WIENER, Circuit Judge:
The instant case presents this court its first opportunity to review a double jeopardy claim in the context of successive prosecutions since the United States Supreme Court handed down its new double jeopardy test in Grady v. Corbin, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). Here, Petitioner-Appellant Thomas E. Lad-ner, formerly Chief of Police of Hemphill, Texas, appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition by the federal district court. Ladner contends that successive state prosecutions for the same conduct, when examined under Grady, placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Finding that Ladner’s murder prosecution in Smith County (second prosecution) did not rise to the level of double jeopardy under Grady, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lad-ner’s petition.
[358]*358FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January of 1988, Ladner was indicted in Sabine County, Texas, under Texas Penal Code § 39.021(a)(1) & (2) — violating the civil rights of a prisoner — for intentionally subjecting Loyal Garner to bodily injury while in police custody in the Sabine County Jail, knowing that his (Ladner’s) conduct was unlawful.2 Specifically, Ladner was accused of (1) beating Garner about the head and body with a slapstick and with his fists, causing Garner to fall and hit his head against a wall or door or both; and (2) denying Garner medical attention. In March of 1988, Ladner was indicted in Smith County, Texas, for Garner’s murder.
In July of 1988, Ladner was tried in Sabine County (first prosecution) and was acquitted by a jury that rendered a general verdict of not guilty. In April of 1990, Ladner was tried in Smith County, and was convicted of murdering Garner. The murder charge and the civil rights charges arose from precisely the same incident.
Prior to the second prosecution, Ladner had filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Texas district court in Smith County, claiming that the second prosecution by the same sovereign3 would subject him to double jeopardy. He argued that the prosecution should be barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.4 The Smith County trial court denied habeas relief, but on appeal the Twelfth Court of Appeals of Texas reversed, holding that the second prosecution would subject Ladner to double jeopardy.5 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the state’s motion for discretionary review. That court, on review, reversed the decision of the Twelfth Court of Appeals and reinstated the state trial court’s denial of habeas relief. See Ladner v. State, 780 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc).
After exhausting his state remedies, Lad-ner petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, reiterating his double jeopardy claim. The case was heard initially by the magistrate judge who recommended that all relief be denied. Lad-ner objected to that recommendation but, on subsequent de novo hearing, the district court overruled Ladner’s objections, accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and denied the writ.6 Ladner immediately filed a notice of appeal to this court, and the district court granted a certificate of probable cause. Ladner also sought emergency relief from this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251, to stay the pending state court proceedings. We refused to grant the requested stay, and Ladner was tried for murder in Smith County. He was convicted by a jury and is now in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
After Ladner’s habeas corpus petitions had been denied and after his second trial had ended in his murder conviction, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Grady, announcing a new test for double jeopardy claims arising in the context of [359]*359successive prosecutions. The sole issue before this court is whether, under the new test enunciated in Grady, Ladner’s trial for murder in Smith County subjected him to double jeopardy.
DISCUSSION
A. Operable Facts and Holdings in Grady
In Grady the intoxicated defendant drove his car across the center line of the highway and collided with an oncoming car. The driver of that car subsequently died as a result of injuries received in the accident, and the passenger was seriously injured. The defendant was issued two misdemean- or traffic tickets, one for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and the other for failing to keep to the right of the median. The traffic court was not aware that a homicide investigation was pending or even that a death had occurred as a result of the accident. Consequently, the defendant was allowed to plead guilty in traffic court to the two misdemeanor tickets and received a minimal sentence.
Two months later, a grand jury indicted the defendant for reckless manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, third degree reckless assault, and DWI. In the bill of particulars the prosecution stated its intention to prove that the defendant had been driving while intoxicated, had crossed the center line, and had driven at a speed which was excessive under the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the subsequent prosecution because the state, in its own pleadings, confirmed its intention to establish essential elements of the homicide and assault offenses by proving conduct that constituted offenses for which the defendant had already been convicted — DWI and failing to keep to the right of the center line. Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2094.7
B. Applicability of Grady to this Case
Grady applies to cases in which a defendant is subjected to successive prosecutions for separate offenses arising out of the same occurrence, regardless of whether the defendant was acquitted or convicted in the first prosecution. See United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir.1990). The prosecution argues that Grady is distinguishable and should not be applied to the facts in the instant case. We disagree. Ladner was prosecuted successively by the same sovereign under two different statutes for two significantly different offenses — civil rights violation and murder— both of which arose from the same occurrence: the beating of Garner at the jail. That the defendant in Grady was convicted in his first prosecution while Ladner was acquitted in his is irrelevant to whether Grady applies to Ladner. See Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2091. Grady addresses all “successive prosecution” situations.
