Thomas R. Lingle v. Citizens Water of Westfield, LLC

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 25A-PL-01898
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Foley

Opinion

FILED Apr 20 2026, 10:05 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana Thomas R. Lingle, Appellant-Defendant

v.

Citizens Water of Westfield, LLC, Appellee-Plaintiff

April 20, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1898 Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable J. Richard Campbell, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D04-2504-PL-4596

Opinion by Judge Foley Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Kenworthy concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 1 of 10 Foley, Judge. 1

[1] In this eminent domain action, Citizens Water of Westfield, LLC (“Citizens”)

sought an easement across real estate belonging to Thomas R. Lingle (“Lingle”)

as part of a water line project. Lingle appeals from an order (1) overruling his

objections to Citizens’ complaint appropriating his real property and (2)

granting Citizens an easement that included rights for sewer, gas, and other

utility services in addition to the water line. We find a single issue dispositive:

whether the easement granted to Citizens included use rights that exceeded the

scope of Citizens’ identified purpose of a water line extension.

[2] We conclude as a matter of law that Citizens did not establish a need for the

additional utility uses. We therefore reverse the order overruling the objections

to the scope of the easement sought and reverse the order of appropriation.

Facts and Procedural History 2 [3] Citizens—an Indiana public utility—filed a Complaint for Appropriation of

Real Estate Interest on April 25, 2025, seeking a permanent, non-exclusive

easement across Lingle’s real property in Westfield, Indiana. 3 Citizens alleged

1 We held oral argument on Thursday, March 19, 2026, at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. We thank Dean Bravo, the law school, and the Moot Court Board for their generous hospitality, and we thank counsel for modeling skilled oral advocacy. We also thank the attending students, who posed incisive questions to the bench and the advocates following the oral argument. 2 Concurrent with this opinion, we issue substantially the same opinion in a companion case, Bahler v. Citizens Water of Westfield, LLC, No. 25A-PL-1922 (Ind. Ct. App. April 20, 2026). 3 The complaint also named Lingle’s wife, who has not participated in the action.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 2 of 10 the easement was necessary “[f]or its project to install a water transmission line

in Hamilton County” as part of the Central Feeder Main Project. Appellant’s

App. Vol. 2 p. 23. Citizens included a proposed easement description that

would grant Citizens the right to “survey, construct, install, operate, use,

maintain, test, inspect, modify, change the size of, replace, renew, relocate,

construct, and remove improvements related to Citizens’ or its affiliate’s

operation of a water, sanitary sewer, natural gas[,] or other regulated utility service

system,” together with associated equipment and appurtenances. Id. at 24

(emphasis added).

[4] Lingle was served on May 5, 2025. Following two extensions of time to file

objections to the complaint, Lingle filed a set of objections on June 19, 2025.

Paragraphs 5, 7, and 20 challenged the scope of the proposed easement:

5. The terms and conditions of the easement that Citizens seeks to acquire in this case are excessive and beyond immediate or reasonable future need outside the scope of a public utility.

7. There is no public need or use for Citizens to operate a sanitary sewer, natural gas[,] or other regulated utility system other than a water system, the same being beyond their scope of incorporation in providing no immediate or public need.

20. Plaintiff’s request is beyond that which is necessary, that is, it is beyond that which is based upon a present need or fair and reasonable future need.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 3 of 10 Id. at 44, 46. 4 On July 9, 2025, Citizens filed a motion to overrule the

objections to its complaint. On July 14, 2025, the trial court overruled the

objections without holding a hearing. On July 29, 2025, the trial court entered

its Order of Appropriation of Real Estate Interest and Appointment of

Appraisers, granting Citizens the specific easement rights that it requested.

Lingle now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [5] Lingle does not dispute that Citizens established a need for a water line. He

argues, however, that Citizens sought more than it needed—an easement that

included rights for sewer, gas, and other utilities without establishing a need for

those uses. Lingle argues that the trial court should have sustained his

objections to the complaint due to the scope of the easement sought.

[6] The State has inherent authority to take private property for public use. U.S.

