COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ————————————
No. 08-25-00301-CR ————————————
The State of Texas, Appellant
v.
Frankie Lee Hines, Appellee
On Appeal from the 143rd District Court Ward County, Texas Trial Court No. 25-08-6924-CRW
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In October 2022, the State filed a five-count indictment against Appellee Frankie Lee Hines for
sexual abuse of a child. It subsequently filed and dismissed four more indictments arising from the
same locus of facts over the next three years. By October 2025, after Hines was indicted for the fifth
time, the trial court dismissed the case on speedy trial grounds. On appeal, the State asserts in a single
1 point of error that the trial court erred in granting Hines’s request for dismissal with prejudice. We
conclude the trial court did not err because Hines established a violation of his right to a speedy trial.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are not in dispute, 1 but we detail them here to demonstrate the proceedings
over the course of three years during which time Hines was prosecuted under five separate indictments
for the same factual allegations. On October 26, 2022, Hines was indicted on one count of aggravated
sexual assault of a child in Cause No. 22-010-6527-CRW for acts committed on or about February 1,
2020 (first indictment); see Tex. Penal Code 22.021(a)(2)(B). Unable to make bond, Hines was jailed
after his arrest on January 28, 2023. A year later on October 23, 2023, the State sought and received a
continuance of trial because it had “not had adequate time to prepare for trial.”
On January 4, 2024, the State dismissed the first indictment and re-indicted Hines on one count
of continuous sexual abuse of child under the age of 14 in Cause No. 24-01-6677-CRW for acts
committed between February 1, 2020 and April 1, 2021 (second indictment). See Tex. Penal Code
21.02. Hines remained in jail. On January 19, 2024, the trial court set the case for trial on April 15,
2024.
On April 4, 2024, Hines filed a motion to set or dismiss for speedy trial violation to ensure the
April 15 trial setting was not delayed. He asserted he had been in custody for more than 12 months,
that the original indictment had been set for trial but dismissed, that the original indictment was for acts
encompassed in the new indictment, and that any additional delay in bringing the case to trial would
1 The State adopts the statement of facts contained in Hines’s September 2025 motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds in its brief. As appellant, the States bears responsibility to obtain complete transcripts for use in the appellate record and to be certain that all exhibits necessary for consideration of its grounds of error is included in it. Moulton v. State, 508 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
2 jeopardize the availability of witnesses. The record does not contain a written response from the State
or any indication that the trial court held a hearing on the matter. On April 5, 2024, the trial court
granted the motion to set, confirmed the April 15, 2024 setting, but denied the motion for dismissal
based on speedy trial violation.
On April 15, 2024, with a jury panel assembled outside the courtroom, Hines announced ready
for trial. The State then moved to dismiss the indictment arguing the complainant and other witnesses
needed to be interviewed in Arkansas, and that it had:
discovered information while doing final trial prep the preceding two days and determined that it cannot prove guilt beyond a reasonable [sic] that defendant committed repeated (two or more) acts of sexual abuse while the complainant was under age 14, as charged in the indictment in this case. This dismissal is without prejudice and the State will consider pursuing non continuous allegations for any acts of sexual abuse while the complainant was under age 17.
The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss on April 15, 2024. Hines was then
immediately extradited to, and incarcerated in, Bentonville, Arkansas, to await trial on allegations
similar to those brought by the complaining witness in the Texas cases. Approximately eight months
later, the Arkansas prosecution was dismissed.
However, while Hines was still in Arkansas, the State filed two new cases against him on
October 23, 2024. In Cause No. 24-10-6803-CRW, Hines was charged with one count of sexual assault
of a child (third indictment), the same as that alleged in the second indictment. See Tex. Penal Code
22.011. In Cause No. 24-10-6804-CRW, Hines was charged with one count of aggravated sexual
assault of a child for acts committed on February 1, 2020 (fourth indictment)—the same charge alleged
in the first indictment. 2 See Tex. Penal Code 21.02. Upon returning from Arkansas, Hines was served
with the new indictments in the Ward County jail, arrested, and re-incarcerated.