Finding that Grady is applicable, we must now determine how its teachings are to be applied.
The Two Phases of Grady
A. Phase I — the Blockburger Phase8
“Grady directs courts to follow a two-step analysis in resolving double jeopardy claims arising in the context of successive prosecutions. First, the court must apply the Blockburger
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WIENER, Circuit Judge:
The instant case presents this court its first opportunity to review a double jeopardy claim in the context of successive prosecutions since the United States Supreme Court handed down its new double jeopardy test in Grady v. Corbin, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). Here, Petitioner-Appellant Thomas E. Lad-ner, formerly Chief of Police of Hemphill, Texas, appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition by the federal district court. Ladner contends that successive state prosecutions for the same conduct, when examined under Grady, placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Finding that Ladner’s murder prosecution in Smith County (second prosecution) did not rise to the level of double jeopardy under Grady, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lad-ner’s petition.
[358]*358FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January of 1988, Ladner was indicted in Sabine County, Texas, under Texas Penal Code § 39.021(a)(1) & (2) — violating the civil rights of a prisoner — for intentionally subjecting Loyal Garner to bodily injury while in police custody in the Sabine County Jail, knowing that his (Ladner’s) conduct was unlawful.2 Specifically, Ladner was accused of (1) beating Garner about the head and body with a slapstick and with his fists, causing Garner to fall and hit his head against a wall or door or both; and (2) denying Garner medical attention. In March of 1988, Ladner was indicted in Smith County, Texas, for Garner’s murder.
In July of 1988, Ladner was tried in Sabine County (first prosecution) and was acquitted by a jury that rendered a general verdict of not guilty. In April of 1990, Ladner was tried in Smith County, and was convicted of murdering Garner. The murder charge and the civil rights charges arose from precisely the same incident.
Prior to the second prosecution, Ladner had filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Texas district court in Smith County, claiming that the second prosecution by the same sovereign3 would subject him to double jeopardy. He argued that the prosecution should be barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.4 The Smith County trial court denied habeas relief, but on appeal the Twelfth Court of Appeals of Texas reversed, holding that the second prosecution would subject Ladner to double jeopardy.5 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the state’s motion for discretionary review. That court, on review, reversed the decision of the Twelfth Court of Appeals and reinstated the state trial court’s denial of habeas relief. See Ladner v. State, 780 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc).
After exhausting his state remedies, Lad-ner petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, reiterating his double jeopardy claim. The case was heard initially by the magistrate judge who recommended that all relief be denied. Lad-ner objected to that recommendation but, on subsequent de novo hearing, the district court overruled Ladner’s objections, accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and denied the writ.6 Ladner immediately filed a notice of appeal to this court, and the district court granted a certificate of probable cause. Ladner also sought emergency relief from this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251, to stay the pending state court proceedings. We refused to grant the requested stay, and Ladner was tried for murder in Smith County. He was convicted by a jury and is now in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
After Ladner’s habeas corpus petitions had been denied and after his second trial had ended in his murder conviction, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Grady, announcing a new test for double jeopardy claims arising in the context of [359]*359successive prosecutions. The sole issue before this court is whether, under the new test enunciated in Grady, Ladner’s trial for murder in Smith County subjected him to double jeopardy.
DISCUSSION
A. Operable Facts and Holdings in Grady
In Grady the intoxicated defendant drove his car across the center line of the highway and collided with an oncoming car. The driver of that car subsequently died as a result of injuries received in the accident, and the passenger was seriously injured. The defendant was issued two misdemean- or traffic tickets, one for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and the other for failing to keep to the right of the median. The traffic court was not aware that a homicide investigation was pending or even that a death had occurred as a result of the accident. Consequently, the defendant was allowed to plead guilty in traffic court to the two misdemeanor tickets and received a minimal sentence.
