IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
THE YOSAKI TRUST, Russell J. § Miller and Mary Miller as co-trustees, § and THE MIOKO TRUST, Russell J. § Miller and Mary Miller as co-trustees, § § No. 157, 2025 Plaintiffs Below, § Appellants, § Court Below: Court of Chancery § of the State of Delaware v. § § C.A. No. 2024-0738 TERESA S. WEBER, MARC D. § BEER, MARY ELIZABETH § CONLON, HAYMAKER SPONSOR § III LLC, a Delaware Entity, STEVEN § J. HEYER, and COOLEY LLP, a § California entity, § § Defendants Below, § Appellees. §
Submitted: October 8, 2025 Decided: December 15, 2025
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
ORDER
The Court, having considered the briefs and the record below, and after oral
argument, rules as follows:
(1) This appeal arises out of a dispute involving a de-SPAC transaction
(“Transaction”). In a Court of Chancery complaint, the Yosaki Trust and The Mioko
Trust (collectively, the “Trusts”), who held equity interests in BioTE Holdings, LLC (“Holdings”), alleged that conflicted fiduciaries at Holdings breached their fiduciary
duties by closing a recapitalization transaction that unfairly redistributed equity and
conferred control on insiders. The Trusts alleged that they were harmed by diluting
their equity interests and diverting Transaction consideration to insiders. The Court
of Chancery dismissed their complaint on several grounds, one of which was lack of
standing because the Trusts sold their equity interests and therefore no longer had
standing to pursue their claims.
(2) On appeal, the Trusts argue that their claims were direct, not derivative,
and their direct claims involving their converted stock were not extinguished by
selling the converted stock post-Transaction. As explained below, however, even if
their claims were direct, once the Trusts sold their equity interests, they lost standing
to pursue their claims. We affirm the Court of Chancery’s judgment.
(3) Dr. Gary S. Donovitz, M.D., an obstetrician-gynecologist, founded
BioTE in 2012 to train medical professionals to administer pellet-based hormone
therapy.1 BioTE Medical, LLC (“Medical”) is BioTE’s main operating company
and is wholly owned by Holdings.2
1 App. to Opening Br. at A18–19 [hereinafter A__] (Pls.’ Am. Verified Compl. ¶ 9 [hereinafter Compl.]). 2 A20 (Compl. ¶¶ 14–15).
2 (4) Defendant Teresa Weber (“Weber”) was the Chief Executive Officer of
Medical during the relevant times, and Marc Beer (“Beer”) was Medical’s Executive
Chairman of the Board of Managers.3 Defendant Mary Conlon (“Conlon,” and
together with Weber and Beer, the “Insider Defendants”) was the Vice President of
Business Development and General Counsel of Medical and Holdings. 4
(5) Beginning in June, 2021, the Trusts alleged that the Insider Defendants
and BioTE’s outside counsel, Cooley LLP (“Cooley”), negotiated a Business
Combination Agreement (“BCA”) with defendant Haymaker Sponsor III LLC
(“Haymaker Sponsor”) and its CEO, Defendant Steven J. Heyer (“Heyer,” and
together with Haymaker Sponsor, “Haymaker Defendants”). As the Court of
Chancery correctly observed, despite the complaint characterizing the Transaction
as a “[m]erger,”5 it did not involve an exchange of consideration to qualify as a
merger.6 Instead, prior to closing, Holdings redomiciled from Nevada to Delaware7
and recapitalized its existing equity classes (Class A Units, Class AA Units, Class
AAA Units, and Class AAAA Units) into a single class of equity designated as Class
3 A20–21 (Compl. ¶¶ 16–17). 4 A22 (Compl. ¶ 18). 5 See, e.g., A16 (Compl. ¶ 2). 6 See A252–57 (Oral Args. and Rulings of the Ct. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 38:12–43:20). 7 A20 (Compl. ¶ 14).
