2
Certiorari to the District Court El Paso County District
Court Case No. 24CV30024 Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge
3
Attorneys for Petitioner: Wigglesworth Law Offices, LLC Erin
A. Wigglesworth Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Michael J. Allen, District
Attorney, Fourth Judicial District Joseph W. Eden, Deputy
District Attorney Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District
Attorney Colorado Springs, Colorado
4
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE
HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE
BLANCO joined.
5
OPINION
SAMOUR, JUSTICE
¶1
The principle that every person accused of a crime is cloaked
in the presumption of innocence lies at the very bedrock of
our justice system. And the right to a speedy trial
"implements that presumption by 'prevent[ing] undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, . . .
minimiz[ing] anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation[,] and . . . limit[ing] the possibilities that
long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend
himself.'" Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S.
437, 442 (2016) (alterations and omissions in original)
(quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320
(1971)). The right to a speedy trial takes top billing in
this opinion.
¶2
The defendant, Khristina Phillips, claims that her statutory
right to a speedy trial was violated as a result of the delay
caused by the People's pursuit of an improper pretrial
appeal from the county court to the district court. The
People counter that their pretrial appeal was proper and thus
tolled the speedy trial deadline. Because Colorado's
speedy trial statute provides that a defendant's speedy
trial deadline is tolled during the pendency of a pretrial
appeal only if the appeal is interlocutory, see
§ 18-1-405(6)(b), C.R.S. (2025), the parties'
disagreement hinges on whether the People's appeal
qualified as "interlocutory."
¶3
As relevant here, our jurisprudence makes clear that an
appeal qualifies as interlocutory under the speedy trial
statute when the prosecuting attorney's
6
assertion that the appeal is legally authorized has arguable
merit. People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946, 952-53
(Colo. 1997). So, the question we must answer is
whether the People's contention that its pretrial appeal
was authorized had arguable merit.
¶4
The People fasten their position firmly to Crim. P. 37.1(a),
which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from a ruling by the
county court granting a "motion to suppress
evidence." Despite their efforts to dress up their
pretrial appeal, however, the People can't make it fit
within Crim. P. 37.1(a). No matter what gloss they attempt to
place on that appeal, the People cannot escape the fact that
it concerned an evidentiary ruling, not a
suppression ruling. In criminal motions practice,
the word "suppress" operates as a term of art-an
instruction to the court to bar from trial any evidence
procured illegally, usually in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights or protections. This
stands in stark contrast to a ruling precluding evidence
based on the rules of evidence.
¶5
We now conclude that the People's assertion that their
pretrial appeal was authorized lacked arguable merit.
Therefore, the appeal did not toll the speedy trial deadline,
and Phillips's statutory right to a speedy trial was
violated. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's
judgment and remand the case to the district court with
instructions to return it to the county court so the county
court may vacate Phillips's judgment of conviction and
dismiss the case with prejudice.
7
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶6
Phillips provided daycare to children in her home. A woman
who had used Phillips's daycare service learned that
Phillips's teenage son had done something "very
inappropriate" with her daughters. Several months later,
the same woman learned that Phillips's son had been under
a blanket with one of her daughters. Shortly thereafter, the
woman stopped bringing her children to Phillips's
daycare. The woman then learned of additional incidents of
improper conduct that had occurred while her daughters were
at Phillips's daycare, and she made a report to the
police.
¶7
Detective Donya Davis was assigned to investigate the
allegations against Phillips's son. As part of that
investigation, Detective Davis asked Phillips to come to the
police station for an interview. Phillips did so willingly,
and the interview was video recorded.
¶8
During her interview, Phillips described her son's
sexualized behavior. She explained how her son cut open the
crotches of dolls and stuffed animals, masturbated using
underwear belonging to others (including the children
attending daycare), masturbated using the couch, stalked
girls, and used electronic devices to watch pornography.
¶9
After the interview, the People charged Phillips with one
count of child abuse-for unlawfully, knowingly, or recklessly
permitting children to be placed
8
in a situation that posed a threat to their wellbeing-and one
count of operating a childcare facility without a license.
