Theresa Stone, et al. v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 3, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00195
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 THERESA STONE, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, Case No.: 2:24-cv-00195-GMN-EJY 5 vs. 6 ORDER GRANTING EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 7 LLC, et al.,

8 Defendants. 9 10 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Compel Arbitration, (ECF No. 66), filed by 11 Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“EIS”).1 Plaintiff Carter Sullivan filed a 12 Response, (ECF No. 85), to which Defendant replied, (ECF No. 86). Further pending before 13 the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority, (ECF No. 14 87), in support of its Motion to Compel Arbitration. No response was filed and the time to do 15 so has passed. 16 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Compel Arbitration 17 and GRANTS the Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority.2 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This action arises from Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC, Trans Union, 20 LLC, and Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting

21 1 The Motion to Compel Arbitration was originally filed at ECF No. 66, however, Defendant filed a Notice of 22 Corrected Image for its Motion to Compel Arbitration at ECF No. 67. The Court refers to the corrected motion, (ECF No. 67), throughout the rest of the Order. 23 2 Under Local Rule 7-2(g), “[a] party may not file supplemental pleadings, briefs, authorities, or evidence without leave of court granted for good cause.” Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to File Notice of 24 Supplemental Authority, informing the Court about an Eleventh Circuit decision. (See Mot. Leave, ECF No. 87). Plaintiff did not file Responses, or otherwise object to the Motion for Leave. Because Plaintiff does not 25 oppose, and for good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority. See LR 7-2(d). 1 Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. Plaintiff Carter Sullivan is a Member in this Class 2 Action suit alleging violations of the FCRA. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 62). 3 EIS was added as a Defendant on May 9, 2025. (Id. ¶ 4). 4 Plaintiff is a member of CreditWorks, the name of EIS’s credit monitoring service, 5 provided by Experian’s affiliate, ConsumerInfo.com (“CIC”). (Smith Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. 1 to Mot. 6 Compel, ECF No. 67-1). CIC also does business as Experian Consumer Services (“ECS”). 7 (Id). Defendant is an affiliate of CIC/ECS and both entities are subsidiaries of Experian 8 Holdings, Inc. (Id. ¶ 2). Experian plc is the parent company of EIS and CIC/ECS. (Id.) 9 Plaintiff enrolled in CreditWorks on February 12, 2023. (Id. ¶ 3). In order to 10 successfully enroll in CreditWorks, Plaintiff completed a single webform that required him to 11 input his personal information (e.g., his name, address, phone number, and email address). 12 (Id.). He then had to click the “Create Your Account” button on the bottom of the webform. 13 (Id.). Between the areas to enter an email address and the “Create Your Account” button, there 14 was black text that read: “By clicking ‘Create your Account,’ I accept and agree to your Terms 15 of Use Agreement.” (Webform Screenshot, Ex. 1 to Smith Decl., ECF No. 67-1). “Terms of 16 Use Agreement” was written in blue text, rather than black. (Id.) The blue text contains a 17 hyperlink that, when clicked, shows the entire Terms of Use Agreement (“TUA”). (Smith Decl. 18 ¶ 4, Ex. 1 to Mot. Compel). The only way for Plaintiff to enroll in the CreditWorks service is 19 by clicking the “Create Your Account” button. (Id. ¶ 5). 20 The TUA defines ECS as encompassing “affiliates (including, but not limited to 21 Experian Information Solution, Inc.).” (TUA, Ex. 2 to Smith Decl. at 1, ECF No. 67-1). The 22 subsequent “Dispute Resolution by Binding Arbitration” (“Arbitration Agreement”) section of 23 the TUA reads: “For Purposes of this arbitration provision, references to “ECS,” “you,” and 24 “us” shall include our respective parent entities, subsidiaries, [and] affiliates.” (Id. at 7). The 25 1 Arbitration Agreement requires parties to the agreement to arbitrate all claims against ECS and 2 its affiliates that “relate to” or “arise out of” the agreement. (Id.). 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Section 2 of the FAA provides that: 5 A written provision in. . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction. . . 6 shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 7 8 9 U.S.C. § 2. “In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring 9 arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 10 claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Southland Corp. v. 11 Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). Courts place arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as 12 other contracts.