3 A Common Units. 8 Thereafter, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (“Haymaker
SPAC”) and Holdings cross-issued equity resulting in “an umbrella partnership C-
corporation, or ‘Up-C’ structure,” with the Haymaker SPAC serving as the publicly
traded entity and Holdings as the flow-through entity indirectly holding substantially
all of the assets.9
(6) Specifically, Holdings issued some of its new Class A Common Units
to the Haymaker SPAC, and in turn, the Haymaker SPAC issued to Holdings the
cash remaining at closing as well as newly created Class V stock. 10 The Class V
stock held voting rights but no equity interest. 11 Holdings thereafter distributed the
Class V stock to holders of the pre-transaction Class A Common Units, which
included the Trusts. 12 The holders of the pre-transaction Class A Common Units had
the right to convert one Class A Common Unit and one Class V share into a single
publicly traded share of the Haymaker SPAC. 13 Haymaker SPAC became the sole
8 App. to Answering Br. at B414 [hereinafter B__] (Business Combination Agreement, Annex A to Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022) [hereinafter BCA]). 9 B45 (Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022)). 10 See B434–35 (BCA §§ 2.1, 2.2). 11 See B45 (Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022)). 12 B434 (BCA § 2.1(d)). 13 B549–50 (Second Am. & Restated Operating Agreement of BioTE Holdings, LLC, Annex I to Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022)).
4 managing member of Holdings and renamed itself biote Corp (“PubCo”). 14
(7) Before the Transaction, the Trusts each owned 2.8% of Holdings.15
Immediately following closing, through their ownership of Holdings’ Class A
Common Units and the new Class V shares, the Trusts each owned about 2% of the
resulting public company’s equity and voting rights. 16 The Trusts voluntarily
converted their Holdings’ Class A Common Units and Class V Haymaker SPAC
shares into biote Corp. Class A common stock (“PubCo stock”). The Trusts then
voluntarily sold their PubCo stock. 17
(8) In their complaint, the Trusts alleged that, although Holdings expected
to receive over $317.5 million in SPAC funding, primarily because 98% of the
Haymaker SPAC investors redeemed their shares, Holdings received only about $12
million. 18 The Court of Chancery summarized the “principal effect” of the
Transaction as “dilut[ing] the ownership interest . . . [of the] pre-transaction
members of Holdings . . . in return for whatever minimal cash the [Haymaker] SPAC
14 A23–24 (Compl. ¶ 21). 15 A19 (Compl. ¶ 11). 16 See id. 17 A153 (Pls.’ Consol. Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 42). 18 A16–17 (Compl. ¶ 4).
5 brought to the table.” 19
(9) In July 2024, the Trusts filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery
asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Insider Defendants, aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty against the Haymaker Defendants and Cooley,
and unjust enrichment against all defendants. In response, the defendants filed
motions to dismiss under Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 and Ch. Ct. R. 12(b)(6).
(10) The Court of Chancery granted the motions. First, the court held that,
because the Trusts’ claims arose out of a cash and equity transaction that diluted their
interests, their claims were derivative under Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Rosson.20
Thus, the Trusts failed to “allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that the
plaintiff has standing to sue derivatively[,]” as required by Ch. Ct. R. 23.1(a)(2).21
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
THE YOSAKI TRUST, Russell J. § Miller and Mary Miller as co-trustees, § and THE MIOKO TRUST, Russell J. § Miller and Mary Miller as co-trustees, § § No. 157, 2025 Plaintiffs Below, § Appellants, § Court Below: Court of Chancery § of the State of Delaware v. § § C.A. No. 2024-0738 TERESA S. WEBER, MARC D. § BEER, MARY ELIZABETH § CONLON, HAYMAKER SPONSOR § III LLC, a Delaware Entity, STEVEN § J. HEYER, and COOLEY LLP, a § California entity, § § Defendants Below, § Appellees. §
Submitted: October 8, 2025 Decided: December 15, 2025
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
ORDER
The Court, having considered the briefs and the record below, and after oral
argument, rules as follows:
(1) This appeal arises out of a dispute involving a de-SPAC transaction
(“Transaction”). In a Court of Chancery complaint, the Yosaki Trust and The Mioko
Trust (collectively, the “Trusts”), who held equity interests in BioTE Holdings, LLC (“Holdings”), alleged that conflicted fiduciaries at Holdings breached their fiduciary
duties by closing a recapitalization transaction that unfairly redistributed equity and
conferred control on insiders. The Trusts alleged that they were harmed by diluting
their equity interests and diverting Transaction consideration to insiders. The Court
of Chancery dismissed their complaint on several grounds, one of which was lack of
standing because the Trusts sold their equity interests and therefore no longer had
standing to pursue their claims.
