Thomas Armand Alexandre Baudin v. Palo Alto Unified School District, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 THOMAS ARMAND ALEXANDRE Case No. 25-cv-10605-PCP BAUDIN, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 9 TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, v. SCREENING COMPLAINT, AND 10 GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND PALO ALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL 11 DISTRICT, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 2, 8 Defendants. 12 13 Self-represented plaintiff Thomas Baudin filed a complaint against the Palo Alto Unified 14 School District (PAUSD) and various district personnel, Dkt. 1, followed by an amended 15 complaint, Dkt. 8. Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis—i.e., without 16 paying the otherwise mandatory filing fee. Dkt. 2. The Court grants plaintiff’s application. As 17 required by 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2), the Court also screens plaintiff’s amended complaint and finds 18 that it improperly omits plaintiff’s signature and fails to adequately allege any federal claims. In 19 the absence of a viable federal claim, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 20 plaintiff’s state law claims. The amended complaint is therefore dismissed with leave to amend. 21 Plaintiff must file a second amended complaint by April 7, 2026, or risk dismissal of his case. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff alleges that on May 13, 2025, he was wrongfully terminated from his substitute 24 teaching position at Ellen Fletcher Middle School after only a few hours of teaching. Plaintiff told 25 a student that the film “Lilo & Stitch” was altered due to the events of September 11, 2001. He 26 alleges that the principal subsequently accused him of telling the student a “9/11 conspiracy 27 theory” and instructed him not to return to the classroom. He later received an email discontinuing 1 by email and in-person to clarify the circumstances that led to his dismissal. Plaintiff also brought 2 a formal complaint to the PAUSD school board. Plaintiff then filed this action alleging five federal 3 claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and eight state law claims against defendants. 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits a court to authorize a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis if the 6 plaintiff shows that they cannot afford the fees necessary to pursue an action. See 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915(a)(1). The Court, however, must screen every civil action brought in forma pauperis under 8 § 1915 and dismiss any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 9 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.” 28 10 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000). 11 ANALYSIS 12 I. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 13 Upon review of plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is persuaded 14 that he is unable to pay the filing fee based on his income and financial resources. His application 15 is therefore granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 16 II. Plaintiff must sign the complaint. 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) requires that “every pleading, written motion, and 18 other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by a party 19 personally if the party is unrepresented. … The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the 20 omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.” 21 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is unsigned. Plaintiff must file a second amended complaint 22 that includes his signature. Nevertheless, the Court proceeds to screen the merits of plaintiff’s 23 claims so that he may file a second amended complaint resolving both the missing signature and 24 the substantive deficiencies identified by the Court below. 25 III. Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a federal claim. 26 A. First Amendment Retaliation (Count 1) 27 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by “terminating him 1 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by 2 the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 3 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 4 Even a temporary or probationary public employee that can be “discharged for any reason or for 5 no reason at all” “may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising 6 her constitutional right to freedom of expression.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383–84 7 (1987) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284–85 (1977)). To 8 determine whether a government employer impeded an employee’s First Amendment rights 9 through retaliatory action, courts in the Ninth Circuit use a five-step test, asking:

10 (1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) 11 whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or 12 motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee 13 differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even 14 absent the protected speech. 15 Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F. 3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Eng v. Cooley, 16 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)). Because the test is sequential, a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy 17 one step of the test “necessarily concludes our inquiry.” Id. (citation omitted). 18 At step one, “[s]peech involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be considered 19 to relate to ‘any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” Eng, 552 F.3d at 20 1070 (citation omitted). “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern 21 must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the 22 whole record.” Id. Plaintiff alleges his speech concerned “historical and educational topics of 23 public concern, including the cultural and media impact of the events of September 11, 2001.” 