The Stone Family Trust v. Credit Suisse AG

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 30, 2022
Docket1:19-cv-05192
StatusUnknown

This text of The Stone Family Trust v. Credit Suisse AG (The Stone Family Trust v. Credit Suisse AG) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Stone Family Trust v. Credit Suisse AG, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT USDC SDNY SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOCUMENT THE STONE FAMILY TRUST, NocH FILED Plaintiff, DATE FILED: 3/30/2022 -against- 19 Civ. 5192 (AT) CREDIT SUISSE AG, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, TIDJANE THIAM ORDER and DAVID R. MATHERS, Defendants. ANALISA TORRES, District Judge: Plaintiff, the Stone Family Trust, brings this action against Defendants Credit Suisse AG and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (together, “Credit Suisse”) and two Credit Suisse executives, Tidjane Thiam and David R. Mathers (together, the “Individual Defendants”). Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 35. Plaintiffs claims arise under (1) Sections 9(a), 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act’), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78), 78t; (2) Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act’), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 770; (3) the Pennsylvania Securities Act (the “PSA”), 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1-401(b), 1-501, 1-503; and (4) Pennsylvania common law. Jd. FJ 352-421. Defendants bring a partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Defs. Mot., ECF No. 37. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. BACKGROUND! This case arises from the February 5, 2018 collapse of the market for XIV, an exchange traded note issued by Credit Suisse AG, the primary operating subsidiary of non-party Credit

! The following facts are taken from the second amended complaint and “are presumed to be true for purposes of considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Fin. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Putnam Advisory Co., LLC, 783 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2015).

Suisse Group AG. See generally SAC. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“CSS”) is a U.S.- based broker-dealer and affiliate of Credit Suisse AG that served as an underwriter and placement and redemption agent for XIV. Id. ¶¶ 55–56. At the time of the collapse, Tidjane Thiam was Credit Suisse’s chief operating officer (“CEO”) and a member of the Capital

Allocation and Risk Management Committee (the “CARMC”), and David Mathers was Credit Suisse’s chief financial officer (“CFO”) and a member of the CARMC and the Valuation Risk Management Committee. Id. ¶¶ 58–59. Thiam assumed the CEO position in 2015, and Mathers became CFO in 2010. Id. I. XIV Credit Suisse AG began issuing XIV in 2010. Id. ¶ 1. XIV’s value tracked the daily inverse performance of Standard and Poor’s (“S&P”) 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index (“VIX Index”), id., which measures the volatility of the stock market, id. ¶ 1 & n.1. Generally, if the VIX Index declined by a certain percentage, because the market was less volatile, the value of XIV would increase by the same percentage, and vice versa. Id. ¶¶ 1, 80.

To hedge its obligations with respect to XIV, Credit Suisse purchased and sold other securities and derivatives, primarily VIX futures contracts, which increased in value when the VIX Index increased in value. Id. ¶¶ 4, 65, 71. Every trading day, Credit Suisse would rebalance its portfolios and make decisions regarding whether to hedge its XIV obligations between 4:00 p.m., when the stock market closed, and 4:15 p.m., when the VIX futures market closed. Id. ¶ 73. If the VIX Index rose during a trading day, Credit Suisse would need to purchase VIX futures in quantities adequate to “rebalance its hedge.” Id. ¶ 75. If Credit Suisse did not purchase a sufficient quantity of VIX futures, “Credit Suisse would own a massive unhedged exposure to volatility through [its] obligations, putting its own capital at risk.” Id. Credit Suisse closely monitored its “rebalancing requirements” and XIV obligations. Id. ¶¶ 235–36. “On at least three occasions prior to February 5, 2018, the market experienced a spike in the VIX Index and an even larger spike in the VIX futures price due to the[se] hedging

activities.” Id. ¶ 97; see also id. ¶¶ 98–100. After each spike in the VIX Index, Credit Suisse responded by purchasing large quantities of VIX futures, which drove up the value of the VIX Index and drove down the value of XIV notes. Id. ¶ 288. This effect was even more pronounced because there were “liquidity issues” in the VIX futures market—i.e., a limited number of VIX futures were available—so the sudden increases in demand temporarily increased the price of VIX futures by even more than what would be expected based on market volatility alone. Id. ¶¶ 97, 103, 106. This excessive increase in the VIX futures price created a corresponding excessive decrease in the price of XIV. See id. ¶ 288. These events also illustrated that, due to liquidity issues, there would quickly become a point where there would not be enough VIX futures available to allow Credit Suisse to rebalance its hedges without a disproportionate impact

on VIX futures prices, and, therefore, the price of XIV. Id. Credit Suisse was aware of the three prior VIX spikes and their impact on the VIX futures market. Id. ¶¶ 97, 104–06, 109, 119, 234, 314. The Individual Defendants were informed about these prior VIX spikes in accordance with Credit Suisse’s risk protocols. Id. ¶¶ 104–05, 109, 120, 290, 301, 314–17. Credit Suisse also took action in response to this risk, and, in July 2016, issued a press release announcing that the issuance of additional XIV notes would be conditioned on purchasers agreeing “to sell to Credit Suisse certain hedging instruments consistent with Credit Suisse’s hedging strategy.” Id. ¶ 115. This announcement was approved by the CARMC, which included Thiam and Mathers. Id. ¶ 266. These new hedging instruments protected only Credit Suisse’s interests, and not the interests of XIV investors. Id. ¶ 118. In March 2017, Credit Suisse represented to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) that it “actively monitor[s] risks and take[s] mitigating actions where they fall

outside accepted levels,” id. ¶¶ 267–68, and that senior management had “strong involvement” in Credit Suisse’s risk management procedures, id. ¶¶ 269–70. Indeed, Thiam, as CEO, received “immediate notification” of any breaches of risk limits, which would include those related to XIV. Id. ¶¶ 274, 324–25. Moreover, on January 11, 2018, analysts warned that the risk that hedging may impact XIV and other similar products was “outsized” and “severe.” Id. ¶ 248. Market professionals at other financial services firms also signaled that the “liquidity gap” in VIX futures could “unleash a monster.” Id. ¶¶ 254–56. Despite knowing that there was a limited number of VIX futures available for purchase at any one time, id. ¶¶ 127, 294, Credit Suisse continued issuing more XIV notes, id. ¶¶ 81, 127, 294. Because of its intimate knowledge of this market, Credit Suisse understood that the next

time VIX’s volatility spiked, as it did every few years, Credit Suisse’s hedging would threaten “the very existence of XIV.” Id. ¶ 81. Yet, in June 2017, Credit Suisse offered an additional five million XIV notes. Id. ¶ 82. Then, on January 29, 2018, Credit Suisse issued over sixteen million new XIV notes. Id. This growth in the XIV market created a grave risk that Credit Suisse’s hedging activities “would have a large impact on VIX futures in the event of any relatively small increase in volatility.” Id. ¶ 86.

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The Stone Family Trust v. Credit Suisse AG, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-stone-family-trust-v-credit-suisse-ag-nysd-2022.