2 The record does not contain a copy of the fourth indictment, Cause No. 24-01-6804-CRW. The cause number is listed in Hines’s supplemental brief to his second motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations, and in his proposed findings of fact
3 Hines filed a second motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations, although that motion, any
response by the State, and any order from the Court are not included in the record before us. On March
18, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. 3 At that time, the State was represented by a
newly elected District Attorney. Hines called the immediate past District Attorney Randy Reynolds to
testify. Reynolds was responsible for Hines’s case from its inception through the filing of the third and
fourth indictments. Reynolds testified about not being ready for the April 2024 trial, and that he
dismissed the second indictment on the day of trial as a result of interviews with witnesses who had
come forward from the case in Arkansas. He testified: “I no longer had confidence we could prove true
all the allegations in that indictment,” and that his theme for the prosecution had “drastically changed.”
He also maintained there were “numerous reasons that supported the dismissal.” Reynolds said he came
to believe that “the best evidence, the critical evidence probably shows it beginning sometime in
September, October, some eight months” after the February 2020 date pleaded in the indictments. The
witness interviews conducted over the weekend also convinced him that “some of the people we needed
to talk to were in Arkansas.” Reynolds did not consider asking for a continuance, but instead believed
dismissal was “the best avenue to go” because “I probably needed longer than just one month.”
Reynolds said it was his practice to make a trial notebook before trial that should have contained
his notes about the case, but he had no idea whether one had even been created, or whether, if created,
where it was or if it was left for the incoming district attorney.
Reynolds did not provide any further information or discovery to Hines’s attorneys as a result
of his interviews with the Arkansas witnesses after the April 14 dismissal or at any time after Hines’s
and conclusions of law submitted to the trial court after it dismissed with prejudice. The State’s brief also confirms that a fourth indictment for aggravated sexual assault, presumably pursuant to Tex. Penal Code 22.021, was filed. 3 The record contains only a transcript excerpt of the March 18, 2025 hearing on Hines’s second motion to dismiss as an exhibit to his supplemental brief filed on April 11, 2025, after the hearing was held.
4 re-indictment in October 2024 even though additional witnesses had come to his attention. He did not
remember receiving any information after the April 2024 dismissals that required disclosure to the
defense, although he remembered there were “several” new witnesses and “there was a difference in
what one witness was saying and what I’d understood the other witnesses to say.” He said the new
witnesses related to the complainant’s outcry and were family members that “you all [the defense]
should explore as well as the State.” He was not sure whether or not this information had been
documented, but if it had it should have been in his trial notebook.
Reynolds agreed that the “basic allegations” in all the indictments arose from the same CAC 4
interview. However, his investigation following the April 2024 dismissal led him to believe there were
now “less” incidents than those alleged in the third and fourth indictments. He agreed the new witness
statements had been given to him verbally and had not been put into writing. He also agreed there were
no new formal witness statements, oral recorded statements, “or anything like [that],” that gave rise to
the third and fourth indictments. He instead “made the decision” to go to the grand jury by reanalyzing
“everything I knew at that point [from the April trial preparation] knowing that there needed to be some
further interviews, investigations and such.”
Reynolds testified he had hoped the Arkansas prosecution would have provided more
information, but none was received when Hines was reindicted in October 2024. He was not aware that
the Arkansas prosecution had been dismissed, nor had he had any contact with the complainant’s family
when he reindicted Hines in October 2024. Reynolds said that at the time of dismissal, he believed
there was potential new evidence but admitted he did not receive any such evidence prior to the time
4 “CAC” is an acronym for Child Advocacy Center. See Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs, 537 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2008). CACs were “established pursuant to Chapter 264, Subchapter E, of the Texas Family Code,” for the purpose of “coordinat[ing] child abuse investigations among the various branches of government, including TDPRS, county law enforcement, and the district attorney, so that children will not experience the trauma of multiple investigations from the different governmental entities.” Id.
5 of the October reindictments or at any time before he left the District Attorney’s Office in December
2024. Reynolds also admitted he never made the trip to Arkansas to interview witnesses.
Following the March 18, 2025 hearing, Hines was released on a personal recognizance bond on
March 21, 2025 after having been incarcerated for approximately 2 years and 2 months. 5 The trial was
re-set for August 18, 2025. 6
In advance of the August 18, 2025 trial setting, the State filed a notice of intention to use
extraneous offenses, prior convictions, other crimes, and bad acts listing one prior Missouri conviction
for misdemeanor stealing on July 25, 2025. On August 15, 2025, Hines filed a Motion in Limine, a
Motion to Compel Election Before Trial Begins, and a motion to have the jury determine his
punishment.