24 Even assuming the Court finds that this speech addressed a matter of public concern, 25 plaintiff’s claim fails at step two because his allegations show that he spoke in his capacity as a 26 public employee. “Statements are made in the speaker’s capacity as citizen if the speaker ‘had no 27 official duty’ to make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product of 1 “whether [plaintiff’s] speech owes its existence to his position, or whether he spoke just as any 2 non-employee citizen could have.” Johnson, 658 F.3d at 967. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 3 found that “teachers do not cease acting as teachers each time the bell rings or the conversation 4 moves beyond the narrow topic of curricular instruction.” Id. at 967–68. Rather, they act in their 5 capacities as public employees “when at school or a school function.” Id. at 968 (concluding that a 6 teacher acted as an employee “when he went to school and taught class, took attendance, 7 supervised students, or regulated their comings-and-goings”); see Peloza v. Capistrano Unified 8 Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994) (“While at the high school, whether he is in the 9 classroom or outside of it during contract time, Peloza is not just any ordinary citizen.”). Although 10 plaintiff alleges that he spoke “in a private conversation not pursuant to his official duties” when 11 “class was only nominally in session,” he nonetheless alleges he spoke to a student, during the 12 school day, and “in a classroom setting.” Because plaintiff spoke at school while teaching or 13 supervising students, his speech was made in his official capacity as a public employee. 14 Accordingly, he fails to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 15 B. First Amendment Right to Free Speech and Right to Petition (Count 2) 16 Plaintiff alleges that an email from defendant and PAUSD superintendent Don Austin 17 directing plaintiff not to contact anyone in the district or visit any district facilities “constituted an 18 unlawful prior restraint and retaliation for Plaintiff’s attempts to petition for redress of 19 grievances.” 20 The petition clause of the First Amendment “protects the right of individuals to appeal to 21 courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of legal disputes.” Borough 22 of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011). A government employee cannot state a 23 claim for a violation of the petition clause against a government employer for the employer’s 24 allegedly retaliatory action unless the employee’s petition related to a matter of public concern. Id. 25 at 392–93, 398–99. Like claims for retaliation based on speech, “whether an employee’s petition 26 relates to a matter of public concern will depend on ‘the content, form, and context of [the 27 petition], as revealed by the whole record. … A petition filed with an employer using an internal 1 political or social point of view beyond the employment context.” Id. at 398. Here, plaintiff’s 2 allegations demonstrate that the petitions for which he allegedly faced retaliatory action concerned 3 only private matters. Plaintiff’s alleged petitions included emails to and conversations with district 4 personnel as well as a formal complaint to the PAUSD school board. These petitions “request[ed] 5 action on his dismissal” from employment and the failure to reinstate him to his substitute 6 teaching position. The petitions were made through individual channels and, in the case of 7 plaintiff’s formal complaint to the school board, an existing mechanism for employee grievances. 8 Taken together, the content and context of plaintiff’s petitions indicate that they concerned matters 9 of private concern “based on ordinary workplace grievances.” See id. at 392. Plaintiff therefore 10 cannot state a claim for retaliation based on this petitioning activity. 11 Plaintiff also does not state a claim for a violation of his First Amendment rights based on 12 his theory that Austin’s email constituted a prior restraint. Prior restraints involve legislative 13 statutes, regulatory schemes, or judicial orders “forbidding certain communications when issued in 14 advance of the time that such communications are to occur.” Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 15 (1983) (emphasis in original); Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853, 858 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017). A prior 16 restraint bears “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,” particularly when it 17 affords a government official or agency unbridled discretion in whether to allow or disallow 18 certain speech or fails to outline sufficient parameters for when speech is allowed. See FW/PBS, 19 Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225–26 (1990). Here, however, plaintiff has not alleged that 20 Austin acted pursuant to any legislative, administrative, or judicial scheme accompanied by any 21 enforcement mechanism—only that Austin asked him to stop emailing district personnel or 22 visiting district facilities. It is not apparent from the amended complaint that Austin had any 23 means to enforce this request given that plaintiff’s employment had already terminated. 24 Accordingly, these allegations are insufficient to state a claim for an unlawful prior restraint. 25 C. Fourteenth Amendment Deprivation of Liberty and Due Process (Count 3) 26 To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must establish “(1) a deprivation of a 27 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural 1 protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. Of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 2 1998). 3 Plaintiff alleges he was terminated without investigation or an opportunity to be heard. In 4 the process, he alleges “Defendants impugned Plaintiff’s honesty and fitness to teach, foreclosing 5 future employment opportunities” and “future licensing” for careers in K-12 education and 6 administration. These allegations fail to establish that defendants deprived plaintiff of a 7 constitutionally protected interest. 8 First, “damage to reputation—without more—is insufficient to implicate the Fourteenth 9 Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Chaudry v. Aragón, 68 F.4th 1161, 1170 (9th Cir. 2023). 10 Second, although there is a protected liberty interest in the right “to engage in any of the common 11 occupations of life,” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (citation omitted), this 12 interest “protects the right to pursue an entire profession, and not the right to pursue a particular 13 job.” Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Therefore, to 14 establish a violation of occupational liberty, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that they are “unable 15 to pursue an entire occupation due to Defendant’s actions … rising to the level of a government 16 blacklist or the revocation of a license to practice a particular profession.” Id. at 1081. Here, 17 plaintiff does not allege he has tried to pursue other opportunities in K-12 education and 18 administration and been denied such opportunities as a result of defendants’ actions. Because 19 “‘loss of future income’ and ‘future employment opportunities’ alone ‘do not rise to the level of a 20 deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest,’” without more, plaintiff 21 does not allege a deprivation. Doe v. Or. State Univ., 614 F. Supp. 3d 847, 860 (D. Or. 2022) 22 (citation omitted); see Guzman v. Shewry, No. 08-cv-00769-MMM (RZx), 2008 WL 11441901, at 23 *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008) (“Guzman has neither alleged nor proffered evidence that he has 24 been barred forever from the practice of medicine.”). Third, “government employees can have a 25 protected property interest in their continued employment if they have a legitimate claim to tenure 26 or if the terms of the employment make it clear that the employee can be fired only for cause.” 27 Blantz v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 727 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). 1 only be fired for cause. 2 Because plaintiff fails to adequately allege defendants deprived him of a constitutionally 3 protected interest, he does not state a due process claim on which relief can be granted. 4 D. Monell Claims (Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 10) 5 Plaintiff’s federal claims are also premised on Monell liability, including the claims 6 discussed above and his standalone claims for Monell liability (count 4) and for failure to train 7 (count 10). Under Monell, local governments are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983. See 8 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). But a municipality may be held liable 9 for constitutional injuries inflicted by one of its employees or agents only if the underlying 10 violation of federal law resulted from: (1) an express municipal policy; (2) a widespread practice 11 that constitutes a custom or usage; (3) the decision of a person with final policymaking authority; 12 or (4) inadequate training. Id.; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); City of 13 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 14 “In order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must 15 [plead] ‘(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that 16 the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 17 plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional 18 violation.’” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. 19 Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). 20 Because the Court has found that plaintiff fails to adequately allege a violation of his First 21 or Fourteenth Amendment rights, plaintiff has failed to plead that he was deprived of a 22 constitutional right. Accordingly, he does not state a Monell claim. 23 IV. The Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. 24 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, a federal court plaintiff must 25 adequately allege that the court has original subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 26 Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). To do so, a complaint must meet the requirements for 27 either (1) federal question jurisdiction or (2) diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. 1 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction requires that parties are citizens of different states and the 2 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff’s amended complaint 3 alleges that the Court has original jurisdiction based on federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff does 4 not allege the citizenship of the parties such that the Court can conclude that is has diversity 5 jurisdiction. 6 When a federal court has original subject matter jurisdiction, it also has “supplemental 7 jurisdiction over all other claims,” including state law claims, “that are so related to claims in the 8 action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 9 Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A federal court “may decline to 10 exercise supplemental jurisdiction,” however, if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has 11 original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 12 Because the Court has concluded that plaintiff’s complaint, as currently alleged, does not 13 state a viable federal claim, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 14 plaintiff’s state law claims unless and until he pleads a valid federal claim. 15 FEDERAL PRO SE PROGRAM 16 Plaintiff is reminded that the San Jose Courthouse’s Federal Pro Se Program provides free 17 information and limited scope legal advice to self-represented civil litigants. This service is free. 18 The Federal Pro Se Program is available by phone appointment at (408) 297-1480. The Court’s 19 webpage includes additional online resources: http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/. 20 CONCLUSION 21 Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Upon screening plaintiff’s 22 amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court finds that each of plaintiff’s 23 federal claims fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. In the absence of a valid 24 federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law 25 claims. Thus, the amended complaint is dismissed. 26 Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint by April 7, 2026. Any 27 second amended complaint must be signed by plaintiff. Failure to timely file a second amended 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 || Dated: February 10, 2026

P. Casey Pitts 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 a 12

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