MacKINNON, Circuit Judge.
Theodore Lombard, his wife Ruth and their four children appeal from a District Court decision dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a claim for damages to themselves and to their children which allegedly resulted from Lombard’s exposure to radiation during military service. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm, 530 F.Supp. 918, the decision of the District Court.
I. Background
Between 1944 and 1946, Lombard served in the United States Army at Los Alamos, New Mexico, where he worked on the “Manhattan Project.” During this period, Lombard, without benefit of protection, allegedly handled plutonium, uranium, and other radioactive substances. Lombard charges that the Army knew such handling might lead to serious health problems, as well as to genetic damage that could debilitate future offspring through inheritance, but that the Army nonetheless permitted him to be exposed to the radiation without warning him of the risks involved. The Army is alleged to have compounded their error by continuing for years after the War to hide information from Lombard on the deleterious effects of radiation contamination.
The Army’s actions allegedly caused Lombard to suffer both physical and genetic damage. His children, all born since the War, have in turn allegedly developed ge[217] netic defects of varying severity. Ruth Lombard, meanwhile, has allegedly suffered mental anguish and emotional distress through caring for her ailing husband and children.
All members of the Lombard family have sued the United States Government, numerous federal agencies, and numerous federal officials both in their official and individual capacities,1 seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),2 the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3),3 42 U.S.C. § 1986,4 and a number of state law provisions. The District Court dismissed appellants’ complaint in toto on the grounds that Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), precluded recovery by any of the named plaintiffs on any of the theories presented. The District Court also granted the motion to strike those defendants named individually from the complaint on the grounds that the complaint did not allege any specific acts on their part for which relief could be granted. This appeal followed.
[218] II. Feres and its Progeny
It is well established that the United States, as sovereign, “is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, ... and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1975). Any waiver of this traditional sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1968); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306 (1957).
The Tort Claims Act is one such explicit waiver. It provides that in most instances of tortious conduct, the “United States shall be liable, respecting . . . tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The application of the Act has been construed in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 1900, 32 L.Ed.2d 499 (1971); and Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941, 947 (D.C.Cir.1975). Notwithstanding the language of the statute, however the Supreme Court has determined that the Act does not waive sovereign immunity for suits brought by servicemen for “service connected injuries.” Feres v. United States, supra; Hatzlachh Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 100 S.Ct. 647, 62 L.Ed.2d 614 (1980); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1976). In Feres v. United States, supra, the Court held without dissent that “the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. The Court noted that though the legislative history of the Tort Claims Act did not specifically refer to the exclusion of suits by servicemen injured on active duty, it was nevertheless discernible from the scheme of the Act itself that Congress did not intend to waive immunity for such suits. On this point the Court remarked, “[i]f Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to apply in cases [involving injuries incident to military service] . . ., it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any provision to adjust . .. [compensation and pension remedies to tort remedies].” Id. at 144, 71 S.Ct. at 158.
This so-called “Feres Doctrine” has been followed by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts.5 Three factors typically underlie the doctrine’s application. First, there is the interpretation of the statute which flows from the “distinctively federal nature” of the relationship between the federal Government and members of its Armed Forces. This supports an interpretation that Congress did not intend the Tort Claims Act to be applicable to service-related injuries because the Act provides that “the law of the jslace-where the act or omissioji-eomplained of-oeeurrgJ~rrrM_§Káll blTlipplied and “it jwouldjnake liiMe-fteaisl-at4ve:l^nsé~to~have -the ftwerQjgen-fe-^^ of ..-_the Armed Services dependent on the fortuity of~rt'he~Dr&visions--efH[aw~~ap^icable in _the locality] wEe?g~the- soldiers happened to [219] be stationed at the time of the injury.”6 Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 2057, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1976). See Feres v. United States, supra, 340 U.S. at 143, 71 S.Ct. at 157.
The second factor supporting the Feres interpretation is the existence of the Veterans’ Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-1008, a form of no fault compensation scheme for servicemen, akin to workmen’s compensation laws, that substitutes for tort liability. Pursuant to this Act, a serviceman is eligible for “simple, certain, and uniform compensation” for injuries occurring during his service, regardless of fault. Hatzlachh Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 100 S.Ct. 647, 62 L.Ed.2d 614 (1980); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc).