On August 18, 2025, with a jury assembled, the trial court granted all of Hines’s pretrial motions,
including the motion to elect. The State then immediately moved to dismiss the third and fourth
indictments because:
The State is exercising its prosecutorial discretion and dismissing the case in order to properly re-indict as a continuous sexual assault given the defense’s late request for an election of offenses, which is impossible to give where the victim was continuously sexually assaulted over many months and in several jurisdictions.
On August 19, 2025, Hines was indicted for the fifth time in a five-count indictment in Cause
No. 25-08-6924-CRW, alleging indecency and prohibited sexual contact with, and sexual abuse and
continuous sexual abuse of a child. He continued to remain out of jail on a personal recognizance bond.
On September 16, 2025, Hines filed a third motion to dismiss based on a violation of his right
to a speedy trial. There is no written response from the State in the record before us. On October 3,
5 This is the total amount of time that Hines spent in Texas jail. The calculation would be different if the excludable time calculated and discussed in factor one “Length of Delay” were included.
6 There is no order resetting the trial date in the record.
6 2025, the trial court held an arraignment on the fifth indictment and hearing on the third motion to
dismiss. The trial court dismissed Cause No. 25-08-6924-CRW with prejudice in a short, written order.
Although both the State and Hines requested permission to file proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, only Hines filed them. None were entered by the trial court. The State filed a motion
to stay all proceedings which the trial court granted on October 22, 2025.
The State timely filed its Notice of Appeal asserting a single issue—that the trial court erred by
granting Hines’s motion to dismiss the State’s fifth indictment with prejudice.
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Texas Constitution, both
guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend VI; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 10; see
Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (observing that Sixth Amendment is
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment). Although the speedy trial right under the
Texas constitution “exists independently of the federal guarantee,” Texas courts have “traditionally
analyzed claims of a denial of the state speedy trial right under the [four] factors established in Barker
v. Wingo.” Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc); see Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Those factors are:
1) whether delay before trial was uncommonly long; 2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay; 3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and 4) whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.
Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
The analysis of a speedy trial claim requires courts to weigh the strength of each Barker factor
and then balance the factors’ relative weights taking the State’s and the defendant’s conduct into
account. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The evidentiary burden differs
7 depending on the Barker factor at stake. The State carries the burden to justify the first factor, the length
of the delay. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. The defendant carries the burden to show the delay is
“presumptively prejudicial” and to prove he or she asserted his right and suffered prejudice. State v.
Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 113–114 (Tex. Crim App. 2021); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280.
We apply a bifurcated standard of review to the Barker factor analysis. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at
113–114. Factual components are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard and legal
components de novo. Id. Given these standards, we defer to explicit or implicit findings made by the
trial court if supported by the record to sustain its ruling. Id. at 114. Although each Barker factor is
initially individually assessed, all are ultimately balanced as a “purely legal question” subject to de
novo review. Id. In the end, the trial court’s ruling must be affirmed if it finds support in the record and
is correct under any applicable theory of law. Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Length of delay
The first Barker factor—the length of delay—initially acts as a “triggering mechanism” to
foreclose a speedy trial claim unless “a period of time that is, on its face, unreasonable in the
circumstances” has passed. Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313–314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–652 (1992); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (“Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors
that go into the balance.”). The defendant carries the burden to demonstrate the presumptive prejudice
of any delay—measured from the time defendant is arrested or charged to the time of trial or demand
for a speedy trial. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113–14. Texas courts generally find delays approaching one
year to be unreasonable enough to trigger a full Barker inquiry. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768.
8 Hines’s trial was delayed by almost three years—2 years, 11 months, and 7 days—from the date
the State charged him to the date that his case was finally dismissed with prejudice. In its brief, the
State concedes, but does not directly address, that the delay was presumptively prejudicial by
characterizing it as “lengthy on its face.” Instead, the State maintains that any delay was caused by
Hines’s actions. Id. However, Texas courts generally consider the reasons for the delay under only the
second, not the first, Barker factor. See, e.g., State v. Uhl, 717 S.W.3d 117, 129 (Tex. App.—Austin
2025, pet. ref’d); Laird v. State, 691 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, pet. ref’d).
