2
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 20CA1.
Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent: Philip J. Weiser,
Attorney General Erin K. Grundy, First Assistant Attorney
General Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner: Megan A. Ring,
Public Defender Lisa Weisz, Deputy Public Defender Denver,
Colorado.
3
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.
GABRIEL, JUSTICE concurred in part and dissented in part.
4
OPINION
SAMOUR, JUSTICE.
¶1
"Certainly any one who has the power to make you believe
absurdities has the power to make you commit
injustices." Voltaire, Miscellanies: On Absurdities
and Atrocities, in Les Philosophes: The
Philosophers of the Enlightenment and Modern Democracy 272,
277 (Norman L. Torrey ed., 1960). This evergreen aphorism is
on full display in this case. The defendant, Madani Ceus
("Ceus"), variously known to her disciples as
"Amma," "Yahweh," and other divine
epithets, preached that she was the creator of all things.
¶2
After years spent caravanning across the country, Ceus and
her group settled for several months on a farm outside
Norwood, Colorado. While there, two young girls-members of
the group since its inception-were declared tainted by Ceus
and were exiled to a car on the far side of the property,
fully exposed to the intense summer heat. Ceus forbade anyone
from giving the girls food or water or interacting with them
in any way. Isolated and ostracized, the children died in the
backseat of the car. Their bodies remained there for weeks
until the deaths were reported to the San Miguel County
Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office").
¶3
The People brought charges against all adult members of the
group. At issue here is the viability of Ceus's
convictions for child abuse resulting in death-convictions
based on jury verdicts. Our task today is to assess the
propriety of the jury instructions given by the court, the
harm any instructional
5
error may have engendered, and whether the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to sustain the
convictions.[1]
¶4
We conclude, as did a division of the court of appeals, that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury because it
failed to require distinct findings on whether the child
abuse resulted in the girls' deaths. The court
should have either used special interrogatories allowing the
jury to make those findings or drafted the elemental
instructions to require the jury to do so.
¶5
But we part ways with the division's conclusion that the
error was not constitutionally harmless. We do so for three
reasons.
¶6
First, whether the girls died as a result of the abuse they
endured was never meaningfully disputed at trial. The core
question was not how they died but who bore
responsibility for their deaths. This focus on who was
responsible permeated the trial-starting with opening
statements, continuing with the evidence, and
6
ending with closing arguments. Ceus's own statements
support the conclusion that the abuse resulted in the
girls' deaths.
¶7
Second, the jury instructions and the verdict forms clearly
directed the jury to determine whether Ceus had engaged in
child abuse that resulted in the girls' deaths.
And the verdicts returned reflect that the jury found her
guilty on both counts of child abuse "[r]esulting in
[d]eath."
¶8
Third, the evidence that the child abuse resulted in the
girls' deaths was formidable. Our thorough review of the
trial record confirms that the through-line from the abuse to
the girls' deaths was unmistakable.
¶9
In our view, taken together, these considerations leave no
reasonable possibility that the instructional error affected
the verdicts. Therefore, we see no basis to question the
verdicts' validity.
¶10
Finally, like the division, we reject Ceus's
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. Viewing the evidence
as a whole and in the light most favorable to the People-as
we must-it is clear that it was both substantial and
sufficient to support her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶11
Accordingly, despite our agreement with parts of the
division's opinion, we ultimately reverse its judgment
and remand the case for consideration of Ceus's remaining
claims.
7
I.
Facts and Procedural History
A.
Overview
¶12
In the late summer of 2017, deputies with the Sheriff's
Office responded to a report of two deceased children on a
property located outside Norwood, Colorado. Upon arrival,
deputies contacted-and subsequently arrested-four adults:
Ashford Nathaniel Archer ("Archer"); Ika Eden
("Eden"); Frederick Alexander Blair
("Blair"); and Ceus. The scene bore the
unmistakable marks of a tragedy. A car held the bodies of two
young girls: M.R., approximately ten years old, and her
sister, H.M., approximately eight years old. The responding
deputies quickly realized that the girls had died some weeks
earlier and had remained in the car; their bodies were
desiccated, skeletonized in some areas, and partially
mummified.
¶13
The People charged Ceus with two counts of first degree
murder-victim under twelve ("murder") and two
counts of child abuse resulting in death.[2]Following nearly
two years of pretrial litigation, Ceus proceeded to a jury
trial, with the two counts of child abuse resulting in death
treated as lesser included offenses of the two murder counts.
8
¶14
During the four-week trial, the jury heard testimony from
nearly forty-five witnesses and reviewed hundreds of
exhibits. We recount the relevant facts and procedural
history next. Before doing so, however, a brief preliminary
word is warranted: Because we review for constitutional
harmless error and Ceus challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, our recitation of the facts is deliberately
extensive,[3] and, given the arguments advanced by the
parties, our summary of the procedural history is necessarily
detailed as well.
B.
Origins and Early Developments
¶15
Around 2015, Ceus, Archer, Eden, and Bramble moved as a group
from Florida to an apartment in North Carolina; they had
children-toddlers and teenagers-in tow. Before the move, the
group members shed their former identities, burning personal
effects such as photographs and identification documents.
Upon arrival, they discarded their clothing and dressed in
white gowns. But it wasn't just their wardrobe that
changed. Ceus-possibly in conjunction with Archer-imposed a
strict diet on the group as a form of bodily cleansing. The
group was prohibited from consuming anything other than
coconuts, almonds, dates, and water. Piece by piece, the
trappings of their past
9
lives fell away as the group began engaging in communal
activities of a spiritual nature.
¶16
Ceus and Archer sat atop the group's hierarchy as social
leaders, with Ceus holding ultimate decision-making authority
and Archer acting in a preaching capacity. But it was Ceus
who was primarily in charge, and the group began to move in
her orbit, shaping their lives around her authority.
¶17
After some weeks in the apartment, the group's food
stores were exhausted, and they went without food. No one
took action to obtain more food, and the group went hungry
for a time. Although no physical restraints prevented members
from leaving, Ceus warned that doing so risked spiritual
contamination. Even so, a couple of the older children left
the group during this time.
C.
Leaving North Carolina and Settling in Colorado
¶18
The group eventually left the North Carolina apartment and
traveled the country in two cars, surviving predominantly on
the charity of friends and strangers. Witnesses who
encountered the group during this time testified that Ceus
and Archer were addressed as "Amma" and
"Abba," respectively. One witness recalled that a
child asked Ceus for permission before sitting in a chair,
and that another member sought Ceus's permission to
accept food, a quilt, and a sleeping bag.
10
¶19
In the early summer of 2017, the group had a chance encounter
with a stranger named Blair outside a gas station near Grand
Junction, Colorado. At the time, members of the group were
dressed in multicolored robes, and they approached Blair to
discuss spiritual matters. Little did the group and Blair
know that this crossroads moment would set them on a
different trajectory.
¶20
Blair owned a seventeen-acre undeveloped farm outside
Norwood. Although he did not reside on his farm, he used it
to cultivate vegetables and marijuana. Within a day, Blair
invited the group to stay on his property. Because the farm
lacked basic utilities, such as electricity and plumbing, and
was also devoid of permanent structures, the group bivouacked
in cars, tents, and makeshift shelters.
¶21
Upon their arrival at the farm, the group consisted of five
adults,[4] all of whom remained deeply committed to
their spiritual practices. Their beliefs centered on past
lives, dream interpretation, and preparation for an impending
apocalypse that Ceus had predicted would occur at the end of
the summer.
¶22
By this time, Ceus was casting herself as an omniscient
divine figure-the "creator of the universe,"
"Yahweh," and "mother." Her authority had
become the axis around which daily life turned. She dictated
the group's schedule and
11
movements. And she used access to food as yet another spoke
in the wheel of her control-members could not accept even a
simple gift of nourishment without first asking for her
approval, which she did not always grant. The group followed
Ceus's directives, convinced that unwavering obedience to
her rules was the sole passage to the "light
bodies" she promised would secure their salvation.
¶23
Ceus typically prepared meals for the group and withheld food
from those she disfavored, particularly individuals she
considered "impure" or insufficiently committed to
her spiritual regimen. She claimed that her
"essence" infused the food she prepared and
insisted that those lacking spiritual dedication did not
deserve to partake of it.
¶24
Early in the group's time on the property, nonmembers
were allowed to visit, and members were occasionally given
permission to leave for brief periods. At one point, six
members-including Ceus and Blair-traveled to Bridal Veil
Falls in Telluride for what Ceus described as a
"sealing" ceremony. Participants drank water from
the waterfall and brought additional water back for the
members who had remained at the farm. Ceus, however, refused
to give any water to M.R., one of the young girls who had
stayed behind, declaring her "unsealed" and
"impure." Around the same time, Ceus began
referring to M.R. as the demon Lilith, claiming she was
Lilith's reincarnation and had harmed others
12
in a past life. This marked an inflection point in Ceus's
treatment of M.R. and presaged M.R.'s isolation from the
group.