Following Phillips's not guilty plea, the county court
and the parties agreed on the speedy trial deadline. Before
trial, Phillips filed a motion to suppress the video of her
interview, arguing that Detective Davis had violated her
Miranda rights. The court held a hearing and
reviewed the video of the interview. It found that Phillips
was in custody during the latter part of the interview, and
therefore law enforcement had violated her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by not giving her a
Miranda advisement when her custodial status
changed. Accordingly, the court suppressed a portion of the
video.
¶10
Pursuant to Crim. P. 37.1(a), the People timely filed an
interlocutory appeal in the district court challenging the
suppression order. The district court reversed. It determined
that Phillips was not in custody at any point during the
interview and therefore no Miranda violation had
occurred and no part of the interview should have been
suppressed. On remand, the parties agreed that the speedy
trial deadline had been tolled during the pendency of the
People's interlocutory appeal. Taking that tolling period
into account, the county court and the parties identified a
new speedy trial deadline.
9
¶11
Later, at the pretrial readiness conference held seven days
before the rescheduled jury trial, both parties announced
ready. The parties did not discuss their trial exhibits at
that time.
¶12
At approximately 8:00 p.m. on the Monday before the Wednesday
trial, the prosecutor informed defense counsel by email that
he intended to introduce into evidence the entirety of
Phillips's interview video. In the same email, the
prosecutor asked counsel if there were substantive objections
to any parts of the video. He noted that he was "just
trying to work out the clip beforehand so we don't have
to cut video while we have a jury."
¶13
Less than forty-eight hours later, on the morning of trial,
the prosecutor notified the court of his intention to offer
the video into evidence. He added that he wanted to
"hash out whatever sort of substantive objections there
may be because it is a lengthy video." Defense counsel
objected to the introduction of the video, explaining that
parts of it were inadmissible. The judge expressed
frustration, noting that, although this case had been pending
for a year and a half, the prosecutor had raised this issue
at the eleventh hour and was essentially requesting that
counsel and the court review and edit the video while the
prospective jurors were waiting in the assembly room.
Further, the judge stated that the interview was duplicative
of Detective Davis's anticipated testimony and that a
large portion of it was irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial.
10
¶14
After a brief recess, the prosecutor asked the court to
clarify whether it had ruled "that the entirety of the
interview between Detective Davis and . . . the Defendant
[was] suppressed." (Emphasis added.) The judge
responded that he was "not suppress[ing]" the video
but merely excluding it because (1) it was
duplicative of other evidence, (2) portions of it were
irrelevant and thus inadmissible under CRE 401, and (3) parts
of it were relevant but unfairly prejudicial and therefore
inadmissible under CRE 403. Then, following another brief
recess, the prosecutor made a record that he intended to play
the entire video and, if the court did not allow it, he would
request a continuance so his office could consider filing
another interlocutory appeal.
¶15
The judge informed the prosecutor that any request for a
continuance would be denied. He explained again that he had
not "suppressed" any evidence. Rather, remarked the
judge, his ruling was strictly evidentiary, so it could not
serve as grounds for an interlocutory appeal. Continuing, the
judge reiterated that the video was cumulative, contained
irrelevant information, was unfairly prejudicial, and would
cause confusion, undue delay, and a waste of the jury's
time. The judge emphasized that he was "exercising [his]
authority in terms of the admission of evidence under CRE
401, 402, and 403."
¶16
Partway through jury selection, the prosecutor told the judge
that his office had filed a notice of an interlocutory appeal
in the district court. After determining
11
that his court's jurisdiction had been transferred to the
district court, the judge stopped the proceedings and
declared a mistrial. He stressed, however, that he did not
believe the People had a legal basis to file an interlocutory
appeal because he had not suppressed the video.
¶17
The district court later dismissed the People's appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that, "[b]y the
plain language of Crim. P. 37.1[,] there must be
'suppression' of evidence by the [c]ounty
court for this [c]ourt to have jurisdiction to hear this
interlocutory appeal." The district court then
determined that no evidence had been suppressed; in fact, the
court commented that "[t]here is nothing unusual about
requiring inadmissible evidence to be edited out of a
defendant's videotaped interview before it is presented
to a jury."
