THE PARENTING OF: A.H.S.

2025 MT 57

Opinion

03/25/2025

DA 24-0382 Case Number: DA 24-0382

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2025 MT 57

IN RE MATTER OF THE PARENTING OF:

A.H.S., a minor child;

CHAD SENECHAL,

Petitioner and Appellee,

and

MAIRA HORTA MOSS,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. DDR-2022-528 Honorable Christopher D. Abbott, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Maira Horta Moss, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Sara S. Berg, Laird Cowley, PLLC, Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: February 19, 2025

Decided: March 25, 2025

Filed:

__________________________________________ CfS"'-- 6MA. If Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Maira Moss (Mother) appeals from the May 18, 2023 Order of the First Judicial

District Court, Lewis and Clark County, determining that it had jurisdiction over the child

custody proceeding concerning A.H.S., and from the Final Parenting Plan and the Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Adopting Parenting Plan issued by that court on

May 22, 2024. We affirm.

¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred in determining that it had initial jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding concerning A.H.S.

Issue 2: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in temporarily limiting A.H.S.’s travel outside Montana.

Issue 3: Whether the District Court erred by not adequately considering evidence of domestic violence when determining A.H.S.’s best interests pursuant to § 40-4-212, MCA.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Mother and A.H.S.’s father, Chad Senechal (Father) were never married but have

one child together, A.H.S., born in February 2018 in San Diego, California. Mother is

from, and has family in, Brazil. Mother and A.H.S. are dual citizens of Brazil and the

United States. Mother and Father moved to Montana with A.H.S. in April 2020. Unhappy

differences arose between the parties, and Mother secreted A.H.S. to California without

prior notice or consent of Father, cutting off contact with Father and refusing to divulge

her location. Nearly immediately thereafter, on September 8, 2022, Father filed his

Verified Petition for Parenting Plan. On that same date, Father also filed a Motion for Ex

Parte Interim Parenting Plan alleging Mother had taken the parties’ child out of her home

2 state of Montana, cut off contact with Father, had the means to leave the country, and law

enforcement would not intervene as there was no parenting plan in effect. On September

9, 2022, the District Court adopted Father’s proposed interim parenting plan as the Interim

Parenting Plan. The Interim Parenting Plan required Mother to immediately return A.H.S.

to Montana for her to remain in Father’s care and to surrender the child’s passports to

Father. Mother, although aware of the Montana parenting plan action and interim parenting

plan, managed to avoid service for several months while Father obtained an order to serve

her by publication and sought criminal contempt against her.

¶4 During this time, Mother attempted to get California to exercise jurisdiction by

filing for a domestic violence restraining order. Krystal Limon, a licensed California

attorney, appeared on Father’s behalf at hearing to contest jurisdiction over Father, to

advise the California court of the pending Montana parenting action, and to request the

court contact the Montana court to conduct a conference required by the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). A UCCJEA conference of the

California court and Montana court was held with the parties present electronically on

October 18, 2022. Following which, the California court issued an order denying further

evidentiary hearing as there were no material facts in controversy. The court noted that

California could exercise personal jurisdiction over Father if he has minimum contacts or

if abusive acts occurred in or were directed at California. The California court concluded

Father made no general appearance in California other than in opposition to UCCJEA

proceedings. The California court also concluded the text message asserted by Mother to

be abusive—saying a party who left the state with the child could be subjected to

3 kidnapping charges—was not abuse. The California court declined to exercise jurisdiction,

concluding it did not have personal jurisdiction over Father, and his actions were not

sufficient to give California jurisdiction as to domestic violence.

¶5 On November 14, 2022, after reading and considering Mother’s petition for a writ

of mandate and request for stay, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

denied Mother’s petition.1 After Mother’s counsel acknowledged service of the parenting

plan petition and additional demand was made for her to comply with the interim parenting

plan, she refused, forcing Father to obtain a contempt order. Following which, Mother

finally returned the parties’ child to Montana in June 2023. Thereafter, commencing

January 17, 2024, the District Court held a hearing on Mother’s motion to amend the

interim parenting plan. Following the first day of hearing, the court issued an Order

Amending Interim Parenting Plan which amended Mother’s parenting time from

supervised to unsupervised. After the second day of hearing on February 5, 2024, the court