(2) On appeal, the Trusts argue that their claims were direct, not derivative,
and their direct claims involving their converted stock were not extinguished by
selling the converted stock post-Transaction. As explained below, however, even if
their claims were direct, once the Trusts sold their equity interests, they lost standing
to pursue their claims. We affirm the Court of Chancery’s judgment.
(3) Dr. Gary S. Donovitz, M.D., an obstetrician-gynecologist, founded
BioTE in 2012 to train medical professionals to administer pellet-based hormone
therapy.1 BioTE Medical, LLC (“Medical”) is BioTE’s main operating company
and is wholly owned by Holdings.2
1 App. to Opening Br. at A18–19 [hereinafter A__] (Pls.’ Am. Verified Compl. ¶ 9 [hereinafter Compl.]). 2 A20 (Compl. ¶¶ 14–15).
2 (4) Defendant Teresa Weber (“Weber”) was the Chief Executive Officer of
Medical during the relevant times, and Marc Beer (“Beer”) was Medical’s Executive
Chairman of the Board of Managers.3 Defendant Mary Conlon (“Conlon,” and
together with Weber and Beer, the “Insider Defendants”) was the Vice President of
Business Development and General Counsel of Medical and Holdings. 4
(5) Beginning in June, 2021, the Trusts alleged that the Insider Defendants
and BioTE’s outside counsel, Cooley LLP (“Cooley”), negotiated a Business
Combination Agreement (“BCA”) with defendant Haymaker Sponsor III LLC
(“Haymaker Sponsor”) and its CEO, Defendant Steven J. Heyer (“Heyer,” and
together with Haymaker Sponsor, “Haymaker Defendants”). As the Court of
Chancery correctly observed, despite the complaint characterizing the Transaction
as a “[m]erger,”5 it did not involve an exchange of consideration to qualify as a
merger.6 Instead, prior to closing, Holdings redomiciled from Nevada to Delaware7
and recapitalized its existing equity classes (Class A Units, Class AA Units, Class
AAA Units, and Class AAAA Units) into a single class of equity designated as Class
3 A20–21 (Compl. ¶¶ 16–17). 4 A22 (Compl. ¶ 18). 5 See, e.g., A16 (Compl. ¶ 2). 6 See A252–57 (Oral Args. and Rulings of the Ct. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 38:12–43:20). 7 A20 (Compl. ¶ 14).
3 A Common Units. 8 Thereafter, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (“Haymaker
SPAC”) and Holdings cross-issued equity resulting in “an umbrella partnership C-
corporation, or ‘Up-C’ structure,” with the Haymaker SPAC serving as the publicly
traded entity and Holdings as the flow-through entity indirectly holding substantially
all of the assets.9
(6) Specifically, Holdings issued some of its new Class A Common Units
to the Haymaker SPAC, and in turn, the Haymaker SPAC issued to Holdings the
cash remaining at closing as well as newly created Class V stock. 10 The Class V
stock held voting rights but no equity interest. 11 Holdings thereafter distributed the
Class V stock to holders of the pre-transaction Class A Common Units, which
included the Trusts. 12 The holders of the pre-transaction Class A Common Units had
the right to convert one Class A Common Unit and one Class V share into a single
publicly traded share of the Haymaker SPAC. 13 Haymaker SPAC became the sole
8 App. to Answering Br. at B414 [hereinafter B__] (Business Combination Agreement, Annex A to Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022) [hereinafter BCA]). 9 B45 (Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022)). 10 See B434–35 (BCA §§ 2.1, 2.2). 11 See B45 (Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022)). 12 B434 (BCA § 2.1(d)). 13 B549–50 (Second Am. & Restated Operating Agreement of BioTE Holdings, LLC, Annex I to Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement, Haymaker Acquisition Corp. III (May 5, 2022)).