For the first time on appeal, the State attacks the length of delay, maintaining that the time
between the dismissal of the second indictment and the filing of the two October 2024 indictments
should not be counted for speedy trial purposes. See Denstitt v. State, No.02-14-00172-CR, 2015 WL
4043285, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Forth Worth July 2, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (failure to raise issue before trial court to preserve error rule applies to foreclose appellate
review in speedy trial claims). Even if we assume this assertion is legally correct, the length of delay
would be reduced by only 192 days for a total delay of 2 years, 4 months, and 27 days.
Nevertheless, we calculate the period of time excludable under the speedy trial as follows. The
total period of delay in this prosecution was 1,073 days (2 years, 11 months, 3 days), from October 26,
2022 (when the first indictment was filed) to October 3, 2025 (when the case was dismissed for speedy
trial violations). Hines served a total of 783 days (2 years, 1 month, 21 days from January 28, 2023 to
March 21, 2025) in jail in this period.
We exclude 363 days from October 26, 2022 (the date of 1st indictment) to October 24, 2023
(the date when State’s trial continuance on 1st indictment was granted because it was not ready for
trial), and even if not excludable would be neutral and not the result of either the State’s or Hines’s
actions. We also exclude the 193 days from April 15, 2024 (the date of dismissal of second indictment)
9 to October 23, 2024 (when the 3rd and 4th indictments were filed) which includes time Hines spent in
Arkansas, and the 1 day between August 18, 2025 (when the 3rd and 4th indictments were dismissed)
to August 19, 2025 (when the 5th indictment was obtained). This accounts for 556 days (1 year, 6
months, 11 days) of which should be excluded from the length of delay speedy trial analysis.
Given these calculations, there are still 517 days that must be included in the length of delay
speedy trial analysis. 7 This period of time is significantly greater than the eight-month minimum needed
to establish presumptively prejudicial delay. Knox v. State, 934 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (“courts generally hold that any delay of eight months or longer is presumptively unreasonable
and triggers speedy trial analysis”).
The trial court took judicial notice of all proceedings relevant to the case before granting Hines’s
third and final speedy trial motion. We agree with the trial court and conclude that the delay in this case
was more than adequate to trigger a full Barker analysis, and that Hines has met his burden to prove he
was presumptively prejudiced by that delay. (“The Court does find that the delays in this matter have
triggered an analysis under Barker v. Wingo.”). Finally, “[b]ecause the length of the delay stretched
well beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim,” we also conclude
“this factor—in and of itself—weighs heavily against the State.” State v. Wei, 447 S.W.3d 549, 554
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (quoting Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649); Doggett,
505 U.S. at 652 (“the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time”).
B. Reasons for delay
Having triggered a full Barker analysis, the State now has the burden to explain the reasons for
and to justify the delay. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. The second Barker factor requires us to determine
“whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay,” and the evidentiary
7 In that period, Hines served 319 days (10 months, 26 days) in jail from October 24, 2023 to April 15, 2024 and October 24, 2024 to March 21, 2025, when he was finally released on a personal recognizance bond.
10 weight assigned depends upon the reasons given for the delay. Doggett v. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S.
81, 90 (2009); Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. Intentional or deliberate attempts to “hamper the defense”
weighs heavily against the State. Id. More neutral reasons, such as official negligence or overcrowded
trial court dockets, are afforded less weight but may nevertheless weigh against the State because it
retains the ultimate responsibility for proceeding to trial expeditiously. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531;
Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. Conversely, any delay caused by the defense weighs against the
defendant. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768.
Although an “unexplained” delay may weigh heavily against the State in some instances, if no
evidence is presented that such a delay on behalf of the State was deliberate, this factor will weigh
against the State, but not heavily. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649–651; Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d
801, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If the record is silent “or one contain[s] reasons [that are] insufficient
to excuse the delay, it must be presumed that no valid reason for [the] delay existed.” Turner v. State,
545 S.W.2d 133, 137–38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Our review of the record compels the conclusion
that the reasons offered by the State are insufficient to excuse the continuing delay in this case.
The State concedes “the previous district attorney representing the State was guilty of
negligence and sloth.” Between diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay is the middle ground of official
negligence in bringing an accused to trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656–57. Although “[s]uch negligence
is weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused’s defense,” judicial tolerance of
such negligence “varies inversely with its protractedness and its consequent threat to the fairness of the
accused’s trial.” State v. Davis, 549 S.W.3d 688, 699 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (quoting
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 (internal citation omitted)).