¶18
On remand, Phillips moved to dismiss, arguing that her rights
to a speedy trial and due process had been violated. Phillips
maintained that, because there were no valid grounds for the
second pretrial appeal filed by the People, the speedy trial
deadline should not have been tolled during the pendency of
that appeal. And it was uncontested that, without that
tolling, the speedy trial deadline had passed.
¶19
The county court denied Phillips's motion. It found that
the appeal had been "taken by the People in good
faith" and that no due process violation had occurred.
12
¶20
In the meantime, the People had edited the video. And, after
denying Phillips's motion to dismiss, the court decided
that the edited video eliminated any concerns related to CRE
401-403. It thus admitted the edited video into evidence.
Hence, despite the county court's earlier denial of the
People's motion for a continuance to edit the video, and
despite the district court's dismissal of the
People's second pretrial appeal as unauthorized, the
People were nevertheless allowed to play an edited version of
the video to the jury.
¶21
The jury found Phillips guilty of both charges. Phillips
appealed to the district court, arguing, as pertinent here,
that her speedy trial and due process rights had been
violated because the prosecution's second pretrial appeal
was not interlocutory and thus did not toll the speedy trial
deadline. But the district court was unpersuaded and
affirmed. People v. Phillips, No. 24CV30024, at 3
(Dist. Ct., El Paso Cnty., Dec. 2, 2024) (unpublished
order).[1]
¶22
The district court concluded that the record demonstrated
"that the People were operating in good faith in
deciding to file an interlocutory appeal on the belief that
they had a strong claim that the [county] [c]ourt acted
without authority
13
in excluding the evidence already found to have been legally
obtained in the first interlocutory appeal."
Id. at 2. Elaborating, the court stated that the
People had made "a colorable argument that the trial
court's exclusion of the [video] warranted an
interlocutory appeal pursuant to the less restrictive
definitions of Crim. P. 37.1(a)." Id. Thus, the
court ruled that the speedy trial deadline had been tolled
while the second pretrial appeal was pending. Id.
¶23
Phillips timely sought our review, and we granted her
petition.[2]
II.
Standard of Review
¶24
Whether a defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial
was violated hinges on our interpretation of section
18-1-405, the governing statute. The interpretation of a
statute implicates "a question of law, which we review
de novo." People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶
19, 467 P.3d 332, 336 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020
CO 22, ¶ 21, 459 P.3d 540, 545). Additionally, the
construction of our procedural rules "is a question of
law that is reviewed de novo." People v. Zhuk,
239 P.3d 437, 438 (Colo. 2010) (involving both the rules of
criminal procedure and the rules of appellate
14
procedure). Lastly, we review a district court's
application of our precedent de novo. Gallegos v. Colo.
Ground Water Comm'n, 147 P.3d 20, 28 (Colo. 2006).
III.
Analysis
A.
Colorado's Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial
¶25
The statutory right to a speedy trial in Colorado guarantees
that a defendant will be "brought to trial . . . within
six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not
guilty." § 18-1-405(1). If a defendant is not
brought to trial within this timeframe, "the pending
charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not
again" be charged "for the same offense, or for
another offense based upon the same act or series of acts
arising out of the same criminal episode." Id.
Section 18-1-405's shield of protection aims to
effectuate the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Lucy, ¶ 20, 467 P.3d at 336. As such, the
statute doesn't actually create any rights; rather, it
stands as a vital bulwark in defense of the constitutional
right to a speedy trial. Id.
¶26
The trial court and the prosecution bear the burden of
compliance with section 18-1-405(1). Lucy, ¶
21, 467 P.3d at 336. To meet its burden, "the trial
court must make 'a record sufficient for an appellate
court to determine statutory compliance.'"
Id., 467 P.3d at 336-37 (quoting Marquez v.
Dist. Ct., 613 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Colo. 1980)).
15
¶27
Whereas subsections (3), (3.5), (4), and (5.1) of section
18-1-405 describe circumstances when the speedy trial period
may be extended, subsection (6) sets forth
circumstances that toll the speedy trial deadline.
Lucy, ¶ 22, 467 P.3d at 337. Under paragraph
(b) of subsection (6), "[t]he period of delay caused by
an interlocutory appeal," whether brought by the
defendant or the prosecution, must be excluded from the
computation of the time within which the defendant must be
brought to trial. § 18-1-405(6)(b).