4 managing member of Holdings and renamed itself biote Corp (“PubCo”). 14
(7) Before the Transaction, the Trusts each owned 2.8% of Holdings.15
Immediately following closing, through their ownership of Holdings’ Class A
Common Units and the new Class V shares, the Trusts each owned about 2% of the
resulting public company’s equity and voting rights. 16 The Trusts voluntarily
converted their Holdings’ Class A Common Units and Class V Haymaker SPAC
shares into biote Corp. Class A common stock (“PubCo stock”). The Trusts then
voluntarily sold their PubCo stock. 17
(8) In their complaint, the Trusts alleged that, although Holdings expected
to receive over $317.5 million in SPAC funding, primarily because 98% of the
Haymaker SPAC investors redeemed their shares, Holdings received only about $12
million. 18 The Court of Chancery summarized the “principal effect” of the
Transaction as “dilut[ing] the ownership interest . . . [of the] pre-transaction
members of Holdings . . . in return for whatever minimal cash the [Haymaker] SPAC
14 A23–24 (Compl. ¶ 21). 15 A19 (Compl. ¶ 11). 16 See id. 17 A153 (Pls.’ Consol. Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 42). 18 A16–17 (Compl. ¶ 4).
5 brought to the table.” 19
(9) In July 2024, the Trusts filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery
asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Insider Defendants, aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty against the Haymaker Defendants and Cooley,
and unjust enrichment against all defendants. In response, the defendants filed
motions to dismiss under Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 and Ch. Ct. R. 12(b)(6).
(10) The Court of Chancery granted the motions. First, the court held that,
because the Trusts’ claims arose out of a cash and equity transaction that diluted their
interests, their claims were derivative under Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Rosson.20
Thus, the Trusts failed to “allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that the
plaintiff has standing to sue derivatively[,]” as required by Ch. Ct. R. 23.1(a)(2).21
(11) Second, the court dismissed the amended complaint under the
“continuous ownership rule” in Lewis v. Anderson. 22 The rule requires “that a
derivative shareholder must not only be a stockholder at the time of the alleged
wrong and at time of commencement of suit but that he must also maintain
19 A266–67 (Oral Args. and Rulings of the Ct. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 52:14–53:8). 20 261 A.3d 1251, 1260 (Del. 2021) (“[D]ilution claims are classically derivative[.]”). 21 A269–70 (Oral Args. and Rulings of the Ct. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 55:21–56:6). 22 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984); A273–74 (Oral Args. and Rulings of the Ct. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 59:23–60:8).
6 shareholder status throughout the litigation.” 23 As noted above, it is undisputed that
the Trusts no longer owned an equity interest in any of the involved entities. 24
(12) Finally, even if the Trust’s claims were direct, as opposed to derivative,
the court held that, under Urdan v. WR Capital Partners, LLC,25 dilution claims were
not personal to the holder of the stock and therefore “travel” with the sale of the
stock. 26 Thus, the Trusts lost standing to pursue their claims when they converted
their Holdings’ Class A Common Units and Class V Haymaker SPAC shares into
PubCo stock and sold that stock.
(13) The Trusts raise two main arguments on appeal. First, they contend that
the Court of Chancery erred in finding that the Trusts’ claims were derivative.27
According to the Trusts, Brookfield did not overrule this Court’s decision in Parnes
v. Bally Ent. Corp.28 which, according to them, stands for the “settled principle that
when fiduciaries extract side payments or self-dealing benefits from a transaction at
23 477 A.2d at 1046. 24 A153 (Pls.’ Consol. Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 42). 25 244 A.3d 668 (Del. 2020); A274–75 (Oral Args. and Rulings of the Ct. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 60:21–61:4). 26 244 A.3d at 678. 27 Opening Br. at 5. 28 722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999).
7 the expense of legacy owners, the resulting harm is personal and redressable by
direct claims.” 29
(14) Second, the Trusts contend that Urdan is inapposite because their
claims “arose well before the closing of the [T]ransaction, when they held entirely
different securities: Class AAA Units in Holdings—a Nevada LLC[.]” 30 Thus, they
say, because Urdan “presumes voluntary sales of the same securities[,]” the Trusts
still have standing to pursue their claims.31 The standing issue raises questions of
law which we review de novo. 32
(15) As we see it, the appeal can be decided based on our Urdan decision.