11 This record demonstrates a continuing course of deliberate conduct by the State to delay the
litigation until it felt comfortable in going to trial on charges it never seemed able to indict properly. 8
This compels the conclusion that the second factor weighs heavily against the State, and Reynold’s
testimony at the March 18, 2025 hearing on Hines’s third speedy trial motion demonstrates the State’s
conduct was grossly, not simply, negligent. 9
There were three trial settings in this case, at each Hines announced ready. At the first setting,
the State sought, and received, a continuance by asserting it was not ready for trial. 10 At the second, the
State dismissed the first indictment claiming it could not prove its case. Reynolds later testified that
last-minute pretrial witness interviews led him to conclude the case required further investigation that
would take him more than a month to complete when he dismissed the case in April 2024. It was the
State’s decision alone that only dismissal of the indictment would suffice, not a continuance for further
investigation.
At the same April 4, 2024 hearing, Reynolds told the trial court he needed to go to Arkansas to
conduct further witness interviews. By his own admission that never happened. Reynolds also testified
his usual practice was to make a trial notebook containing his notes on witness interviews and other
documentation in support of the prosecution. However, he admitted he had no idea whether he made
such a notebook, or if made, whether it still existed or had been left for the incoming District Attorney.
Hines has maintained, and Reynolds agreed in his testimony, that the State never produced further
8 At the October 3, 2025 hearing on Hines’s third and final motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation the trial court said: “I do find that the actions cumulatively have created a situation in which the motion to dismiss based on those violations is granted . . . with prejudice” Given the record, we find no abuse of discretion in this finding of fact.
9 In his brief, Hines raised the specter of bad faith by the State. However, the trial court was not asked to make such a finding in Hines’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law nor did it ever make such a finding. We refrain from drawing any conclusions on this point. 10 There is no evidence in the record that Hines agreed to the continuance.
12 discovery or information to the defense, and the State does not challenge that assertion on appeal. Most
revealing is Reynold’s admission that the third and fourth indictments were simply based on the same
information he “reanalyzed” after the second indictment was dismissed; this conduct supports the
conclusion that the State intentionally delayed bringing Hines to trial. This admission, together with
Reynold’s testimony that he dismissed the second indictment because the case required further
investigation, negates any inference that State’s given reasons for the dismissal of the third and fourth
indictments were genuine.
Hines also never received further discovery or information from the State in support of the fifth
indictment. That indictment was obtained at “an emergency sitting of the grand jury the following day
[after the August 2025 dismissal] to make sure that we did get [Hines] timely reindicted.” It appears
that this prosecution has been primarily, if not solely, supported by the same evidence which supported
the first and second indictments. If the opposite conclusion is true, that the prosecution did develop
further factual bases and information in support of the third, fourth, and fifth indictments, the State
never produced any such additional discovery to the defense. The State’s serial dismissals and re-
indictments prejudiced the defense, at the least, by the loss of potential documentary evidence,
information concerning exculpatory or favorable witnesses or testimony, or information for cross-
examination that the material in Reynold’s notebook might have supported. 11
At the October 3, 2025 speedy trial hearing, the only explanation offered by the State for the
August 2025 dismissals and fifth indictment was that “as soon as the State realized the procedural
nuances that me as the newly elected [sic] did not fully appreciate in August, the only fair thing to do
for justice was to dismiss and reindict.” For the first time on appeal, however, the State argues its
11 Reynolds testified that the pretrial witness interviews threw off his understanding of the cases’ timelines and revealed contradictory testimony and potential new witnesses to such an extent that he “no longer had confidence [the State] could prove true all the allegations in that indictment.”
13 actions did not violate Appellee’s right to a speedy trial asserting that Hines “lay[] behind the log” by
filing his motion to compel election three days before the August 18, 2025 trial setting, an election
which resulted in “extreme delay.” See Denstitt, 2015 WL 4043285 at *2–3 (failure to raise issue before
trial court to preserve error rule applies to foreclose appellate review in speedy trial claims). However,
motions to elect can be asserted even when a jury has been empaneled or in the middle of trial at the
close of the State’s evidence. See Hubbard v. State, 753 S.W.2d 496,499 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, 1998,
pet. granted), aff’d Hubbard v. State, 798 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Crim.App.1990) (motion to elect made
after jury empaneled correct procedure that permits double jeopardy to attach); Garcia v. State, 614
S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (in sexual assault of a child prosecution, defendant “had a
constitutional, due-process right to an election at the close of the State’s case in chief”). Fairly construed,
Hines’s pretrial motion to elect was an attempt to save time and judicial resources instead of waiting to
make such a motion at trial.
