Marriage of Ramsey

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: DA 25-0479
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Shea

Opinion

06/02/2026

DA 25-0479 Case Number: DA 25-0479

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 123N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

CLARK RYAN RAMSEY,

Petitioner and Appellant,

and

WHITNEY LYNN SODERHOLM (f/k/a WHITNEY LYNN HUBER, WHITNEY LYNN RAMSEY),

Respondent and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DR-20-0160 Honorable Colette B. Davies, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Matthew T. Cochenour, Cochenour Law Office, PLLC, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Jeff A. Turner, Hendrickson Law Firm. P.C., Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: February 18, 2026 Decided: June 2, 2026

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve

as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Clark Ryan Ramsey appeals from the June 5, 2025 Order of the Montana Thirteenth

Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, declining to relinquish jurisdiction of a child

custody matter to the King William County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of

Virginia (Virginia JDR Court). We affirm.

¶3 Ramsey and Whitney Lynn Soderholm married in 2008; they moved from Virginia

to Montana in April 2019. They have three children. Ramsey petitioned for dissolution in

the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, on February 12, 2020. At the

time the dissolution petition was filed, both parties and their children were living in

Montana. After a two-day hearing in July 2020, the District Court ruled that Soderholm

and the children could move back to Virginia where most of Soderholm’s and Ramsey’s

relatives reside. After the move, Ramsey maintained contact with the children and

exercised parenting time, although both parties routinely obstructed the other’s contact

with the children.

¶4 The underlying matter primarily centers around Ramsey’s and Soderholm’s

disagreement over child custody arrangements. The District Court held a three-day bench

trial at which numerous expert and lay witnesses testified to Ramsey’s and Soderholm’s

2 ability to parent and to the well-being of the children. In September 2022, the District

Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered a Final Parenting Plan

and Decree of Dissolution. The Final Parenting Plan granted primary physical custody to

Soderholm, who would continue to live in Virginia, and allowed Ramsey to spend time

with the children in Virginia each month during the school year and to spend time with the

children in either Virginia or Montana during school breaks.

¶5 The Virginia JDR Court registered the Final Parenting Plan in July 2024. In

September 2024, Ramsey petitioned the Virginia JDR Court on behalf of the children for

an order of protection based on allegations of child abuse. Ramsey alleged Soderholm had

engaged in abusive behavior and was using corporal punishment. The Virginia JDR Court

issued an order of protection that required Soderholm to refrain from subjecting the

children to corporal punishment and required Soderholm to attend parenting classes. The

order did not otherwise limit Soderholm’s contact with the children or remove the children

from her custody. A King William County Circuit Court affirmed the order and extended

the order’s effectiveness to June 6, 2026. Ramsey also moved the Virginia JDR Court to

modify the child custody arrangement.

¶6 On November 25, 2024, Ramsey filed in the District Court a Verified Motion to

Surrender Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA (Motion to Relinquish), requesting the District

Court to relinquish jurisdiction of the child custody determination to the Virginia JDR

Court. Ramsey contended that the District Court no longer had jurisdiction under

§ 40-7-202(1)(a), MCA, and that even if the District Court had jurisdiction, it was an

inconvenient forum under § 40-7-108, MCA. On December 3, 2024, the Virginia JDR

3 Court issued an order staying proceedings on Ramsey’s motion to modify child custody

until the District Court resolved Ramsey’s Motion to Relinquish.

¶7 The District Court held a hearing on Ramsey’s motion on June 3, 2025, and denied

the motion on June 5, 2025. The District Court concluded it was unnecessary to employ a

jurisdictional analysis under § 40-7-202, MCA, because there was not a pending parenting

plan proceeding before the Virginia JDR Court. The District Court concluded in the

alternative that it retained jurisdiction under § 40-7-202(1)(b), MCA, because Ramsey

resided in Montana and it was not an inconvenient forum under § 40-7-108, MCA.

¶8 “We review a district court’s decision on a motion to decline jurisdiction for abuse

of discretion.” In re B.P., 2008 MT 166, ¶ 11, 343 Mont. 345, 184 P.3d 334 (citation

omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs if a court exercises granted discretion based on a

clearly erroneous finding of fact, erroneous conclusion or application of law, or otherwise

acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or in excess of the bounds

of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.” In re L.D.C., 2022 MT 161, ¶ 11, 409 Mont.

