The Shand

16 F. 570, 1882 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 23, 1882
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 16 F. 570 (The Shand) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Shand, 16 F. 570, 1882 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1882).

Opinion

Brown, J.

The principal exception on the part of the libelants is based upon the ground that the claimants have failed to show what was the amount of. the loss and damage occasioned by the first flooding as distinguished from the second; that the burden of proof was upon them to show-affirmatively and definitely what portion of the loss and damage they are legally exempt from; and that, not having done so, they are legally chargeable either with the whole amount of the loss, as was held in Speyer v. The Mary Belle Roberts, 2 Sawy. 1-6, or at least for the one-half part of the entire loss, as in the case of Snow v. Carruth, 1 Spr. 324, 327. In the case last cited there had been a loss by leakage upon barrels of oil and tierces of lard shipped from New Orleans to Boston. Sprague, J., says:

“ I am satisfied that the great loss in this case (above the necessary leakage) was partly attributable to the negligence of the carrier, and partly to the negligence or misfortune.of the shipper or consignee, and that it is not practicable to ascertain for how much of the loss the one party or the other is, in fact, responsible. I am, therefore, obliged to adopt some arbitrary rule in determining the amount to be allowed the respondents. An analogy may be found in the rule adopted by courts of admiralty, in cases of collision, when both'parties are in fault. In such cases the aggregate amount of the damages is divided equally between the parties.”

[573]*573In the case of Speyer v. The Mary Belle Roberts, which was an action for damages for an injury to goods on 'a voyage from Hamburg to San Francisco, on the part of the vessel it was claimed that the damage had arisen mainly through the access of water to the cargo arising from the severe weather encountered. The libelant claimed that it arose from bad stowage and insufficient dunnage. HofehaN, J., says:

“ In the view I take of the case it is not necessary to attempt to determine (if that were possible) how much of the injury to the cargo is to be attributed to this cause,” (perils of the sea.) “ That some of it was due to it cannot, I. think, be denied; but probably no very considerable amount when compared with the total damage. * * * But the most important allegation of the libel with regard to the stowage of the cargo and the insufficiency of the dun-nage, appears to be clearly established by the proofs. * * * That the cargo would have sustained, even if properly dunnaged, some injury from the unavoidable effect of sea perils encountered by the vessel, and her consequent leaking, must be admitted. But what would have been the extent of that injury, and how much of the damage is to be attributed to each cause, it is impossible now to ascertain. * * *
“ It is evident that in this case the carrier is liable for all injuries which, though immediately caused by a peril of the sea, would not have occurred liad not his own negligence contributed to produce the injurious result. * * * The real difficulty in the case arises from the fact, which, however, is not conclusively established, that the cargo would have sustained some damage even if it had been properly stowed; but how much cannot be known. We are thus forced to choose between two alternatives, — either to hold the carrier responsible for damages, a part of which he is not accountable for, or else to deny to the shipper any compensation for losses which, in great part, were caused by the carrier’s fault. The former alternative must, in my opinion, be adopted. * * * The cargo being found to be damaged, the burden of proof was on him ” (the carrier) “ to show that the loss was occasioned by one of the causes which, by law and the terms of his contract, afford an excuse for its non-performance. * * * To excuse himself for that portion of the loss for which he is not liable, he must show how much that portion is; and, unable to exonerate himself in toto, he should establish the degree and extent of the exoneration to which he is entitled. If he fails to do this, it seems to me that he must be held responsible for the whole damage.”

In both the cases cited the rule adopted was apjslied as a rule of last resort .only, it being conceded that any attempt at an apportionment would, in these cases, be impracticable. In the ease of The Mary Belle Roberts it was “not conclusively established” that any part of the damage was caused by a peril of the sea, and if any were so caused it was comparatively small; while in the other case the leakage was owing to the negligence of both, and there were no [574]*574data whatever for determining what part or proportion was owing to the negligence of either. In each case the rule applied was adopted to prevent a failure of justice, not as an exact measure of what was in fact due to each of the causes of loss, for that was not ascertain- , able, but because it was the nearest approximation to justice which the circumstances of the ease permitted. In the case of The Mary Belle Roberts, where the loss from sea peril, if any, was/comparatively small, it was just to hold the carrier answerable for the whole unless he could show how much was to be deducted on account of the minor cause as to which he might claim exemption. But if the general circumstances of the case show that the loss has probably arisen as much from the act or cause attributable to the one party as from that attributable to the other, there would be no justice in imposing the whole loss upon one simply because he could not separate and distinguish the.exaet amount arising from his own fault; and the rule adopted by Sprague, J., is, in such a case, obviously the juster one. But neither of these rules can be rightly applied where the facts and circumstances afford the means of a tolerable approach to accuracy in an apportionment of the loss to the several parties, or where an approximate apportionment of the damages is practicable.

In the case of Rogers v. Mechanics’ Ins. Co. 1 Story, 603, 609, cited by the commissioner, Story, I., says, in reference to the value of blubber jettisoned:

“ It is said that it is difficult, and indeed impracticable, to ascertain its true and exact value when thrown overboard. There may be difficulty, and perhaps an impossibility, to ascertain its exact and minute value, for we have, no means of weighing it in scales, or fixing its positive price. But the same difficulty occurs in many other cases of insurance; as in cases of injuries to sails or rigging or spars by tempest, or by cutting"them away in cases of jettison; and yet no one doubts that they must be contributed for according to their value, ascertained by a jury,'in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon pyoper evidence. Suppose that fruit is insured, and the vessel has a long passage, in which, by ordinary Waste and decay, it must suffer some deterioration, and then a storm occurs in which it suffers other positive damage and injury, or there is a jettison thereof; how are we to ascertain what diminution is to be attributed to natural waste and decay, and what to the perils of tlxe sea? or what was its true value at the time of the jettison? There can be no positive and absolute certainty. The most that can be done is to ascertain, by the exercise of a sound judgment, what, under all the circumstances, may reasonably be attributed to One ease,'and what to the other. Absolute certainty in eases of this sort is unattainable.

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Related

The Georgian
4 F. Supp. 718 (S.D. Florida, 1933)
The Musselcrag
125 F. 786 (N.D. California, 1903)
The Shand
21 F. Cas. 1155 (S.D. New York, 1879)

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Bluebook (online)
16 F. 570, 1882 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-shand-nysd-1882.