II.
Analysis
¶4
"Because we must always satisfy ourselves that we have
jurisdiction to hear an appeal, we may raise jurisdictional
defects sua sponte, regardless of whether the parties have
raised the issue." People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5,
¶ 9, 269 P.3d 735, 737.
¶5
Here, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to hear this case as
an interlocutory appeal under section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S.
(2025), and C.A.R. 4.1. Section 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1
authorize the prosecution to immediately appeal a district
court's order granting a defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress evidence based on certain constitutional
violations. People v. Brown, 2022 CO 11, ¶ 13,
504 P.3d 970, 974. Here, however, the district court's
order granted a motion to exclude evidence under section
24-31-902. Because section 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1 do not
authorize such an appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider
it.
¶6
Section 16-12-102(2) authorizes the prosecution in criminal
cases to file an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court
under limited circumstances. Largely tracking the statute,
Colorado Appellate Rule 4.1(a) limits our appellate review to
district court orders granting a defendant's pretrial
motion under Crim. P. 41(e) and (g) and Crim. P. 41.1(i).
Crim. P. 41(e) concerns the return of property and the
suppression of evidence resulting from an unlawful search and
seizure; Crim. P. 41(g) concerns the suppression of an
involuntary confession or admission; and Crim. P. 41.1(i)
concerns nontestimonial identification evidence seized
without sufficient grounds or a proper order. See
Phillips v. People, 2026 CO 21, ¶ ¶
45-46,P.3d. Each of these grounds for suppression is premised
on a violation of a defendant's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See People v. Lindsey,
660 P.2d 502, 504 (Colo. 1983).
¶7
Moreover, in suppression motions and under C.A.R. 4.1, the
word "suppress" "is a specialized term
denoting the exclusion from trial of any evidence procured
illegally, typically in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights or protections."
Phillips, ¶ 35. "[W]e have gone so far as
to indicate on multiple occasions that suppression is
generally reserved for evidence obtained in violation of
constitutional rights or protections and does not normally
extend to evidence collected in violation of statutory
rights." Id. at ¶ 36. Relevant here,
"sup-press and exclude do not travel
together as interchangeable terms." Id. at
¶ 39.
¶8
By contrast, the motion and order excluding evidence here
were grounded entirely in section 24-31-902. Under that
statute, an officer must activate their body-worn camera
when responding to a call for service, entering into a
premises for the purposes of enforcing the law or in response
to a call for service, during a welfare check except for a
motorist assist, or during any interaction with the public
initiated by the peace officer, whether consensual or
nonconsensual, for the purpose of enforcing the law or
investigating possible violations of the law. §
24-31-902(1)(a)(II)(A).
¶9
If an officer fails to do so, "there is a permissive
inference in any investigation or legal proceeding . . . that
the missing footage would have reflected misconduct by the
peace officer." § 24-31-902(1)(a)(III). The failure
to comply "creates a rebuttable presumption of
inadmissibility" of "any statements or conduct
sought to be introduced in a prosecution through the peace
officer related to the incident that were not recorded."
Id.
¶10
In this case, Schneider did not file a motion to suppress
evidence under Crim. P. 41(e), (g), or Crim. P. 41.1(i).
Instead, he filed a motion to exclude officers'
testimony under section 24-31-902 regarding about twenty
minutes of unrecorded police activity. In addressing the
motion, the district court did not mention any constitutional
or enumerated basis under C.A.R. 4.1 to suppress
officers' testimony. Instead, it granted Schneider's
motion to exclude the testimony expressly and solely
under section 24-31-902. Such a ruling is not encompassed by
the confines of a C.A.R. 4.1 appeal. See Lindsey,
660 P.2d at 505 ("Simply stated, interlocutory appeals
may not be used to obtain pre-trial review of issues not
covered by C.A.R. 4.1. Likewise, C.A.R. 4.1 may not be used
to 'piggyback' issues
not embraced by that rule to obtain review of pre-trial
evidentiary decisions." (citation omitted) (quoting
People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924, 927 (Colo.
1978))).
¶11
Although we considered the interaction of C.A.R. 4.1 and
section 24-31-902 in People v. Havens, 2025 CO 65,
580 P.3d 1179, that case is distinguishable. There, the
district court suppressed evidence because it was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment — not based on a
violation of section 24-31-902 itself. Havens,
¶¶ 1-3, 580 P.3d at 1180. In that case, an officer
failed to activate the audio on his body-worn camera when
talking to a motel clerk. Id. at ¶ 6, 580 P.3d
at 1181. The court found that the officer's testimony
about the clerk's statement was inadmissible under
section 24-31-902. Havens, ¶ 3, 580 P.3d at
1180. Because the clerk's statement was the sole basis
for the search warrant, the court concluded that the warrant
lacked probable cause. Id. Accordingly, the court
suppressed the fruits of the search. Id. We had no
reason to question our jurisdiction under C.A.R. 4.1 because
the basis of the district court's ruling was
constitutional rather than purely statutory.
¶12
People v. Soron, 2026 CO 3, 581 P.3d 778, another
case appealed through C.A.R. 4.1, is likewise
distinguishable. There, we discussed section 24-31-902 in the
context of whether body-worn camera footage contained
information within the scope of the physician-patient
privilege. Soron, ¶¶ 38-42, 581 P.3d at
786. The issue in that case did not concern the body-worn
camera activation requirements
under section 24-31-902(1)(a)(II). And although the defendant
in Soron disputed our C.A.R. 4.1 jurisdiction,
contending that the trial court based its order on alleged
privilege and statutory violations not at issue here, we
concluded that our jurisdiction was proper because the trial
court expressly looked to Crim. P. 41(e), analyzed the
questions according to the law governing search warrants, and
relied on Fourth Amendment principles in issuing its ruling.
Soron, ¶¶ 18-19, 581 P.3d at 783. By
contrast, the district court's ruling here was grounded
entirely in section 24-31-902.
¶13
In sum, the district court granted Schneider's pretrial
motion to exclude evidence under section 24-31-902; it did
not grant a pretrial motion to suppress evidence under Crim.
P. 41(e), (g), or Crim. P. 41.1(i), nor did it discuss these
rules or their underlying constitutional principles as
grounds for its ruling. Because C.A.R. 4.1 does not authorize
the prosecution to file an interlocutory appeal to review a
district court's order granting a defendant's
pretrial motion to exclude evidence under section 24-31-902,
we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider the
People's appeal.