D.
Ostracizing M.R. and H.M. and the Consequences That
Followed
¶25
Thereafter, Ceus gradually orchestrated the exclusion of M.R.
and her sister, H.M. After learning of Ceus's concerns
about M.R.'s purported past life, Blair sought and
received permission to speak with M.R. Following that
interaction, however, Ceus regarded Blair with a chilled
affect, pronouncing that he had been contaminated by
M.R.'s "dark matter" through his contact with
her.
¶26
Ceus eventually exiled the two sisters from the group and
ordered their confinement in a car situated away from the
group's living quarters. She further decreed that neither
child would be permitted to eat from the group's food.
¶27
As a result, Blair sought Ceus's permission to obtain
food for the two girls from elsewhere. Ceus allowed it, and
Blair and Bramble, the girls' mother, traveled to a food
bank and then to a local grocery store. Upon their return,
however, Ceus declared the outside food "unclean"
and "impure." When Blair told her he had eaten
bananas from the food bank, she claimed he had become
contaminated. Ceus then prohibited Blair from any future
trips to obtain food and forbade group members from leaving
the farm altogether, warning that violating this edict would
contaminate them and cause their "souls [to] be
harvested."
13
¶28
From that point forward, no adult member of the group
provided food to M.R. and H.M. Although the girls initially
received water, those efforts ceased after Ceus deemed Archer
contaminated with "gray matter" because he had come
so close to them while siphoning gasoline from their vehicle.
Ceus then forbade anyone from approaching the girls. Thus, at
Ceus's direction, the girls were left in the car without
food or water and without protection from the elements,
including the intense summer heat.
¶29
In the weeks following the girls' exile, the group
continued its normal routine-holding meetings, meditating,
gathering water, and sharing meals. Meanwhile, M.R. and H.M.
remained isolated in the vehicle. No one approached the car
again until after their deaths.
¶30
Sometime after the girls' deaths, Bramble informed Blair
that her daughters had passed away. When Blair approached the
car, he observed one girl's foot hanging motionless
outside the door. At Ceus's direction, Blair used a
shovel to push the foot back inside the vehicle. He then
covered the car with a tarp and sealed it with duct tape to
contain the "stench of death." In the days that
followed, the group continued its daily activities without
reporting the girls' deaths.
¶31
Ceus eventually deemed Bramble lacking in spiritual diligence
and ordered that she be denied food and water. Bramble, who
was pregnant at the time, was then banished from the group
for her purported impurity and, like her daughters,
14
was confined in a vehicle.[5] Ceus told the group that Bramble would
either have to leave the property or "die like [the
girls]" did. Her exile lasted only several days.
E.
Discovery of the Girls' Deaths and the Investigation That
Followed
¶32
Near the end of the summer of 2017, the outside world finally
breached the group's isolation when Blair's father
and a friend arrived at the farm to check on Blair's
well-being. Although initially hesitant, Blair eventually
revealed that M.R. and H.M. were dead and that their bodies
were on the property, inside a vehicle that was covered with
a tarp.
¶33
Blair's father contacted the Sheriff's Office to
report the deaths. Deputies responded and discovered the
severely decomposed remains of M.R. and H.M. inside the car,
surrounded by food wrappers and a swarm of flies. They
arrested Ceus, Blair, and the other adult members of the
group who were there. Bramble was not arrested at that time
because she had left the farm a few days before law
enforcement responded.
¶34
Colorado Bureau of Investigation agents were called to the
scene. That evening, Agent John Zamora interviewed Ceus. When
he asked Ceus how the
15
girls died, Ceus responded, "I'm not aware of nobody
killing them." Although deputies found more than 100
pounds of food on the property, Ceus indicated that the girls
had "probably" died from a lack of food and water:
"I think they died from not eating or drinking....
It's not rocket science." When Agent Zamora asked
Ceus whether she was concerned that the girls were not
receiving food or water, she stated that she had "just
shut it out."
¶35
M.R.'s and H.M.'s bodies had decomposed to the point
of partial mummification. Because of the advanced state of
decomposition, the coroner and medical examiner were unable
to determine an exact cause of death and requested additional
testing from a laboratory in New Mexico. Both forensic
pathologists who examined the girls' remains classified
the manner of death as "homicide." Although the
precise cause of death could not be conclusively
determined-any opportunity to pinpoint it having long since
been lost to time and heat-the possible causes of death were
identified as starvation, dehydration, and hyperthermia.
¶36
As mentioned, the People then charged Ceus. A jury later
found her guilty of the lesser included offense of child
abuse resulting in death as to each child.[6]
16
F.
The Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms
¶37
At trial, Ceus requested specialized unanimity instructions
directed specifically to causation. Her proposed instructions
would have required the jury to unanimously agree that she
"committed the same act or acts" or "committed
all of the acts alleged" that "caused the death
of" M.R. and H.M. (Emphasis added.) The trial court
rejected the tendered instructions and instead gave the model
unanimity instruction, which informed the jury that to
convict Ceus of murder or child abuse resulting in each
death, it must either unanimously agree that she committed
the same act or acts, or unanimously agree that she committed
all the acts alleged. COLJI-Crim. E:11 (2025).
¶38
Ceus also proposed specialized interrogatories the jury would
complete only if it found her guilty of the lesser included
offenses of child abuse resulting in death. The tendered
interrogatories would have required the jury to make
unanimity determinations in two categories: (1) which of the
three statutory forms of child abuse resulted in each
child's death, and (2) whether Ceus acted (a) knowingly
or (b) recklessly in committing each offense. The trial court
declined to submit these interrogatories, reasoning that they
would improperly require jurors to "pick one"
option in each category and were, in any event, unnecessary
in light of the unanimity instruction it planned to give.
17
¶39
On its own initiative, however, the court modified the model
elemental instruction for child abuse resulting in death by
limiting it to those circumstances in which the abuse results
in death and not merely serious bodily injury:
The elements of the crime of [c]hild [a]buse [r]esulting in
[d]eath [knowingly or recklessly] are:
1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place
charged,
3. knowingly or recklessly,
4. caused an injury to a child's life or health, or
permitted a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation
that posed a threat of injury to the child's life or
health, or engaged in a continued pattern of conduct that
resulted in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care,
cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of
injuries that ultimately resulted in the death of a
child.
(Emphasis added.) Cf. COLJI-Crim. 6-4:01 (2025)
(ending the fourth element with the following language:
"that ultimately resulted in the death of a child or
serious bodily injury to a child" (emphasis
added)).
¶40
Apparently because it had modified the fourth element, the
court failed to provide the companion special interrogatory
requiring a distinct finding on whether the abuse resulted in
death-as opposed to serious bodily injury-as set forth in the
model jury instructions:
6-4:09.INT CHILD ABUSE-INTERROGATORY (DEATH)
If you find the defendant not guilty of child abuse, you
should disregard this instruction and sign the verdict form
to indicate your not guilty verdict.
18
If, however, you find the defendant guilty of child abuse,
you should sign the verdict form to indicate your finding of
guilt, and answer the following verdict question on the
verdict form:
Did the child abuse result in death? (Answer "Yes"
or "No")
The prosecution has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the child abuse resulted in death. ....
COLJI-Crim.
6-4:09 (2025).
¶41
The verdict form given for each murder charge, which did not
contain any special interrogatories, allowed the jury to find
Ceus not guilty of any crime or guilty of either (1) murder
or (2) the lesser included offense of child abuse resulting
in death. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on the two
lesser included offenses, the court sentenced Ceus to
sixty-four years in the Department of Corrections.
G.
Ceus's Appeal and the Parties' Cross-Petitions for
Certiorari
¶42
Ceus appealed, raising a bevy of contentions. She argued,
among other things, that the trial court failed to properly
instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of child
abuse resulting in death and that, in any event, the evidence
was insufficient to sustain those convictions. She also
advanced several evidentiary challenges, claimed that the
child abuse statute was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on
19
independent intervening cause, and maintained that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument.
Finally, she contended that the cumulative effect of these
errors required reversal.
¶43
The division took up these issues in turn. Beginning with the
instructional claim, it concluded that the trial court erred
by failing to give the jury a special interrogatory requiring
a determination as to whether the People proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the abuse of each child resulted in
death. People v. Ceus, No. 20CA1360, ¶ 13 (June
27, 2024). In the division's view, the absence of such
findings meant that the guilty verdicts supported only
misdemeanor child abuse convictions, which do not require
proof that a death resulted. Id. at ¶ 24. The
division then considered whether the error was
constitutionally harmless and held that it was not, reasoning
that "causation was the central disputed issue at
trial." Id. at ¶ 27.