439, 516 P.3d 631 (citations omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if not

supported by substantial evidence, the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or,

based on our review of the record, we are definitely and firmly convinced that the lower

court was otherwise mistaken.” In re L.D.C., ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

¶9 Ramsey asserts the District Court abused its discretion in multiple respects,

including (1) by determining there was no pending proceeding in the Virginia JDR Court

that necessitated a jurisdictional analysis, (2) by failing to address whether it had exclusive,

continuing jurisdiction under § 40-7-202(1)(a), MCA, and (3) by failing to address all the

4 factors enumerated in § 40-7-108(2), MCA, when it determined it was not an inconvenient

forum.

¶10 The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) governs

this dispute. Montana enacted the UCCJEA1 to address problems arising from interstate

child custody disputes, including “re-litigation, forum shopping, and self-help never ending

disputes.” See In re A.H.S., 2025 MT 57, ¶ 11, 421 Mont. 196, 571 P.3d 1002 (citation

omitted). Section 40-7-202(1), MCA, governs whether a district court retains jurisdiction

over a child custody determination. In re A.V.R., 2025 MT 162, ¶ 13, 423 Mont. 174, 573

P.3d 305. A district court has no obligation to relinquish jurisdiction over a child custody

determination under § 40-7-202(1), MCA, unless a relevant proceeding exists in another

state. In re A.R.B., 2013 MT 310, ¶ 19, 372 Mont. 274, 312 P.3d 425.

¶11 The District Court concluded that employing § 40-7-202(1), MCA, was unnecessary

because it “ha[d] not been presented with any evidence that a parenting plan proceeding

ha[d] been commenced in any state other than Montana.” The District Court concluded

the Virginia JDR Court’s proceedings that addressed Ramsey’s petition for a protective

order did not constitute a proceeding that invoked a jurisdictional analysis.

¶12 Ramsey argues the District Court abused its discretion by failing to apply

§ 40-7-202(1), MCA, because he presented evidence that established a child custody

proceeding had commenced in the Virginia JDR Court. Soderholm argues that Ramsey

raises this theory for the first time on appeal. Soderholm is incorrect. Ramsey repeatedly

1 Sections 40-7-101 through -317, MCA. 5 represented to the District Court that a motion to modify child custody was pending before

the Virginia JDR Court, including in his Motion to Relinquish and at the June 3, 2025

hearing.

¶13 Ramsey’s counsel stated at the June 3, 2025 hearing that he did not know if there

was a pending parenting proceeding before the Virginia JDR Court and informed the

District Court that he would defer to Ramsey’s knowledge. Ramsey’s Motion to

Relinquish stated that the Virginia JDR Court had set a hearing on Ramsey’s motion to

modify child custody. At the June 3, 2025 hearing, Ramsey also referred the District Court

to the Virginia JDR Court’s orders that were submitted in support of the Motion to

Relinquish, which included the Virginia JDR Court’s December 3, 2024 order staying

proceedings. Soderholm questioned Ramsey’s credibility, but she never asserted that

Ramsey had not moved the Virginia JDR Court to modify child custody. The Virginia

JDR Court’s December 3, 2024 order staying proceedings clearly establishes that

Ramsey’s motion to modify child custody was pending before the Virginia JDR Court and

that the Virginia JDR Court would either dismiss the motion or accept jurisdiction

depending on the District Court’s resolution of Ramsey’s Motion to Relinquish. The

District Court clearly erred in finding that an action pertaining to the Final Parenting Plan

had not been commenced in the Virginia JDR Court.2

¶14 Soderholm asserts in the alternative that the District Court could not have

transferred jurisdiction of the child custody determination to the Virginia JDR Court

2 We do not reach the issue of whether the proceedings on the petition for order of protection constitute a proceeding that would trigger a jurisdictional analysis under § 40-7-202, MCA. 6 because it is a court of limited jurisdiction under the Code of Virginia. Soderholm relies

on § 20-146.27, Va. Code Ann., for this proposition. Section 20-146.27(B), Va. Code

Ann., permits “a court of this Commonwealth” to modify a child custody determination of

another state pursuant to “Article 2 (§ 20-146.12 et seq.).” The Virginia JDR Court

constitutes “a court of this Commonwealth” because it has “exclusive original jurisdiction

in custody cases” unless and until a Virginia Circuit Court assumes concurrent jurisdiction

either through an appeal from a Virginia JDR Court decision or the direct filing of an

appropriate proceeding in the circuit court. Childress v. Childress, No. 1374-22-3, 2024

WL 1513425, at *7 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2024) (citing Peple v. Peple, 364 S.E.2d 232, 235

(Va. Ct. App. 1988)); § 16.1-241(A), Va. Code Ann. (defining Virginia JDR Court’s

jurisdiction). Soderholm does not argue that the Virginia JDR Court lacks the authority to

modify child custody under Article 2 of the Code of Virginia so we decline to address her

argument any further. Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 MT 246, ¶ 42, 358 Mont.

