The Newfoundland

89 F. 510, 1898 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187
District Court, D. South Carolina·Decided September 12, 1898·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

BBAWLEY, District Judge.

The opinion filed August 17th, on the preliminary hearing (89 Fed. 99), based upon the testimony in preparatorio, sets forth the facts relating to the conduct of the Newfoundland up to the evening of July 19th, when she was captured off the port of Havana, and the cause is now before me upon an order for further proof. As was stated in that opinion, a mere suspicion of an intention to violate the blockade, however well founded, is not sufficient ground for condemnation. There must be some overt act de[511] noting an attempt to do the thing forbidden, some fact in addition to the proved intention to commit the infraction, which shows that the unlawful intent is persisted in, and is being carried into execution. The precise question new to be considered is whether there is sufficient evidence of acts denoting the intention to break the blockade at Havana, for to that point the additional testimony has been directed. Upon the preliminary hearing the court was led to believe that the American consul at Ilalifax was in possession of information that would have an important bearing upon the issue, but no testimony from that quarter has been offered. Actual entrance into a blockaded port rarely can be and need not be proved, for, if that were so, captures would cease to be possible; and as no instrument lias yet been devised by which the operations of the human mind can with certainty be disclosed, and intentions must be inferred from acts, so it must be that in all cases of this nature, proof must rest largely upon presumptions, and, accordingly as those presumptions are or are not unavoidable, acquittal or conviction follows. Condemnation cannot justly follow proof of facts from which mere mental intention can be inferred, unless there is also proof of acts from which the presumption necessarily arises that there is the beginning to put into execution the unlawful intent. The sailing for a prohibited port, after knowledge of the blockade, with intent to enter, is held to be such overt act. So, the appearance before a blockaded port for the alleged purpose of inquiry, when the blockade is generally known, has been held to be a breach of the blockade, on the ground that such approach would afford great facility for eluding it, and knowledge honestly sought could be obtained elsewhere.

Sir William Scott is the greaL luminary from which we derive most of our light on the law of prize. He regarded the breaking of a blockade as an act of deep turpitude. In that opinion I do not agree, perhaps from an early experience of, and modest participation in, some of its benefits; and 1 am aware that, notwithstanding his great ability, his purity of character, and charming manners, he did not escape the censure of his contemporaries, and that the severity of his judgments led to the charge of “ministerial subserviency.” In The Heutralitet, (> O. Rob. Adm. 35, with a vigor and beauty of diction which must charm, if it does not convince, he thus states the law:

"It will not bo necessary in the present case to lay down a general principle on this point, bnt 1 am disposed to agree to a position advanced in argument that a belligerent is not called upon to admit that neutral ships can innocently place themselves In a situation where they may with impunity break the blockade, whenever they please. If the belligerent country has a, right to impose a blockade, it must be justified in the necessary means of enforcing that right; and if a vessel could, under the pretense of going further, approach cy-pres, close up to the blockade port, so as to be enabled to slip in without obstruction, it would be impossible that any blockade could be maintained. It would, I think, be no unfair rule of evidence to hold as a presumption de jure that she goes there with an intention of breaking the blockade; and if such an inference may possibly operate with severity in particular cases, where the parties are innocent in their intention, it is a severity necessarily connected with the rules of evidence, and essential to the effectual exercise of this right of war.”

[512] Describing tbe catholic character of the prize jurisdiction, he thus expressed himself:

“I trust that it has not escaped my anxious recollection for one moment what it is that the duty of my station calls for from me, namely, to consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out, without distinction, to independent states, some happening to he neutral and some to he belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally here, in the belligerent country, according to the known law .and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden, ás a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character.” 1 C. Rob. Adm. 295.

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The Newfoundland, 89 F. 510, 1898 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187 (D.S.C. 1898).

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