The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Brooks

District Court, M.D. Alabama·Decided November 3, 2021·No. 3:18-cv-01003·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE ) COMPANY OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO.: 3:18-cv-1003-RAH ) (WO) SHA’QUEL BROOKS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER Pending before the Court is Plaintiff The Prudential Insurance Company of America’s (Prudential) Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 50) and Renewed Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 57) as to Defendants Adriana Omondi, Mike B. Bailey, Sharmonte A. Brooks, and Simone Fuller.1 On November 29, 2018, Prudential filed a Complaint for Interpleader and Declaratory Relief against Sha’quel Brooks, Adriana Omondi, Mike B. Bailey, Sharmonte A. Brooks, Simone Fuller, and J.B., a minor, after Sha’Quel Brooks was charged with the murder of Prudential’s insured. (Doc. 1.) Prudential initiated this action to disclaim any interest in the Death Benefit to be paid under the subject life insurance policy and to

1 Prudential has also moved for interpleader relief. (Docs. 50, 57.) The Court reserves ruling on this matter until a pro ami hearing can be held. ask the Court to determine the potential claims of the defendants to the life insurance proceeds.

Defendants Omondi, Bailey, Sharmonte Brooks, and Fuller have all failed to answer the Complaint or otherwise formally appear in this action. The Clerk of Court entered a default against Omondi on April 2, 2019 (Doc. 14), and against

Bailey, Sharmonte Brooks, and Fuller on September 17, 2019 (Docs. 27, 28, 29). Omondi, Bailey, Sharmonte Brooks, and Fuller have all likewise failed to respond to Prudential’s motions for default judgment within the time prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons discussed below, Prudential’s motions are due to be GRANTED as to the request for default judgments against Omondi, Bailey, Sharmonte Brooks, and Fuller.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE The jurisdiction of this Court is properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1335 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1397 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a).

II. LEGAL STANDARD In the Eleventh Circuit, there is a “strong policy of determining cases on their merits” and default judgments are therefore viewed “with disfavor.” In re Worldwide

Web Systems, Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless, it is well- settled that a “district court has the authority to enter default judgment for failure . . . to comply with its orders or rules of procedure.” Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169,

1174 (11th Cir. 1985). Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for entry of default and default judgment where a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend as

provided by these rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Although modern courts do not favor default judgments, they are appropriate when the adversary process has been halted because of an unresponsive party. Flynn v. Angelucci Bros. & Sons, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). Where a defendant has failed

to respond to or otherwise acknowledge the pendency of a lawsuit against him or her months—or years—after being served, entry of default judgment may be appropriate.

The law is clear, however, that a defendant's failure to appear and the Clerk's subsequent entry of default do not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default judgment. A default is not “an absolute confession by the defendant of his [or her] liability and of the plaintiff's right to recover,” but is instead “an admission of the

facts cited in the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a defendant's liability.” Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004); see also Descent v. Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp.

2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“The defendants' default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief”); Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir.

1997) (“A default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”). “The allegations must be well-pleaded in order to provide a sufficient basis for the judgment entered.” De Lotta v. Dezenzo's Italian Rest., Inc., Case. No. 6:08-

cv-2033-ORL-22KRS, 2009 WL 4349806 at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009) (citing Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009)). In deciding whether the allegations in the complaint are well pleaded, the “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations omitted). Instead, the “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id. And pertinent to an interpleader action, “[a] named interpleader defendant who fails to answer the interpleader complaint and assert a claim to the res forfeits any claim of entitlement that might have been asserted.” Sun Life Assur. Co. of

Canada v. Conroy, 431 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (D.R.I. 2006). III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In its Complaint, Prudential asserts that Defendant Sha’Quel Brooks, a former member of the United States Army, was insured by Prudential through the Office of Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance program. (Doc. 1 at 3.) This program also extends family coverage to servicemembers’ spouses and unmarried dependent

children and automatically names the servicemember as the beneficiary. Sha’quel Brooks’s minor child, C.B., was covered through this program in the amount of $10,000.00. In addition to Sha’quel Brooks, Defendants Omondi, Bailey, and

Sharmonte Brooks are each designated as co-equal primary beneficiaries of this Death Benefit. Defendant Fuller is not a designated beneficiary. Instead, she was named in this lawsuit as the mother of J.B., a named defendant who is also the sister of C.B., the deceased insured.

C.B. died on February 21, 2018, and the Death Benefit owed under the policy became due. (Doc. 1 at 3.) On March 3, 2018, Sha’quel Brooks made a claim to the Death Benefit. (Id.

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