IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 52872-2025
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO ) TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )
) Boise, May 2026 Term Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Opinion filed: September 2, 2026 v. )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk TRIPLE CROWN DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) an Idaho limited liability company, )
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Defendant-Appellant, )
)
and )
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THUESON CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) AMERICRETE READY MIX CONCRETE, ) INC., dba G&B REDI-MEX; AMERICRETE ) LAND HOLDING LLC, an Idaho limited ) liability company; and RIVER ROCK SAND ) & GRAVEL LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) company, )
)
Defendants Intervenors-Appellants. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Canyon County. Gene A. Petty, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, Boise, and Kronberg Law, PLLC, Boise, for Appellants. Chris Kronberg argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Ryan Stewart argued.
ZAHN, Justice.
This case concerns eligibility for business damages in connection with a condemnation proceeding. The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board (“the State”) planned to construct a highway interchange through property owned by Triple Crown Development, LLC. The State
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issued an order of condemnation and filed a complaint initiating a condemnation proceeding against Triple Crown. The State and Triple Crown stipulated to allowing the following parties to intervene: Thueson Construction, Inc. (“TCI”); Americrete Ready Mix Concrete, Inc., dba G&B Redi-Mix (“G&B”); Americrete Land Holding LLC (“Americrete”); and River Rock Sand & Gravel LLC (“River Rock”) (collectively, “Intervenors”). Triple Crown and Intervenors are all controlled by Lance Thueson. Americrete owns land adjacent to Triple Crown’s property and the other intervenors conduct business on Americrete’s property.
This appeal concerns Triple Crown’s and Intervenors’ claim for business damages pursuant to Idaho Code section 7-711(2). The State moved for summary judgment on the claim, arguing that neither Triple Crown nor Intervenors qualified for business damages. The district court granted the motion and concluded that Triple Crown was not entitled to business damages because there was no evidence that Triple Crown owned any business operating on the condemned property. It concluded that Intervenors were not entitled to business damages because they did not conduct business on the condemned property or on property owned by Triple Crown.
Triple Crown and Intervenors appeal the district court’s summary judgment decision and argue that fee title ownership is not required to pursue a claim for business damages. They argue they have an ownership interest in the property by virtue of a joint venture and that interest is sufficient to meet the requirements of section 7-711(2). We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that, to qualify for business damages under section 7-711(2), Triple Crown must own the business for which damages are sought and the business must operate on its property; and Intervenors’ businesses must operate upon property owned by Triple Crown. Because Triple Crown and Intervenors failed to establish either circumstance, we affirm the district court’s decision granting summary judgment and dismissing their claims for business damages.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The connections between Triple Crown and Intervenors.
Triple Crown and Intervenors are controlled by Lance Thueson. Thueson is in the gravel and concrete production business. Triple Crown owned the condemned property at issue in this appeal. Americrete owns real property adjacent to the condemned property. G&B operates a concrete plant on the Americrete property. River Rock excavates gravel or aggregate and crushes, washes, and sorts it for sale or for use in the manufacture of concrete at G&B sites, including one located on the Americrete property. TCI uses the finished gravel and concrete for construction
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projects and hauls finished gravel to G&B concrete plants, including one located on the Americrete property.
Thueson claims that he purchased the condemned property for the gravel located on the property and that he intended to have River Rock mine the gravel on the condemned property and have TCI transport the mined gravel to the G&B concrete plant located on the adjoining Americrete property, where G&B would process the mined material. However, Thueson never obtained permits for this work and he never commenced mining operations on the condemned property. B. The procedural history of this matter.
The State condemned a portion of the Triple Crown property for the purpose of constructing a highway interchange. The State and Triple Crown entered into an agreement for possession, in which Triple Crown agreed to allow the State to take possession of the portion of the property needed for the highway project before the value of the property was determined. The parties subsequently could not agree on a reasonable value for the property and the State issued an order of condemnation for the property and filed a complaint to initiate condemnation proceedings.
Triple Crown filed an answer and demand for jury trial, asserting a claim for just compensation and severance damages. The answer did not seek to recover business damages. However, Triple Crown later sent a letter to the State and asserted a demand for business damages. The parties later stipulated to the value of the condemned property. They also stipulated to allow River Rock, TCI, G&B, and Americrete to intervene, to waive the demand for a jury trial, and to proceed to a bench trial on the remaining claims.