Two months later, a grand jury indicted the defendant for reckless manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, third degree reckless assault, and DWI. In the bill of particulars the prosecution stated its intention to prove that the defendant had been driving while intoxicated, had crossed the center line, and had driven at a speed which was excessive under the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the subsequent prosecution because the state, in its own pleadings, confirmed its intention to establish essential elements of the homicide and assault offenses by proving conduct that constituted offenses for which the defendant had already been convicted — DWI and failing to keep to the right of the center line. Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2094.7
B. Applicability of Grady to this Case
Grady applies to cases in which a defendant is subjected to successive prosecutions for separate offenses arising out of the same occurrence, regardless of whether the defendant was acquitted or convicted in the first prosecution. See United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir.1990). The prosecution argues that Grady is distinguishable and should not be applied to the facts in the instant case. We disagree. Ladner was prosecuted successively by the same sovereign under two different statutes for two significantly different offenses — civil rights violation and murder— both of which arose from the same occurrence: the beating of Garner at the jail. That the defendant in Grady was convicted in his first prosecution while Ladner was acquitted in his is irrelevant to whether Grady applies to Ladner. See Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2091. Grady addresses all “successive prosecution” situations.
Finding that Grady is applicable, we must now determine how its teachings are to be applied.
The Two Phases of Grady
A. Phase I — the Blockburger Phase8
“Grady directs courts to follow a two-step analysis in resolving double jeopardy claims arising in the context of successive prosecutions. First, the court must apply the Blockburger test and its traditional exceptions to determine whether the offense charged in the subsequent prosecution ‘requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” Calderone, 917 F.2d at 720 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, [360]*360284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)); see also Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2090-93. If, in the first phase of the Grady analysis, application of Blockburger reveals that the offenses have identical statutory elements or that one is a lesser included offense of the other, the subsequent prosecution is barred. Id. (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)). The second prosecution must also be tested to determine if it is barred under one of the two limited exceptions to Blockburger found in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977), and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), respectively. See Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2092-93.
In Harris, the defendant was prosecuted first for robbery and subsequently for felony murder based on a homicide that occurred during the course of the same robbery. The Supreme Court recognized that the second prosecution would not be barred under Blockburger because, on the faces of the relevant statutes, the essential elements of the crimes were different. The Court held, however, that the defendant’s second prosecution constituted double jeopardy because the felony murder prosecution would necessarily require the defendant to defend against the robbery charge for which he had already been prosecuted. While in that case the robbery was not truly a lesser included offense of murder, the Court nonetheless categorized it as “a species of lesser-included offense.” See Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980)).
In Ashe, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a second prosecution arising from the same incident when that prosecution would require relitigation of factual issues that were necessarily resolved in the defendant’s favor in the first prosecution. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1193-94. Under this doctrine, acquittal in the first prosecution bars subsequent prosecution unless a reviewing court can conclude that a “rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Id. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194.
Thus, to determine whether Ladner’s second prosecution is barred by double jeopardy under the Blockburger phase of Grady, we first must apply the Blockburger test itself. But even if the second prosecution survives Blockburger, we still must determine whether Ladner's second prosecution is barred under Harris or Ashe.
B. The Blockburger Phase Applied to Ladner
Ladner’s subsequent prosecution for murder survives the Blockburger test. The statutory elements of murder differ from the statutory elements of violating a prisoner’s civil rights.9 Specifically, each offense requires proof of an element that need not be proved in the other: Death need not be proved for a civil rights conviction; neither police custody of the victim nor peace officer status of the defendant need be proved for a murder conviction. Moreover, each offense requires proof of different facts for their respective intent or mens rea elements: For the civil rights violation the prosecution must prove that Ladner acted intentionally or willfully and [361]*361had actual knowledge (subjective) that his action was unlawful; for the murder charge the prosecution must prove that Ladner acted “intentionally or knowingly,” i.e., with specific intent (objective). Therefore, the prosecution’s first hurdle, the Blockburger test, is cleared.
Ladner’s second prosecution also clears the post-Blockburger hurdles of Harris and Ashe. Ladner’s second prosecution did not require proof of every element of the civil rights violations; neither is the civil rights violation either a true lesser included offense of a murder charge or a “species” of lesser included offense of murder. Therefore, Ladner’s second prosecution is not barred by Harris. In the Blockburger phase, that leaves only Ashe to be considered.
