Thomas Lester Jones v. Arnold Jago, Sup't.

701 F.2d 45, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30294

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: February 22, 1983
• Docket: 81-3269
• Status: Published

Opinions

CONTIE, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Jones appeals a district court order denying relief on a habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted of murder in Ohio under procedural circumstances identical to those considered by the Supreme Court in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).

The indictment in this case charged Jones with aggravated murder. He claimed self-defense. Traditionally, Ohio law required defendants in murder cases to prove the defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. On January 1, 1974, however, a new statute became effective:

Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused.

Though this statute possibly indicated a shift in the law regarding the burden of proving affirmative defenses as of January 1,1974, Jones did not specifically object¹ to the following jury instruction during trial in July of that year:

The burden of proving the defense of self-defense is upon the defendant. He must establish such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Subsequent to Jones’ trial, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the new statute had changed the burden of proof as of its effective date. While a defendant retained the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to raise an affirmative defense question, the state bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even to the extent of disproving the asserted defense. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976). Thus the court had improperly instructed the jury in Jones’ case. The Ohio Supreme Court later held, however, that defendants who had not objected to jury instructions which improperly shifted the burden of proving affirmative defenses could not reap the benefits of Robinson. State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977).

After exhausting state remedies, Jones brought this action in the district court. While petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the jury instruction in question, the petition can also be construed to allege that the jury instruction itself violated due process. This court will consider both claims. Jones also preserved for appeal the questions of whether the jury reached a unanimous verdict and whether Jones was given notice in the indictment of the lesser included offense of murder for which he was convicted. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Jones violated Ohio’s contemporaneous objection rule as set forth in Humphries when he failed to object to the jury instruction at issue. Thus, the due process challenge to the jury instruction clearly is barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Engle v. Isaac.2 Even if this court were to reach the merits, we would hold that the instruction in question did not violate due process. Carter v. Jago, 637 F.2d 449 (6th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 980, 102 S.Ct. 2249, 72 L.Ed.2d 856 (1982).

Nor was Jones denied effective assistance of counsel under the test established in Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.1974). In essence, petitioner contends that competent counsel would have realized that the new statute possibly changed the burden of proving affirmative defenses and would therefore have objected to the jury instruction concerning the burden of proving self-defense. Counsel’s failure to do so has resulted in a procedural default which has precluded Jones’ due process challenge to the instruction. This failure to protect petitioner’s rights allegedly constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

This argument is unconvincing. Were it correct, the Supreme Court’s holding in En-gle v. Isaac would in effect be circumvented because every case like it would become an ineffective assistance of counsel case. We cannot agree that the Supreme Court intended such a result. The Court’s opinion in Engle v. Isaac supports this conclusion. Though the Court held that the failure to object to the burden of proof instruction did not establish “cause” under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) because attorneys in numerous other cases had raised similar objections, the Court also indicated that not every astute or competent counsel would have recognized Isaac’s constitutional claim. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S.Ct. at 1574. Hence the attorney’s failure to object in this case is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner raises two other claims, the first of which is that he was not convicted by a unanimous jury decision. While the State of Ohio has not presented an original certified copy of the verdict form, it has tendered a copy of the certified copy which bears twelve juror signatures. Since Jones has not challenged the authenticity of this copy, we reject his claim.

Secondly, Jones claims that he did not receive proper notice of the murder charge for which he was convicted. This claim is frivolous. The indictment charged aggravated murder, which Ohio defines as “purposely, and with prior calculation and design, causing] the death of another.” Ohio Rev.Code Anno. § 2903.01(A) (Page) (1982). Since Ohio defines “murder” as “purposely caus[ing] the death of another,” Ohio Rev.Code Anno. § 2903.02(A) (Page) (1892), the indictment gave petitioner sufficient notice of the charge for which he was convicted.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1 . Jones generally objected to the entire set of instructions. This objection did not satisfy Ohio’s contemporaneous objection requirement. Nieb v. Jago, 695 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1982).

2 . The dissenting opinion notes that the Ohio appellate court rejected Jones’ due process claim on two grounds: 1) petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred for failure to comply with Ohio’s contemporaneous objection rule and 2) the jury instruction was not constitutionally deficient. The dissent contends that since the Ohio courts reached the merits of petitioner’s claim in an alternative holding, the federal courts may also consider the merits.

Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115-16 (6th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933, 101 S.Ct. 1395, 67 L.Ed.2d 367 (1981), held that where a procedural default is a substantial basis for the state courts’ refusal to grant habeas relief, that basis is an adequate and independent state ground precluding habeas corpus review, absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Since Jones’ failure in the present case to comply with Ohio’s contemporaneous objection rule was a substantial ground underlying the state appellate court’s holding, this court may not reach the merits unless petitioner shows cause and prejudice. Engle v. Isaac prevents him from doing so.

County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147-49, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2219-2220, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979), does not control this case. In Allen, the New York courts decided petitioner’s claim solely on the merits. Since the state courts eschewed grounding their denial of relief on an alleged procedural default, petitioner’s substantive claim was properly before the court. Since Jones’ failure to object was a substantial basis of the state appellate courts’ holding in the present case, Allen is distinguishable. Hocken-bury v. Sowders and Engle v. Isaac directly apply.