B.
The People's Second Pretrial Appeal Did Not Constitute an
Interlocutory Appeal Under Section 18-1-405(6)(b)
¶28
The People argue that their second pretrial appeal
constituted an interlocutory appeal and therefore tolled the
speedy trial deadline pursuant to subsection (6)(b). Phillips
disagrees. To bring the matter to rest, we must ascertain
what qualifies as an interlocutory appeal for purposes of the
speedy trial statute.
¶29
The speedy trial statute does not define the term
"interlocutory appeal." But this isn't a trail
we're blazing for the first time. We've previously
charted this stretch of legal terrain.
¶30
In Gallegos, we were called upon to decide whether
the prosecution's appeal of a partial dismissal of the
multi-count information at the preliminary hearing qualified
as an interlocutory appeal within the meaning of the speedy
trial statute. 946 P.2d at 948. We held that an interlocutory
appeal under section 18-1-405(6)(b):
16
is an appeal which is taken in good faith before a
defendant has been convicted and sentence is imposed, and
which necessarily disrupts the course of proceeding to a
final resolution of the allegations before the court. An
appeal is taken in good faith when the assertion that such an
appeal is authorized has arguable merit, is not taken for the
purpose of delay, and the issues raised have a substantial
effect on the prosecution's case.
Gallegos, 946 P.2d at 952-53 (emphases added).
¶31
Thus, to satisfy the good-faith test from Gallegos,
the People must show that: their assertion that the appeal
was legally authorized had arguable merit; the appeal was not
taken for the purpose of delay; and the issues raised in the
appeal had a substantial effect on the People's case.
Because we conclude that the People's assertion that
their appeal was authorized had no arguable merit, we need
not address whether the People have established that their
appeal was taken for a non-dilatory purpose and that the
issues raised had a substantial effect on their case.
Accordingly, we keep our discussion on a short leash.
1.
The People's Assertion That Their Appeal Was Legally
Authorized Lacked Arguable Merit
¶32
Under Gallegos, whether the People's assertion
that their appeal was legally authorized had arguable merit
requires us to "construe the language of the speedy
trial statute and other related statutes in order to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General
Assembly." Id. at 950. As mentioned, the
language of the speedy trial statute doesn't move the
needle on this front because it doesn't define
"interlocutory appeal." But the language of Crim.
P. 37.1(a), which governs
17
interlocutory appeals from the county court to the district
court, and C.A.R. 4.1, which governs interlocutory appeals
from the district court to our court, does. Construing that
language and drawing strength from our relevant
jurisprudence, we conclude that the People's assertion
that their appeal was authorized lacked arguable merit.
a.
The Language of Crim. P. 37.1(a), "Interlocutory Appeal
from the County Court"
¶33
We first turn to the language of Crim. P. 37.1(a). Crim. P.
37.1(a) allows prosecutors to file an interlocutory appeal in
the district court following a county court ruling in limited
circumstances:
The prosecuting attorney may file an interlocutory
appeal in the district court from a ruling of a county
court granting a motion made in advance of trial by
the defendant for return of property and to suppress
evidence or granting a motion to suppress
evidence or granting a motion to suppress an
extra-judicial confession or admission; provided that
the prosecuting attorney certifies to the judge who granted
such motion and to the district court that the appeal is not
taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence is a
substantial part of the proof of the charge pending against
the defendant.
(Emphases added.)
¶34
The People maintain that the language of this rule accords
arguable merit to their position. Specifically, homing in on
the rule's repeated use of the word "suppress,"
the People contend that their appeal was in response to an
order by the county court that "suppress[ed]
evidence." But the plain meaning of the word
"suppress" in criminal law contradicts the
People's argument. Id.
18
¶35
The word "suppress" in criminal motions practice is
a specialized term denoting the exclusion from trial of any
evidence procured illegally, typically in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights or protections.