¶44
But the division rejected Ceus's challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at ¶ 35. It
likewise rejected her constitutional contentions.
Id. at ¶¶ 42, 46, 50. Finally, the
division declined to reach her remaining claims, concluding
that they were effectively moot because they were directed at
overturning the convictions for child abuse resulting in
death, which the division had already determined could not
stand. Id. at ¶¶ 52, 54.
20
¶45
The division therefore remanded the case to the trial court
with instructions to allow the People to elect either to
retry Ceus for child abuse resulting in death as to each girl
or to seek a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor child
abuse on each count. Id. at ¶ 28. Rather than
make that election on remand, the People sought our review.
Ceus, in turn, cross-petitioned for review. We granted both
petitions for certiorari.
II.
Analysis
¶46
We turn first to the standards that serve as doctrinal
markers orienting our review. We then consider if the trial
court erred by failing to require distinct findings on
whether the abuse resulted in M.R.'s and H.M.'s
deaths. Because we conclude that the court did err, we
proceed to evaluate whether that error was constitutionally
harmless. We hold that it was. Finally, we shift our
attention to Ceus's cross-petition and reject her
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
convictions.
A.
Standards of Review
¶47
The Colorado Constitution grants the General Assembly the
"power to define criminal conduct and to establish the
legal components of criminal liability." Randolph v.
People, 2025 CO 44, ¶ 12, 570 P.3d 1022, 1026
(quoting Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo.
2000)). In keeping with a defendant's constitutional
right to the "presumption of innocence," a trial
court must
21
"properly instruct the jury as to each element of the
crime charged." Id. (citing Garcia v.
People, 2022 CO 6, ¶ 15, 503 P.3d 135, 140).
¶48
We review de novo whether an instruction accurately informed
the jury of the governing law. Garcia, ¶ 16,
503 P.3d at 140. When an elemental jury instruction is
"provided in error" and the error is "properly
preserved," the applicable "reversal-determining
standard is constitutional harmless error," which calls
for reversal unless the prosecution establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt "that the error was harmless."
Randolph, ¶ 15, 570 P.3d at 1026. We have
understood this standard to require reversal when "there
is a reasonable possibility" that the error
"might have contributed to the conviction."
Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d
116, 119 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967)). In assessing constitutional harmlessness, we
consider the record as a whole. Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
¶49
Jury instructions that fail to correctly define the elements
of an offense, thereby preventing the jury from determining
whether the prosecution proved those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, are "constitutionally deficient."
Key v. People, 715 P.2d 319, 323 (Colo. 1986). Even
so, the United States Supreme Court has explained that
"where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the omitted [instructional] element was
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that
the jury verdict would have been
22
the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is
properly found to be harmless."[7] Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999). In the spirit of
Neder's framework, a division of the court of
appeals has likewise recognized that the "omission of an
element"-and, "by extension the lesser error of
failing to . . . define an element"-may be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt when "the evidence relating to
that element is overwhelming." People v.
Grudznske, 2023 COA 36, ¶ 73, 533 P.3d 579, 595-96
(quoting People v. Draper, 2021 COA 120, ¶ 40,
501 P.3d 262, 274); see also Key, 715 P.2d at 323
(noting that in evaluating for constitutional harmlessness, a
reviewing court considers whether the evidence on a disputed
issue is overwhelming). A review of the jury instructions as
a whole may also support a reviewing court's
determination of constitutional harmlessness.[8] See Key,
715 P.2d at 323.
23
¶50
We also review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction. People v. Douglas,
2015 COA 155, ¶ 8, 412 P.3d 785, 788. Such a challenge
requires us to determine whether the evidence presented at
trial, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, is both substantial and sufficient to
support the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005).
Although a conviction cannot rest on speculation or
conjecture, it may be supported by reasonable inferences
drawn from the evidence. People v. Donald, 2020 CO
24, ¶ 19, 461 P.3d 4, 7.
B. The
Trial Court Erred by Failing to Require Distinct Findings on
Whether the Abuse Resulted in M.R.'s and H.M.'s
Deaths
¶51
The People contend that the division erred in concluding that
the trial court should have required the jury to explicitly
find that the child abuse resulted in M.R.'s and
H.M.'s deaths. We disagree.[9]
¶52
Section 18-6-401, C.R.S. (2025), the statute criminalizing
child abuse, differentiates between the actions or omissions
that constitute child abuse, which
24
comprise the elements of the crime, and the result of the
child abuse. Compare § 18-6-401(1)(a),
with § 18-6-401(7). A person commits child
abuse if the person
causes an injury to a child's life or health, or permits
a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a
threat of injury to the child's life or health, or
engages in a continued pattern of conduct that results in
malnourishment, lack of proper medical care, cruel
punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that
ultimately results in the death of a child or serious bodily
injury to a child.
§ 18-6-401(1)(a).
¶53
Subsection (7) of the statute, in turn, specifies the level
of the criminal offense and its corresponding punishment,
both of which vary based on the defendant's culpable
mental state and the result of the child abuse. But while the
culpable mental state is an element of the offense, the
result of the child abuse-no injury, injury, serious bodily
injury, or death-functions only as a sentence enhancer.
See § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a); People v.
Robinson, 874 P.2d 453, 464 (Colo.App. 1993)
("[T]he fact that a child victim dies is a sentence
enhancement factor and not an element of the crime of child
abuse."); Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576,
580 (Colo. 1993) ("[A] sentence enhancement provision is
not an element of the offense charged.").
¶54
As relevant here, when child abuse is committed knowingly or
recklessly and results in an injury less severe than
"serious bodily injury," the offense is a class 1
misdemeanor. § 18-6-401(7)(a)(V). By contrast, if the
child abuse is
25
committed knowingly or recklessly and "results in death
to the child," the offense is a class 2 felony. §
18-6-401(7)(a)(I).
¶55
Subject to exceptions not applicable here, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Erlinger v. United
States, 602 U.S. 821, 833 (2024); Caswell v.
People, 2023 CO 50, ¶ 38, 536 P.3d 323, 332. Thus,
sentence-enhancing factors-such as child abuse resulting in
death-must generally be proved to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Ramirez, 997 P.2d 1200,
1206 (Colo.App. 1999), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 43 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2001) (mem.). It follows that
for Ceus to be properly convicted of class 2 felony child
abuse, the People were required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt not only the elements of child abuse, but also the
sentence enhancer in question-that the child abuse resulted
in death.
¶56
In this case, the trial court did not provide any special
interrogatories requiring the jury to explicitly find that
the child abuse resulted in each girl's death. Nor did
the elemental instructions require such findings. Because the
People were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the child abuse resulted in the girls' deaths, we
conclude that the trial court erred in instructing
26
the jury.[10] To be clear, the jury did find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ceus committed child abuse against the
girls, which necessarily means that she bore responsibility
for their confinement in the car without food or water during
the intense summer heat for an extended period. The error
lies in the court's failure to require the jury to
additionally determine whether that confinement resulted in
the girls' deaths.
¶57
But does that error require reversal? After all, "[a]
defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect
trial." People v. Mills, 557 P.2d 1192, 1194
(Colo. 1976). We take up that question now.
C.
The Error Was Constitutionally Harmless
¶58
Having concluded that the trial court erred, we must consider
whether the error was constitutionally harmless. If it was,
we will not reverse.
¶59
The relevant inquiry is whether "there is a reasonable
possibility that the [error] might have contributed
to the conviction." Hagos, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d
at 119 (alteration in original) (quoting Chapman,
386 U.S. at 24). Our meticulous vetting of the entire trial
record-including the parties' opening and closing
statements,
27
the evidence introduced, and the instructions provided to the
jury-leads us to conclude that there is no reasonable
possibility that the instructional error contributed to
Ceus's convictions. See Garcia, ¶ 18, 503
P.3d at 140. That determination rests on three grounds,
considered together: (1) the proposition that the child abuse
resulted in the girls' deaths was not meaningfully
contested at trial;[11] (2) the jury instructions and verdict
forms repeatedly reminded the jury that Ceus was accused of
child abuse "[r]esulting in [d]eath"; and (3) the
evidence that the girls' deaths resulted from the abuse
was overwhelming.
1.
The Parties Did Not Meaningfully Dispute That the Child Abuse
Resulted in the Girls' Deaths
¶60
To begin, the central disputed issue at trial was not how the
girls died but, rather pointedly, who was responsible for
their deaths. Indeed, the trial's primary theme was
whether Ceus bore responsibility for the girls'
confinement in the car without food or water during the
intense summer heat for an extended period, not whether such
confinement ultimately resulted in their deaths.