The State moved for summary judgment on the business damages claim, arguing that Triple Crown and Intervenors were not entitled to business damages under Idaho Code section 7-711(2). The State first asserted that, to qualify for business damages under Idaho Code section 7-711(2), the business must either be owned by the party whose land is condemned or be located on an adjoining property owned or held by the same party. The State asserted that Triple Crown did not qualify for business damages because, although it owned the condemned property, it did not own the businesses seeking business damages and it did not own the property upon which those businesses were located. Next, the State argued that Intervenors did not qualify for business damages because none of them engaged in any business on the condemned property. Finally, the State contended that Triple Crown and Intervenors did not have the requisite five years’ standing
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required by section 7-711(2), they failed to meet the formal statutory requirements to raise a business damages claim, and their damages were speculative.
Triple Crown and Intervenors opposed the State’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that the production of concrete at the G&B plant located on the Americrete property was a joint venture. Because the joint venture planned to utilize sand and gravel from the condemned land, Triple Crown was a part of the joint venture. They asserted that the joint venture owned both the condemned property and the Americrete property and therefore each business, as a member of the joint venture, had a business damages claim. In response, the State argued that a joint venture cannot qualify for business damages under section 7-711(2). However, even if a joint venture could seek business damages, the State argued that Triple Crown and Intervenors failed to establish they were engaged in a joint venture.
The district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. It concluded that because there was no evidence that Triple Cown owned any business operating on the condemned property for five years, Triple Crown did not qualify for business damages. It further concluded that Intervenors did not qualify for business damages because Triple Crown did not own the land where Intervenors conducted business.
Triple Crown and Intervenors filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that it was not necessary for the same person or entity to hold title to both the condemned property and the Americrete property in order to be considered a “larger parcel” for business damages. Instead, they argued the condemned property and Americrete property are one large parcel because Thueson is the beneficial owner of both pieces of land. The district court was unpersuaded and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The district court entered judgment, in relevant part, dismissing Triple Crown and Intervenors’ claim for business damages. Triple Crown and Intervenors timely appealed.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred by dismissing the business damages claim. 2. Whether the State is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “When reviewing a summary judgment ruling or a ruling on a motion to reconsider a summary judgment order, this Court applies the same standard utilized by the district court in deciding the motion.” Christiansen v. Potlatch #1 Fin. Credit Union, 169 Idaho 533, 540, 498 P.3d
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713, 720 (2021). The district court “must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.” Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012) (quoting Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The district court did not err by dismissing the business damages claim because the “owner” of property for purposes of section 7-711(2) is the fee title owner of the property.
Triple Crown and Intervenors argue they are entitled to business damages incurred as a result of the State’s condemnation of Triple Crown’s property. Their claim is governed by Idaho Code section 7-711(2)(b), which addresses when business damages are available in connection with a condemnation proceeding:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
.... 2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel: . . . (b) the damages to any business qualifying under this subsection having more than five (5) years’ standing which the taking of a portion of the property and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff may reasonably cause. The business must be owned by the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands owned or held by such party. Business damages under this subsection shall not be awarded if the loss can reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the business or by taking steps that a reasonably prudent person would take, or for damages caused by temporary business interruption due to construction; and provided further that compensation for business damages shall not be duplicated in the compensation otherwise awarded to the property owner for damages pursuant to subsection (1) and (2)(a) of this section 7-711, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 7-711(2)(b) (emphasis added). This Court has held that “[t]here are two independent ways to qualify under [section] 7-711(2): ‘[T]he business must be owned by the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands owned or held by such party.’ ” City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 584, 130 P.3d 1118, 1122 (2006) (quoting I.C. § 7-711(2)(b)). Put differently, the first way qualifies a business if it is “owned by the party whose lands are being condemned.” See id. at 584, 130 P.3d at 1122 (quoting I.C. § 7-711(2)(b)). The second way
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qualifies a business if it is “located on land immediately adjoining the condemned piece of property and on land owned by the condemnee.” See id. at 585, 130 P.3d at 1123 (citing I.C. § 7-711(2)(b)).
Here, the district court determined that Triple Crown failed to qualify for business damages because it did not conduct business on the condemned property, and it did not own the lands on which Intervenors conducted their businesses. It concluded that Intervenors did not qualify because they did not conduct business on land owned by Triple Crown that adjoined the condemned property. Further, it determined that, while Thueson owned Triple Crown and Intervenors, he was not the titled owner of the condemned property.
The district court rejected an argument by Triple Crown and Intervenors that they qualified for damages because they were engaged in a joint venture and the joint venture had a beneficial ownership interest in the condemned property and the Americrete property, which they alleged constituted “adjoining lands” for purposes of section 7-711(2). 1 The district court concluded that, even if a joint venture existed, it would not qualify for damages because the joint venture had not been located on the condemned property for more than five years and because, while Triple Crown owned the condemned property, it did not own the adjoining property. The district court determined that the issue of ownership was dispositive and declined to address the parties’ remaining arguments.