Black's Law Dictionary confirms this understanding. It
defines a "motion to suppress" as a "pretrial
motion to exclude evidence from a criminal trial; esp., a
request that the court prohibit the introduction of illegally
obtained evidence." Motion to Suppress,
Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
¶36
In line with this established legal meaning, our court has
acknowledged that the "suppression of evidence is . . .
generally confined to violations of constitutional
rights." People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471, 473
(Colo. 1986). Indeed, we have gone so far as to indicate on
multiple occasions that suppression is generally reserved for
evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights or
protections and does not normally extend to evidence
collected in violation of statutory rights. See,
e.g., People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380, 383
(Colo. 1997) ("In contrast to a constitutional
violation, a statutory violation does not ordinarily require
suppression of relevant evidence ...."); Dike v.
People, 30 P.3d 197, 200 (Colo. 2001) ("[W]hen
noncompliance with a statute does not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights, the suppression of
evidence derived from such error may not be
appropriate."); People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d
831, 838 (Colo. 2009) ("Suppression of evidence is
generally reserved to remedy violations of constitutional
rights ....").
19
¶37
The record here belies the People's contention that their
appeal was based on the suppression of evidence and was thus
authorized by Crim. P. 37.1(a). The county court judge did
not preclude any evidence that was illegally obtained, let
alone evidence allegedly collected in violation of
Phillips's constitutional rights or protections. Far from
it. The judge stated, no less than five times, that he was
not suppressing the video of Phillips's
interview. Instead, he explained, he was "exercising
[his] authority . . . under [CRE] 401, 402, and 403" and
keeping the video out because it was "cumulative"
and its probative value was substantially outweighed by
concerns related to "unfair prejudice,"
"confusion," "und[ue] delay," and
"waste of time." Thus, the judge made it plain that
his ruling was purely evidentiary.
¶38
Notably, the judge contrasted this evidentiary ruling with
his previous ruling on the "suppression
issue"-namely, whether the interview of Phillips
violated her Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination-which had already been "dealt with
through an [i]nterlocutory [a]ppeal" that properly
tolled the speedy trial statute. The judge informed the
People, in no uncertain terms, that the evidentiary ruling
excluding the video could not be challenged through an
interlocutory appeal. Rather than heed the judge's
admonition, however, the People went forward with their plan
to appeal.
20
¶39
The People nevertheless claim that suppress is
merely the twin of exclude. In this regard, the
People direct us to the "common parlance" usage of
the word "suppress," suggesting that it simply
means "to keep from public knowledge . . . to keep
secret." But that dog won't hunt here given the
universally accepted understanding of "suppress" in
the specific context of criminal motions practice. In this
context, suppress and exclude do not travel
together as interchangeable terms.
¶40
We're not persuaded otherwise by the People's
reliance on one sentence from Murray v. Just In Case Bus.
Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 23, 374 P.3d 443,
452, a civil case. The People wrench from its context our
passing reference to the word "suppress" there as
we discussed the trial court's discretion to exclude
evidence that doesn't clear the CRE 403 bar. See
id. At no point in Murray did we touch on-much
less undertake any analysis of-the specific use of the term
"suppress" in criminal cases. Hence, the invocation
of Murray cannot carry the day for the People.
¶41
Significantly, were we to sign off on the People's
interpretation of the term "suppress" in Crim. P.
37.1(a), the practical result would be to greenlight
interlocutory appeals following any adverse pretrial
evidentiary ruling. This, in turn, would all but hand
prosecutors a blank check to toll the speedy trial deadline
based on any unfavorable evidentiary ruling. Of
course, that would be an absurd
21
result, and we must eschew interpretations that lead to
absurd results. See McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,
¶ 38, 442 P.3d 379, 389 (stating that we must avoid
construing statutory language in a way "that would
render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical
or absurd results"); People v. Angel, 2012 CO
34, ¶ 17, 277 P.3d 231, 235 (explaining that when we
construe the rules of criminal procedure, we employ the same
principles applicable to statutory interpretation).
¶42
The authority to bring interlocutory appeals is circumscribed
because such appeals necessarily subvert the adjudicatory
process. Nothing in the language of Crim. P. 37.1(a) reflects
an intent to grant prosecutors carte blanche to interrupt
proceedings in this way, let alone to encourage gamesmanship
by giving them free reign to engage in dilatory practices
when it is to their advantage.