28
¶61
The People's case revolved around the theory that
Ceus's authority and control over the group, coupled with
her ostracism of the girls, rendered her responsible for
their deaths. As the People emphasized in their opening
statement, the core question for the jury was whether
"Ceus [was] responsible for the [girls']
deaths." The People's evidence likewise pivoted
around Ceus's control, authority, and decision-making,
which allegedly culminated in the girls' deaths. In
closing, the People returned to this central narrative,
arguing that Ceus had "consciously disregard[ed] a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that [the girls] would
die."
¶62
The defense, for its part, pushed back against any effort to
place responsibility for the girls' deaths on Ceus. It
argued that she could not be responsible because she was not
the girls' mother, and that Bramble, as their mother-or
perhaps Blair, the owner of the farm-shouldered that
responsibility. Defense counsel underscored this point in
opening statement, asserting that "[i]t was
[Bramble's] choice and her choice alone" to
"abandon her girls." Distilled, the defense's
theory was that "Ceus's failure to help or force . .
. Bramble to take care of her own children is not a
crime." This framing carried through to closing
argument. Defense counsel began: "Bramble is the one who
is responsible for the death[s] of her two children."
Continuing, counsel maintained that Ceus could not be held
responsible for child abuse through inaction or a failure to
protect the girls because she owed no legal duty to ensure
their well-being. Thus, rather than
29
contend that the child abuse did not result in the girls'
deaths, the defense insisted that Ceus was not responsible
for any child abuse in the first place.[12]
¶63
The division nevertheless concluded that "causation was
the central disputed issue at trial." Ceus,
¶ 27. But the division was mistaken in its understanding
of both the law and the record. We begin with the law before
turning to the record.
¶64
"[C]ausation," as the division understood the term,
had no legal relevance to the child abuse charges. Although
the murder charges required proof that Ceus
"cause[d]" the girls' deaths, the child abuse
charges did not; they required only proof that the abuse
"result[ed] in" their deaths. Compare
§ 18-3-102(1)(f), C.R.S. (2025), with §
18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(I).
¶65
Just last term, we clarified that "results in" and
"proximate cause" are statutory terms with distinct
meanings. People v. Beverly, 2025 CO 18, ¶ 28,
568 P.3d 398, 405-06. We explained that when a criminal
statute requires not only conduct but also that the conduct
caused a particular result, the prosecution must
prove both actual (or "but for") causation and
legal (or "proximate") causation. Id. at
¶ 24, 568 P.3d at 405. The former is "any cause
'but for' which the harm
30
would not have occurred," and the latter is "any
'cause which in natural and probable sequence produced
the claimed injury.'" Id. (quoting
Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 13, 542 P.3d
675, 679).
¶66
We further noted in Beverly that numerous federal
cases interpret "results from" in a criminal
narcotics statute "as imposing only a but-for cause
requirement." Id. at ¶ 28, 568 P.3d at
406. In doing so, Beverly cited United States v.
Jeffries, 958 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2020), which drew
on a respected dictionary to define "results":
"A thing 'results' when it 'arises as an
effect, issue, or outcome . . . .'" (Quoting
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210-11
(2014), which in turn quoted Results, 2 The New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).)[13] The Sixth
Circuit therefore concluded in Jeffries that
"[t]he proper inquiry" was whether death arose as
an effect, issue, or outcome of drug use, "not whether
death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's
[distribution] violation." 958 F.3d at 520-21.
31
¶67
Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of
"results" here, the People were required to prove
that the girls' deaths were an effect, outcome, or
consequence of the child abuse. More precisely, they had to
establish that the deaths were an effect, outcome, or
consequence of the girls' confinement in the car without
food or water during the intense summer heat for an extended
period.
¶68
Our decision in People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619
(Colo. 2004)-a case involving child abuse resulting in
serious bodily injury-does not alter the analysis. There, the
defendant told the police that after shaking his
girlfriend's infant child two or three times, the child
became quiet. Id. at 622. The People pursued the
first two statutory bases of liability under section
18-6-401(1)(a). Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 622. Under the
second, they alleged that the defendant permitted the child
to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat
of injury to the child's life or health. Id. at
625. We concluded that the record supported a finding that
this allegation was established because there was proof that
the defendant knowingly or recklessly failed to promptly seek
treatment, concealed the seriousness of the injury, and
attempted to prevent the child from receiving medical care.
Id. at 626-27. But we nevertheless held that the
evidence was insufficient because the prosecution failed to
show that the child abuse "resulted in serious bodily
injury to the child." Id. at 627. We explained
that the prosecution presented no expert testimony that the
ninety-minute delay in
32
obtaining medical treatment aggravated the injury already
present or resulted in other serious bodily injury.
Id.
¶69
Today's decision hews closely to Dunaway.
Consistent with Dunaway, we hold that when the
prosecution charges child abuse resulting in death as a class
2 felony, it is not sufficient to prove that the defendant
knowingly or recklessly committed child abuse; the
prosecution must also prove that the abuse "result[ed]
in death to the child." § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I).
¶70
We recognize that, in a few instances in our Dunaway
opinion, we used the less precise phrase "causal
connection" rather than "resulted in."
Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 627-28. But all we meant was
that there must be a link between the child abuse and the
result-the abuse must result in the child's injury or
death. In other words, the child abuse must be the but for
cause of the resulting injury, and conversely, the resulting
injury must be the effect, outcome, or consequence of the
child abuse. Thus, we rejected the prosecution's
assertion that mere evidence of the defendant's delay in
obtaining medical treatment for the child's serious
injury sufficed. Id. at 628. As we explained, this
evidence didn't necessarily prove that the delay
"resulted in" serious bodily injury. Id.
¶71
Still, we nowhere suggested that the prosecution must prove
that the defendant proximately caused the
child's injury or death. Nor could we have done so, since
such a requirement would have contravened the statute's
plain language.
33
See § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) (requiring proof that
the child abuse "result[ed] in" the child's
death, not that the defendant proximately caused the
child's death); § 18-6-401(7)(a)(III) (requiring
proof that the child abuse "result[ed] in" the
child's serious bodily injury, not that the defendant
proximately caused the child's serious bodily injury);
see also Beverly, ¶ 28, 568 P.3d at 405-06
(clarifying that "results in" and "proximate
cause" have different meanings). This is not
after-the-fact speculation about what our court meant in
Dunaway; it's necessarily what the court
meant-based on the plain statutory language.
¶72
Here, the jury found that Ceus was responsible for the girls
being confined in the car without food or water during the
intense summer heat for an extended period. Unlike in
Dunaway, however, the prosecution also proved the
result of the child abuse. More to the point, the prosecution
established that the girls' confinement in the car-the
child abuse-resulted in their deaths. Yet the division
anchored its harmless error analysis in its belief that
whether Ceus proximately caused the girls' deaths was not
only relevant to the child abuse resulting in death
convictions but was the preeminent issue in the case.
Ceus, ¶ 27. This was error as a matter of law.
¶73
Beyond this legal error, the division also misapprehended the
record by equating Ceus's argument that she wasn't
responsible for the girls' deaths with an argument that,
regardless of who was responsible for confining the girls in
the car,
34
the confinement didn't result in their deaths. What is
readily apparent from the record is that, to the extent the
defense urged that Ceus was not responsible for the
girls' deaths, it was asserting that she bore no
responsibility for the girls' well-being at all-not
that the girls' deaths, after they were confined in the
car, did not result from their having no food or water and
being exposed to the intense summer heat for an extended
period. The real contested issue throughout the trial was
the culpable source of the child abuse, not the effect,
outcome, or consequence of the child abuse. This is a
nuanced but important distinction-one the division
overlooked. And perhaps no evidence speaks louder on this
score than Ceus's own words to law enforcement: "I
think they died from not eating or drinking .... It's not
rocket science." We are hard-pressed to treat the trial
court's instructional error as reversible when the
question whether the confinement in the car resulted in the
girls' deaths was not meaningfully contested at
trial.[14]
35
2.
The Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms Reinforce Our
Conclusion
¶74
The jury instructions and verdict forms bolster our
conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that the
instructional error contributed to Ceus's convictions.
The trial court duly gave Ceus's tendered
theory-of-defense instruction, which asserted that "she
is not guilty of first degree murder or child abuse
resulting in death, because she was not responsible
for any children other than her own." (Emphasis added.)
The instruction went on to state that Ceus was not
responsible for "the death of any child,"
and that "[i]nstead, . . . Bramble" should be held
accountable for "the death of her children
through her own criminal conduct." (Emphases added.) It
concluded that Ceus "did not know or foresee that . . .
Bramble . . . would kill her children," and
that Ceus "had no duty to protect [the girls] from their
mother." (Emphasis added.)