The final factor underlying Feres interpretation of the statute, as articulated most clearly by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112, 75 S.Ct. 141, 145, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954), is the
peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty.
See also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 671-72, 97 S.Ct. at 2057-58; United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1857, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963).7 That some rare cases might be long delayed in filing does not diminish this factor — in most eases lawsuits involving military personnel would occur if at all shortly after the event. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).8 In any event, liability should not depend on delay in prosecuting a claim.
In addition to its application to cases brought by servicemen concerning injuries suffered while on active duty in the armed services, Feres has also been held to bar cases brought by third parties (usually family members) where the claim originates with or derives from an injury to a serviceman incident to military service.9 In such cases, relief is “unavailable for essentially the same reasons that the direct action [was] ... barred in Feres.” Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2058.
[W]here the case concerns an injury sustained by a soldier while on duty, the effect of action upon military discipline is identical whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by a third party. The litigation would take virtually the identical form in either case, and at issue would be the degree of fault, if any, on the part of the Government’s agents and the effect upon the serviceman’s safety.
Id. (emphasis added).
Of central importance in scrutinizing cases against the Government in light of [220] Feres is an adherence to “the line drawn in the Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the course of military duty.” United States v. Brown, supra, 348 U.S. at 113, 75 S.Ct. at 145. Thus, in Henry v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1978), for example, the Government was held immune from liability to a third party defendant and two National Guard helicopter pilots killed while on active duty as a result of allegedly defective helicopter construction by the third party defendant.
In United States v. Brown, supra, meanwhile, a discharged veteran suffered an injured left knee due to negligent treatment by doctors in a Veterans Administration hospital. Though the Government urged that the ensuing tort suit be dismissed as being barred by Feres, the Supreme Court ruled that the serviceman’s injury was not incident to military service, and suit was accordingly authorized under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
III. Discussion op Appellants’ Federal Tort Claims
The sole substantive issue in this appeal is whether or not Feres may be applied across the board to dismiss the various claims presented by the Lombards. For the reasons set forth below, we find that Feres does bar such claims.
A. Theodore Lombard
Theodore Lombard attempts to circumvent Feres by arguing that the Army committed two separate torts in his case: (1) the intentional tort of exposing Lombard to radioactive substances while on active duty at Los Alamos; and (2) the negligent tort of failing to warn Lombard after his discharge from service of the hazards of radiation poisoning. This second tort, he claims, occurred wholly after his tour of duty, and as such is actionable (i.e., not barred) by Feres.
Lombard’s claim in this respect claims support from the district court opinion of this Circuit in Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C.1979). In Thorn-well, a serviceman was given LSD in an effort to get him to confess to the theft of various classified documents. He did not learn that he had been given the drug until some sixteen years after the incident. On being so informed, he sued the Government for all the injuries he had suffered because of the treatment and for the Government’s subsequent failure to inform him of that exposure.
The District Court held that Feres barred recovery for all claims relating to the original administration of the drug, but that recovery was due for the negligence that occurred since Thornwell left the service. The court found that there were two separate torts, one intentional and one negligent, the second occurring “in its entirety” after Thornwell had attained civilian status. 471 F.Supp. at 351.
Thornwell is distinguishable from the case at bar.10 Here, the alleged failure to warn did not occur “in its entirety” after Lombard’s discharge. As noted in Part I, Lombard concedes that the Army knew of the potential dangers involved in exposing servicemen to radioactive substances at the time of the exposure itself. The negligent act of “failing to inform,” then, began at the time of initial exposure and continued through to the present. We are not dealing with two separate torts, therefore, but one continuous tort.
It is apparent that Lombard believes the failure to warn occurred early on since the complaint alleges that:
[a]t all relevant times from 1944 to the present, defendants, their agents and representataives [sic], and their predecessor agencies and officers . . ., acting jointly and severally, and in conspiracy with each other, have fraudulently concealed information concerning the increased risk of somatic and chromosomal injury to persons such as Theodore Lombard and [221] Ruth, his wife, and their family, by reason of work performed at or for the Los Alamos facility during the period 1944-1946 without protection from radiation exposure.
Complaint, ¶ 35 (JA at 11a) (emphasis added).