¶43
Ultimately, the language of Crim. P. 37.1(a) adds no weight
to the People's position. Still, our analysis must go
further.
b.
The Language of C.A.R. 4.1, "Interlocutory Appeals in
Criminal Cases" from District Court to This
Court
¶44
While Crim. P. 37.1(a) provides the grounds for interlocutory
appeals from the county court to the district court, C.A.R.
4.1(a) provides the grounds for interlocutory appeals from
the district court to our court. Of course, this is an appeal
from the county court to the district court. So, why are we
bothering with C.A.R. 4.1(a)? Because the People contend that
the divergence in language between Crim. P. 37.1(a) and
C.A.R. 4.1(a) bestows arguable merit to their
22
assertion that their appeal was authorized by Crim. P.
37.1(a). We're not sold. Quite the opposite: The language
of C.A.R. 4.1(a) supports our conclusion.
¶45
C.A.R. 4.1(a) states as follows:
The state may file an interlocutory appeal in the
supreme court from a district court order granting a
defendant's pretrial motion under Crim. P. 41(e) and (g)
and Crim. P. 41.1(i) for return of property and to
suppress evidence or granting a motion to suppress
an extra-judicial confession or admission, provided that
the state certifies to the judge who issued the order being
appealed and to the supreme court that the appeal is not
taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence is a
substantial part of the proof of the charge pending against
the defendant.
¶46
Contrasting the two rules, the People note that, although
Crim. P. 37.1(a) authorizes interlocutory appeals from
any rulings granting motions to suppress evidence,
C.A.R. 4.1(a) authorizes interlocutory appeals only from
rulings granting motions to suppress evidence pursuant to
Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g), or 41.1(i).[3] The People infer
that, unlike C.A.R. 4.1(a), which restricts interlocutory
appeals to appeals based on the three enumerated criminal
rules (Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g), and 41.1(i)), Crim. P. 37.1(a)
sweeps in a much broader swath of appeals and includes the
appeal at issue in this case. But that doesn't wash with
us.
23
¶47
To begin with, the People overlook that C.A.R. 4.1(a) also
refers to a district court's order granting "a
motion to suppress an extra-judicial confession or
admission." This part of the rule makes no reference to,
and is therefore not restricted by, Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g),
and 41.1(i).
¶48
More importantly, the People's argument disregards the
similarities between Crim. P. 37.1(a) and the
contents of the three criminal rules listed in C.A.R.
4.1(a). A side-by-side comparison drives the point home:
|
Crim. P. 37.1(a)
|
Rules Listed in C.A.R. 4.1(a)
|
|
Crim. P. 37.1(a) (first enumerated basis for appeal):
"[A] motion ... for return of property and to
suppress evidence"
|
Crim. P. 41(e):
"[A] motion for Return of Property and to
Suppress evidence"
|
|
Crim. P. 37.1(a) (second enumerated basis for
appeal): "[A] motion to suppress evidence"
|
Crim. P. 41.1(i):
"[A] motion to suppress"
|
|
Crim. P. 37.1(a) (third enumerated basis for appeal):
"[A] motion to suppress an extra-judicial
confession or admission"
|
Crim. P. 41(g):
"(A motion for] Suppression of Confession or
Admission"
|
As this
chart highlights, the substance of Crim. P. 37.1(a) directly
mirrors the substance of the three rules referenced in C.A.R.
4.1(a).
¶49
In short, the People's reliance on C.A.R. 4.1(a)
backfires; that rule drives a stake through the heart of
their argument because it aligns with Crim. P. 37.1(a).
Accordingly, we conclude that C.A.R. 4.1(a) gives the People
no foothold.
24
c.
Relevant Case Law
¶50
Our precedent applying Crim. P. 37.1's predecessor, Crim.
P. 41.2, lends weight to our conclusion that the People's
assertion that their appeal was legally authorized lacked
arguable merit. This case law is particularly persuasive
because, as relevant here, Crim. P. 41.2(a) and its
offspring, Crim. P. 37.1(a), are nearly identical.
¶51
Applying Crim. P. 41.2(a) in Bowers, we explained
that, since any issues related to evidentiary admissibility
were "not constitutional in character, rulings on such
issues [were] not within the scope of Crim. P. 41.2[a]."
