The Mississippi Bar v. Candace L. Williamson

CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedJune 22, 2023
Docket2020-BD-01354-SCT
StatusPublished

This text of The Mississippi Bar v. Candace L. Williamson (The Mississippi Bar v. Candace L. Williamson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Mississippi Bar v. Candace L. Williamson, (Mich. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-BD-01354-SCT

THE MISSISSIPPI BAR

v.

CANDACE L. WILLIAMSON

ATTORNEYS FOR COMPLAINANT: ADAM BRADLEY KILGORE MELISSA SELMAN SCOTT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: GRAHAM PATRICK CARNER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - BAR MATTERS DISPOSITION: SUSPENDED FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO YEARS - 06/22/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Mississippi Bar seeks disciplinary action against Candace L. Williamson, an

attorney licensed to practice law in both Tennessee and Mississippi, based on discipline

Williamson has received in Tennessee. The Supreme Court of Tennessee ordered

Williamson suspended from the practice of law for two years, with one of those years

suspended and Williamson placed on probation. Williamson was also issued a public

reprimand by the Tennessee Bar in another matter.

¶2. Williamson has been temporarily suspended in Mississippi since November 2021

because she failed to inform the Mississippi Bar of the Tennessee disciplinary orders. ¶3. The Mississippi Bar asks this Court to discipline Williamson appropriately pursuant

to Rule 13 of the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi State Bar. The Bar contends that

the Tennessee sanctions are in line with this Court’s past punishments for similar

misconduct, and it recommends that this Court suspend Williamson “prospectively” for “up

to two years.” The Bar also asks that it recover from Williamson the costs and expenses

incurred in filing its formal complaint. Williamson concedes that reciprocal discipline is

warranted, and she agrees with the sanction recommended by the Mississippi Bar.

¶4. Given Williamson’s difficult circumstances at the time of the misconduct, we find no

“extraordinary” reason to deviate from the punishments found appropriate by the Tennessee

Supreme Court. We therefore publicly reprimand Williamson, suspend her for two years,

with one year suspended on probation, and assess her the Bar’s expenses in bringing this

proceeding. Having been suspended for more than six months, Williamson will have to

petition to be reinstated. See M.R.D. 12.

FACTS

¶5. Williamson’s discipline in Tennessee resulted from five bar complaints. In Supreme

Court of Tennessee Cause Number M2020-00910-SC-BAR-BP, the Board of Professional

Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court disciplined Williamson for four of those.

In the first, the board found that:

In the fall of 2015, [the complainant] retained Ms. Williamson to represent him in a divorce. Ms. Williamson filed the divorce in December 2015, and the complaint was served January 13, 2016. In October 2016, Ms. Williamson filed a Motion to Compel Mediation which was approved by the court on October 20, 2016. Prior to attending mediation, both parties executed a Marital Dissolution Agreement on October 25, 2016. According to Ms.

2 Williamson the Marital Dissolution Agreement was not filed because the “clerk took notice that not all the pages were there.”

Ms. Williamson took no further court action for nearly a year and on September 19, 2017, she filed a Motion to Seal Divorce. Ms. Williamson twice set the motion for a hearing but struck the hearing date both times. Ms. Williamson took no further court action in the case.

[The complainant] terminated Ms. Williamson’s representation by letter dated May 5, 2018, . . . and requested his client file but never received it from Ms. Williamson. [The complainant] subsequently retained new counsel and the divorce was finalized in December 2018.

¶6. The second complaint was described as follows:

By letters dated November 26, 2018, and December 12, 2018, the Board forwarded the [second] complaint . . . to Ms. Williamson and requested her response. Ms. Williamson did not respond to the Board.

On or about March 2018, [the complainant] retained Ms. Williamson to represent her in a divorce action filed by [the complainant’s] husband. Ms. Williamson filed an Answer and CounterComplaint on March 13, 2018. Ms. Williamson advised husband’s counsel that she would propose a settlement offer but an offer was never made.

On May 25, 2018, [the complainant’s] husband’s counsel filed a Motion to Require Mediation, but the motion was not heard. [The complainant’s] husband’s counsel renewed the Motion to Require Mediation on September 21, 2018 and scheduled a hearing with the court on September 28, 2018.

Although she remained suspended from the practice of law, Ms. Williamson appeared for the hearing and executed an agreed order setting mediation for October 15, 2018, which was filed with the court. [The complainant’s] husband’s counsel was the only one to appear for the October 15, 2018, mediation, which did not move forward.

On September 27, 2018, [the complainant] filed a complaint with the Board’s Consumer Assistance Program alleging that Ms. Williamson had not communicated with her about her divorce case since May 9, 2018, and failed to respond to phone calls, text messages, or e-mails.

3 Ms. Williamson was reinstated to the practice of law on October 19, 2018. The parties thereafter executed a Marital Dissolution Agreement which was filed with the court on December 11, 2018, and a Final Decree of Divorce was entered on December 12, 2018.

¶7. The third complaint concerned practicing law while suspended:

By email dated October 19, 2018, Ms. Williamson self-reported her appearance in court on October 15, 2018, during her temporary suspension. On October 18, 2018, the Board received a complaint from informant [opposing counsel] Constance Alexander relating to the conduct that Ms. Williamson had self-reported. By letters dated October 22, and November 8, 2018, the Board mailed Ms. Alexander’s information to Ms. Williamson, advised her that it would be added to her self-report and requested that she respond. She did not respond.

On October 15, 2018, Ms. Williamson appeared in court for a status conference and informed the court that she was still working with her client. Ms. Williamson appeared in court after she was suspended from the practice of law and before she was reinstated on October 19, 2018. She failed to inform the court and opposing counsel of her licensure status and failed to comply with her obligations as a suspended attorney required by the Order of Temporary Suspension and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 28.

¶8. The fourth complaint was likewise for practicing law while suspended. The

misconduct occurred around the same time as the third complaint, during the brief period

between Williamson’s initial temporary suspension’s becoming effective and its being lifted

(i.e., August to October 2018):

On October 22, 2018, the Board received information about Ms. Williamson’s appearance in court while suspended from Judge Wagner and forwarded the information to Ms. Williamson requesting a response by letters dated October 29, and November 27, 2018. Ms. Williamson did not respond to the Board.

While she was temporarily suspended from the practice of law, Ms. Williamson appeared in court before Judge Wagner on July 30, 2018, September 24, 2018, and October 15, 2018. Pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 12.3, Ms. Williamson was allowed to continue representation of current

4 clients for thirty (30) days following her temporary suspension, which would have been August 17, 2018.

Ms. Williamson was not reinstated until October 19, 2018. Accordingly, Ms. Williamson appeared in court after she was suspended from the practice of law and before she was reinstated.

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The Mississippi Bar v. Candace L. Williamson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-mississippi-bar-v-candace-l-williamson-miss-2023.