193, 244 P.3d 321 (citations omitted) (“[i]t is not this Court’s job to conduct legal research

on [a party’s] behalf, to guess as to [a party’s] precise position, or to develop legal analysis

that may lend support to that position”).

¶15 The District Court concluded in the alternative that it would retain jurisdiction over

the child custody determination even if there was a pending proceeding in the Virginia JDR

Court that warranted a jurisdictional analysis. It implicitly relied on § 40-7-202(1)(b),

MCA, to conclude that it retained jurisdiction because Ramsey still resided in Montana.

Ramsey asserts that the District Court abused its discretion because it did not address

whether § 40-7-202(1)(a), MCA, warranted relinquishing jurisdiction.

7 Section 40-7-202(1), MCA, provides that a Montana court has jurisdiction over a child

custody determination until

(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or

(b) a court of this state or a court of another state determines that neither the child, a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in this state.

A Montana court loses jurisdiction over a child custody determination once it determines

that either of the events described in subsections (a) or (b) have occurred. In re B.P., ¶ 19.

The “significant connection” inquiry under subsection (a) is akin to determining whether a

“substantial connection” exists for the purposes of determining initial jurisdiction of a child

custody determination under § 40-7-201, MCA. Section 40-7-202, MCA, Annotations,

Comm’rs Note (2025). Section 40-7-202(1)(b), MCA, divests jurisdiction solely based on

the domicile of the relevant parties. See In re B.P., ¶ 19.

¶16 Ramsey may have cited § 40-7-202(1)(a), MCA, as the basis for his Motion to

Relinquish, but he failed to substantively address whether subsection (a) required the

District Court to relinquish jurisdiction. Ramsey only addressed § 40-7-202(1)(b), MCA,

by repeatedly and solely asserting that the District Court must relinquish jurisdiction

because Soderholm and the children reside in Virginia rather than Montana. Ramsey never

articulated how Soderholm’s and the children’s domicile in Virginia fractured their

“significant connection” with Montana and never addressed whether “substantial

evidence” was available in Montana as specified in § 40-7-202(1)(a), MCA. The District

8 Court did not abuse its discretion by addressing the substance of Ramsey’s jurisdictional

argument by determining it retained jurisdiction under § 40-7-202(1)(b), MCA, based on

Ramsey’s domicile in Montana. See § 1-3-219, MCA (“The law respects form less than

substance.”).

¶17 A district court that retains jurisdiction under § 40-7-202(1), MCA, may decline to

exercise jurisdiction if the court determines that it is an inconvenient forum under

§ 40-7-108, MCA. Section 40-7-202(2), MCA. The district court “shall consider all

relevant factors” when assessing whether it constitutes an inconvenient forum, including:

(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; (b) the length of time that the child has resided outside this state; (c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; (e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; (f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child; (g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and (h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.

Section 40-7-108(2), MCA; Stoneman v. Drollinger, 2003 MT 25, ¶ 16, 314 Mont. 139, 64

P.3d 997 (stating courts must at a minimum consider the factors enumerated in

§ 40-7-108(2), MCA). A district court’s failure to expressly address all the factors

enumerated in § 40-7-108(2), MCA, does not constitute an abuse of discretion if the

unconsidered factors were immaterial to the district court’s conclusion. In re A.R.B.,

¶¶ 24-25.

9 ¶18 The District Court determined it was not an inconvenient forum because it could

expeditiously resolve the issues of the underlying matter and because of its extensive

familiarity with the facts and issues of the case. The District Court acknowledged the

Virginia JDR Court’s order of protection and instructed the parties to inform it if

Soderholm subjects the children to physical harm. The District Court implied that retaining

jurisdiction aligned with the purposes of the UCCJEA, including discouraging forum

shopping.