¶75
More broadly, the jury instructions repeatedly framed the
offense as "[c]hild [a]buse resulting in
[d]eath," referring to that full title no fewer
than eleven times and never to "child abuse" in
isolation. (Emphasis added.) The jury was specifically
instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of "child abuse
resulting in death." (Emphasis added.)
¶76
Further, the jury was instructed to hold the prosecution to
its burden of proof when completing the verdict forms.
Mindful of all those instructions, the
36
jury filled out each verdict form by selecting the box next
to "child abuse resulting in death."
(Emphasis added.)
3.
The Evidence Was Overwhelming
¶77
The evidence that the child abuse resulted in M.R.'s and
H.M.'s deaths was nothing short of overwhelming-this,
too, buttresses our conclusion that the instructional error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lay witness
testimony, expert testimony, and physical evidence converged
to reveal a factual portrait that left little room for doubt:
The girls died from starvation, dehydration, and
hyperthermia, or a combination of those conditions. And the
record contained a mountain of evidence showing that those
conditions resulted from the girls' confinement in the
car.
¶78
Here, again, we rely on what Ceus herself said: This is
"not rocket science." Ceus was right: This really
isn't rocket science. The girls died after being confined
in the car without food or water during the intense summer
heat for an extended period. There was no evidence suggesting
any other cause of death. The forensic evidence confirmed as
much. One of the pathologists opined that "[t]here was
no evidence of external trauma" on either girl, allowing
him to rule out fractures, major trauma, and similar causes.
And while he acknowledged that advanced decomposition made it
impossible to rule out every conceivable alternative, he
37
opined that the most likely causes of death for both girls
were starvation, dehydration, and hyperthermia.
¶79
In sum, for the three reasons we have set forth, there is no
reasonable possibility that the instructional error affected
the guilty verdicts. We therefore conclude that the error was
constitutionally harmless.
D. The
Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Jury's Verdicts
Finding Ceus Guilty of Child Abuse Resulting in the
Girls' Deaths
¶80
In her cross-petition, Ceus challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying her convictions for child abuse resulting
in death. She relies on two grounds to buoy her position. We
take them in turn.
1. The
Child Abuse Statute Did Not Require Proof of a Formal
Caretaking Relationship; What Matters Is That Ceus Placed the
Girls' Lives or Health at Risk
¶81
Consistent with her defense at trial, Ceus challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence on the ground that she lacked a
formal caretaking relationship with M.R. and H.M. But the
child abuse statute does not allow a person to escape
liability simply because she is not the victim's parent,
guardian, or other formal caretaker. See People v.
Arevalo, 725 P.2d 41, 48 (Colo.App. 1986) ("Every
person has a duty to refrain from any action which causes a
child to be placed in a situation which endangers the
child's life and health."). To the contrary, the
statute's reach is both preventive and expansive,
covering not only those who directly inflict harm on
38
children but also those who threaten -or even permit -such
harm. Id. at 48-49; see also People v.
Archer, 2022 COA 71, ¶¶ 11-20, 518 P.3d 1143,
1148-49 (holding that sufficient evidence supported the class
2 felony child abuse conviction of one of Ceus's
codefendants despite the absence of a familial relationship
with M.R. and H.M.); People v. Mann, 646 P.2d 352,
355-56 (Colo. 1982) (interpreting the child abuse statute as
encompassing both those who physically harm children and
those who allow another to do so). This stands in stark
contrast to the murder statutory provision under which Ceus
was charged. See § 18-3-102(1)(f) (requiring
proof that the perpetrator was in a "position of
trust" with respect to the victim).
¶82
The relevant question for the jury, therefore, was not
whether Ceus owed a legally recognized duty of care
to the girls by virtue of her relationship to them, but
whether she engaged in conduct that placed their lives or
health at risk. And the prosecution presented
substantial evidence that she did. A parade of
witnesses-group members and peripheral observers
alike-described Ceus as exercising extraordinary authority
over nearly every aspect of the group's existence. Having
elevated herself to the status of a spiritual leader-or, in
her own view, a deity-Ceus dictated members' daily
routines, controlled their interactions with outsiders,
directed their religious practices, and exerted significant
control over their access to the most fundamental item of
sustenance: food. That authority extended to the girls'
mother.
39
¶83
Significantly, witnesses testified that, while wielding this
extraordinary power, Ceus banished the girls to the car,
declared one of them "impure," forbade them from
eating the group's food, prohibited members from leaving
the property to obtain alternative food, instructed members
to avoid the car for fear of contamination, and, after the
girls died, directed that the vehicle be covered with a tarp.
This conduct brought Ceus squarely within the ambit of the
child abuse statute, regardless of whether she occupied a
formal caretaking role with respect to the girls. Viewed in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing every
reasonable inference in its favor, this evidence was more
than sufficient to support her convictions.
2.
There Was Sufficient Evidence to Establish that Ceus Acted
Knowingly or Recklessly
¶84
The People were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Ceus acted either "knowingly" or
"recklessly." Ceus claims they failed to do so. We
disagree.
¶85
The child abuse statute directs the factfinder to assess the
defendant's mental state by examining "the nature of
the offender's conduct in relation to the child or to the
circumstances under which the act or omission occurred."
People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 371 (Colo. 1996).
Thus, in a case like this one, the statute does not require
proof that the defendant specifically intended or foresaw the
result of the abuse-death. See id. That approach is
consistent with the statute's
40
"results in" requirement, which does not demand
traditional proximate-cause foreseeability.
¶86
We have already concluded that the evidence showing the child
abuse resulted in the girls' deaths was as decisive as it
was abundant. And viewing now the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People and affording them the benefit of
every reasonable inference-as the law requires-we hold that
the record contains ample evidence from which a rational jury
could conclude that Ceus acted knowingly or recklessly.
¶87
Our case law provides the framework for assessing the
requisite culpable mental state under the statutory
provisions defining child abuse resulting in death. A
defendant acts knowingly when she possesses a "general
awareness of the abusive nature of [her] conduct in relation
to the child" or an awareness of the circumstances under
which she acted against the child's well-being.
Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 625 (quoting People v.
Noble, 635 P.2d 203, 210 (Colo. 1981)). Recklessness is
less demanding. See Deskins, 927 P.2d at 373
("[T]he awareness required for reckless child abuse is
simply the risk that one's conduct could result
in an injury to a child's life or health."). A
defendant acts recklessly when she consciously disregards
"a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that, under
the circumstances, a particular act or omission would
constitute child abuse. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d
570, 575 (Colo. 1991). Whether a risk is substantial and
unjustifiable
41
depends on both the likelihood and the magnitude of the harm
involved. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 220 (Colo.
2000). And because death represents the gravest possible
harm, even conduct creating a relatively slight risk of death
may satisfy that standard. Id.
¶88
The question for us, therefore, is whether the prosecution
presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find
that Ceus was aware of, or consciously disregarded,
circumstances posing a substantial and unjustifiable risk to
the girls' health or safety, and that the danger she was
aware of or consciously disregarded ultimately resulted in
their deaths. We join our colleagues in the division in
concluding that the evidence comfortably met that standard.
We need not repeat here our earlier account of the compelling
evidence of the hold Ceus exercised over the group, including
the girls' mother. Suffice it to say that a rational jury
could reasonably infer from the witnesses' testimony that
Ceus either knew, or consciously disregarded, that the group
members were devoted to her authority and would comply with
her directives to leave the girls confined in the car without
food or water during the intense summer heat for an extended
period.
¶89
And the evidence of Ceus's culpable mental state did not
end there. The jury watched the video recording of her
post-arrest interview. She acknowledged to law enforcement
that the girls likely died because they were "not eating
or drinking." When asked whether she was concerned that
the girls were not
42
receiving food or water, Ceus admitted that she simply
"shut it out." A rational jury could interpret
these statements as admissions that she was aware of the
grave danger confronting the girls and deliberately chose to
ignore it.
¶90
Considered together, the evidence was abundantly sufficient
for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ceus acted knowingly or, at the very least, recklessly.
III.
Conclusion
¶91
For the foregoing reasons, although we agree with portions of
the division's opinion, we ultimately reverse its
judgment. We therefore remand the case for the division to
consider the remaining claims raised by Ceus.
43
GABRIEL, JUSTICE concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶92
I agree with the majority's conclusion that, viewing the
evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
People, the evidence was substantial and sufficient to allow
a reasonable jury to find Madani Ceus guilty of child abuse.
Maj. op. ¶¶ 10, 80-90. I further agree with the
majority's conclusion that the instructions on the child
abuse charges erroneously failed to advise the jury that it
needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ceus's
alleged child abuse resulted in the victims' deaths.
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 46, 51-56. I do not, however,
agree with the majority's ultimate determination that the
instructional error in this case was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 46, 58-79.