Before Grady was decided, Ladner relied on the collateral estoppel rule in Ashe to support his double jeopardy claim. We find that reliance misplaced. Ladner argues that the only issue in dispute in the first prosecution on which the jury could have acquitted him was whether he was justified in striking Mr. Garner.10 In insisting that no rational jury could have acquitted him on the question of whether he knew his actions were unlawful, Ladner attempted to foreclose reconsideration of the issue of justification under Ashe, claiming that the jury necessarily decided in his favor on that issue.11 But we agree with the district court’s determination that, as a matter of law, the jury might have acquitted Ladner on an issue other than justification so that the second prosecution was not barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine of Ashe. The district court found, and we agree, that under the jury’s general verdict of not guilty, acquittal could have resulted from the jury’s belief that Ladner did not know his conduct was unlawful. It cannot be said that no rational jury could have reached this conclusion.
Having thus tested Ladner’s second prosecution under the three steps required by the Blockburger phase of Grady, and found that it is not barred, we must proceed to phase II of Grady.
C. Phase II — The New Grady Phase
Grady instructs the examining court that if the indictment12 in the second prosecution survives Blockburger and its exceptions (the Blockburger phase), that prosecution must be tested further to determine if, “to establish an essential element of an offense charged in [the second] prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.” Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2087 (emphasis added).
In the short time since the opinion in Grady was published, some courts and commentators have referred to the second phase of Grady as a “same conduct” test. See United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1538 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Russo, 906 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir.1990). But when the pure holding of Grady is carefully parsed, such a limited interpretation is found to be an oversimplification. Grady requires much more than a mere search for congruity of conduct. Moreover, if we were to look solely to the con[362]*362duct that occurred during the subject incident to determine whether Grady’s second phase test is satisfied, we would risk transforming Grady’s new test into a “same transaction” test, an interpretation expressly and unequivocally rejected by the Court. See Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2094 n. 15. But see id. at 2105 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“prosecutors ... will be well advised to proceed on the assumption on that the ‘same transaction’ theory has already been adopted”). Finally, we conclude that Grady should not be read to establish either a “same evidence” or “same offense” test. Id. at 2093.
Thus, the second phase of the Grady analysis requires more than merely comparing the acts alleged in the first prosecution with those alleged in the second to determine whether they overlap. Rather, in the second phase of Grady the examining court must take the following four analytical steps in sequence to determine whether double jeopardy bars the second prosecution:
1. Identify each essential element of the offense with which the defendant is charged in the second prosecution.
2. Determine what conduct of the defendant the state proposes to prove to establish each essential element identified in step one.
3. Examine the conduct determined in step two to see if, in and of itself, such conduct constitutes one or more separate and distinct offenses for which a person could be prosecuted.
4. Determine whether, in the first prosecution, the defendant was in fact prosecuted for one or more of the separate and distinct offenses found in step 3.
If the examining court gets to the fourth step and finds in the affirmative, the second prosecution would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. But if the court answers either the third or fourth step in the negative, there would be no double jeopardy bar to the second prosecution.
D. Application of Grady’s New Four Step Test to Ladner
At the first step we seek to identify the essential elements of the offense (murder) with which Ladner is charged in the second prosecution. In doing so we find that the first essential element of that offense is the degree of criminal intent or mens rea, here acting “intentionally and knowingly.” And we find that the second essential element of the offense of murder is the overt act of the defendant, here that he “cause[d] the death of an individual” or, alternatively, “intend[ed] to cause serious bodily injury and commitfted] an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes death.”
At the second step we seek to determine precisely what conduct the state proposes to prove in establishing each of the essential elements identified in the first step. The conduct alleged in the indictment for the second prosecution is that Ladner beat Garner about the head with a slapstick, a nightstick and an object unknown, thereby intentionally and knowingly causing his death; or alternatively that Ladner intentionally and knowingly committed an act clearly dangerous to a human life by striking Garner in that manner.
At the third step, we examine the conduct we found in the second step to determine whether such conduct constitutes one or more separate offenses for which Ladner could be prosecuted separately. Clearly the conduct that the state proposes to use in proving the essential elements of murder&emdash;Ladner’s brutal beating of Garner&emdash; would constitute any number of separate and distinct homicide offenses (such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, involun- tary manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide) as well as several non-lethal ex- cessive force offenses (such as aggravated assault or assault), for which Ladner could have been prosecuted separately. Thus, the question posed in the third step of the second phase of Grady is answered affirm- atively. As the
As third step was answered affirmatively, we must proceed to the fourth and final step of Grady’s second phase. At phase. At [363]*363this final step we must determine whether Ladner was in fact prosecuted in the first (civil rights) trial for any separate and distinct offenses constituted by conduct that the prosecution would have to prove to establish an essential element in the second (murder) trial. Our conclusion is clearly not. In the first trial Ladner was not prosecuted for any of the various homicide offenses; neither was he prosecuted for assault, aggravated assault, or any other non-lethal excessive force offenses. The essential element at issue in Ladner's prosecution for murder is the physical element that the prosecution stated it would prove by evidence of Ladner’s beating of Garner. Although this conduct alone (the beating) may constitute a number of separate and distinct offenses (such as aggravated assault, assault, etc.), none of those distinct offenses are offenses for which Ladner was in fact tried in the first prosecution.