The State, also for the first time on appeal, argues that Hines did not assert his speedy trial right
in the 14-month period between the filing of the first indictment (October 2022) and the filing of the
second indictment in January 2024, which it claims was a reason for the for “extreme delay” in the case.
But in January 2024, the case was less than 14-months old. The State wants this delay to be held against
Hines, even though the State had requested and received a continuance of a trial setting in October 2023
because it was not ready. Nonetheless, we excluded the 363 days from October 26, 2022 (date of first
indictment) to October 24, 2023 (date when State’s trial continuance on first indictment was granted
because it was not ready for trial). Even if we had not, we would give that period neutral weight because
it was not the result of either the State’s or Hines’s actions.
After the first indictment was dismissed and the second filed in January 2024, the trial court set
the case for trial on April 15, 2024 because the State said it needed to interview witnesses in Arkansas.
14 When Hines filed his motion to set or dismiss for speedy trial violation ten days before that trial, he did
so with the express purpose of ensuring the trial date. Hines announced ready and wanted to go to trial.
See Burgett v. State, 865 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d) (where trial
continued pursuant to defense-requested continuances, “[d]elay caused by acts of the accused which
are beyond the control of the prosecution should not weigh against the State”). The delay between the
January 2024 and April 2024 trial setting is solely attributable to the State and its inability to marshal
the quantum of evidence necessary for trial.
The trial court acknowledged that “even though [the new district attorney] was not associated
with the actions of the State prior to . . . taking the office in 2025, those actions are still [imputed] upon
the office as one continuous entity, the State that is. And I do find that the actions cumulatively have
created a situation in which the motion to dismiss based on those violations is granted . . . with
prejudice.” In the context of this record, and the State’s failure to propound a genuine reason for the
delay, we conclude the second Barker factor weighs heavily against the State. See Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d
at 314 (explaining that delays weigh against the State if not justified; to weigh heavily there must be
evidence of “a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense”).
C. Assertion of the right to speedy trial
Because the defendant retains the responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial, he carries
the burden to prove he timely asserted his right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771.
In this regard we keep in mind that “[t]he constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not [to the]
dismissal of the charges.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281. Filing a motion to dismiss and requesting that the
trial court dismiss the pending charges based on an alleged speedy-trial violation, as opposed to filing
a motion for speedy trial that requests a prompt trial setting, attenuates the strength of a speedy-trial
complaint because it creates an inference that the defendant prefers no trial at all, rather than a speedy
15 trial. Id. (if defendant asks for only dismissal, he must show he tried to get the case into court to go to
trial in a timely manner); Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“a defendant’s
motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes
attenuate the strength of his claim”). The third Barker factor also acknowledges “the reality that
defendants may have incentives to employ delay as a ‘defense tactic’: delay may ‘work to the accused’s
advantage’ because ‘witnesses may become unavailable, or their memories may fade’ over time.”
Brillon, 556 U.S. at 90 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 521).
The record before us demonstrates that Hines diligently continued to assert his right to a speedy
trial beginning with his first motion to set or dismiss for speedy trial violation filed on April 4, 2024,
in advance of the April 15, 2024 trial on the second indictment. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283.
(“Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of the defendant.”). In that motion, he
specifically asked the trial court to “maintain the current April 15, 2024 jury trial date OR dismiss the
captioned cause.” Fairly read, this was a request to protect his right to a speedy trial by proceeding to
trial on April 15 and “[t]o preclude further delay.” The record reflects the trial court interpreted the
motion in this manner because it granted the motion to set the next day and affirmed the April 15 trial
setting.
A second motion for speedy trial was filed and heard on March 18, 2025. That motion was
denied. It was followed by the filing of the third and fourth indictments, which were also dismissed
before trial.
After a fifth indictment, Hines filed his third motion for speedy trial which was heard on October
3, 2025. Hines asked the trial court to recall that he had been ready to go to trial on each of the three
trial settings that were cancelled because of the State’s conduct. 12 The State did not object nor offer
12 Hines asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the events in each of the four prior dismissed cases which the court agreed to do.