¶19 Ramsey argues the District Court abused its discretion because the District Court’s

findings addressed only two of the factors enumerated in § 40-7-108(2), MCA. Ramsey

also asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in weighing the factors because it

minimized the Virginia JDR Court’s protective order that demonstrated the children had

been abused by Soderholm and because it overvalued its familiarity with the case and its

ability to expeditiously resolve custody issues. Ramsey supports this argument by

analogizing to Stoneman. Ramsey’s reliance on Stoneman is misplaced.

¶20 We concluded in Stoneman that the record did not indicate whether the Montana

court or Washington court could expeditiously resolve a child custody modification issue.

Stoneman, ¶ 40. We concluded that the District Court overvalued its familiarity with the

case because three different district court judges had presided over the underlying matter

and it had been subject to two appeals. Stoneman, ¶ 41. The District Court in this case did

not overvalue its ability to expeditiously resolve the issues of the underlying matter or

overvalue its familiarity with the case. Judge Davies is the only judge who has presided

over the dissolution and child custody determination. The record demonstrates that the

10 District Court can expeditiously address child custody issues because the District Court

presided over numerous hearings and a three-day trial pertaining to child custody and

issued a Final Parenting Plan based on its extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In re Marriage of Fontenot, 2010 MT 86, ¶¶ 13-15, 356 Mont. 123, 232 P.3d 358

(Louisiana court could expeditiously resolve case because it held hearings on the merits of

custody whereas the Montana court only addressed jurisdictional issues). The limited

familiarity of the underlying matter that the Virginia JDR Court has gained through the

proceedings on Ramsey’s petition for a protective order does not outweigh the District

Court’s substantial knowledge of the matter.

¶21 We also concluded in Stoneman that the District Court abused its discretion in

addressing which forum could best protect the party from domestic abuse because the

District Court “acknowledged the well-documented history of domestic violence” but

“neglected to consider which forum could best protect Drollinger and the children from

further abuse.” Stoneman, ¶¶ 32-34. Neither Ramsey, Soderholm, nor the Virginia JDR

Court’s protective order proceedings indicate that their children have been subjected to

extensive and serious domestic violence like in Stoneman, where the record clearly

demonstrated that the husband repeatedly and violently abused his wife and endangered

their children’s lives. Stoneman, ¶¶ 27, 32-33 (wife suffered serious injuries and husband’s

behavior corresponded to homicidal indicators). The Virginia JDR Court’s protective

order prohibited Soderholm from subjecting their children to corporal punishment, such as

“popping” the children on the head, but the protective order did not otherwise limit

Soderholm’s interactions with or custody of the children. The District Court properly

11 considered the severity of the domestic abuse at issue because it instructed Ramsey to

inform the District Court if Soderholm subjected the children to physical violence so it

could handle the transgressions accordingly.

¶22 The factors that the District Court did not expressly address in its order were

immaterial to its conclusion. Soderholm and the children resided in Virginia virtually from

the inception of the underlying matter in February 2020 until the District Court entered a

Final Parenting Plan in September 2022. The District Court’s successful management of

the docket clearly demonstrates it was not an inconvenient forum based on the distance

between Montana and Virginia, the location of the children, the location of the witnesses

and evidence, and the finances of Ramsey and Soderholm. The District Court properly

considered the UCCJEA’s purpose of discouraging forum shopping because Ramsey’s

decision to move the District Court to relinquish jurisdiction at this juncture when the

circumstances are virtually identical to those impacting the entry of the Final Parenting

Plan raises questions as to his motives. See In re M.M.K., 2016 MT 81, ¶ 22, 383 Mont.

161, 369 P.3d 344 (concluding the record did not indicate the parent forum shopped

because she stipulated to applying Montana law and her reasons for moving from Montana

were “plain in the record”).

¶23 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by determining it was not an

inconvenient forum pursuant to § 40-7-108(2), MCA, because the record supports it could

12 expeditiously resolve the issues of the case based on its extensive familiarity with the

underlying matter and the factors it did not address were immaterial to its conclusion.3

¶24 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents

no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent

or modify existing precedent. We affirm the June 5, 2025 order.

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

3 We do not reach whether it would be appropriate to remand for further findings under § 40-7-108(2), MCA, because we concluded the District Court did not abuse its discretion by determining it was not an inconvenient forum. 13