It is thus unquestioned that Lombard’s “injur[y] ... did ... arise out of or in the course of military duty.” United States v. Brown, supra, 348 U.S. at 113, 75 S.Ct. at 145 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Army’s negligent act is barred from suit by Feres.11
A look at the factors discussed in Part II supra underlying Feres and its progeny demonstrates that our conclusion here is squarely in line with the Supreme Court concerns set out in that opinion. As noted, the Court barred suit in Feres for three reasons: (1) “[t]he relationship between the Government and the members of its armed forces is ‘distinctively federal in character,’ (2) Congress has provided by statute a “ ‘simple, certain, and uniform’ ” system of compensation for those injured in military service; and (3) tort actions between members of the armed services have never been allowed.
In the case at bar, to allow Lombard to recover would be to contravene all three of the basic principles that underlie Feres. First, Lombard’s suit is clearly “federal in character and Congress never intended to submit armed forces personnel to the vagaries of over 50 different species of local law.” Second, Lombard may seek recovery on his claim pursuant to the Veterans’ Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. Finally, his suit is undeniably one between members of the armed services. To rule on the merits of that suit would embroil the Court in passing on matters of intramilitary concern, something the Supreme Court clearly sought to avoid.
A number of courts have examined cases involving servicemen and the “failure to warn” theory of negligence, and have applied Feres in dismissing said cases for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
In a recent decision by the Eighth Circuit, Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), a serviceman exposed to three atomic tests in 1947-48 on Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands alleged a post-discharge failure to warn concerning the known dangers of radiation poisoning. Judge Stephenson writing for a unanimous court, held that claim barred by Feres.
We agree . . . that the plaintiff’s allegations constitute a continuing tort. . . . [T]he plaintiff’s claim[ ] founded upon the FTCA for . .. negligent failure to warn or treat [is] not within the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA and, therefore, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, [citing cases].
Id. at 267.12
In Kelly v. United States, 512 F.Supp. 356 (E.D.Pa.1981), a serviceman exposed to [222] thermonuclear radiation during military tests in the South Pacific charged that the Army had been negligent in not warning him after he had been discharged of the potential harmful side-effects of that testing. Plaintiff argued a “separate tort” cause of action in the same fashion as Lombard in the instant case. The District Court rejected the argument, saying,
I am not persuaded that [plaintiff’s] complaint here alleges post-discharge tortious conduct which is factually distinct from the allegedly tortious conduct which occurred while he was still in the military. ... In effect, [plaintiff’s] complaint is that he was exposed to nuclear radiation without adequate safeguards and without warning of the possible adverse effects. I see no essential difference between defendant’s failure to warn him initially and their failure to warn him thereafter. [Plaintiff] avers that the defendants knew at the time he was exposed that there was a grave risk of injury to him, but nonetheless gave orders which resulted in his exposure. Accordingly, under [plaintiff’s] own theory, the duty to warn him of the danger exist-' ed at the time he was first exposed, and the defendant’s subsequent failure to warn him was but a continuation of the original wrong. 512 F.Supp. at 360-61.
Similar conclusions were reached in Schnurman v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 429 (E.D.Va.1980) and Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981). Schnurman involved a serviceman exposed to mustard gas while testing some experimental anti-chemical warfare clothing. In dismissing the complaint based on post-discharge failure to warn, the court remarked,
Disallowing recovery for an in-service tort under Feres, but allowing recovery for a failure to monitor and treat injuries resulting from the same tort would leave very little of Feres immunity, especially in cases where injuries do not manifest themselves until after a serviceman’s discharge. 490 F.Supp. at 437.
Stanley, meanwhile, involved a serviceman who voluntarily took some LSD as part of the Army experimentation on the effects of various drugs. Discovering in later years that such experimentation had deleterious side-effects, the serviceman sued the Army on a failure to warn theory. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the charge, both as it pertained to negligence committed during the actual experiment and to the period after Stanley was discharged. Essentially, the court chose to follow Schnurman over Thornwell in holding that the failure to warn was at all stages part and parcel of one continuous tort on the Army’s part, and was thus barred from suit by Feres. “Stanley has alleged merely an act of negligence which occurred while he was on active duty, the effects of which remained uncorrected after discharge.” 639 F.2d at 1154.
