The People of the State of South Dakota in the Interests of C.C.H., Minor Child, and Concerning N.C.H. and M.C.H.

2002 SD 113, 651 N.W.2d 702, 2002 S.D. LEXIS 133

• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Decided: September 4, 2002
• Docket: None
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice ROBERT A. AMUND-

[IT 1.] SON delivers the majority opinion of the Court on Issue 1, which reverses the trial court’s delinquency adjudication.

[¶ 2.] Acting Justice GORS delivers the majority on Issue 2, which reverses the trial court’s child in need of supervision adjudication.

[¶ 3.] C.C.H., a minor child, was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to SDCL Chapters 26-7A and 26-8C and a child in need of supervision as defined in SDCL Chapter 26-8B. C.C.H. appeals this disposition. We reverse.

FACTS

[¶ 4.] On February 13, 2001, in response to a teacher’s inquiry, C.C.H., an eighth grader in Winner, South Dakota, made threatening remarks regarding another student. Audrey Keierleber (Keier-leber), C.C.H’s Home Economics teacher, had noticed C.C.H. was behind on a class project, so she tried to assist him. C.C.H., however, refused to concentrate; rather, he stared across the classroom at B.C., another student. When Keierleber inquired into his actions, C.C.H. stated in a serious tone that he was angered by some of the students and that he wanted to kill B.C. Keierleber changed the subject and did not discuss C.C.H.’s comments with him. Later the same afternoon, Keierle-ber e-mailed middle school administrators the following message:

I am not sure what I should be doing. [C.C.H.] is in my 8th period FACS [home economics] class. When he is here he will not work for me. He wanted to [kill B.C.] and [S.] is irritating him. And the White Girls are looking at him. As a result he gets nothing done. I am open to suggestions. There is a potential explosion about to happen, and I want some way to deal with the problem ahead of time. Thanks for the help.

/s/ Audrey Keierleber

[¶ 5.] The following day, C.C.H. worked more productively in Keierleber’s class, but at the end of the period, again, responded to a second teacher inquiry that he wanted to kill B.C. In response, Keier-leber again wrote an e-mail to school administrators explaining that things went well, but that C.C.H. said he still wanted to kül B.C.

[¶ 6.] On February 15, 2001, school administration notified the Winner Police Department of C.C.H.’s statements to Keier-leber. C.C.H. was charged with simple assault and two counts of disorderly conduct. After a court trial, the simple assault charge and one count of disorderly conduct were dismissed. The trial court found C.C.H. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the remaining charge and entered an order of disposition.¹

[¶ 7.] The court entered a judgment finding C.C.H. to be a delinquent child as defined by SDCL 26-8C-2.² The court further held that C.C.H. is a child in need of supervision (ChINS) as defined by SDCL 26-8B-2 even though the State did not submit a ChINS petition.³

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8.] Our standard of review for the disposition of a delinquency finding requires us to ensure that “the State proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Interest of A.W., 438 N.W.2d 557, 558 (S.D.1989). When reviewing the evidence, we will construe any inferences in favor of supporting the verdict. Id. See also In Interest of W.Y.B., 515 N.W.2d 453, 455-56 (S.D.1994). The State must prove the allegation made in a ChINS adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt, -and this Court applies the clearly erroneous standard on review of the trial court’s decision. In Matter of T.K., 462 N.W.2d 893, 895 (S.D.1990). “When an asserted error implicates an infringement of a constitutional right, we employ a de novo standard of review.” State v. Dillon, 2001 SD 97, ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d 37, 43.

DECISION

[¶ 9.] AMUNDSON, Justice, delivers the majority on Issue 1, which reverses the trial court’s delinquency adjudication.

[¶ 10.] In addition to arguing that the elements of disorderly conduct have not been met,⁴ C.C.H. argues that his threats were -mere words of frustration that were communicated privately to Ms teacher. Therefore, he contends his words were not criminal in nature, and constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.