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 13 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 14 Under the FAA, parties to an arbitration agreement may seek an order from the Court to 15 compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a 16 district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to 17 arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter 18 Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (alteration in original). Thus, the Court’s “role 19 under the [FAA] is. . . limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists 20 and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Lee v. Intelius Inc., 21 737 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 2013). In answering these questions, the Court must “interpret 22 the contract by applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation, while giving due 23 regard to the federal policy in favor of arbitration by resolving ambiguities as to the scope of 24 arbitration in favor of arbitration. Wagner v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 83 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th 25 Cir. 1996). The party seeking to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by [a] preponderance of the evidence.” Bridge Fund Cap. 1 Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 2 marks and citation omitted). If a district court decides that an arbitration agreement is valid and 3 enforceable, then it should either stay or dismiss the claims subject to arbitration. Nagrampa v. 4 MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 2006). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 Defendant EIS filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration against Plaintiff Carter Sullivan, 7 arguing that the Arbitration Agreement is a valid and enforceable instrument which requires 8 Plaintiff to arbitrate all claims arising out of his contract with Defendant. (See generally Mot. 9 Compel). As such, Defendant asserts that the case should be stayed pending arbitration. (Id.). 10 Plaintiff opposes the motion, asserting that Defendant has failed in its burden to prove the 11 existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement. (Resp. 11:4–9, ECF No. 85). Moreover, Plaintiff 12 asserts that even if Defendant can establish that a valid Arbitration Agreement exists, 13 Defendant is neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary to the Arbitration Agreement and is 14 therefore unable to compel arbitration. (Id. 6:13–23, 8:26–9:1). The Court first addresses 15 whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. 16 A. Validity of Arbitration Agreement 17 The Court’s “role under the [FAA] is. . . limited to determining (1) whether a valid 18 agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute 19 at issue.” Lee, 737 F.3d at 1261. Because Plaintiff does not raise any opposition regarding the 20 second prong, the Court need only address whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. In 21 evaluating the validity of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court applies “ordinary state-law 22 principles that govern the formation of contracts.” First Options of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan, 23 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). In Nevada, an agreement constitutes an enforceable contract where 24 there is “an offer and acceptance, meeting of the minds, and consideration.” May v. Anderson, 25 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Nev. 2005). The party seeking to compel arbitration, in this case 1 Defendant, bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid agreement by a preponderance 2 of the evidence. Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc., 944 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2022). 3 Defendant claims that Plaintiff signed a valid agreement to arbitrate when he clicked the 4 “Create Your Account” Button on the CreditWorks website. (Mot. Compel 5:17–6:13). To 5 support this argument, Defendant offers a declaration by Dan Smith, the Director of Product 6 Operations for CIC. (Smith Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. 1 to Mot. Compel). In the declaration, Smith testifies 7 as to his role at CIC, confirms the date that Plaintiff created his CreditWorks account, and 8 outlines the procedure necessary to create such an account, which necessarily included Plaintiff 9 agreeing to terms of arbitration. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3). Plaintiff, however, challenges the validity of the 10 Arbitration Agreement arguing that (1) the Smith Declaration is inadmissible, (2) the 11 declaration does not prove the existence of the contract, and (3) Plaintiff did not receive proper 12 notice of the Arbitration Agreement negating the element of mutual assent. (See generally 13 Resp.). 14 1. Admissibility of the Smith Declaration 15 Plaintiff first argues that the Smith Declaration is inadmissible and cannot be used as 16 evidence to prove the existence of the Arbitration Agreement. (Id. at 11:4–14). For evidence to 17 be admissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 56(c)(4), a “declaration used to 18 support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be 19 admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the 20 matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(4). “Evidence to prove personal knowledge may 21 consist of the witness’s own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. It may also “be inferred from a 22 declarant’s position.” In re Kaypro, 218 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2000). 23 Here, Smith testified to his position and duties at CIC/ECS. (Smith Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. 