¶93
In my view, contrary to the People's assertion, Ceus
preserved her assertion of instructional error by (1)
submitting a special interrogatory that would have required
the jury to make the finding that she claims the given
instructions omitted and (2) citing the applicable case law
and pattern jury instruction requiring such a finding. In
addition, I believe that the division below correctly
concluded that the jury was not properly instructed and did
not make the requisite finding of causation. Finally, because
Ceus's entire defense was that her conduct did not cause
the victims' deaths, I cannot perceive how the absence of
an instruction and a jury finding of the requisite causation
can be said to be harmless at all, much less harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
44
¶94
Accordingly, I would affirm the division's judgment. I
therefore respectfully concur in part with and dissent in
part from the majority's opinion.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶95
The majority sufficiently sets forth the facts of this tragic
case, and I need not repeat those facts. Instead, I will
principally limit my factual recitation to the procedural
issues that are relevant to my analysis.
¶96
The People charged Ceus with two counts of first degree
murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death. The
case proceeded to trial, and Ceus's principal defense was
that she did not cause the victims' deaths. To the
contrary, she argued that the victims' mother, who was
separately convicted of two counts of first degree murder,
was responsible.
¶97
At trial, before the jury instruction conference, Ceus's
counsel tendered to the court a packet of draft proposed jury
instructions. Although the packet did not include an
elemental instruction for child abuse resulting in death, it
included a single page, entitled, "Lesser Included
Offenses," that said, "COLJI-Crim. E:14,
COLJI-Crim. 6-4:01, § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(I)[, C.R.S.
(2025)], Friend v. People, [2018 CO 90,] 429 P.3d
1191 . . . (child abuse resulting in death is a lesser
included offense of first degree murder of a child by one in
a position of trust [sic]." Section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I),
which Ceus cited, establishes the required element of
causation, and Friend, ¶ 38, 429 P.3d at 1197,
recites the elements of child abuse resulting in
45
death and notes as an element of that offense that the child
abuse resulted in a child's death.
¶98
In addition, Ceus's counsel tendered two special
interrogatories, one for each count of child abuse, that
provided, in pertinent part:
You should only complete this instruction if you find the
defendant guilty of child abuse resulting in death of [the
victim]. If you do not find the defendant guilty of child
abuse resulting in death of [the victim], you should
disregard this instruction.
If, however, you find the defendant guilty of child abuse
resulting in death of [the victim], you should sign the
verdict form to indicate your finding of guilt, and answer
the following two verdict questions:
1. Did the death of [the victim] result from (check one):
___ The defendant knowingly or recklessly causing an injury
to the child's life or health that resulted in the death
of the child, or
___ The defendant knowingly or recklessly permitting the
child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a
threat of injury to the child's life or health, that
resulted in the death of the child, or
___ The defendant knowingly or recklessly engaging in a
continued pattern of conduct that resulted in malnourishment,
lack of proper medical care, cruel punishment, mistreatment,
or an accumulation of injuries, that ultimately resulted in
the death of the child?
2. Did the defendant commit this crime (check one) [sic]
___ Knowingly, or
___ Recklessly?
The prosecution has the burden to prove each numbered
condition beyond a reasonable doubt.
46
¶99
The court refused this tendered special interrogatory and
instead instructed the jury on the elements of child abuse
resulting in death, in pertinent part, as follows:
The elements of the crime of Child Abuse Resulting in Death
[knowingly or recklessly] are:
1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place
charged,
3. knowingly or recklessly,
4. caused an injury to a child's life or health, or
permitted a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation
that posed a threat of injury to the child's life or
health, or engaged in a continued pattern of conduct that
resulted in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care,
cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of
injuries that ultimately resulted in the death of a child.
¶100
The court did not instruct the jury that it was required to
find that any child abuse committed by Ceus resulted in or
caused the victims' deaths. Nor did the court provide a
special interrogatory requiring the jury to make such a
finding. And the verdict form provided by the court did not
require the jury to make that finding. Instead, the verdict
form gave the jury the option of finding Ceus not guilty of
both first degree murder and child abuse resulting in death
or finding her guilty of either "Murder in the First
Degree ([Victim])" or "Child Abuse Resulting in
Death [knowingly or recklessly] ([Victim])."
47
¶101
The jury found Ceus guilty of child abuse resulting in death
as to both victims, and the trial court subsequently
sentenced her to sixty-four years in prison.
¶102
Ceus appealed, arguing, as pertinent here, that the trial
court had reversibly erred by failing to instruct the jury
completely on the crime of child abuse resulting in death.
People v. Ceus, No. 20CA1360, ¶ 13 (June 27,
2024). Specifically, she asserted that the trial court had
erred by declining to provide the jury with a special
interrogatory requiring it to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the child abuse resulted in the victims' deaths.
Id.
¶103
In a unanimous, unpublished decision, the division agreed
with this argument and reversed Ceus's child abuse
conviction. Id. at ¶¶ 13-28, 56. In so
concluding, the division initially opined that Ceus had
preserved her contention of instructional error by objecting
to the child abuse instructions and submitting her own
instructions, including a special interrogatory related to
the causation requirement. Id. at ¶ 19.
¶104
The division next determined that neither the jury
instructions nor the verdict forms provided by the court
required the jury to find that Ceus's conduct resulted in
the victims' deaths. Id. at ¶¶ 20-26.
Specifically, the division opined that, although the trial
court had properly instructed the jury on the elements of
child abuse and the three alternative ways of committing that
crime under section
48
18-6-401(1)(a), the court never instructed the jury that it
was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the child
abuse resulted in death, as required to elevate the offense
to a class 2 felony under section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I).
Id. at ¶ 25. The division thus agreed with Ceus
that the jury had convicted her only of misdemeanor, not
felony, child abuse. Id.
¶105
In so concluding, the division rejected the People's
argument that the elemental instruction that the trial court
had provided sufficiently required the jury to determine that
Ceus's child abuse resulted in the victims' deaths.
Id. at ¶ 24. To the contrary, the elemental
instruction set forth the three alternative ways of
committing child abuse and nothing more. Id. On this
point, the division observed that in People v.
Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619, 627 (Colo. 2004), we had
"soundly rejected" an argument that proof of the
act element under subsection (1)(a) "'necessarily
proves'" the injury element under subsection (7)(a).
Ceus, ¶ 25 (quoting Dunaway, 88 P.3d
at 627). The division further rejected the People's
contention that the title of the elemental instruction (i.e.,
"child abuse resulting in death") was sufficient to
sustain a felony child abuse conviction. Id. at
¶ 26. In the division's view, nothing in the title
required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ceus's abuse resulted in the victims' deaths.
Id. Nor did the verdict form or any interrogatory
require such a finding. Id.
49
¶106
Finally, the division disagreed with the People's
contention that the foregoing error was constitutionally
harmless. Id. at ¶ 27. The division observed
that the issue of causation was "the central disputed
issue at trial" and that Ceus had defended on the theory
that the victims' mother had caused their deaths.
Id. Accordingly, without an instruction requiring
the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ceus's
abuse resulted in the victims' deaths, the division could
not conclude that the instructional error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶107
In light of the foregoing, the division determined that
reversal was required and that, on remand, the People could
elect to try Ceus again for felony child abuse or could ask
the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction on
misdemeanor child abuse. Id. at ¶ 28.
¶108
The People then petitioned for certiorari review, and we
granted their petition.
II.
Analysis
¶109
I begin by discussing the applicable standard of review. I
then address, in turn, the questions of preservation,
instructional error, and constitutional harmless error.
A.
Standard of Review
¶110
Trial courts must correctly instruct the jury on the
applicable law, although they have discretion as to the style
and form of the instructions.
50
People in Int. of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 33, 370
P.3d 1151, 1161. We review jury instructions de novo to
determine whether the instructions, considered as a whole,
correctly informed the jury as to the pertinent law.
Id.
B.
Preservation
¶111
We and divisions of our court of appeals have long and
consistently maintained that by tendering an instruction that
accurately states the law, a party preserves for appellate
review a claim of instructional error relating to that
tendered instruction. See, e.g., Thomas v.
People, 820 P.2d 656, 659 (Colo. 1991); People v.
Ridgeway, 2013 COA 17, ¶ 10, 307 P.3d 126, 128.
This is so even if the party does not then object or
otherwise raise the issue during a jury instruction
conference. People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, ¶
10, 433 P.3d 60, 64.
¶112
Here, in light of this settled case law, Ceus clearly
preserved the issue now before us by (1) submitting a special
interrogatory that would have required the jury to make the
finding that she claims the given instructions omitted and
(2) citing the applicable case law and pattern jury
instruction requiring such a finding.