16 any rebuttal, and the trial court did not reject that assertion. This is not a case where Defendant’s
inaction “weighs more heavily against a violation the longer the delay becomes.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d
at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted). We find the third Barker factor weighs in Hines’s favor.
D. Prejudice to the defendant
The final Barker factor requires that we determine whether, and to what extent, the defendant
suffered prejudice because of the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The weight of any prejudice is
assessed by considering the interests that the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (1)
prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimization of anxiety and concerns of an accused;
and (3) to limit the possibility that the defendant’s defense would be impaired. Id. Of these interests,
“the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews
the fairness of the entire system.” Id.; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772. Affirmative proof of particularized
prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim because “excessive delay presumptively
compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify . . .
and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017).
As to the first and second factors, Hines was under threat of prosecution for almost three years,
and jailed for 2 years, 2 months and 7 days (800 days) from January 28, 2023 to March 21, 2025 because
he could not make bond. 13 Of the five indictments filed by the State in that three-year period, all were
based upon the same set of operative facts, and four were continued or dismissed on the State’s motion.
The State does not contest that Hines was ready for trial. By definition, that readiness
encompassed expense for legal work, witness fees, and travel for Hines who lives seven hours from
Pecos. When he returned from incarceration in Arkansas after the prosecution against him was
13 The amount of jail time spent in Arkansas is excluded from this calculation.
17 dismissed, the State rearrested him in jail on two new indictments and his incarceration continued. As
a result of this extended prosecution, his physical and mental health and financial capacity also suffered.
Each of these issues was raised and documented by Hines in his motions and briefing before the trial
court, and in his brief to this Court.
This presentation shifted the burden to the State to rebut Hines’s claims of prejudice. See Huynh
v. State, No. 05-21-00991-CR, 2022 WL 17261155, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication). However, the State did not introduce any evidence to rebut Hines’s
claims or to explain why Hines would not be prejudiced by its actions. We reject the State’s assertion
that Hines was not prejudiced by the delay because the gaps between indictments and the time spent in
Arkansas rendered the remaining two years and two months of incarceration non-prejudicial.
Reynold’s testimony further demonstrates that Hines’s defense was significantly impaired and
that the loss of evidence as a result of his Reynold’s conduct was a reasonable possibility. Barker, 407
U.S. at 532. Again, the State never provided a reason for [Reynold’s conduct] except to say that it was
the result of “negligence and sloth.”
By itself, Reynold’s admission that the third and fourth indictments were based upon the same
evidence as the second, and that no further investigation of the case was undertaken, demonstrates how
the State’s action in filing and dismissing indictments to avoid trial settings when Hines announced
ready was prejudicial to the defense. And the State cannot support its assertion in its brief that. “[t]here
is nothing in the record demonstrating that [Hines] has suffered any prejudice.” It has failed to
overcome the presumption of prejudice by demonstrating that the defense was unimpaired by the delay,
such as by establishing that no evidence was lost or impaired during the time of delay. Gonzales, 435
S.W.3d. at 814–815.
18 We find the fourth Barker factor weighs against the State because Hines has made a showing
of both actual and presumptive prejudice to the defense. Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 923–24 (“excessive
delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for
that matter identify”).
E. Balancing the Barker factors
We now turn to the final piece of the Barker analysis—balancing the various factors in light of
the parties’ conduct. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. In so doing, we keep the
following legal principles in mind: Hines bears the burden to prove his diligent assertion of his right to
a speedy trial (factor 3) and to show prejudice (factor 4). Id. His burden on the latter two factors varies
inversely with the length of delay (factor 1) and the State’s culpability for the delay (factor 2). Huynh,
2022 WL 17261155, at *4 (citing Cantu, at 280–281). The greater the bad faith or official negligence
on the part of the State, the less a defendant must show assertion of his speedy trial right or prejudice.
Id. Here, the presumption of prejudice on the first factor has been met, and the remaining factors all lie
against the State.
Weighing all the Barker factors, we find a violation of Hines’s right to a speedy trial. The trial
court did not err when it found a violation of Hines’s right to a speedy trial and dismissed the case
against him with prejudice. We overrule the State’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the fifth indictment against Hines with
prejudice.
MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice
19 July 23, 2026
Before Salas Mendoza C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)