Theodora Medley v. Kathleen Allison

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJune 23, 2021
Docket5:21-cv-00937
StatusUnknown

This text of Theodora Medley v. Kathleen Allison (Theodora Medley v. Kathleen Allison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Theodora Medley v. Kathleen Allison, (C.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:21-937-DOC (MAR) Date: June 23, 2021 Title: Present: The Honorable: MARGO A. ROCCONI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ERICA VALENCIA N/A Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Defendants: N/A N/A Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE, AND INSTEAD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1631 FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

On May 9, 2021, Theodora Medley (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, constructively filed1 a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“section 2254”), challenging her 2000 murder conviction. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1.

The Petition is subject to dismissal under section 2254(b)(1) because it appears to be second or successive.2 See Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The Court will not make a final determination regarding whether the Petition should be dismissed, however, without giving Petitioner an opportunity to address this issue.

A. AEDPA AND SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS

1. Applicable law

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “creates a ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for the consideration of second or successive applications in district court.” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996). Under this procedure, “[a]n individual seeking to a file a ‘second or successive’ application must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order directing the district court to consider his application.” Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998). Thereafter, the appellate court “may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of” AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).

1 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). 2 The Petition also appears to be untimely and either partially or wholly unexhausted, but the Court does not reach these issues here because the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a second or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152–53 (2007). Similarly, the Court declines to rule on Petitioner’s motion for a stay at this time. CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:21-937-DOC (MAR) Date: June 23, 2021 Title: 2. Analysis

Here, the instant Petition appears to be a second or successive petition because it challenges the same 2000 conviction Petitioner challenged in her first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person In State Custody (“2003 Petition”). See Medley, 506 F.3d; see also Medley v. Runnels, 552 U.S. 1316 (2007) (denying Petitioner’s writ of certiorari). The instant Petition therefore appears to be second or successive to the 2003 Petition.

Petitioner has failed to identify or submit any documentation indicating the Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner “proper authorization” to file a second or successive petition in district court. As such, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to address the Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Burton, 549 U.S. at 152–53.

B. TRANSFER IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1631

28 U.S.C. § 1631 (“section 1631”) governs the transfer of civil actions among federal courts to cure jurisdictional defects. “Transfer is appropriate under section 1631 if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice.” Real v. California, No. CV 18-2486 R (SS), 2018 WL 3219651, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2018). To that end, “[i]t is widely recognized that ‘[w]hen a second or successive § 2254 or § 2255 claim is filed in the district court without the required authorization from [the court of appeals], the district court may transfer the matter to [the court of appeals] if it determines it is in the interest of justice to do so under § 1631, or it may dismiss the motion or petition for lack of jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139 (3rd Cir. 2002) (district court may either dismiss an unauthorized successive petition for lack of jurisdiction or transfer it to the circuit court pursuant to section 1631); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683, 691 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).

“Normally transfer will be in the interest of justice because the dismissal of an action that could be brought elsewhere is ‘time consuming and justice-defeating.’” Cruz-Aguilera v. INS, 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962)). Factors to consider when deciding whether transferring a case is in the interest of justice include: “whether the failure to transfer would prejudice the litigant, whether the litigant filed the original action in good faith, and other equitable factors.” Id.; see also In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1251 (“Factors considered in deciding whether a transfer is in the interest of justice include whether the claims would be time barred if filed anew in the proper forum, whether the claims alleged are likely to have merit, and whether the claims were filed in good faith or if, on the CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:21-937-DOC (MAR) Date: June 23, 2021 Title: other hand, it was clear at the time of filing that the court lacked the requisite jurisdiction.” See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1223 n. 16 (10th Cir. 2006)).

2. Analysis

Here, failure to transfer could prejudice Petitioner because a dismissal may present or exacerbate timeliness issues.

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Related

Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman
369 U.S. 463 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Felker v. Turpin
518 U.S. 651 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal
523 U.S. 637 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Burton v. Stewart
549 U.S. 147 (Supreme Court, 2007)
In Re Cline
531 F.3d 1249 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Roberts v. Marshall
627 F.3d 768 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Leantry Benton v. Odie Washington
106 F.3d 162 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Medley v. Runnels
506 F.3d 857 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Trujillo v. Williams
465 F.3d 1210 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)

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Theodora Medley v. Kathleen Allison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/theodora-medley-v-kathleen-allison-cacd-2021.