¶113
I am not persuaded otherwise by the People's argument to
the contrary. In asserting that Ceus did not give the trial
court an opportunity to address the question, the People
ignore the above-cited case law and, in essence, assert that
Ceus was required to do more than cite the applicable law and
tender an
51
interrogatory that addressed the precise issue now before us.
For the reasons that I have stated, Ceus had no obligation to
do more than she did.
¶114
Having thus determined that Ceus preserved for appellate
review her assertion of instructional error, I turn to the
merits of that question.
C.
Instructional Error
¶115
Section 18-6-401 provides, in pertinent part:
(1)(a) A person commits child abuse if such person causes an
injury to a child's life or health, or permits a child to
be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of
injury to the child's life or health, or engages in a
continued pattern of conduct that results in malnourishment,
lack of proper medical care, cruel punishment, mistreatment,
or an accumulation of injuries that ultimately results in the
death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child. ....
(7)(a) Where death or injury results, the following shall
apply:
(I) When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child
abuse results in death to the child, it is a class 2 felony
except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection (7).
¶116
We construed the requirements of this statute over two
decades ago in Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 627-28. There, we
concluded that the child abuse statute "specifically
links subsection (7)(a) to subsection (1)(a) and plainly
requires a causal connection between the two."
Id. at 628. And we made clear that the abusive act
described in subsection (1)(a) must "result[] in"
the injury described in subsection (7)(a), thereby equating
the statutory term "results in" with the
requirement of a causal connection. Id. at 627. In
so concluding, we expressly
52
rejected the People's request that we infer proof of the
injury element of subsection (7)(a) from proof relating to
subsection (1)(a). Id. at 627. We observed that
"the legislature specifically contemplated and provided
for those situations where the prosecution establishes proof
of section 18-6-401(1)(a) but without a resulting
injury." Id. (noting that subsection (7)(b)
provides for the scenario in which no death or injury
resulted). We thus opined that "no reasonable
interpretation of subsection (1)(a) would lead to the
conclusion that proof of [the injury required by subsection
(7)(a)] is made or inferred through proof of the conduct
listed in subsection (1)(a)." Id. at 627-28.
¶117
We reiterated these requirements over a decade later when, in
Friend, ¶ 38, 429 P.3d at 1197, we recited the
elements of child abuse resulting in death and expressly
noted that the fact that the child abuse resulted in the
child's death is a separate element of the offense.
¶118
Consistent with the foregoing, at the time of Ceus's
trial, the Colorado model criminal jury instructions provided
both an elemental instruction and a special interrogatory
requiring the jury to find the injury element of subsection
(7)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶119
Specifically, the model elemental instruction for "Child
Abuse (Knowingly or Recklessly)" provided, in pertinent
part:
The elements of the crime of child abuse (knowingly or
recklessly) are:
53
1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place
charged,
3. knowingly or recklessly,
4. caused an injury to a child's life or health, or
permitted a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation
that posed a threat of injury to the child's life or
health, or engaged in a continued pattern of conduct that
resulted in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care,
cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of
injuries that ultimately resulted in the death of a child or
serious bodily injury to a child.
COLJI-Crim.
6-4:01 (2018).
¶120
The special interrogatory titled, "Child
Abuse-Interrogatory (Death)," in turn, provided, in
pertinent part:
If . . . you find the defendant guilty of child abuse, you
should sign the verdict form to indicate your finding of
guilt, and answer the following verdict question on the
verdict form:
Did the child abuse result in death? (Answer "Yes"
or "No")
The prosecution has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the child abuse resulted in death.
COLJI-Crim.
6-4:09.INT (2018).
¶121
This model interrogatory, however, contained a comment that
provided:
It is not necessary to submit a special interrogatory asking
the jury to determine whether the child abuse resulted in
death if the instruction defining the offense is drafted in
such a manner that, in order to find the defendant guilty,
the jury necessarily must find that the abuse resulted in
death.
Id.
at cmt. 3.
54
¶122
Here, as noted above, the trial court gave an elemental
instruction that advised the jury on the three alternative
ways of committing child abuse. It never instructed the jury,
however, regarding the injury element set forth in section
18-6-401(7)(a)(I). Nor did it, either in the elemental
instruction, a special interrogatory, or a verdict form,
require the jury to find that the People had proved that
injury element beyond a reasonable doubt, as the law
indisputably demands. Thus, the People were never required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt-and the jury was never
required to find-the causal connection between section
18-6-401(1)(a) and section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) that we made
clear in both Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 628, and
Friend, ¶ 38, 429 P.3d at 1197, was required to
sustain a felony child abuse conviction.
¶123
In my view, as the division below concluded, this constituted
clear instructional error. The prosecution was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of child
abuse as charged, including both that the abuse was
committed in one of the three ways set forth in section
18-6-401(1)(a) and that this abuse, when committed
knowingly or recklessly, resulted in the death of a child
under section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I). The jury was not instructed
that it was required to find the latter, nor did it make any
such finding.
¶124
In so concluding, I am not persuaded by the People's
argument that the instructions given and the verdict form
provided were adequate because they
55
consistently referred to "Child Abuse Resulting in
Death." In advancing this argument, the People rely on
the title of the charge and assert that we can infer the
requisite section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) finding from a section
18-6-401(1)(a) finding. These arguments, however, fail.
¶125
Regarding the elemental instruction, the instruction itself
demonstrates why relying on the title of the charge is
insufficient. As noted above, in the elemental instruction
provided by the court, the court described the charge as
"Child Abuse Resulting in Death" but then
instructed on all three alternative ways of committing child
abuse, the first two of which did not require the death of a
child. Accordingly, if the jurors followed the instructions
that they were given, which we presume they did, People
v. McKeel, 246 P.3d 638, 641 (Colo. 2010), then they
could have convicted Ceus of "child abuse resulting in
death" based on findings that Ceus's conduct caused
injury to the victims' life or health or permitted the
victims to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a
threat of injury to the child's life or health, neither
of which required a finding that the abuse resulted in death.
See § 18-6-401(1)(a).
¶126
The "mere presence" instruction does not alter this
conclusion, as the People contend. That instruction advised
the jury only that it could not convict Ceus of either of the
charged offenses unless the prosecution proved all of the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. For the
reasons just stated, such an
56
instruction, whether alone or in combination with the other
instructions given, did not advise the jury that, to convict
Ceus of the felony child abuse charges, it was required to
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ceus's abusive
conduct resulted in the victims' deaths.
¶127
Lastly, as to the People's assertion that we can infer a
section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) finding from a section
18-6-401(1)(a) finding, we expressly rejected the same
contention in Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 627-28.
¶128
For these reasons, like the majority and the division below,
I would conclude that the jury instructions on the charge of
felony child abuse were erroneous because they did not advise
the jury on the injury element of the crime and did not
require the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Ceus's abuse resulted in the victims' deaths.
¶129
The question thus becomes whether this error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, as the majority concludes. Maj.
op. ¶¶ 5, 46, 58-79. I turn to that issue next.
D.
Constitutional Harmless Error
¶130
When a trial court misinstructs a jury on the elements of an
offense, either by omitting or misdescribing that element,
and the error was preserved for our review, we review the
error for constitutional harmless error. Griego v.
People, 19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo. 2001); Ridgeway,
¶ 9, 307 P.3d at 127; see also Hagos v. People,
57
2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119 (noting that we
review trial errors of constitutional dimension that were
properly preserved for review for constitutional harmless
error). Under this standard, we must reverse unless we can
conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Hagos, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d at 119. Thus, we
will reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that the
error contributed to the conviction. Id.
¶131
Once a constitutional error is established, the burden of
establishing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt rests with the People. Id.
¶132
Here, Ceus's entire defense was that she did not cause
the deaths of the victims but rather their mother did. In
these circumstances, unlike the majority, I perceive no basis
on which to conclude that the error in this case was
harmless, much less that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
¶133
On this point, I am not persuaded by the majority's
suggestion that the jury necessarily found that Ceus's
abusive conduct resulted in the victims' deaths because
the instructions given and the verdict form provided
consistently referred to "Child Abuse Resulting in
Death." Maj. op. ¶¶ 59, 74-76. To reach this
conclusion, the majority makes the same mistakes that the
People make. Specifically, the majority overlooks the fact
that the instructions and verdict form advised the jury on
all three alternative ways of committing child abuse, the
first two of which did not require the death of a child.
Thus, the instructions and
58
verdict form allowed the jury to convict Ceus of "child
abuse resulting in death" without finding that any abuse
that she committed resulted in the victims' deaths. In
addition, by eliminating the requirement that the People
prove a causal connection between the abusive act described
in section 18-6-401(1)(a) and the injury element described in
section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I), Maj. op. ¶¶ 63-73, the
majority's rationale effectively infers a subsection
(7)(a)(I) finding from a subsection (1)(a) finding. Again,
however, we rejected precisely such an analysis over two
decades ago in Dunaway.
