We are convinced the court improperly granted defendants' motion to
A-3116-23 16 dismiss. Plaintiff alleged viable causes of action for economic duress and lack
of consideration.
In count four of the first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges the
Agreement should be set aside because it "was achieved through coercion,
deception, fraud, undue pressure, or unseemly conduct," and therefore, he was
"not competent to voluntarily consent thereto."
"Generally, a settlement agreement is governed by principles of contract
law." Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 600-01 (2008) (quoting
Thompson v. City of Atl. City, 190 N.J. 359, 379 (2007)). "An agreement to
settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into
and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling
circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts." Ibid.
(quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div. 1983)).
"It is not the function of the court to rewrite or revise an agreement when the
intent of the parties is clear." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (citing
J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013)). Thus, "when the intent of the parties is
plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the
agreement . . . ." Ibid.
A-3116-23 17 However, "there are circumstances under which economic pressure may
invalidate an otherwise enforceable contract." Cont'l Bank of Pa. v. Barclay
Riding Acad., Inc., 93 N.J. 153, 175 (1983). "Economic duress occurs when the
party alleging it is the victim of a wrongful or unlawful act or threat, which
deprives the victim of his unfettered will." Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick
LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252, 263 (App. Div. 2000). "[T]he decisive factor is the
wrongfulness of the pressure exerted on the party seeking to void the contract. "
Cont'l Bank of Pa., 93 N.J. at 177. "The term 'wrongful' in this context
encompasses more than criminal or tortious acts, for conduct may be legal but
still oppressive." Ibid. "In addition, duress entails inadequate consideration."
Quigley, 330 N.J. Super. at 263.
"The situations are so varied that one cannot be sure of a simple formula "
for determining economic duress. Cont'l Bank of Pa., 93 N.J. at 177 (quoting
West Park Ave., Inc. v. Twp. of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 129 (1966)). However, the
following generalizations are relevant in deciding if there was duress:
[w]here there is adequacy of consideration, there is generally no duress . . . . Whenever a party to a contract seeks the best possible terms, there can be no rescission merely upon the grounds of "driving a hard bargain." Merely taking advantage of another's financial difficulty is not duress. Rather, the person alleging financial difficulty must allege that it was contributed
A-3116-23 18 to or caused by the one accused of coercion . . . . Under this rule, the party exerting pressure is scored only for that for which he [or she] alone is responsible.
[Ibid. (citation omitted).]
Plaintiff alleges he was compelled to sign the Agreement under economic
duress as the provider for his family, which includes a special needs child.
Plaintiff claims he was denied due process under the collective bargaining
agreement, the New Jersey Civil Service Act, and the United States Constitution.
He also maintains he was threatened, and the Agreement lacks consideration
because he was already eligible to retire because of his twenty years of service.
Based upon our de novo review, we are convinced the court improperly
granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleged a claim of economic
duress. Having viewed plaintiff's first amended complaint with the required
liberality at the motion to dismiss stage, we are persuaded dismissal with
prejudice was premature. While the Agreement states it was not the product of
duress, the factual contention that the County wanted to terminate plaintiff after
twenty years of service over one incident of purported insubordination for not
wearing PPE adds credence to plaintiff's argument that he was pressured to
resign.
A-3116-23 19 The court failed to give plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference
under Rule 4:6-2(e). Moreover, the court improvidently went beyond the
confines of the first amended complaint in rendering its decision. The court
narrowly focused on whether the Agreement plaintiff signed is enforceable as
written and did not analyze each statute pled by plaintiff to determine the legal
sufficiency of the first amended complaint. Discovery needs to be conducted to
develop a more robust record addressing plaintiff's allegations. We therefore
reverse the order dismissing with prejudice of plaintiff's first amended complaint
and vacate both April 26, 2024 orders under review.
Reversed, vacated, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-3116-23 20