On appeal, Triple Crown and Intervenors argue that the district court erred because section 7-711(2) does not require the owner of condemned land to hold fee title to the property. As a result, a beneficial ownership interest is sufficient to qualify as ownership under the statute. They argue the condemned property and the Americrete property (on which Intervenors’ businesses operated) were part of one “larger parcel,” on which Intervenors conducted business. They contend that they qualified for business damages under section 7-711(2) because the joint venture had a beneficial ownership interest in: (1) the condemned property, (2) the adjoining Americrete property; and (3) the businesses. Alternatively, they argue they qualify for business damages because Thueson was the beneficial owner of both properties and also the owner of Triple Crown and Intervenors.
1 On appeal, the State argues that the Americrete property does not directly adjoin the condemned property and therefore section 7-711(2) does not apply because Intervenors’ businesses are not located on adjoining lands for purposes of the statute. Triple Crown and Intervenors dispute this contention and make several arguments for why the statute applies to Intervenors. Because we affirm the district court on other grounds, we need not address these arguments.
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Triple Crown’s and Intervenors’ argument requires us to interpret the following language in Idaho Code section 7-711(2): “The business must be owned by the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands owned or held by such party.” They ask us to interpret the word “owned” broadly so that ownership does not just encompass fee simple ownership, but also extends to those that have a “beneficial” ownership interest in the condemned property or in the lands adjoining the condemned property. The State, on the other hand, argues that ownership is limited to the fee simple owner of the property. The State asserts that fee simple ownership encompasses all interests in the property and therefore no other entity could have an ownership interest in the property.
“Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law which this Court reviews de novo.” Genho v. Riverdale Hot Springs, LLC, 174 Idaho 894, 901, 560 P.3d 1041, 1048 (2024) (citing Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2022-32), 171 Idaho 677, 680, 525 P.3d 715, 718 (2023)). “The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.” Hess v. Hess, 174 Idaho 524, 535–36, 558 P.3d 254, 265–66 (2024) (citation omitted). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction.” Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014) (citation modified).
Triple Crown’s and Intervenors’ argument is premised on the fact that the legislature has not defined the word “owned” for purposes of section 7-711(2), and the statute does not expressly limit “owned” to those who hold fee title to the condemned property or to the lands adjoining the condemned property. As a consequence, they argue we should interpret the term broadly to encompass both legal and equitable interests in real property, including the “beneficial interest” of a joint venture. Their argument, however, relies on interpreting section 7-711(2) in isolation, which flies in the face of this Court’s well-established precedent concerning statutory interpretation.
We construe statutes “as a whole without separating one provision from another.” Izaguirre v. R & L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC, 155 Idaho 229, 234, 308 P.3d 929, 934 (2013) (citation omitted). “Language of a particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine the legislature’s intent.” Lockhart v. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897, 828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992) (citations omitted).
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In this case, a review of other sections in title 7, chapter 7 of the Idaho Code establishes a legislative intent that the word “owned” refers to a legal ownership interest in the property. We begin with section 7-711(2). Relevant to this appeal, the section limits a claim for business damages to: (1) businesses “owned by the party whose lands are being condemned,” or (2) businesses “located on land immediately adjoining the condemned piece of property and on land owned by the condemnee.” See Seubert, 142 Idaho at 584–85, 130 P.3d at 1122–23 (emphasis added).
To determine whether ownership for purposes of section 7-711(2) encompasses beneficial ownership interests, we turn to section 7-702, which identifies the “estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use[.]” I.C. § 7-702. The statute identifies three estates and rights that can be taken: (1) a fee simple interest; (2) an easement; and (3) a right of entry and occupation. I.C. § 7-702(1)–(3). In this case, the State filed a complaint seeking to take part of the fee simple interest in the property and also seeking to take an easement over part of the property. A fee simple interest is necessarily taken from the person who holds the fee simple interest—the fee title owner of the property. See I.C. § 7-703(1) (“The private property which may be taken under this chapter includes: 1. all real property belonging to any person.”); see also I.C. § 7-711A (addressing a sale or contract entered into between the condemning authority and the property owner). Similarly, an easement is taken from the fee title owner of the property. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 707–08, 152 P.3d 575, 578–79 (2007) (explaining that express easements may be created between the owner of the dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate). Thus, section 7-702 establishes that the interests the State may condemn are ones that must be taken from the fee title owner of the property.