1 In a May 21, 2024 order, the California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s ruling and dismissal and remanded the matter back to the lower court to clarify either (1) that it was deciding the question of home state jurisdiction, in which case Mother could then renew her request for an evidentiary hearing or (2) whether the court intended to address whether California is an inconvenient forum and Montana the more convenient forum, in which case the parties must be permitted to present evidence on the statutory factors. In a subsequent order of June 11, 2024, the California Court of Appeal modified its May 21, 2024 order to amend footnote 6 to clarify that although the Court of Appeal declined to make findings regarding Father’s assertion that Mother averred Montana to have “exclusive and continuing jurisdiction” in her verified motion to amend the interim parenting plan filed in the Montana cause, Father may ask the lower court upon remand to take judicial notice of her motion. Although proceedings are still pending in California, such do not preclude this Court from determining whether the District Court erred in finding Montana had jurisdiction to enter an initial child custody determination and rejecting Mother’s attempts to persuade the court to decline jurisdiction in favor of California. 4 again amended the interim parenting plan, directing the parties to transition parenting time

to every other week.

¶6 On April 17 and May 1, 2024, the District Court conducted another two-part hearing

for the purpose of establishing a final parenting plan. On May 22, 2024, the District Court

issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Adopting Parenting Plan along

with its Final Parenting Plan in which it provided for a 50/50 alternating week parenting

schedule and provided a limitation of travel precluding either parent from removing A.H.S.

from Montana or the United States until the litigation related to the child or jurisdiction

over parenting remained pending in California. The court imposed this continuing

limitation due to its concern that allowing Mother to travel created some risk that she could

further seek relief in California courts while traveling with the child, again severing ties

with Father.

¶7 Mother appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 A district court’s determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction is a

conclusion of law reviewed for correctness. In re Marriage of Sampley, 2015 MT 121, ¶ 6,

379 Mont. 131, 347 P.3d 1281. We review a district court’s findings establishing a

parenting plan under the clearly erroneous standard. In re Marriage of Williams, 2018 MT

221, ¶ 5, 392 Mont. 484, 425 P.3d 1277. We review a district court’s conclusions of law

to determine if they are correct. In re the Parenting of C.J., 2016 MT 93, ¶ 12, 383 Mont.

197, 369 P.3d 1028. A district court has broad discretion when considering the parenting

of a child, and we must presume the court carefully considered the evidence and made the

5 correct decision. C.J., ¶ 13 (citation omitted). Accordingly, absent clearly erroneous

findings, we will not disturb a district court’s decision regarding parenting plans unless

there is a clear abuse of discretion. C.J., ¶ 13.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred in determining that it had initial jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding concerning A.H.S.

¶10 Mother asserts the District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the child

custody proceedings as there is an unresolved UCCJEA jurisdictional conflict with

California. Mother also asserts the District Court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction

because Montana is an inconvenient forum and California is a superior forum. Contrarily,

Father asserts the California Court of Appeal’s orders of May 21, 2024 and June 11, 2024

have no bearing on Montana’s binding, continuing, and exclusive jurisdiction. Father

asserts the orders make no finding that California, rather than Montana, should have

UCCJEA jurisdiction. Rather, they remand the matter for further proceedings during

which Mother may ask the court to consider UCCJEA jurisdiction, and Father may ask the

court to take judicial notice of Mother’s verified assertion in her motion to amend the

interim parenting plan that Montana has “exclusive and continuing jurisdiction.” Father

also asserts the District Court’s determination of custody jurisdiction is supported by

substantial credible evidence and proper application of the UCCJEA and Montana law.

¶11 In 1977, Montana adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),

which was enacted to promote uniformity and discourage jurisdictional conflict. Prior to

all 50 states adopting the UCCJA, the disparate and conflicting exercise of jurisdiction over

6 child custody matters encouraged re-litigation, forum shopping, and self-help never ending

disputes. The purpose of the UCCJA was to eliminate these problems by establishing

uniform criteria for states to exercise jurisdiction of child custody matters. See UCCJA

§ 1. The UCCJA was revised to help further the Act’s goals and address inconsistencies

among state interpretation and enforcement of the UCCJA resulting in the UCCJEA, which

Montana adopted in 1999.2 Montana did not repeal the UCCJA but instead amended its

language. Sampley, ¶ 24 (citing Sec. 4, Ch. 91, L. 1999); see §§ 40-7-101 to -317, MCA.

