The Tjomo

115 F. 919, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedApril 12, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 115 F. 919 (The Tjomo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Tjomo, 115 F. 919, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252 (S.D. Ala. 1902).

Opinion

TOUDMIN, District Judge.

The libelant brings this suit to recover damages for breach, of contract on the part of the vessel to deliver a cargo of cattle shipped by him to Havana, Cuba. The ship sailed August n, 1901, and while on her voyage, on the night of the I2th-i3th of August, encountered a terrific storm in the Gulf of Mexico, in which many of the cattle were lost by being carried overboard or killed or injured by the breaking down of the superstructure of the cattle fittings upon the deck, which was in great part broken away and also carried overboard. The bill of lading contains the following provisions:

“It is expressly stipulated that live stock shall be at the risk of the owner, shipper, or consignee thereof, and the steamship is in no way responsible for any accident or any mortality which may occur during the voyage, * * * from whatever cause arising. It is also mutually agreed that steamer reserves the right to load the live stock either under or on deck of steamer, shippers accepting fittings, fastenings, and ventilation as satisfactory. It is also mutually agreed that this shipment is subject to all the terms and provisions of, and all exemptions from liability contained in, an act of congress of the United States approved on the 13th day of February 1893 [known as the “Harter Act”].”

“In every contract for the carriage of goods there is an implied engagement on the part of the carrier to furnish safe and suitable means of transportation, and in the case of a carrier by ship to supply a ship which is not only seaworthy, but is also reasonably fit to carry the cargo stipulated for in the bill of lading. It is also elementary law that a carrier by vessel cannot escape liability for the loss or injury [921]*921of goods during transportation through dangers of navigation caused by its own previous default, notwithstanding an exception in the bill of lading from liability from sea perils.” The Exe, 6 C. C. A. 410, 57 Fed. 399.

In The Prussia, 35 C. C. A. 625, 93 Fed. 837, the court said:

“It is the duty of the carrier by water, when he offers a vessel for freight, to see that she is in suitable condition to transport her cargo in safety; and he impliedly warrants that this duty has been fulfilled. * * * But it is competent for the parties by express contract to modify the obligations which would otherwise devolve upon the carrier, including even that of providing a seaworthy vessel, and short of any modifications which will exempt him from the consequences of his own misconduct or negligence, or those for whom he is responsible, such contracts, though strictly construed against the carrier, are given full effect.”

In Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 441, 9 Sup. Ct. 472, 32 L. Ed. 788, it is said that:

“Special contracts between the carrier and the customer, the terms of which are reasonable, and not contrary to public policy, are upheld; such as those exempting the carrier from responsibility for losses happening from accident, * * * or for perishable articles, or live animals when injured without default or negligence of the carrier.”

The warranty that a ship is fit at the beginning of a voyage to safely carry the cargo received by her, which is decided to be implied where the bill of lading is silent, cannot be implied if the parties have chosen to contract otherwise. The burden of proof in such case is not upon the carrier, but upon the shipper, and there must be sufficient evidence of the carrier’s negligence before the shipper can recover. The Southwark (D. C.) 104 Fed. 103.

The proctors for libelant do not, as I understand it, question these principles of law, but their contention is that, through the negligence of the owner of the steamship, or of those for whom he is responsible, the ship was unseaworthy, and improperly equipped, in that the fittings of the pens or compartments provided for the cattle were insufficient and insecure, both in construction and material; and that the cattle were improperly and negligently stowed on the ship by being too much crowded in the pens, and that the loss complained of was attributable to these causes. The claimant takes issue on this contention, and alleges that the loss was attributable solely to the perils of the sea. The evidence on the part of the claimant shows the encountering by the ship of a terrific storm of wind and heavy seas, characterized by the master of the ship as “a very heavy hurricane,” with wind from 90 to 100 miles an hour. The first mate, who had been going to sea ioj4 years, speaks of it as “the most terrible storm” he ever saw. The second mate has been going to sea 10 years, and says he “never saw such a big storm before.” This evidence shows a specific and. adequate cause for the loss of the cattle, consistent with the seaworthiness of the ship, and warrants the conclusion that this was the immediate cause of the loss. This, then, puts-the burden on libelant to show that the result would have been prevented by the exercise of due care and diligence in the construction of the fittings of the vessel, and in the proper stowage of the cattle. My opinion is that, notwithstanding the stipulations in the bill of lading, the owner of the ship-[922]*922should have exercised due diligence to properly equip and outfit the vessel, and to make her seaworthy, and capable of performing her intended voyage, and the obligations of the master, agents, or servants to properly stow the cattle were not thereby lessened or avoided. Harter Act, Feb. 13, 1893. The Manitoba (D. C.) 104 Fed. 145. Where it satisfactorily appears that the vessel encountered marine perils which might well disable a staunch and well-manned ship, where it appears that the loss has been caused by the dangers of navigation, it devolves upon the shipper to make out that the damage might have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill upon the part of the carrier. Christie v. The Craigton (D. C.) 41 Fed. 62; The Warren Adams, 20 C. C. A. 486, 74 Fed. 413. If the steamship Tjomo was not unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage either by reason of insufficient and defective fittings and fastenings or of negligent or improper stowage of the ship, then the libelant cannot recover. “The requirement of ‘seaworthiness’ intends that the ship shall be in a fit state as to repair, equipment, crew, and in all other respects, to encounter the ordinary perils of the contemplated voyage. Seaworthiness does not require perfection, but only reasonable fitness.” The Aggi (D. C.) 93 Fed. 490; The Rover (D. C.) 33 Fed. 515; The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U. S. 199, 14 Sup. Ct. 823, 38 L. Ed. 688; Dupont De Nemours v. Vance, 19 How. 162, 15 L. Ed. 584. “If the ship was at the commencement of the voyage in such a state as to be reasonably capable of performing it, she was seaworthy.” The Titania (D. C.) 19 Fed. 101. “The question of seaworthiness is to be determined with reference to the customs and usages of the port from which the vessel sails, the existing state of knowledge and experience, and the judgment of prudent and competent persons versed in such matters.” Id.

The preponderance of evidence clearly shows the seaworthiness of this vessel in respect to her fittings and fastenings.

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Bluebook (online)
115 F. 919, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-tjomo-alsd-1902.