Other provisions in the same code chapter express a similar intent that “owner” means the fee title owner of the property. Section 7-703 states that private property subject to taking includes “[a]ll real property belonging to any person.” I.C. § 7-703(1) (emphasis added). Section 7-711A describes the advice of rights form that a condemning authority must provide the owner of property when it begins negotiations to acquire a parcel of real property in fee simple. That section requires the form to include a variety of statements related to the rights of the property owner, including a statement that the condemning authority must negotiate in good faith with the property owner to purchase the property. I.C. § 7-711A. The language of these sections similarly refers to owner in a way that indicates the fee title owner of the property. Property “belongs” to the person identified
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on the property deed. And a condemning authority can only purchase property from the fee title owner.
For these reasons, we hold that, after construing the entirety of title 7, chapter 7 of the Idaho Code, the word “owned” as used in section 7-711(2) references the fee title owner of the property. Our caselaw recognizes that a beneficial interest in property is different than a legal interest. See Mace ex rel. Collins v. Luther, 174 Idaho 910, 919, 560 P.3d 1057, 1066 (2024) (discussing that imposition of a resulting trust is appropriate when person receiving legal title to the real property was not intended to have the beneficial interest in the property); see also Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474, 477 (1986) (discussing that constructive trust arises when legal title to real property is obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or under circumstances rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain a beneficial interest in the property). Because the holder of a beneficial interest in real property is not the fee title owner of the property, we conclude that a beneficial owner does not qualify for business damages under section 7-711(2).
In this case, there is no dispute that Triple Crown is the fee title owner of the condemned property. Similarly, there is no dispute that Americrete is the fee title owner of the property that Triple Crown and Intervenors allege adjoins the condemned property. Triple Crown did not own Intervenors’ businesses, nor were those businesses located on the condemned property. Given these undisputed facts, the district court did not err in concluding that Triple Crown and Intervenors failed to establish that they qualified for business damages.
We next turn to Triple Crown’s and Intervenors’ alternative argument that Thueson controlled Triple Crown and Intervenors and therefore he was the common owner of the condemned property, the Americrete property, and Intervenor businesses. This argument fails because, for the reasons discussed above, to qualify for business damages under section 7-711(2), the fee title owner of the condemned property must own the businesses that are located on the condemned property or located on the adjoining lands owned by the fee title owner of the condemned property. Thueson is not the fee title owner of the condemned property or the lands where Intervenors’ businesses are located. As a result, Thueson does not qualify for business damages. Moreover, Thueson was never made a party to this case.
Triple Crown and Intervenors argue that our decision in Seubert should be applied here to conclude that Thueson is effectively the fee title owner of the condemned property and Americrete
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property. In Seubert, the plaintiff was the fee title owner of the condemned land and was also the majority shareholder in two closely-held corporations that operated on the land. 142 Idaho at 583, 130 P.3d at 1121. The two closely-held corporations intervened in the condemnation action and asserted claims for business damages. One of the issues on appeal concerned whether they had established a right to recover business damages under section 7-711(2). Id. Relevant to this appeal, the Court held that one of the intervenors qualified because, as a closely held corporation owned by the family that owned the condemned property, the intervenor corporation was “owned by the party whose lands are being condemned.” Id. at 584–85, 130 P.3d at 1122–23 (“A majority shareholder in a corporation is in effect the owner of the corporation.”). Seubert, however, is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
Contrary to Triple Crown’s and Intervenors’ assertion, the Court did not hold that Seubert’s status as the corporation’s owner gave her any individual interest in the corporation’s assets. It merely determined that, as the majority shareholder, she owned the corporation. Moreover, the Court did not engage in any statutory interpretation or determine the meaning of the word “owned” as used in section 7-711(2). In short, the decision addressed legal concepts concerning the ownership of closely-held corporate entities, not the language of the statute itself. This appeal presents a different issue which Seubert simply does not address.
Because we hold that Triple Crown and Intervenors did not meet the ownership requirements of Idaho Code section 7-711(2), and that issue is dispositive, it is unnecessary to address the remaining arguments raised by the parties. For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court’s decision granting the State’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the business damages claim. B. The State is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
The State seeks attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-117. Idaho Code section 12-117 provides that, “in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person,” this Court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party if “the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” I.C. § 12-117(1).
Triple Crown and Intervenors, relying on State of Idaho, Department of Transportation v.
Grathol, 158 Idaho 38, 51, 343 P.3d 480, 493 (2015), respond that the State is not entitled to fees because the proper statute for an award of attorney fees in a condemnation case is Idaho Code section 12-121. Citing Grathol, 158 Idaho at 51, 343 P.3d at 493, they assert that an award of
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attorney fees to a condemnor is only appropriate in extreme and unlikely situations. They contend that the determination of whether this is an “extreme and unlikely situation” requires consideration of several factors, none of which have been addressed by the State. (Citing Grathol, 158 Idaho at 51, 343 P.3d at 493 (adopting three-prong inquiry to determine whether fees should be awarded in a condemnation case under section 12-121, which includes consideration of the factors described in Ada County Highway District ex rel. Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983)).) They argue that, even if the Grathol and Acarrequi factors are considered, this is not “an extreme and unlikely situation” because they raised valid questions of statutory interpretation and the applicability of this Court’s prior precedent.