¶12 Recognizing the potential for inconsistencies among state interpretation and

enforcement, the UCCJEA contains important judicial communication and cooperation

provisions to promote uniformity and reduce the potential for courts to issue inconsistent,

competing jurisdictional orders in child custody proceedings. Section 40-7-107(1), MCA,

precludes a court of this state from exercising jurisdiction “if at the time of commencement

of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously

commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction . . . unless the proceeding has

been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state.” Further, before hearing a child

custody proceeding, the court must determine if a child custody proceeding was previously

commenced in a court of another state and, if so, “stay its proceeding and communicate

with the court of the other state.” Section 40-7-107(2), MCA. Section 40-7-139, MCA,

then provides the ability for the court to communicate with a court of another state, to allow

the parties to participate in the communication, and for a record of the communications

2 Massachusetts is the only state that has not adopted the UCCJEA. 7 between the courts to be kept. Section 40-7-140, MCA, provides for a court of this state

to request a court of another state to hold an evidentiary hearing; order a person to produce

evidence; order a child custody evaluation; forward certified copies of the transcript,

evidence presented, and evaluation prepared to a court of another state; and order a party

to appear in the proceeding. Section 40-7-140, MCA, provides these same abilities to a

court of another state. Communication between courts with participation of the parties is

designed to reduce the potential for courts to issue competing, inconsistent orders regarding

jurisdiction.

¶13 The UCCJEA governs when there is a dispute as to which state should have

jurisdiction over a parenting action. Under the UCCJEA, general principles of determining

jurisdiction, including a party’s domicile, are inapplicable. See § 40-7-201(3), MCA.

Instead, the UCCJEA prioritizes home-state jurisdiction for child custody proceedings,

under which a state has jurisdiction if it is the child’s “home state.” Section 40-7-201(1)(a),

MCA.

¶14 Under the UCCJEA:

a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: (a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state; (b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under 40-7-108 or 40-7-109, and:

8 (i) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and (ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; (c) all courts having jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under 40-7-108 or 40-7-109; or (d) no state would have jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c).

Section 40-7-201, MCA. Here, as required by the UCCJEA, the District Court

appropriately conferenced with the California court on October 18, 2022, which was

attended by both parties and their counsel, afforded the parties opportunity to be heard, and

consulted Mother’s affidavit in assessing whether it could exercise jurisdiction as the

child’s home state or otherwise under § 40-7-201(1), MCA.

¶15 According to Mother’s affidavit, between the time the parties moved to Montana in

April 2020 and the commencement of this action on September 8, 2022, A.H.S. had lived

primarily in Montana and Brazil as follows:

Date Start Date End Location Duration (approx.)

April 2020 August 2020 Montana 4 months

September 8, 2020 February 20, 2021 Brazil 5 months

February 21, 2021 November 12, 2021 Montana 8 months

November 13, 2021 April 22, 2022 Brazil 5 months

April 23, 2022 September 4, 2022 Montana 4 months

September 4, 2022 September 8, 2022 California 4 days

9 The District Court noted that a state is the “home state” if it is “the state in which a child

lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months

immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” At the time this

proceeding was initiated on September 8, 2022, the court correctly noted A.H.S. had

resided in California for only four days, and in the six preceding months she had resided in

Montana for at least four months and in a foreign nation, Brazil—which is not a “state”

within the meaning of the UCCJEA.3 It was undisputed A.H.S. had not resided in

California for well over two years, and in October 2022, the California Superior Court, San

Diego County had made the same determination. Consequently, under § 40-7-201, MCA,

because A.H.S. had not resided in California for a six-month consecutive period before

commencement of the parenting action, California is not the “home state,” and without

counting the time in Brazil as a temporary absence, no state would be considered the “home

state” within the meaning of the UCCJEA. Montana may exercise jurisdiction to make an

initial child custody determination because there is no other state with jurisdiction. Having

correctly concluded there is no other state with jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, the District

Court determined it had jurisdiction to make a parenting determination pursuant to

§ 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA. Section 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, provides:

3 The District Court did not analyze whether, under the totality of the circumstances, A.H.S.’s time in Brazil was a temporary absence from Montana which would be considered part of the six consecutive month period. See § 40-7-103(7), MCA; Sampley, ¶¶ 22, 26-27. While on the record before us, the five months in Brazil could reasonably be considered to have been a temporary absence from Montana, we do not further consider such as the District Court did not err in its determination that “Montana may exercise jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination because there is no other state with jurisdiction” under § 40-7-201, MCA. 10 (1) A court of this state competent to decide parenting matters has jurisdiction to make a parenting determination by initial or amended decree if: . . .

(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because: (i) the child and the parents or the child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with this state; and (ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.

Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the District Court correctly determined it is in

the best interests of A.H.S. for the Montana court to assume jurisdiction because A.H.S.

and Father have a significant connection with Montana and substantial evidence

concerning A.H.S.’s present or future is available in Montana.4 Once the District Court

determined it had jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA and § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, it then

undertook evaluation as to whether to decline to exercise its jurisdiction based on

inconvenient forum. Section 40-7-108(1), MCA, provides, “[a] court of this state that has

jurisdiction . . . to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its

jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the

circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.”

4 Mother does not seriously contest that A.H.S. and Father have a significant connection with Montana, nor that substantial evidence is available in Montana concerning A.H.S.’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Instead, she asserts California jurisdiction better meets A.H.S.’s best interests. Even were we to assume such to be accurate, which we do not, that is not the statutory criteria for exercising child custody jurisdiction under § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA. 11 Section 40-7-108(2), MCA, sets forth relevant factors a court shall consider in determining

whether it is an inconvenient forum:

(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; (b) the length of time that the child has resided outside this state; (c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; (e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; (f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child; (g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and (h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.

Section 40-7-108(2), MCA.

¶16 Here, the District Court considered each factor separately, conscientiously outlining

its reasoning in concluding Montana is not an inconvenient forum. The court noted that

although distance between the courts weighs both directions, given the length of time

A.H.S. has resided in Montana, her strongest and most recent connection is to Montana.

Of primary consideration to the District Court in considering the § 40-7-108(2), MCA,

factors was not to incentivize continued forum-shopping by Mother.

¶17 Mother and Father each presented their jurisdictional evidence. The Montana Court

considered and weighed that evidence and prepared comprehensive findings and

conclusions pertinent to the jurisdictional issue supporting the basis of its determination

that Montana has jurisdiction under § 40-7-201, MCA, § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA,

§ 40-7-108(2), MCA, and § 40-7-202, MCA. From our review of the record, the District

Court did not misinterpret the law, did not misapprehend the circumstances, its findings

12 were not clearly erroneous, and it did not err in exercising jurisdiction. The record contains

substantial credible evidence supporting the findings and conclusions of the Montana

Court. Once it appropriately exercised jurisdiction, the District Court had “exclusive,

continuing jurisdiction” pursuant to § 40-7-202, MCA.

¶18 Issue 2: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in temporarily limiting A.H.S.’s travel outside Montana.

¶19 In the interim parenting plan, the District Court temporarily precluded Mother from

any out-of-state or international travel with A.H.S. until the litigation pending in California

courts was concluded. The Final Parenting Plan stated, “neither parent may take A.H.S.

out of the state or the United States without the advance written permission of the other

parent.” The District Court was concerned that allowing A.H.S. to travel created risk

Mother may flee with A.H.S. and seek further relief in California, again severing ties with

Father.

¶20 Mother argues the temporary travel ban violates her right to travel. She claims the

restriction was overly broad and not narrowly tailored to address the court’s concern of her

absconding to California, especially considering the court explicitly acknowledged Mother

did not present a legitimate risk of absconding at that time. Mother also claims the travel

ban negatively impacts A.H.S.’s cultural and familial connections against her best interests,

and it disproportionately impacts A.H.S. and Mother more than Father because Father lives

in and grew up in Montana.

¶21 Father argues Mother misinterpreted the travel ban to include herself, when it really

only applies to A.H.S. Thus, Father asserts the travel ban affects both parents equally as

13 they are both precluded from interstate and international travel with A.H.S. Father asserts

the travel ban supports A.H.S.’s needs and best interests by providing stability and

continuity in her care. Father argues the travel ban provides time with both parents without

disruption of her care or denial of contact with either parent.

¶22 We find the District Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the temporary

travel restriction on A.H.S. The District Court intended the travel restriction to be

temporary and to further A.H.S.’s best interests. Under § 40-4-212(1)(h), MCA, a court

may consider the continuity and stability of care when determining a child’s best interests.

The court found A.H.S. was deprived of continuity and stability of care from September

2022 until July 2023 because Mother secretly absconded with A.H.S. to California without

telling Father. Thereafter, Mother evaded service of process from Father relating to the

Montana proceedings, only accepting service once she faced charges of contempt and

potential incarceration. Mother then failed to follow court orders to immediately return

A.H.S. to Montana. Although Mother eventually conceded Montana has continuing and

exclusive jurisdiction while she was asking the Montana court to expand her parenting

time, Mother contrarily pursued appeals in the California courts. The District Court noted,

because of Mother’s less than good faith efforts and actions, “A.H.S. veered from near-

exclusive parenting from one parent to the next and has shuttled between two states.” This

inconsistency heightened A.H.S.’s need for stability and a predictable, consistent routine

for exchanges between parents.