[¶ 11.] We have previously analyzed First Amendment rights to free speech and the types of speech exempted from constitutional protection. See, e.g., In the Interest of S.J.N-K., 2002 SD 70, 647 N.W.2d 707 (2002) (finding First Amendment protection did not apply to student’s vulgar language based on student’s threatening behavior); State v. Hauge, 1996 SD 48, 547 N.W.2d 173 (discussing over-breadth and restriction on speech by restraining order); Krueger v. Austad, 1996 SD 26, 545 N.W.2d 205 (discussing First Amendment in a libel action). We have not, however, had the opportunity to address the “true threats” doctrine.

[¶ 12.] The United States Supreme Court has clearly announced that a “true threat” is not protected by the First Amendment. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969). In Watts, the United States Supreme Court determined that an individual should not be prosecuted for statements he made about killing the President at a political rally. The comments made, the Court held, were not threats under the particular facts of the case, and true threats “must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at 707, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. at 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664.

[¶ 13.] In examining the true threats doctrine, it is obvious that courts have somewhat conflicting rulings regarding what constitutes a true threat. . Some courts have held students’ threatening words fall outside the realm of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 64 S.W.3d 728 (2002) (holding a rap song from one classmate to another that described the killing of the recipient and her family constituted a true threat so that the First Amendment did not apply); In re A.S., 243 Wis.2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712 (2001) (affirming adjudication of delinquency based on telling classmate a detailed plan of how he was going to kill and torture people at 'school). See also Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D.1994) (finding a minor’s “incessant teasing” and “harassment” of another minor was not protected speech pursuant to the “fighting words” doctrine). Other courts, however, have held students’ threatening words fall within the realm of protected speech. In re Douglas D., 243 Wis.2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725 (2001) (finding story written as a class assignment, which described the teacher’s head being cut off, is protected speech under the First Amendment); Doe ex rel. v. Pulaski Co. Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833 (8thCir.2001) (holding eighth grader’s composition discussing killing of classmate who broke up with him was protected speech under the First Amendment).

[¶ 14.] The Eighth Circuit has stated that the Supreme Court has not “established a bright-line test for distinguishing a true threat from protected speech.” Pulaski Co. Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d at 836.⁵ In Pulaski, the Eighth Circuit analysis of the true threat doctrine provides for consideration of the following factors:

Whether an objectively reasonable recipient would view the message as a threat; whether the threat was communicated directly to its victim; whether the maker of the threat had made similar statements to the victim in the past; whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence; and whether the recipient of the alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses “a determination or intent to hurt presently or in the future.”

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“Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). We adopt this analysis.

[¶ 15.] In applying this test, we first acknowledge that there are very few pages in the adjudicatory trial transcript that address these factors. Clearly, the evidence proves,that the threats were not communicated directly to the intended victims, but rather to a teacher who had inquired into C.C.H.’s demeanor. There is, however, very little evidence upon which to determine whether an objectively reasonable recipient would view the message as a threat.

[¶ 16.] Few pages in the trial transcript prove how Keierleber, the listener, reacted after hearing C.C.H.’s words. When asked what her reaction was when C.C.H. said he wanted to kill B.C., she said, it

“[k]ind of scared me. It was a very serious tone of voice. Very believable.” Despite Keierleber’s alleged fear, -she let C.C.H. and B.C. both leave her classroom at the end of class. She did e-mail her concerns to school administrators, but there is no indication in the trial record of why the administration did not act more quickly. Additionally, the only other .witness who testified about the threat 'was Paul Schueth, the police officer who questioned C.C.H. , about the incident. He merely stated that he had a short conversation with C.C.H., during which C.C.H. denied saying that he wanted to kill B.C.