In Urdan, we observed that “a purchaser of a . . . security acquires all rights in the
security that the transferor had or had power to transfer.” 33 We noted that the words
“all rights in the security” distinguishes between rights that “inhere in the security
itself” and personal rights which do not travel with the sale of a security.34 Claims
29 Opening Br. at 6. 30 Id. 31 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 32 Empls. Ins. Co. of Wausau v. First State Orthopaedics, P.A., 312 A.3d 597, 606 (Del. 2024) (“We also review questions of justiciability, including standing, de novo.”). 33 244 A.3d at 677 (citing 6 Del. C. § 8-302(a)). 34 244 A.3d at 677 (citing In re Sunstates Corp. S’holder Litig., 2001 WL 432447, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2001)).
8 that arise from “the relationship among stockholder, stock and the company” inhere
in the security itself.35 Personal claims arise when the underlying “property happens
to be shares, but the cause of action is not a property right carried by the shares.”36
Examples of the former category include a claim alleging a corporate charter
violation, the fairness of a proposed transaction, or a challenge to executive
compensation.37 “[E]xamples of personal claims would include a contract claim for
breach of an agreement to purchase or sell shares or a tort claim for fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of shares.”38
(16) After Urdan, dilution claims, “[w]hether described as direct,
derivative, or both,” are “not personal to the plaintiffs and travel[ ] with the sale of
their [ ] stock.”39 The same is true of diversion claims – they involve the relationship
between the stockholder and the company, not a claim arising out of a share sale. It
is undisputed that, following closing, the Trusts converted their Holdings’ Class A
35 244 A.3d at 677 (citing I.A.T.S.E. Local No. One Pension Fund v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2016 WL 7100493, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 2016)). 36 244 A.3d at 677 (citing In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1056 (Del. Ch. 2016)). 37 See 244 A.3d at 677. 38 Id. (citing 124 A.3d at 1056). 39 244 A.3d at 678 (emphasis added).
9 Common Units and Class V shares into PubCo stock and then sold that stock.40
Under Urdan, the Trusts’ dilution and diversion claims traveled with the Class A
Common Units and Class V shares. The Trusts lost standing after exchanging the
equity and selling the PubCo shares.
(17) The Trusts try to distinguish Urdan by arguing that “[t]he logic
undergirding Urdan (which did not involve a merger) breaks down when, as here,
the securities to which any claims attached were forcibly converted or exchanged as
a precondition to the transaction a plaintiff challenges.”41 In other words, (a) their
claims arose at the time the Trusts held Class AAA Units in Holdings as a Nevada
LLC; (b) their Class AAA units were involuntarily exchanged or converted into
Class A Common Units; and therefore (c) an involuntary conversion occurred which
allows them to pursue their claims post-Transaction.
(18) As an initial matter, the Trusts did not raise this argument below.
Instead, in the Court of Chancery, the Trusts attempted to distinguish Urdan because
the transaction in Urdan did not involve the involuntary surrender of equity through
a merger transaction.42 But as the Trusts eventually agreed, the transaction here did
40 A153 (Pls.’ Consol. Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 42). 41 Opening Br. at 31. 42 See A154–55 (Pls.’ Consol. Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 43–44).
10 not involve a merger.43 Thus, the Trusts cannot present a new argument for the first
time on appeal.44
(19) Even if the Trusts did not waive their new argument, we find it
unpersuasive. The Holdings’ conversion from Nevada to Delaware, and
recapitalization of the existing equity classes (Class A Units, Class AA Units, Class
AAA Units, and Class AAAA Units) into a single class of equity designated as Class
A Common Units, was only preparatory to the Transaction. It was the exchange of
Class A Holdings Units and Class V shares where the dilution and diversion is
alleged to have occurred. The Trusts retained their equity interest in Holdings after
the recapitalization. They could have held those units and preserved standing.
Instead, they voluntarily exchanged their Holdings’ equity for PubCo shares. With
the exchange and sale of the PubCo shares went the standing to pursue dilution and
conversion claims.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the
Court of Chancery is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice
43 Opening Br. at 21 (“Although the transaction was not technically a merger, it functionally operated as one.”) (emphasis added). 44 Supr. Ct. R. 8.