¶23 We find the record evidence supports the District Court’s findings and conclusions.

Mother’s less than good faith efforts and actions gave rise to appropriate concern that she

14 may attempt to secret the child away again and continue to forum shop in California, or

elsewhere. A temporary travel restriction—placed on A.H.S., not the parents—was a

reasonable use of discretion to protect the stability and continuity of A.H.S.’s care while

the pending litigation resolves. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.

¶24 Issue 3: Whether the District Court erred by not adequately considering evidence of domestic violence when determining A.H.S.’s best interests pursuant to § 40-4-212, MCA.

¶25 Mother argues the District Court did not give proper attention to the evidence in the

record of domestic violence and the effect it had on A.H.S. According to Mother, the

District Court focused only on the absence of physical harm to A.H.S. and disregarded

evidence of Father’s threats and acts of violence towards Mother and the psychological

effects that has on A.H.S. Father argues the District Court properly considered the statutory

best interest of the child factors and determined he should not receive less than equal

parenting time based on the prior domestic violence allegations.

¶26 Section 40-4-212, MCA, provides that a court must determine the parenting plan in

accordance with the child’s best interests. When reviewing the child’s best interests, the

court may consider relevant parenting factors, including but not limited to: the wishes of

the child and parents; the child’s relationship with the parents; the child’s adjustment to

home, school, and community; the mental and physical health of all involved; physical

abuse by one parent against the other or the child; chemical dependency; continuity of care;

the child’s development needs; whether a parent knowingly failed to pay birth-related costs

or financially support the child; whether the child has contact with both parents; and any

adverse effects on the child resulting from continuous parenting plan amendments.

15 Additionally, when analyzing the best interest factors, it is the District Court’s role to

untangle any conflicting evidence. In re Matter of A.F., 2003 MT 254, ¶ 24, 317 Mont.

367, 77 P.3d 266. Even when there is a conflict in the evidence, this Court will uphold the

district court’s determinations so long as there is substantial credible evidence to uphold

its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bock v. Smith, 2005 MT 40, ¶ 27, 326 Mont.

123, 107 P.3d 488.

¶27 Here, the court appropriately heard and marshalled the evidence, weighed its

credibility, thoroughly and conscientiously considered the best interest factors set forth in

§ 40-4-212, MCA, and set forth specific findings related to each factor. Specifically,

regarding Mother’s concern of physical abuse, the court stated:

There is no evidence of abuse directed at A.H.S. Nick Ransom and [Mother’s] testimony established by a preponderance of the evidence that [Father] likely did behave inappropriately and cause [Mother] to reasonably fear injury . . . . The Court has some concern based on [Mother’s] testimony about [Father’s] anger management. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that [Father] is anything but a patient, safe, and loving parent towards A.H.S. or that he should receive anything less than equal parenting time because of this prior incident.

¶28 After reviewing the record, we find the evidence supports the District Court’s

findings and conclusions. The court heard testimony from Officer Nick Ransom and

Mother that described the domestic dispute that took place between Father and Mother.

The court also heard testimony from Kathleen Shea, a licensed social worker, who has been

seeing A.H.S. since 2023. Shea testified she had no concerns with either parent’s ability

to safely parent A.H.S. Accordingly, despite the domestic incident, the court found there

was no evidence suggesting either parent was an unsafe, abusive, or neglectful parent. The

16 District Court properly applied the § 40-4-212, MCA, best interest factors to the evidence

presented, and we cannot conclude the court erred in ordering the parenting plan that it did.

CONCLUSION

¶29 Consistent with the requirements and intent of the UCCJEA, the Montana and

California Courts appropriately communicated and cooperated exactly as they were

supposed to in order to resolve the jurisdictional issue. The record contains substantial

credible evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and conclusions of the Montana

Court. As such, we conclude the Montana Court did not err in exercising initial subject

matter jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding and continuing jurisdiction.

¶30 Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a temporary

travel restriction on A.H.S. because it was in A.H.S.’s best interest to have a stable and

continuous parenting routine that interstate or international travel would interrupt. Based

on Mother’s prior less than good faith actions, including absconding with A.H.S. to

California, the District Court’s decision appropriately protects A.H.S.’s best interests.

¶31 Finally, we find the District Court did not err in its analysis of the best interest

factors under § 40-4-212, MCA, as the record evidence supports the court’s decision.

¶32 Affirmed.

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We Concur:

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE