The United States of America v. John Joseph Prochaska, Jr

222 F.2d 1

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: June 10, 1955
• Docket: 11357
• Status: Published

Opinions

LINDLEY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant was indicted on the charge that he, with intent to extort from Maurice B. Frank a sum of money, deposited with and caused to be delivered by the Post Office Department, a letter addressed to Frank, containing a threat to injure the person of the addressee, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 876. The document, set forth verbatim in the indictment, is as follows: “Okay, Maurie, this is it, get it and get it straight because you have only one chance. We want $10,000.00 cash in 10’s and 20’s to be placed by you in a place designated by us in our next letter. You have 5 to 7 days. If you should wish to contact us please do so by advertising under personals in the Tribune. Please Maurie, make it easy on yourself by cooperating fully.”

The cause was tried without a jury, on the stipulation of the parties that defendant mailed the letter, as well as others of like import, to the addressee, and that he was apprehended by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation immediately after he had picked up a parcel which he supposed contained the money demanded.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the letter failed to disclose any threat to injure the person of the addressee was overruled. His motion in arrest of judgment to the same effect was likewise overruled. He assigns error in each of these rulings, contending that any document, in order to amount to an offense under the Statute, must contain an express threat to do injury to the person of the addressee as well as an illicit demand for money, i. e., that the statutory crime of extortion by mail cannot be based on innuendo or implied threats.

The statute provides in pertinent part: “Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, so deposits, or causes to be delivered [by the Post Office Department] any communication containing any threat * * * to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 876. We have found no guiding judicial interpretation of this statutory language, but we think it obvious that Congress intended thereby to penalize every extortion demand by mail which is coupled with an express threat or with any language or expression which carries with it the reasonable connotation of / a threat to injure the person of the addressee. Our decision, therefore, must depend on whether the essential significance of the language used by defendant necessarily constituted a threat to injure the person of Frank; whether the actual meaning of the language, plus its necessary suggested implications, was such as reasonably to instill in him the actual apprehension of impending bodily harm. We would render the statute impotent and define the crime as one depending on the degree of ingenuity of each individual extortionist, if we were to require that the injury intended be precisely catalogued as to its physical nature or exact method of perpetration.

Measured by the proper test, we are of the opinion that the ruling of the trial court that this indictment was sufficient was sound. Written words or phrases take their character as threatening or harmless from the context in which they are used, measured by the common experience of the society in which they are published. Whatever the connotation of the language “Okay Maurie, this is it, get it and get it straight because you have only one chance” and “Please Maurie, make it easy on yourself by cooperating fully”, when used in a different context or in a society different from ours, when employed by members of our society in context with an extortion demand its necessary implications are precisely clear. We note judicially that the slang expressions employed are a part of the stereotyped vocabulary of the Hollywoodesque underworld and are essentially synonymous with a promise of a “one-way ride.” As such, they have become a universally understood part of our vocabulary. Not only are they not ambiguous in the connection in which they were here used, but, in fact, they express ^ even more than oy connotation a well nigh explicit threat of bodily harm. The admonitions that you have only one chance and make it easy on yourself remove any doubt that the threat was addressed to the person of Frank, the addressee.

The judgment is Affirmed.