Other cases which further support the dismissal of the claim here include Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 676, 30 L.Ed.2d 664 (1972) (barred suit for failure to inform veteran of his true condition disclosed by X-rays which had been taken while he was on active duty); Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F.Supp. 599 (E.D.Wis.1976) (denied veteran’s claim based on a failure to provide him, after discharge, with results of a blood test taken while he was in the service); Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (in cases of radiation, a failure to warn is only actionable “if the Government learned of the danger after [the serviceman] left the service.”); and even Thornwell, supra, 471 F.Supp. at 351. (“[I]t is clear at the very least that a mere act of negligence which takes place while the plaintiff is on active duty and which then remains uncorrected after discharge is not grounds for suit.”)13
[223] In sum, Lombard’s claims under the Federal Torts Claims Act were properly dismissed as being in contravention of the Feres doctrine.
B. Ruth Lombard and the Lombard Children
Ruth Lombard and the Lombard children contend that even if Lombard himself is barred from suit by Feres, they are eligible to recover under the Tort Claims Act for the injuries they have incurred as a result of Lombard’s exposure to radiation at Los Alamos since they never served in the military, and since the children were all born after Lombard left military service. While these allegations are more compelling than those by Lombard discussed above, the case law nonetheless supports a finding that said claims were properly dismissed by the District Court.
It is well established that Feres bars recovery by family members where the cause of action is ancillary or derivative to the serviceman’s action for his own injury received incident to military service. See discussion infra. Indeed, in Feres itself, two of the three suits barred were wrongful death actions instituted on behalf of widows of servicemen who had died from injuries suffered incident to service.
This rule has also been specifically applied in two cases involving genetic defects developed in children as a result of exposure of their respective serviceman fathers to genetically mutating agents of one kind or another.
In Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit, dismissing claims for alleged genetic injury to a child resulting from a parent’s in-service exposure to radioactive substances during work on the “Manhattan Project,” noted that “but for” the injury sustained by the father while in the service, the child would not have sustained the injury at issue. The child’s injury, having its “genesis” in the non-actionable injury of the father, was similarly non-actionable pursuant to Feres.
Whether [plaintiff’s] injury occurred when she was born with a birth defect or when her father suffered chromosomal change, the allegedly negligent act drawn into question was performed while [her father] was in the service. Thus, just as [her father] could not recover on the grounds that his injury was post service, we cannot grant [plaintiff] recovery on these [Federal Tort Claims] grounds.
661 F.2d at 133.
A similar case, In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F.Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.1980), involved claims filed, inter alia, by genetically deformed children whose fathers allegedly had been exposed to various herbicides sprayed by the Army in Vietnam. In dismissing the children’s claims pursuant to the Torts Claims Act, the District Court remarked:
The injuries alleged by the children had their genesis in the exposure of their parents and, assuming that Agent Orange could produce the genetic changes alleged, the injuries were inflicted on the serviceman at the time of exposure. Thus, although Agent Orange may ultimately be found to have caused injuries in subsequently conceived children, those injuries, nevertheless, arose out of and were incident to the service of the parent .... For these reasons, the Court holds that the children’s claims for genetic injuries and birth defects from Agent Orange exposure of their veteran parents are injuries suffered “incident to and arising out of service” and cannot be recompensed in an action maintained directly against the government.
506 F.Supp. at 781 (emphasis added). See also Laswell v. Brown, supra, 683 F.2d at 269. (As regards negligence claims brought by children whose genetic injuries developed after their father had left the service, “the proper focus in applying the Feres doctrine is not the time of injury but the [224] time of the negligent act which took place during their father’s military service.”)14
The courts in both Monaco and Agent Orange found that permitting the aggrieved third parties to recover would embroil the courts in a matter that was “distinctively federal in character,” and that was basically, though indirectly, “between members of the armed services.” Such involvement was deemed impermissible as being in contravention of Feres.
[W]here the case concerns an injury sustained by a soldier while on duty, the effect of the action upon military discipline is identical whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by a third party. The litigation would take virtually the identical form in either case, and at issue would be the degree of fault, if any, on the part of the Government’s agents and the effect upon the serviceman’s safety.