716 P.2d at 473. The People push back, though, arguing that
Bowers is inapposite because it relied on cases
dealing with C.A.R. 4.1(a), not Crim. P. 37.1(a). But
we've already determined that C.A.R. 4.1(a) and Crim. P.
37.1(a) are similar in substance. Besides, by citing C.A.R.
4.1(a) case law to support its holding, Bowers
directly linked C.A.R. 4.1(a) and Crim. P. 41.2(a) (Crim. P.
37.1(a)'s precursor). This connection is compelling
because C.A.R. 4.1(a) does not permit interlocutory appeals
of pretrial evidentiary rulings. See People v.
Lindsey, 660 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1983). Rather,
appellate review under C.A.R. 4.1(a) is "proper where
evidence was suppressed due to an unlawful search
and seizure, an involuntary confession or admission, or an
improperly ordered or insufficiently supported,
nontestimonial identification." People v.
Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 171 (Colo. 2001) (emphasis
added).
25
¶52
In harmony with C.A.R. 4.1(a)'s text, we have cautioned
prosecutors bringing C.A.R. 4.1(a) appeals that they
"may not . . . 'piggyback' issues . . . to
obtain review of pre-trial evidentiary
decisions." Lindsey, 660 P.2d at 505 (emphasis
added) (quoting People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924,
927 (Colo. 1978)). And we see no reason to break stride in
extending Lindsey's rationale here, especially
considering the parallel nature of C.A.R. 4.1(a) and Crim. P.
37.1(a).
¶53
Tellingly, mapping the holding in Lindsey onto the
present circumstances comports with Crim. P. 37.1(a)'s
traditional usage. A review of our jurisprudence reflects
that whenever we've analyzed Crim. P. 37.1(a), the appeal
at issue has stemmed from a ruling suppressing evidence
purportedly obtained illegally and in violation of a
defendant's constitutional rights or protections.
See, e.g., People v. Sapp, 934 P.2d 1367,
1370 (Colo. 1997) (involving a Crim. P. 37.1(a) interlocutory
appeal taken in response to a ruling suppressing the
defendants' statements as "involuntary and in
violation of Miranda"); Tate v.
People, 2012 CO 75, ¶ 6, 290 P.3d 1268, 1269
(dealing with a Crim. P. 37.1(a) interlocutory appeal taken
in response to the suppression of evidence obtained through
an unlawful seizure); Zhuk, 239 P.3d at 438
(implicating a Crim. P. 37.1(a) interlocutory appeal taken in
response to the suppression of evidence based on a
Miranda violation). We are aware of no cases, and
the People have unearthed none, suggesting that a Crim. P.
37.1(a) interlocutory appeal may be based on a pretrial
evidentiary ruling.
26
C.
The People's Interlocutory Appeal Did Not Toll the Speedy
Trial Deadline
¶54
Having determined that the People's assertion that their
appeal was authorized lacked arguable merit, the rest of the
analytical path requires little navigation. Because the
People failed to clear one of the prongs of the
Gallegos litmus test-that their assertion that their
appeal was authorized had arguable merit-we conclude that
their second pretrial appeal was not taken in good faith and
thus did not qualify as "interlocutory" for
purposes of the tolling provision in section 18-1-405(6)(b).
IV.
Conclusion
¶55
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district
court's judgment. We remand the case to the district
court with instructions to return it to the county court so
the county court may vacate Phillips's judgment of
conviction and dismiss the case with prejudice.
---------
Notes:
[1] There were three appeals taken from
the county court to the district court in this case: The
first pretrial appeal reversing the suppression ruling that
there had been a Miranda violation; the second
pretrial appeal, which was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction; and the appeal following Phillips's
conviction. Three different district court judges presided
over these appeals.
[2] We agreed to review the following
question:
Whether the tolling of speedy trial due to the
government filing an interlocutory appeal in the district
court challenging a county court ruling concerning the form
in which evidence could be presented at trial violates a
defendant's right to speedy trial and right to due
process.
[3] Because the People's contention is
cabined to Crim. P. 37.1(a) and C.A.R. 4.1(a), we limit our
analysis accordingly and do not address any other basis for
filing an interlocutory appeal.