Ladner was tried only for violating Garner’s civil rights. Each such offense involved the physical injury element plus three additional elements: a prisoner in custody, a peace officer as malefactor, and the subjective knowledge of such peace officer that his action was illegal. The beating alone does not constitute the offense of violating a prisoner’s civil rights. Moreover, none of the three additional elements, nor the civil rights offense itself, are required to be proved by the prosecution in Ladner’s subsequent trial to establish an essential element of murder. Therefore, even though Ladner’s conduct (the beating) constitutes any number of offenses (aggravated assault, assault, etc.), and even though that same conduct (the beating) would necessarily be used to establish essential elements in Ladner’s murder trial, Ladner was never before prosecuted for any offense based solely on that “conduct.” In and of itself, the conduct to be proved to establish an essential element in the second (murder) prosecution does not constitute either of the civil rights violations for which he was previously prosecuted.
We recognize that in the two prosecutions there is an identity of conduct — evidence of Ladner’s beating of Garner featured prominently in both prosecutions. But the fact that the same evidence may be presented in both trials is irrelevant. See Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2094 & n. 15. The critical inquiry is whether an essential element of the offense charged in the second prosecution requires proof of conduct that constitutes a separate and distinct offense for which Ladner has already been prosecuted.
In Grady, the defendant was prosecuted in his first trial for specific offenses — DWI and crossing the center line — established by conduct that in the second prosecution the state’s bill of particulars stated would be used to prove the essential elements of the vehicular homicide and assault offenses. By contrast, Ladner was not prosecuted in his first trial for any offense wholly established by proof of conduct that would be used to establish an essential element of an offense charged in his second prosecution. In no way did the beating (an essential element in the murder charge), in and of itself, constitute either offense for which Ladner was tried in the first prosecution.
E. The Lesson of Grady
Grady teaches that, in the context of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the subsequent prosecution if the government will prove conduct that establishes an essential element of an offense charged in the second prosecution and that conduct, in and of itself, constitutes an offense for which the defendant was tried in the initial prosecution. Again, Ladner was not prosecuted in his civil rights trial for any offense constituted solely by conduct the proof of which would have been used to establish an essential element of the murder offense for which he would be tried in the second prosecution.13
[364]*364Further, Grady admonishes that it is establishing neither an “actual evidence” or “same evidence” test, nor a “same conduct” or “same transaction” test. Rather, the new second phase test of Grady is a complex, skillfully crafted four step test: “The Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish [1] an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove [2] conduct that constitutes [3] an offense for which the defendant has already been [4] prosecuted.” Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added). When those four steps are faithfully followed in the instant case, the conclusion is inescapable that Ladner’s second prosecution survives not only Grady’s first phase tests of Blockburger and its exceptions, but the new, second phase four-step test of Grady as well. Clearly, Ladner’s second prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
CONCLUSION
Grady is new and its lesson, even if carefully analyzed and painstakingly administered, is not easy to apply. As demonstrated above, applying Grady’s new test to Ladner’s circumstances is considerably more arduous than applying it to the more straightforward circumstances of Grady itself.14 A strict reading of Grady, however, convinces us that our interpretation is accurate and that the result reached in this case is correct, albeit opposite from the final result of Grady. In that case the defendant obviously had been prosecuted in his first trial for offenses constituted by conduct the proof of which the State proposed to use in establishing essential elements of the crimes charged in the second prosecution. In the instant case the reverse is true: Ladner was never prosecuted in Sabine County for an offense constituted by conduct that would be used by the State in Smith County to prove an essential element of the offense of murder. The sole similarity in the two prosecutions of Lad-ner is the congruity of conduct (the beating) which the prosecution used as evidence of each offense. Under Grady that simply is not enough to produce a double jeopardy bar.
Because we find that Ladner’s Smith County prosecution for the murder of Loyal Garner was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the judgment of the district court denying Ladner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is
AFFIRMED.