Theresa Brooke v. The Zislis Group Inc.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 1, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00358
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 Case No.: 2:24-cv-00358-MEMF-PD 10 THERESA BROOKE, a married woman

dealing with her sole and separate claim, 11 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE Plaintiff, COURT SHOULD NOT DECLINE TO 12 EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL v. JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S 13 STATE LAW CLAIMS

14 THE ZISLIS GROUP INC., a California

15 corporation,

Defendant. 16

19 On January 13, 2024, Plaintiff Theresa Brooke, a married woman dealing with her sole and

20 separate claim, filed a Complaint against Defendant The Zislis Group Inc., a California corporation,

21 asserting: (1) a claim for injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with 22 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182–121881; (2) a claim for damages pursuant to 23 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 52, et seq. ECF No. 1. The 24 Complaint alleges that this Court has jurisdiction over the ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 25 and 42 U.S.C. § 12188, and that the state law claims are brought pursuant to supplemental 26 27

28 1 1 jurisdiction. Id. at ¶¶ 3–6. The Complaint also alleges that supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate

2 over the Unruh Act claim pursuant to Arroyo v. Rosas.2

3 Principles of pendent jurisdiction have been codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute,

4 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when

5 deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in

6 each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

7 and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added)

8 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).

9 California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for a limited group of lawsuits

10 brought under the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.55(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading

11 standard requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant

12 case to file a verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the

13 specific barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff

14 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a). A “high-frequency

15 litigant fee” is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t

16 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints

17 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately

18 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation”

19 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant

20 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing

21 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 22 §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint 23

24 2 Although no citation is included for this case, the Court interprets this to be referencing Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 25 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021). However, the Court notes that Arroyo actually stands for the proposition that it is proper for a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim. Id.at 1213 (“The 26 district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this extraordinary situation threatens unusually significant damage to federal-state comity and presents ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of 27 §1367(c)(4).”). Rather, the Ninth Circuit only held that the district court abused its discretion in denying supplemental jurisdiction after summary judgment, when it had “effectively completed its adjudication of 28 | || is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 2 | plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 3 || high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 4 | individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the 5 || individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 6 In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Brooke to show cause in writing why the Court 7 | should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In 8 | responding to this Order to Show Cause: 9 1. Brooke shall identify the amount of statutory damages Brooke seeks to recover. 10 2. Brooke and Brooke’s counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause 11 with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court 12 to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by 13 California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.55(b)(1) & (2). This includes, but is not limited to: 14 a. the number of construction-related accessibility claims filed by Brooke in the twelve 15 months preceding the filing of the present claim; and 16 b. the number of construction-related accessibility claims in which Brooke’s counsel has 17 represented high-frequency litigant plaintiffs in the twelve months preceding the 18 filing of the present claim. 19 Brooke shall file a Response to this Order to Show Cause by no later than fourteen days from 20 || the date of this order. The failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may, 21 | without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 22 | Unruh Act claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 af 25 Dated: March 1, 2024 26 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 27 United States District Judge 28