¶134
I likewise am unpersuaded by the majority's view that the
evidence here was overwhelming. Maj. op. ¶¶ 59,
77-78. To the contrary, although I agree with the majority
that, viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the People, the evidence was substantial and
sufficient to support a child abuse conviction, that is not
the test in the context of determining whether an error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, as noted above,
we consider whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the error contributed to the conviction. Hagos,
¶ 11, 288 P.3d at 119.
¶135
Here, substantial evidence at trial, which the majority
largely ignores, raised a legitimate question as to whether
Ceus's alleged abusive conduct (as opposed to that of the
victims' mother, who was convicted of first degree murder
in the victims' deaths) was the cause of those deaths.
Thus, for example, evidence
59
produced at trial indicated that (1) the victims' mother
had a history of abusing and neglecting them; (2) Ceus moved
away from the victims two weeks before they died and did not
see them again thereafter; (3) the last time Ceus saw the
victims, they were healthy and well; (4) others brought the
victims food and water in the interim; (5) at no point did
Ceus preclude the victims' mother from providing them
with food and water; (6) the food pantry on the site where
the victims lived had food that was available to them, and
the victims' mother knew how to cook food on site; and
(7) a grocery store and free food bank were within a
fifteen-minute walk from the site at which the victims and
their mother were living. Such evidence, if believed, would
have allowed a properly instructed jury to conclude that the
victims' mother, and not Ceus, had caused their deaths.
¶136
To overcome this obstacle, the majority asserts that the
statute required the prosecution to prove only that the abuse
"resulted in" the victims' deaths and that no
causal connection between Ceus's conduct and the
victims' deaths was required or even relevant. Maj. op.
¶¶ 63-73. And having stated this premise, the
majority goes on to say that whether the victims died as a
result of abuse was not disputed at trial, thus allegedly
supporting the majority's view that the instructional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
¶¶ 6, 59-60. But the majority's premise is
wrong, and therefore, its conclusion is, as well.
Specifically, although the majority begins from the premise
that "resulted in"
60
requires no causal connection to the victims' deaths, in
Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 628, we said precisely the
opposite. Indeed, as noted above, in Dunaway, we
expressly equated the concepts of "resulted in" and
"causal connection." Id. at 627-28 (noting
that the People were required to prove that the
defendant's actions under section 18-6-401(1)(a)
"resulted in" the requisite injury under section
18-6-401(7)(a) and that the statute plainly required a
"causal connection" between the two subsections).
¶137
Although the majority acknowledges that this is what we said,
it proceeds to opine as to what "we meant," namely,
that to obtain a conviction under the statute, the People
must establish only but for causation. Maj. op. ¶ 70.
The words "but for causation," however, appear
nowhere in our opinion in Dunaway, and I believe it
is far more appropriate to rely on what our precedent
actually says than to rely on speculation-decades after the
fact and without supporting evidence-as to what our
predecessors meant (particularly when that speculation
differs from what they said). For these reasons, I do not
agree that the majority's decision today "hews
closely to Dunaway," as the majority claims.
Maj. op. ¶ 69. To the contrary, I believe that the
majority's opinion is inconsistent with that longstanding
precedent.
¶138
Accordingly, I would conclude that the instructional error
committed by the trial court was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and, like the division
61
below, I would further conclude that Ceus's child abuse
conviction must be reversed.
III.
Conclusion
¶139
The facts of this case are obviously tragic, and the need to
do justice for the innocent victims here is strong and
indisputable. But that undeniable goal cannot justify our
ignoring decades of settled precedent or diminishing
Ceus's constitutional rights.
¶140
For the reasons discussed above, I would conclude that,
viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the People, the evidence was substantial and
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Ceus guilty of
child abuse. I would further conclude, however, that (1) Ceus
properly preserved the instructional error issue that is now
before us; (2) the trial court erred in not instructing the
jury that it needed to find that Ceus's abusive conduct
resulted in the victims' deaths and in not providing a
special interrogatory or verdict form requiring such a
finding; and (3) this instructional error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Like the division below, I would
therefore reverse Ceus's child abuse conviction and
remand this case to the trial court with instructions that,
on remand, the People may elect to retry Ceus for felony
child abuse or ask the trial court to enter a judgment of
conviction on misdemeanor child abuse.
62
¶141
Accordingly, I would affirm the division's judgment and
therefore respectfully concur in part with and dissent in
part from the majority's opinion in this case.
---------
Notes:
[1] We granted certiorari to review the
following three issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred by not
considering the instructions and trial as a whole in
determining whether the jury properly understood that it
needed to find, and did find, the sentence enhancer beyond a
reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred by holding that
any possible error was reversible in light of the
instructions, arguments, and evidence all showing that the
defendant's actions resulted in the children's
deaths.
3. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the convictions.
[2] Archer, Eden, and Blair were also
arrested and charged. Nashika Bramble ("Bramble"),
the children's biological mother, was later arrested and
charged as well.
[3] The facts we set forth are those that
a reasonable jury could have found from the evidence
presented at trial.
[4] The adults were Ceus, Archer, Eden,
Bramble, and a teenager who had turned eighteen while they
were on the road. There were also four children in the
group.
[5] Similarly, sometime after the
girls' ostracism, Ceus pronounced Blair's dog, Lion,
an "abomination" and banished him to his crate
without food or water. Lion was ultimately rescued.
[6] In separate proceedings, Archer was
convicted of child abuse resulting in death and accessory to
a crime, People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, ¶ 1,
518 P.3d 1143, 1146-47, and Bramble was convicted of murder,
People v. Bramble, No. 19CA1965, ¶ 7 (Dec. 15,
2022). Blair, meanwhile, pleaded guilty to an accessory
charge.
[7] In the context of an unpreserved
error, "we have refused to find plain error unless a
review of the entire record demonstrates a reasonable
possibility that the improper instruction contributed to the
defendant's conviction." Espinoza v.
People, 712 P.2d 476, 478 (Colo. 1985). We have further
explained that "[w]here an element of a crime was not
contested at trial, failure to instruct properly on that
issue generally does not constitute plain error."
Id.
[8] We recognize that we address here an
instructional error involving a sentence enhancer rather than
an element. But, as pertinent here, sentence-enhancing
factors generally function much like elements: With
exceptions not applicable here, a defendant may not receive
an enhanced sentence unless the prosecution proves the
relevant factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Armintrout v.
People, 864 P.2d 576, 580 (Colo. 1993).
[9] The People assert that Ceus did not
preserve this issue because her objection at trial was based
solely on unanimity concerns. While the People's argument
has some force, we need not resolve the question. Because we
ultimately conclude that any error was constitutionally
harmless, we assume without deciding that the issue was
properly preserved.
[10] Our model jury instructions for
child abuse offer guidance on this very issue. COLJI-Crim.
6-4:01 cmt. 3 (2025); COLJI-Crim. 6-4:09 cmt. 3 (2025)
("It is not necessary to submit a special interrogatory
asking the jury to determine whether the child abuse resulted
in death if the instruction defining the offense is drafted
in such a manner that, in order to find the defendant guilty,
the jury necessarily must find that the abuse resulted in
death.").
[11] Although our case law in this area
addresses instructional errors that were uncontested at
trial, Ceus did not meaningfully dispute whether the
child abuse-that is, the girls' confinement in the
car-resulted in their deaths. We hasten to emphasize,
however, that we should not be understood as holding that
this ground alone suffices to support our determination that
the error was constitutionally harmless. Rather, we hold that
the three grounds we have identified, considered together,
compel the conclusion that the error was constitutionally
harmless.
[12] Ceus pointed the finger at Bramble
throughout the trial, and the jury was informed of
Bramble's murder convictions relating to the deaths of
her children. Even so, the jury found Ceus guilty of child
abuse resulting in death.
[13] Other reputable dictionaries define
"result" similarly. See, e.g.,
Result, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ result
[https://perma.cc/FE9S-NCR5] (stating that "result"
means "to proceed or arise as a consequence, effect, or
conclusion"); Result, Cambridge English
Dictionary,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/result
[https://perma.cc/C5TC-69KZ ] (defining "result" as
"something that happens or exists because of something
else").
[14] To be clear, we are not inferring
that the abuse resulted in death from the proof establishing
the abuse itself, a proposition Dunaway expressly
disavowed. 88 P.3d at 627-28. To the contrary, as discussed
below, overwhelming evidence at trial established that the
girls' deaths resulted from their confinement in the car.
Rather than meaningfully dispute that the girls died from
starvation, dehydration, and exposure-to quote Ceus,
"It's not rocket science"-Ceus sought to lay
responsibility at Bramble's feet, a maneuver the jury
clearly rejected.
---------