1 to 24 Mot. Compel). He describes the process that Plaintiff would have to complete to successfully 25 create a CreditWorks account. (Id. at ¶ 3). Smith also verified Plaintiff’s account through 1 CreditWork’s internal records. (Id. at ¶ 1). In evaluating similar declarations, also made by 2 Smith in other lawsuits, courts found that “Smith’s job title and description of his duties are 3 sufficient to establish his personal knowledge of the steps a customer must take (and the 4 webpages a customer must encounter) when signing up for a CreditWorks account.” Oatway v 5 Experian Sols., Inc., No. 2:24-CV-00523-LK, 2024 WL 4879822, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 6 2024) (quoting Williams v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., No. CV-23-01076-PHX-DWL, 2024 WL 7 3876171, at *15 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2024). Persuaded by the reasoning of those courts in 8 evaluating the admissibility of almost identical declarations by Smith, the Court finds that the 9 evidence provided in Smith’s declaration was from the declarant’s personal knowledge and is 10 therefore admissible under FRCP 56(c)(4). 11 2. The Declaration is Sufficient to Establish a Valid Contract 12 Plaintiff next contends that because Smith testified only to his knowledge of the 13 enrollment process, rather than about Plaintiff’s actual experience, the declaration fails to 14 establish the existence of a contract. (Resp.12:25–13:13). Plaintiff does not dispute the facts 15 offered in the declaration, namely that Plaintiff “(1) enrolled in CreditWorks; (2) . . . completed 16 a single ‘webform’ which collected [Plaintiff]’s personal information; and (3) . . . accepted and 17 agreed to ConsumerInfo.com’s terms of Use Agreement by clicking a button labeled ‘Create 18 Your Account.’” (Id. at 12:7–11). Rather, he contends that Smith lacked personal knowledge 19 because Smith had no way of knowing what Plaintiff actually saw on his electronic device 20 because he was not in the room with Plaintiff. (Id. at 12:11–12). 21 Courts in this circuit have generally found Smith’s declarations offered in other similar 22 cases sufficient to establish the existence of a contract. See, e.g., Bryant v. JPMorgan Chase 23 Bank, N.A., 763 F. Supp. 3d 946, 950 (C.D. Cal. 2025); Oatway, 2024 WL 4879822, at *5 24 (“Smith’s declaration is therefore sufficient to show that he has personal knowledge of the 25 enrollment process and [Plaintiff]’s enrollment based on his job duties and his review of 1 Experian’s business records.”). Requiring Smith to have personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s 2 specific enrollment data, or to validate what Plaintiff saw on his device “imposes a far greater 3 burden for personal knowledge than what is required.” Oatway, 2024 WL 4879822, at *4. 4 Plaintiff relies on Newton v. Experian Info. Sols., in which a court found a similar 5 declaration by Smith insufficient to establish the existence of a valid contract, to support his 6 position. No. CV 623-059, 2024 WL 3451895 (S.D. Ga. July 18, 2024), rev’d and remanded, 7 No. 24-12398, 2025 WL 2102084 (11th Cir. July 28, 2025). Plaintiff’s reliance on Newton, 8 however, is misplaced. Since filing his Response, the district court’s finding in Newton—that 9 the declaration by Smith was inadmissible—has been overruled by the Eleventh Circuit. 10 Newton v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 24-12398, 2025 WL 2102084, at *3 (11th Cir. July 11 28, 2025). In making its ruling, the panel found that the declaration was sufficient because 12 Smith was able to confirm the date and time of enrollment, as well as “the exact path the 13 consumer encountered when completing their enrollment.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Court 14 therefore joins numerous other courts and finds that Smith’s declaration in this case is sufficient 15 to establish the existence of a valid contract. 16 3. Notice 17 Plaintiff finally contends that even if a contract was formed, the website did not provide 18 sufficient notice such that Defendant fails to establish mutual assent. (Resp. 13:27–14:18). If a 19 website operator cannot demonstrate actual notice, mutual assent may be found on a theory of 20 inquiry notice if “(1) the website provides reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to which 21 the consumer will be bound; and (2) the consumer takes some action, such as clicking a 22 button.” Godun v. JustAnswer LLC, 135 F.4th 699, 709 (9th Cir. 2025). In internet contracts, a 23 website using a “sign-in wrap” “provides a link to terms of use and indicates that some action 24 may bind the user but does not require that the user to actually review those terms.” Chabolla v 25 ClassPass Inc., 129 F.4th 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2025). “Courts should expect that a reasonable 1 internet user is more vigilant in looking for contractual terms when the context of the 2 transaction reasonably implies a contractual relationship.” Godun, 135 F.4th at 709. 3 Looking at the form itself, the Court concludes that a reasonably prudent internet user 4 would be aware that they were being bound to the Terms of Use. The “Terms of Use” 5 hyperlink is in a contrasting blue font, and the text clearly states: “By clicking ‘Create Your 6 Account’ I accept and agree to your ‘Terms of Use Agreement.’” (Webform Screenshot, Ex. 1 7 to Smith Decl.). Plaintiff does not dispute that he took the affirmative action of clicking on the 8 “Create Your Account” button. In examining an identical webform, other courts have come to 9 the same conclusion as this Court. See, e.g., Saucedo v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc. No. 1:22-cv- 10 01584-ADA-HBK, 2023 WL 4708015, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2023); Driskill v Experian 11 Info. Sols., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 3d 839, 845 (N.D. Cal. 2024); Oatway, No. 2:24-cv-00523-LK 12 2024, WL4879822, at *6. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff was provided notice of the 13 Arbitration Agreement and a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. 