As a preliminary matter, section 12-121 might not be the sole basis for the recovery of attorney fees in a condemnation case in light of legislative acts taken following our decisions in Acarrequi and Grathol. We do not answer that question today because the issue was not squarely presented, and we hold that the State is not entitled to attorney fees for other reasons discussed below.
Nevertheless, while Triple Crown and Intervenors are correct that Acarrequi recognized section 12-121 as the sole basis for an award of attorney fees in condemnation cases, section 12- 117 did not exist at the time that case was decided. Rather, section 12-117 was enacted the following year. See Act of Apr. 3, 1984, ch. 204, 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 501, 501–02. Further, as first enacted, section 12-117 did not permit the state to seek an award of attorney fees, but instead only permitted the “person” opposing the state to seek an award. See I.C. § 12-117 (Supp. 1984). Subsequent statutory amendments to section 12-117 permitted the state to seek attorney fees. See Act of Apr. 12, 2000, ch. 241, § 1, 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 675, 675–76.
Although Grathol was decided after these legislative acts, the decision did not analyze the language of section 12-117. Instead, the Court cited Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 154 Idaho 981, 992–93, 303 P.3d 1237, 1248–49 (2013), as holding that section 12-121 provided the basis for the recovery of attorney fees in a condemnation case. Telford, in turn, cited to Acarrequi for this statement. Id. at 992, 303 P.3d at 1248. However, the decision in Acarrequi predated the legislative amendments to section 12-117 that permitted the state to seek attorney fees. Given the legislature’s adoption of section 12-117, and the subsequent amendments permitting the state to seek attorney fees under that section, it is not clear that the state is precluded from relying on section 12-117 for recovery of attorney fees in a condemnation case.
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In addition, it is not clear that our prior caselaw continues to support Triple Crown’s and Intervenors’ second argument, that the Acarrequi and Grathol factors control the award of attorney fees under section 12-121. At the time Acarrequi and Grathol were decided, section 12-121 did not limit the award of attorney fees to cases “brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” See I.C. § 12-121 (1979); I.C. § 12-121 (2010). Rather, the legislature did not add that language to section 12-121 until 2017. Act of Mar. 1, 2017, ch. 47, § 2, 2017 Idaho Sess. Laws 75, 76.
At the time Acarrequi and Grathol were decided, section 12-121 simply provided, “the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party or parties[.]” I.C. § 12-121 (1979); I.C. § 12-121 (2010). When Grathol was decided, the frivolousness standard applicable to attorney fee requests under section 12-121 stemmed from Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2). See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) (2014). The Rules of Civil Procedure were not in effect at the time of the events in Acarrequi, so the Court adopted the Acarrequi factors to guide lower courts in determining whether to award attorney fees in condemnation cases. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876– 878, 673 P.2d at 1070–72. Grathol then cited the Acarrequi factors and expanded upon them. Grathol, 158 Idaho at 51–55, 343 P.3d at 493–97. Again, we provide this history to explain why it is not certain that, given the subsequent legislative amendments to section 12-121, the factors described in Acarrequi and Grathol still control the award of attorney fees under that statute.
However, we need not resolve these questions today because all the tests contain a common element that the State fails to meet here: that Triple Crown and Intervenors brought this appeal frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. I.C. § 12-121; Flynn v. Sun Valley Brewing Co., 175 Idaho 612, ___, 568 P.3d 831, 844 (2025) (discussing standard for award of attorney fees under section 12-117); Grathol, 158 Idaho at 51–55, 343 P.3d at 493–97 (holding that party seeking attorney fees “must meet the standard in section 12-121”). We conclude that the State has failed to establish this appeal is frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.
Triple Crown and Intervenor made meritorious arguments regarding the availability of business damages for related corporate entities. Although their arguments were ultimately unsuccessful, Triple Crown and Intervenors cited legal support for their arguments. Their policy concerns about the fairness of Idaho’s condemnation damages framework to related business entities are more appropriately directed to the legislature. Although Triple Crown’s and Intervenors’ appeal is unsuccessful, their arguments do not merit an award of fees to the State.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of the State’s motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the business damages claim. We decline to grant the State attorney fees on appeal.
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and MEYER CONCUR.