[¶17.] We refuse to analyze C.C.H.’s usé of the word kill “in a vacuum[,]” and the surrounding untimely attentiveness by school administrators, lack of compelling testimony by Keierleber and lack of evidence regarding C.C.H.’s propensity to carry through with his threats leave us unconvinced that C.C.H.-should have been adjudicated a delinquent for the words he spoke. See S.J.N-K., 2002 SD 70 at ¶ 15, 647 N.W.2d at 712 (acknowledging the Court’s analysis of the circumstances surrounding the use of profane language). The evidence presented fails to prove that the solicited comments of C.C.H. constitute true threats. On this record, the only result that can be reached is that the words uttered by C.C.H. were not true threats; thus, we refrain from stripping C.C.H. of his right to free speech.

[¶ 18.] Hostility and competition among our youth- is natural. It happens in competitive sports; it happens in adolescent love affairs; it happens among siblings; it is an inevitable part of growing up. Many of the unkind words that stem from this hostility and competition may cause others uneasiness, but most of the words are protected by the First Amendment.

[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views' of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk; and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom — this kind of openness — that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society. .

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (holding First Amendment protects. right to wear arm bands displaying disapproval of Vietnam War to school).

[¶ 19.] Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s delinquency adjudication.

[¶ 20.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, Justice and GORS, Acting Justice, concur as to Issue 1. [¶ 21.] SABERS, Justice, dissents as to Issue 1. [¶ 22.] ZINTER, Justice, not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.

1 . Under SDCL 22-13-1, disorderly conduct occurs when "[a]ny person who intentionally causes serious public inconvenience, annoy-anee, or alarm to any other person, or creates a risk thereof by: (1) Engaging in fighting or in violent or threatening behavior; ... ”

2 . SDCL 26-8C-2 states that a delinquent child is defined as "any child ten years of age or older who ... violates any federal, state or local law or regulation for which there is a penalty of a criminal nature for an adult....”

3 . A child in need of supervision is defined by SDCL 26-8B-2 as:

(1) Any child of compulsory school age who is habitually absent from school without legal excuse;

(2) Any child who has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian;

(3) Any child whose behavior or condition endangers the child's own welfare or the welfare of others; or

(4) Any child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or regulation for which there is not a penalty of a criminal nature for an adult, except violations of § 34-46-2(2), or petty offenses.

4 . C.C.H. contends that there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate him delinquent because he did not "intentionally” threaten B.C., and therefore the state failed to prove that element of the crime underlying his delinquency adjudication. SDCL- 22-13-1. C.C.H. also contends Keierleber’s response to the threats- was insufficient to prove the threats were a serious, public inconvenience. See SDCL 22-13-1(1) (requiring "serious public alarm” to prove disorderly conduct); State v. Rocky Mountain, 449 N.W.2d 257, 258 (S.D.1989) (explaining the "public” element of disorderly conduct).

"Intent” under the disorderly conduct statute may be proven through circumstantial evidence and a, defendant's state of mind is “fairly deducible from the circumstances surrounding the offense.” State v. Holzer, 2000 SD 75, ¶ 14, 611 N.W.2d 647, 651. We have further said that "[bjecause the nature of intent is such that it is 'rarely susceptible to direct proof, the fact finder may determine intent by such reasonable inferences and deductions as may be drawn from facts proved by evidence in accordance with common experience and observation.’ " Id. at ¶ 16 (citation omitted). In this case, we find intent could certainly have been deduced from the evidence.

Also,- the actions took place in a public school, which is clearly a public place. We have stated that "disorderly conduct may be directed at one person,” and that “it is clear from the statute that an essential element of disorderly conduct is the public nature of the offense.” Rocky Mountain, 449 N.W.2d at 258 (quoting Ellis v. Archer, 38 S.D. 285, 161 N.W. 192 (1917)). Thus, we need not address this issue further.

5 . Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 64 S.W.3d 728 (2002), analyzed Me various tests used by courts to assess whether a threat is true, and thus unprotected by the constitution. The First Circuit says the standard is “whether [the defendant] should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it was made.” Id. at 735 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit asks if the language "on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.” Id. at 734-35 (citation omitted.) The Sixth Circuit asks if a reasonable person would perceive "a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm” and "the purpose of furthering some goal through the use of intimidation.” Id. at 735 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit asks, "[w]hether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.” Id. (citation omitted).