Const. amends. 5, 14 (authorizing a taking with just compensation); Ind. Const.

art. 1, § 21 (same); Duke Energy Ind., LLC v. Bellwether Props., LLC, 192 N.E.3d

1003, 1006–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. And “the legislature may

delegate the State’s eminent domain authority to other entities.” Bender Enters.,

LLC v. Duke Energy, LLC, 201 N.E.3d 206, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Indiana

4 There were also objections related to service of process; however, Lingle withdrew most of those objections through his Clarification of Argument on Appeal, filed after oral argument. In any case, as earlier noted, our disposition renders other issues moot. Cf. Ind. Code § 32-24-1-8(d) (allowing a condemnor to file an amended complaint after an objection is sustained; this filing would start a new objections period).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 4 of 10 Code article 32-24 governs the delegation of eminent domain authority and

prescribes procedures for its exercise. See Ind. Code §§ 32-24-1-3(a) (mandating

that eminent domain authority be exercised “only in the manner provided in

this article”), 32-24-4-1 (delegating the authority to public utilities like Citizens).

[7] Eminent domain actions “are not civil actions but are actions of a special

character based wholly upon the statute by which they are authorized.” State ex

rel. Bd. of Aviation Comm’rs of City of Warsaw v. Kosciusko Cnty. Sup. Ct., 430

N.E.2d 754, 755 (Ind. 1982) [hereinafter Aviation] (quoting City of Indianapolis v.

Schmid, 240 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ind. 1968)). An eminent domain action

commences when an authorized party, known as the condemnor, files a

complaint proposing a taking. I.C. § 32-24-1-4(a). The ensuing proceedings are

bifurcated; the first phase involves objections to the taking proposed in the

complaint, and the second phase involves a computation of damages. See I.C.

§§ 32-24-1-8(e), -9, -11; Aviation, 430 N.E.2d at 755. Where, as here, the trial

court enters a ruling based on a paper record, our review is de novo. Trinity

Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006); Johnson v. Poindexter

Transp., Inc. & Crane Serv., 994 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[8] Here, Lingle objected to the complaint. Indiana Code section 32-24-1-8

governs the filing of objections, specifying that a defendant may object to the

proceedings “because the plaintiff does not have the right to exercise the power

of eminent domain for the use sought . . . .” A utility “must demonstrate an

immediate or present need for private property that it seeks to take through the

power of eminent domain. Wymberley Sanitary Works v. Batliner, 904 N.E.2d

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 5 of 10 326, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Put differently, a utility “may not

maintain an action of condemnation for purely speculative future needs.” Id.

(quoting Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Harlan, 504 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind. Ct. App.

1987), trans. denied). The Indiana Supreme Court applied the necessity

requirement in Country Estates, Inc. v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.,

explaining that the legislature “has limited [eminent domain authority] to the

taking of property which is necessary in the operation of the business of the

condemnor . . . .” 258 N.E.2d 54, 56 (Ind. 1970). Because a taking must be

necessary, the Court concluded in that case that a utility would exceed its

authority by taking “an additional 50 feet [of land] for the contingent possibility

of having to at some future time construct an additional [utility line] . . . .” Id.

[9] Applying these principles, we conclude that Citizens failed to establish a need

for the easement it requested, and therefore, the trial court should have

sustained Paragraphs 5, 7, and 20 of the objections. Citizens claimed the

easement was necessary “[f]or its project to install a water transmission line” in

connection with the Central Feeder Main Project. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p.

23. This allegation was sufficient to establish Citizens’ need for a water line

easement. But the complaint did not establish that Citizens needed an

easement allowing the additional uses incorporated into the easement

description, which were rights related to “operation of a . . . sanitary sewer,

natural gas[,] or other regulated utility service system . . . .” Id. at 24.

[10] Citizens argues that these additional uses would fit within the same geographic

footprint as an easement for only a water line, and so the taking did not affect

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 6 of 10 more physical real estate than necessary. See Appellee’s Br. p. 28 (claiming this

case is “distinguishable from cases in which a utility is taking more land than is

presently needed” and an objection fails “if the acquisition area is needed for a

valid use”). But an easement is not defined solely by its physical dimensions;

rather, an easement is equally defined by the scope of its permitted uses. See

I.C. § 32-24-1-4(b) (specifying that a condemnation complaint must state “[t]he

use the plaintiff intends to make of the property or right sought to be

acquired[,]” and, “[i]f a right-of-way is sought, the location, general route,

width, and the beginning and end points of the right-of-way”). As to the scope

of permitted uses here, the proposed taking exceeded the need identified in the

complaint, and Citizens has not persuaded us that takings law allows for

bootstrapping additional, speculative uses within an easement area.

[11] Citizens also suggests that, without additional compensation to Lingle, it could

have obtained a limited water line easement and then lawfully engaged in

sewer, gas, and other utility uses. Citizens then argues that by including the

additional uses in the easement it sought in this case, Lingle is better served

because Citizens must compensate Lingle for the broader rights in the damages

phase. 5 Citizens relies on cases involving existing easements and whether a

new use falls within the scope of an existing easement. For example, in Howard

v. United States, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that a new use falls

“within the scope of the easement” if the new use “is compatible with the

5 These arguments arose at oral argument, following Citizens’ filing of a Notice of Additional Authority.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 7 of 10 original purpose” of the easement. 964 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis

removed). In that case, the Court addressed a “rails to trails” project converting

railroad tracks to public trails; landowners argued that recreational trail use fell

outside the scope of the existing easement for transportation. Id. In answering

a certified question regarding the use for a public trail, our Supreme Court

agreed with the landowners, concluding that the purpose of the easement was

for transportation and “[t]he transformation of a line of railway to a public trail

imputes a different purpose.” Id. at 784.

[12] The principles in Howard do not apply here. That is, Howard and its

predecessors involved existing easement rights, and the question was whether a

particular new use was compatible with the original purpose of the easement.

Here, there are no existing easement rights, and Lingle is challenging the taking

itself, not any subsequent use within an established easement. More

fundamentally, Indiana landowners have the ability under statute to object to a

taking where the condemnor lacks “the right to exercise the power of eminent

domain for the use sought . . . .” I.C. § 32-24-1-8(a)(2). The question is not

whether Citizens must compensate Lingle for all of the rights condemned, but

rather whether Citizens has the power to condemn for uses that are unrelated to

the “use sought,” which in this instance is the installation of a water

transmission line.

[13] Citizens further contends that including easement rights for sanitary sewer,

natural gas, or other utility systems reflects engineering judgment that should

not be second-guessed. See Appellee’s Br. p. 30 (“Here, Citizens is the party

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 8 of 10 with the engineering expertise to determine the best and most efficient manner

to install its utility infrastructure in the interests of conserving important

ratepayer and judicial resources and in accordance with [regulatory standards]

and accepted engineering practices.”). However, we are constrained by

Citizens’ own characterization of its project as being a “project to install a water

transmission line . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 23. Furthermore, to the

extent Citizens claims the additional uses are de minimis, we note that the

statutory framework does not contain a de minimis exception that would

relieve a condemnor of the requirement of demonstrating a need for each

proposed use.

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court should have

sustained Paragraphs 5, 7, and 20 of the objections, which related to the scope

of the easement rights that Citizens sought to acquire in its complaint. Indeed,

the complaint established a need for a water line only, and the easement

description exceeded that need by incorporating rights for sewer, gas, and other

utility services for which Citizens alleged no present or prospective need. We

therefore reverse the order overruling those objections and the Order of

Appropriation of Real Estate Interest and Appointment of Appraisers, which

flowed from the trial court’s decision overruling the objections. We remand for

further proceedings as necessary, noting that pursuant to Indiana Code section

32-24-1-8(d), Citizens has the right to amend its complaint if it chooses,

whereupon Lingle would have a new period to file objections.

[15] Reversed and remanded.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 9 of 10 Tavitas, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Zechariah D. Yoder Raymond M. Adler Noblesville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Yasmin L. Stump Erica S. Sullivan Yasmin L. Stump Law Group, PC Carmel, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1898 | April 20, 2026 Page 10 of 10