Monaco v. United States, supra, 661 F.2d at 133-34, quoting Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2058 (emphasis added). The fact in both Monaco and Agent Orange that children of injured servicemen had no immediate alternative recourse because of the barred tort action was deemed unfortunate, but on balance not sufficient to permit recovery. “To hold otherwise,” the court concluded in Agent Orange, “might open the door for governmental liability to countless generations of claimants having ever diminishing genetic relationship[s] to the person actually injured.” 506 F.Supp. at 781. In addition, a contrary holding would contravene the implicit congressional intent described in Feres to provide a general exemption to the Tort Claims Act in cases involving “injuries incident to military service.”
The one case with an opinion filed contra on the question of possible recovery under the Torts Claims Act for children affected by genetic injuries suffered by their father during military service is Hinkie v. United States, 524 F.Supp. 277 (E.D.Pa.1981), a case which is not yet final in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.15 In Hinkie, the District Court, in refusing to dismiss the complaint, held that a given fact situation must satisfy all three criteria set out in Feres before the suit in question would be barred. It then ruled oversimplistically that since Hinkie’s wife and children had never been members of the armed services, and because no alternative remedy for their genetic damage was readily discernible, that the Feres criteria were not met. It, accordingly, held that the suit was not barred.16
While some of the analysis in Hinkie may at first blush seem to have some plausibility, its conclusion flows from a fatally flawed premise. In Hinkie, the court describes “two lines of cases regarding recovery by members of a serviceman’s family since Feres.” 524 F.Supp. at 280. First, “[mjembers of a serviceman’s family have recovered against the United States for injuries caused directly to them, independent of injury to the serviceman, if they arise from non-combatant activities. . . . [citing cases].” Id. (emphasis added) Second— and on the other hand — “actions by family members for alleged injuries suffered them[225] selves by reason of a serviceman’s injury, that is, derivative injuries, have been held barred by the Feres doctrine .... [citing cases].” Id. at 281. The court then proclaims that the Hinkie facts — Hinkie’s wife and children had filed “independent” Federal Tort claims for injuries suffered as a result of Hinkie having been exposed to radiation during nuclear tests by the Army in 1953 — “do[] not fall neatly into either line of cases.” Id. Thinking it to be without firm guidance, the court undertook its own independent analysis in light of Feres and Stencel and concluded that the claims, for the reasons set forth above, were not barred.
The inherent flaw in this analysis is that the facts in Hinkie do not as the court suggested fall between the enumerated types of cases. None of the cases cited by the Hinkie court on “direct injuries” to the wives/children of servicemen involved any injury to the serviceman of relevance to the fact patterns in question.17 The harm suffered by the wives/children in those cases, being truly independent of anything that happened to their serviceman husband/father, were not barred by Feres. In the second lme of cases, meanwhile, all of the injuries to the wives/children of servicemen arose as a result of prior injuries to the servicemen themselves.18 Because these injuries suffered by the wives/children stemmed from injuries that were incident to the military service of their respective husband/father they were all incurred derivatively from military service and were not actionable under Feres.
The facts in Hinkie clearly fall squarely under the “derivative injury” line of cases, viz., the claims of Hinkie’s wife and children would not have arisen “but for” the injury to Hinkie himself. Accordingly, the Hinkie court erred in not following the holdings in the “derivative injury” cases. In so doing, it specifically contravened the intent of Congress, as interpreted in Feres, not to waive immunity in the Tort Claims Act for cases involving “injuries incident to military service.”
It also appears that Hinkie is in conflict with its own Circuit’s decision in Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). In Jaffee, the Third Circuit en banc held that constitutional causes of actions stemming from injuries incident to [226] military service brought by, inter alia, a serviceman’s wife, are barred by Feres. Having barred such claims, it seems inconceivable that the Third Circuit would hear far less compelling claims of mere negligence such as those brought by the third parties in Hinkie. The Hinkie court, therefore, should have barred the claims of both Hinkie’s wife and children.19
The Federal Tort claims of the Lombard children are identical to those of the children in Monaco and Agent Orange, viz., each claim had its “genesis” in an injury to a serviceman incident to military service. As a result, those claims were properly dismissed by the District Court as being barred by Feres.
