The Georgian

4 F. Supp. 718, 1933 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1325
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 23, 1933
DocketNo. 3459-J
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 4 F. Supp. 718 (The Georgian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Georgian, 4 F. Supp. 718, 1933 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1325 (S.D. Fla. 1933).

Opinion

STRUM, District Judge.

This is a libel to recover for damage to a refrigerated cargo of citrus fruit loaded on board the steamship Georgian at Tampa, Fla., March 16, 1929, and transported by said vessel via Jacksonville and other South Atlantic ports to London, England, where it was unloaded on April 16, 1929.

[720]*720The pertinent provisions of the bill of. lading are: i

That the fruit was received on board the vessel “in apparent good order and condition.”

That the vessel shall not be liable “for loss or damage occasioned by causes beyond their control; by the act of God; by the perils of the sea; * * * or unseaworthiness of the vessel even existing at the time of shipment or sailing of the voyage, provided the owners have exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy; nor for heating, frost, decay, putrefaction, rust, sweat; vermin, change of character * * * or any loss or damage arising from the inherent vice, defect or nature of the goods, or insufficiency of packages.”

“Notice of loss, damage, or delay must be given in writing to the vessel’s agent within thirty days after the removal of the goods from custody of the vessel * * *. Written claims for loss, damage, or delay must be filed with the vessel’s agent within six months after giving such written notice. Unless notice is given and claim filed as above provided, neither the vessel, her owner or agent shall be liable.”

“The goods or articles carried in any refrigerator chambers are at the sole risk of .the owner thereof, and subject to all conditions, exceptions and limitations as to carrier’s liability and other provisions of this bill of lading; and, further, the carrier shall not be liable for any loss for damage occasioned by the temperature, risks of refrigeration, accidents, or explosion, breakage, derangement or failure of any refrigerator plant or part thereof unless shown to have been caused by negligence of the carrier, from lia^ bility from which the carrier is not exempt under the provisions of the Harter Act. * *

The ship was not chartered, but was carrying general cargo for hire and was, therefore, a common carrier subject to the provisions of the Harter Act (46 USCA §§ 190-195).

Libelant asserts that it was agreed that the fruit should be carried at a temperature of not less than 34 degrees, and not more than 38 degrees, Fahrenheit; but that contrary to such agreement the temperature was negligently permitted to .fluctuate above and below those limits, damaging the fruit by frosting, overheating, and by “drip” from overhead refrigerating coils due to condensation when the temperature rose too high to hold the “snow” or “frost” on the refrigerating ■pipes; also, that sea water was negligently permitted to enter the holds, especially No. 4, damaging the packing cases therein.

Respondents deny, these charges and claim that the preshipment cleaning treatment to which the fruit was subjected bruised, punctured, and otherwise injured the fruit, causing softening and decay, and that deterioration of the fruit was due, not to negligent refrigeration, but to “decay, inherent vice, defect or nature of the cargo,” for which respondents are not liable under the terms of the bill of lading; and that the damage caused by sea water resulted from a peril of the sea, which is also excepted by the bill of lading.

Respondents also claim that notice of damage was not given in writing to the vessel’s agent within thirty days after removal of the goods, which is made a condition precedent to liability by clause No. 11 of the bill of lading.

At the time in question, about 98 per cent, of all Florida fruit was cleaned for marketing by a “wet-wash” process, by which the fruit is first washed in water and then passed through a soaping tank containing slightly warmed water and a solution of borax, after which it was subjected to a paraffin vapor.

Most of the fruit here involved was cleaned by a dry-cleaning device then in use at the Tampa Terminal Company. This device consisted of a large hollow cylinder about thirty feet long and three feet in diameter, lined inside with brushes and containing a quantity of sawdust. The cylinder was inclined at an angle of about forty-five degrees, the fruit entering at the high end,, and as the cylinder revolved the fruit passed through it and out at the lower end; the rust and dirt on the fruit being cleaned off in the passage through the cylinder by rotary contact with the brushes and sawdust. Respondents claim, but libelant’s witnesses deny, that this process bruised the fruit, and that the stems of the fruit punctured other fruit passing through, thus causing the fruit to become soft and inherently susceptible to quick decay, notwithstanding proper refrigeration.. The libelant discarded this dry-cleaning device as unsatisfactory soon after the shipment in question was made. Respondents assert that this was done because the process injured the fruit, while libelant’s witnesses testify that the machine was discarded simply because it did not clean the fruit satisfactorily.

When unloaded in London and subjected to normal temperatures, the fruit quickly broke down and became soggy and inferior.. [721]*721All of it was in a state of “full maturity.” Some of it showed.stem-end decay; some of it was withered and pitted. Many of the eases coming from No. 4 hold were stained by sea water.

There is convincing evidence both of injurious preshipment treatment and of negligent refrigeration during the voyage, though the evidence is replete with perplexing conflicts upon almost every material question of fact. As between the two theories as to the cause of the damage, the evidence is nicely balanced.

In support of respondents’ contention of injurious preshipment treatment, the evidence establishes that the dry-cleaning machine above described was installed “on trial” in libelant’s packing house during the fall of 1928. This machine was discarded as unsatisfactory a few days after the fruit in question was loaded on the steamer and the wet-wash process installed in its place. There is evidence on behalf of libelant that the machine was discarded simply because it did not clean the fruit satisfactorily, not because it damaged the fruit. This evidence, however, is outweighed by contrary evidence.

Under date of March 12,1929', eight days before this cargo was loaded and while the cargo was being prepared for shipment, the president of the libelant, Tampa Union Terminal Company, addressed a letter to the local agent of the manufacturer of the dry-cleaning machine, in which amongst other things it was said: “We find that grape fruit run through the dry cleaners supplied by you * * * are being severely damaged and we are constantly having comments coming back from the market that the fruit is soft. We have found upon examination of fruit in the bins that a very large percentage of the fruit of larger sizes are soft, this condition decreasing as the fruit decreases in size. However, in all sizes of fruit the amount of soft fruit produced by the action in the dry-cleaner is so large that we cannot continue to operate these dry-cleaners in their present form.” Then follows the writer’s statement of his opinion as to what part of the machine caused the damage, and suggesting that certain changes be made in the machine, to be followed by further experiments.

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Related

Guanancita
69 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Florida, 1947)
Thomas Roberts & Co. v. Calmar SS Corporation
59 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1945)
The Georgian
76 F.2d 550 (Fifth Circuit, 1935)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 F. Supp. 718, 1933 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1325, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-georgian-flsd-1933.