14 B. Defendant is a Party to the Arbitration Agreement 15 The Court next examines whether Defendant may directly enforce the arbitration 16 agreement as a party. In this case, the Arbitration Agreement requires Plaintiff to arbitrate all 17 claims against ECS that “relate to” or “arise out of” the Arbitration Agreement. (TUA at 10, 18 Ex. 2 to Smith Decl.). The Arbitration Agreement defines all references to ECS to include 19 “respective parent entities, subsidiaries, [and] affiliates.” (Id.). The TUA specifically names 20 Defendant as one of the affiliates included in the Arbitration Agreement. (Id. at 4). 21 Despite this, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not a party to the Arbitration Agreement, 22 because Defendant and CIC/ECS are entirely separate legal entities. (Resp. 6:21–23). In his 23 Response, Plaintiff cites Revitch v DIRECTTV, LLC, which found that DirectTV was not a 24 party to an arbitration agreement that the plaintiff had entered into with AT&T Mobility, an 25 affiliate of DirectTV. 977 F.3d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 2020). However, Revitch is distinguishable 1 from the facts here. In Revitch , the court found that DirectTV was not a party to the agreement 2 because it was not an affiliate of AT&T at the time the agreement was entered into; rather it 3 became affiliated with AT&T years after the plaintiff and AT&T entered into the agreement. 4 Id. at 717. The fact that AT&T and DirectTV were not affiliates at the time of the agreement 5 was dispositive: “[h]ad the wireless services agreement stated that “AT&T” refers to ‘any 6 affiliates, both present and future,’ we might arrive at a different conclusion.” Id. at 718. Here, 7 in contrast, Defendant was already affiliated with CIC when Plaintiff entered into the 8 Arbitration Agreement. Indeed, the very language of the TUA informed Plaintiff that he would 9 be bound in arbitration with Defendant. 10 Plaintiff further contends that, because Defendant and CIC/ECS provide different 11 services, the Court should find that EIS is not a party to the Arbitration Agreement. (Resp. 12 8:14–25). He describes the services provided by CIC, including credit monitoring, 13 CreditWorks, Experian Boost, and Financial Management Tools. (Id. at 7:19–24). Defendant, 14 on the other hand, provides statutory credit reporting. (Id. at 7:25–26). Again, relying on 15 Revitch, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant may not be a party to the agreement, because the 16 services it provides are only “tangential” to those provided by CIC. (Id. at 8:17–19). But, as 17 stated above, Revitch rests on the impossibility of the plaintiff knowing he would be bound in 18 arbitration with an as of yet unaffiliated entity. Revitch, 977 F.3d at 718. It also found that 19 neither the services provided by DirectTV (cable television service) nor the dispute between it 20 and the plaintiff had “anything to do with providing wireless services.” Id. at 717. Here, in 21 contrast, although CIC and Defendant provide different services, CIC depends on Defendant as 22 a source of credit data; the two entities are not wholly unrelated. (Reply. 9:24–25, ECF No. 86). 23 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit, and district courts within the Ninth Circuit, have found 24 that Defendant, as an affiliate of ECS and CIC, is a party to arbitration agreements between 25 1 consumers and ECS. Meeks v. Experian Info. Servs., Inc., No. 21-17023, 2022 WL 17958634, 2 at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2022); Bryant, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 951; Driskill, 753 F. Supp. 3d at 847. 3 The Court, for the reasons discussed above, joins other courts in the circuit in finding 4 that Defendant is a party to the Arbitration Agreement. Accordingly, Defendant may compel 5 Plaintiff into arbitration.3 6 C. Stay of Plaintiff Sullivan’s Claims Against Defendant EIS 7 Defendant next argues that the Court should impose a stay pending arbitration 8 proceedings. (Mot. Compel 11:23). Plaintiff does not file any points and authorities opposing 9 Defendant’s request to stay the case. See LR 7-2(d). Case law provides that courts should stay 10 or dismiss the claims subject to arbitration. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1276–77. But “[w]hen a 11 federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the 12 court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on 13 the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475–76 14 (2024). Accordingly, the Court enters a stay in this case, only as to Plaintiff Carter Sullivan’s 15 claims against Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. because they are subject to 16 arbitration. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s 19 Motion to Compel Arbitration, (ECF No. 66), is GRANTED. The Court enters a STAY in this 20 case only as to Plaintiff Carter Sullivan’s claims against Defendant Experian Information 21 Solutions, Inc. because they are subject to arbitration. 22 23

24 3 Defendant argues that if the Court did not find it to be a party to the Arbitration Agreement, it could 25 alternatively enforce the Arbitration Agreement as a third-party beneficiary. (Mot. Compel 9:10–11:11). Because the Court finds that Defendant is a party to the Arbitration Agreement, and may therefore compel arbitration, it will not address whether Defendant is a third-party beneficiary. l IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s 2 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority, (ECF N. 87), is GRANTED. 3 DATED this 3 _ day of February, 2026. 4 ° Gloria M. rro, District Judge 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 11 of 11