Thole v. Westfall

682 S.W.2d 33, 1984 Mo. App. LEXIS 4369
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 9, 1984
DocketNo. 47929
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 682 S.W.2d 33 (Thole v. Westfall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thole v. Westfall, 682 S.W.2d 33, 1984 Mo. App. LEXIS 4369 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinion

DONALD BARNES, Special Judge.

This is an appeal of several cases which were consolidated at trial below. All the cases involve video games that were seized, pursuant to warrants, from several bars and taverns in St. Louis County on August 5, 1982. The sole issue1 for our consideration is whether the court below misinterpreted and misapplied Missouri gambling laws in holding that none of the games was a gambling device subject to forfeiture under § 572.120 RSMo 1978.

The games are described in the record as “Omega Double Up”, “Royal Flush”, “Electro Sport Draw Poker”, “Electro Sport Draw Poker II”, “Double Up”, “Draw 90 Card Game”, “Draw 80 Card Game”, “Tuni Electro”, “Draw Poker Video”, “Draw Poker”, “Sweet Shawnee II”, “Shawnee # 2”, “Kenney Sweet Shawnee”, “Circus Days”, and “Players Choice”. All were leased, usually under oral profit sharing arrangements, by their respective owners (Respondents herein) to the bars and taverns from which they were seized.

The characteristics and play of the machines are not in dispute. Four simulate slot machine play, one features Black Jack poker and the remainder are programmed to simulate some of the elements of draw poker. The electronic circuitry of the slot machine devices is programmed to produce, at random, images of various objects which “rotate” on the screen. When the “rotation” stops, the player is awarded “points” if designated combinations of objects are shown or highlighted.2 The circuitry of the poker devices produces an electronic simulation of a hand of five cards, in the case of draw poker, or two hands of two cards (the “dealer’s” and the player’s), in the case of Black Jack. After the cards are displayed, the player must press a button to indicate whether he wishes to “stand pat” or, in the ease of draw poker, to discard and have replacement cards “dealt” or, in the case of Black Jack, to simply have additional cards “dealt”. If the resulting hand is a winning hand according to the rules of the respective games, the player is awarded “points”.3 Some devices allow players to accumulate up to 9,999 points.

All machines are coin operated accepting from a single coin to multiples of coins, in some cases hundreds of coins (generally quarters) at a time and will credit the player one “point” for each coin inserted. The machines are programmed so that points credited for coins and points won for successful play may be used in the same manner: either may be used to replay the device and, on some machines, may also be bet, up to ten at a time, on any one replay. All points, whether won or paid for, are thus equal in value to an equivalent number of coins.

On most machines, points of players who do not wish to continue play may be erased by using a “knock down” button or switch. The number of points so erased is either recorded on meters concealed from public view or stored in “memory” and brought up only by flipping a special switch or entering a special code. At trial, the owners of these machines testified they were aware of this recording feature but could not explain its purpose.4 Appellant’s expert witness, William L. Holmes, an agent with FBI gambling unit, testified that a record of total points erased was useful only if someone were making payoffs for [36]*36points won and needed a record of points paid off (points erased) so that he could be reimbursed by the machine’s owner.

Although there was no evidence that cash payoffs had been made on the machines in issue, Officer Schupp of the St. Louis County Police Department testified that, in the course of his department’s investigations, he had observed bar owners making cash payoffs on an “Omega Double Up” and “Draw 90” like those in issue. He testified that bar owners made the payoffs (ten dollars for forty points and thirty dollars for one hundred twenty points) and then erased the points paid off.

The trial court held that, since the machines in issue directly pay off only in free replays, they are capable of innocent use and thus may not be declared forfeit without evidence that other types of payoffs have been made. Appellant, the Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, contends the trial court, in so holding, misinterpreted and misapplied the applicable gambling laws.

We begin with the fundamentals. In Missouri, a machine may be deemed a gambling device even when there is no showing that it has been used for gambling. § 572.010(5) RSMo 1978 defines gambling devices to include devices that are usable, as well as those that are used, in gambling. Of course, not every device that is merely usable in gambling may be seized. Such a device, with the exception of a slot machine, is subject to seizure only if its possessors knew or had reason to believe it was to be used in gambling. §§ 572.120 and 572.070 RSMo 1978.5 When it is obvious, from the appearance and play of a device, that it was specifically devised for gambling, the device itself will be circumstantial evidence that its possessors knew it was to be so used.6 Whether or not such a device is capable of innocent use is irrelevant; any device may be used innocently just as any device may be used in gambling.

§ 572.010(4), (3), (12) RSMo 19787 provide the basis for determining whether a device is specifically devised for gambling. These definitions show that gambling includes playing games wherein 1) players stake or risk something of value, 2) chance is a material factor and 3) success[37]*37ful play is rewarded by “something of value”. The only game expressly excluded from the definition of gambling is “an amusement device that confers only an immediate right of replay not exchangeable for something of value”. Thus, a device should be considered an inherent gambling device — a gambling device per se — if it 1) features a game with the aforementioned elements and 2) does not fall within the statutory exception.

We believe that the devices in issue feature games with all the gambling elements. Players must insert coins in order to initiate play, and it is obvious from the character of the featured games that this money is “staked or risked”. It is also apparent that the outcome of the games depends, in a material way, upon the element of chance.8 In the slot machine games, the objects that appear on the screen are determined by the devices’ electronic circuitry and the player has no control over which combination of objects will appear. Thus, from the player’s point of view, winning is purely a matter of luck, a matter of chance.9 In the Black Jack and draw poker games, the player decides whether additional cards will be dealt but has no control over other factors materially affecting the composition of the final hand: the cards initially displayed and the cards selected either as additions to the original hand (in the case of Black Jack) or as replacements for the discards (in the case of draw poker) are determined by the games’ electronic circuitry. Thus, for even the most exceptional player, chance plays a significant role in determining whether he wins or loses.1011 And finally it is clear that, upon successful play, the seized devices award “something of value”. “Something of value” is defined, in § 572.010(12) RSMo 1978, to include, among other things, any form of credit “involving extension of ... a privilege of playing at a game ... without charge”.

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Bluebook (online)
682 S.W.2d 33, 1984 Mo. App. LEXIS 4369, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thole-v-westfall-moctapp-1984.