As for the Federal Tort claims of Ruth Lombard, the First Circuit has held that Feres bars claims of mental anguish suffered by family members over conditions stemming from injuries to servicemen. In De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. 2436, 32 L.Ed.2d 684 (1972), the wife and children of a serviceman who died because of alleged negligent treatment by Army doctors claimed under the Tort Claims Act that they had suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. The First Circuit, in a one page opinion, held that claim properly barred by Feres. The court specifically addressed that part of the complaint which alleged a “claim of a separate and independent tort to the wife based on mental anguish arising from her observations of the inadequate care given her deceased husband.” 453 F.2d at 1240. Noting that this independent claim ultimately traced back to the death of the serviceman/husband, the court remarked, “we are satisfied that this allegation [does] not remove the incident-to-service limitation of Feres. We [are] unwilling to depart therefrom. . . . ” Id.
In paragraph 54 of the complaint in the case at bar, Ruth Lombard claims:
As a direct result of her husband’s exposure to radioactive materials by defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions as aforesaid, and the consequent adverse health and medical effects suffered by him and their children, Ruth Lombard has suffered and continues to suffer much mental anguish, emotional stress, tensions and anxieties, all to her great financial loss and detriment to her total mental and physical well-being.
(JA at 15A). In claiming to suffer “mental anguish, emotional stress, tensions and anxieties” over the condition of her husband and children, Ruth Lombard is clearly alleging a tort that, while it has some incidence of being “independent” in nature, basically it has its genesis and relies upon “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] service.” Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. Her claim, being “ancillary or derivative to” an injury to a serviceman incident to military service, was properly dismissed by the District Court as being barred by Feres.20 De Font v. United States, supra; In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, supra, 506 F.Supp. at 780-81.
In sum, the District Court properly dismissed the Federal Tort claims of Ruth Lombard and the Lombard children as being barred by Feres.
IV. Federal Tort Claims Against Federal Officials
In addition to alleging Federal Tort violations by the Government as a single [227] unit, appellants also have alleged that eight individual federal officials have jointly and severally “fraudulently concealed information concerning the increased risk of somatic and chromosomal injury.... ” (Complaint para. 35). This concealment, appellants argue, entitles them to damages as alleged.
The claims against the individual defendants are deficient because those defendants only came into office shortly before Lombard’s complaint was filed. See Laswell v. Brown, supra, 683 F.2d at 268. (“The individually named defendants are ... improperly joined because it is not claimed that they actually participated in the alleged violations.”) The allegations against them in their individual capacity are accordingly vague, conclusory and impermissibly imprecise. Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977). The District Court therefore acted properly in striking the names of the eight officials in question from the complaint.
Appellant’s claim against the individuals in their official capacity is likewise without merit. The Supreme Court noted in Feres, “[W]e know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is serving.” 340 U.S. at 141, 71 S.Ct. at 157. As officials of the federal Government, the eight named officials/defendants in this suit21 are part of “the Government he is serving” and are thus immune from appellants’ claims.
V. Appellants’ Constitutional Claims
In addition to their Federal Tort claims, the Lombards contend that all defendants are jointly and severally liable in their official and individual capacities for violating the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, plus 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and § 1986. They argue that Feres applies at most only to the Federal Tort claims and cannot therefore be used to bar constitutional claims as well.
This argument is without merit. “Feres applies to claims based upon constitutional grounds as well as to claims arising under the [Tort Claims Act].” Laswell v. Brown, supra, 683 F.2d at 268. See Nagy v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C.1979). (“An action sounding in constitutional, as opposed to common law, tort is not exempt from application of the Feres doctrine.”); Misko v. United States, supra; Jaffee v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 632 (D.N.J.1979). Thus, the existence of alternative remedies and the special relationship between the Government and members of the military services bars any constitutional cause of action against the United States in the case at bar. Laswell v. Brown, supra, 683 F.2d at 268-269. Similarly, constitutional claims against governmental officials named herein in their official capacity are also barred. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1235-37 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). Constitutional claims against the named governmental officials in their individual capacity need not be considered insofar as those defendants were properly stricken from the complaint. See Part IV supra.
Conclusion
In rendering this decision, we are not without very considerable sympathy for Theodore Lombard and his family. This is particularly true for the Lombard children, for whom there is at present no viable means of redress for the injuries they may have suffered. Because we must adhere to Feres and other controlling decisions, however, we must find that the claims of all members of the Lombard family were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Any remedy in such cases must come from Congress in an enlargement of the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate such claims against the United States, or in special private bills as was formerly the case with torts now covered by the Tort Claims Act, supra. The dismissal of the complaint is therefore affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.