Theroux v. Mici

District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided June 15, 2023·No. 4:23-cv-40021·Unknown

Opinion

MICHAEL SKYLAR THEROUX, Case No. 4:23-cv-40021-MRG

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER v.

MASSACHUSETTS, ATTORNEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Defendants.

Before the Court is Michael Skylar Theroux’s (“Theroux”) Verified Amended Complaint, ECF No. 13 and renewed motion for appoint of pro bono counsel, ECF No. 14. The Verified Amended Complaint is subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (“Section 1915”) because Theroux is proceeding in forma pauperis, see Order, ECF No. 11, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (“Section 1915A”) because Theroux is a prisoner. Both Section 1915 and Section 1915A authorize federal courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the claims therein are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In conducting this review, the Court liberally construes Theroux’s complaint because she1 is proceeding pro se. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520- 21 (1972). For the reasons stated below, certain defendants will be dismissed and Theroux is granted leave to file an amended complaint by August 15, 2023, or the action will be dismissed. The renewed motion for appoint of counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

1 Theroux identifies as a transgender female. Ver. Am. Compl. 1. Accordingly, the pronoun “she” Theroux’s verified amended complaint alleges that on June 29, 2023, she was sexually assaulted by another prisoner, and that the defendants failed to protect her. The factual allegations of the complaint read as follows: On June 29th 2023, Inmate Michael "Skylar" Theroux who is a transgender female was forcibly involved with a sexual assault at the N.C.C.I. Prison. The Investigation was substantiated under Federal PREA. The Assault was "phone tipped" to the I.P.S. Officers at the prison that an event was in progress. Plaintiff was a known target by this individual and the DOC Refused, Failed to act, the Commissioner of Correction let an SBCC Inmate with a history of similar assault actions (but in a more catastrophic outcome) transfer to a Level 4 Medium Security Facility and floor unit in Thomson Hall that houses vulnerable inmates known as the Residential Treatment Unit and Transgender Inmates. Plaintiff alleges that The Superintendent of N.C.C.I. (Defendant) failed to protect the defendant at N.C.C.I. who has had a history of being a victim to abuse and reported it to the appropriate departments. Plaintiff has suffered serious injuries such as Rape Syndrome, Emotional Distress, Night terrors, Inability to Concentrate, Flash Backs and other Symptoms. Correctional Staff knew of the inmate who was transferred from S.B.C.C. to lower custody and onto a floor where Plaintiff lives and the event took place. But failed to intervene or alert the Plaintiff his safety may be an issue. Correctional Staff knew there were issue between both the victim and Perpetrator who is now transferred to Norfolk State Prison. Ver. Am. Compl. 1. Attached to the Amended Complaint are 53 pages of exhibits that include reports and other documents concerning the alleged assault incident, Exhibits, ECF No. 13-1. II. DISCUSSION A. Claims Against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Department of Corrections, and Official Capacity Monetary Damages Claims Against the Individual Defendants Are Barred by Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity. “The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against states and state officials.” Doe v. Shibinette, 16 F.4th 894, 903 (1st Cir. 2021). It “does not bar suits for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities, though such officials are usually protected by common law immunity.” Haidak v. Univ. of Massachusetts-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 76 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)); see Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 558 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2009). It also does not bar “prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law, in part because a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action in enforcing state law is not one against the State.” Shibinette, 16 F.4th at 903 (citations and quotations omitted). Regardless of the relief sought, to the extent that the complaint is construed to bring a Section 1983 claim against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and DOC, the action is DISMISSED on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. Poirier, 558 at 97 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of the Massachusetts Department of Correction on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds); Cavitt v. MDOC, CV 19-12479-NMG, 2020 WL 8970663, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 2020). Furthermore, the individual defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in their official capacities for monetary damages, and such claims are DISMISSED. The action is not dismissed to the extent Theroux seeks Section 1983 damages from individual defendants in their personal capacities, or injunctive relief against them in their official and personal capacities. B. The Amended Complaint Fails to Meet the Procedural Pleading Requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Amended Complaint fails to meet the basic pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Rules, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and “‘give [each] defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). To be sure, “the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) are minimal — but ‘minimal requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent requirements.’” Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988)). Accordingly, a “complaint should at least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why—although why, when why means the actor's state of mind, can be averred generally.” Id. Here, while the three-paragraph complaint is understandable, there is insufficient factual development of the knowledge and participation of the remaining individual defendants: Superintendent Matthew Divris and Commissioner Carol Mici.2 There are allegations that these individuals directly participated, but the few facts appear to be more akin to a theory of supervisory liability. If so, Theroux should understand that “a

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Haines v. Kerner
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Haidak v. Univ. of Mass-Amherst
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Doe v. Shibinette
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