The Matter of Patrick J. Lynch v. City of New York

CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 23, 2023
Docket39
StatusPublished

This text of The Matter of Patrick J. Lynch v. City of New York (The Matter of Patrick J. Lynch v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Matter of Patrick J. Lynch v. City of New York, (N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

State of New York OPINION Court of Appeals This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports.

No. 39 In the Matter of Patrick J. Lynch, &c. et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. City of New York, et al., Appellants-Respondents.

MacKenzie Fillow, for appellants-respondents. Robert S. Smith, for respondents-appellants.

SINGAS, J.:

At issue here is whether tier 3 police officers in the New York City Police Pension

Fund (PPF) who otherwise might be eligible for retirement credit under the statutory

provisions discussed herein may use those provisions to apply prior non-police service

-1- -2- No. 39

toward their retirement eligibility. We hold that they may not. The plain language of

Retirement and Social Security Law § 513 (c) (2) limits eligible prior service for those

officers to police service.1 Therefore, the proceeding should be dismissed.

I.

In 2016, the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., and

its president Patrick J. Lynch on behalf of its members (collectively, the PBA), commenced

an action seeking a declaration that the City of New York, the PPF, and other related parties

(collectively, the City), violated certain sections of the Retirement and Social Security Law

and the New York City Administrative Code by refusing to permit tier 3 officers to obtain

credit toward retirement eligibility for prior non-police service. The PBA also sought a

declaration that the City’s denials of credit for prior service breached a 2002 agreement

between the parties that resolved litigation regarding what prior service counted toward

New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers’ retirement eligibility.

Supreme Court granted the City’s motion to convert the declaratory judgment action

to a CPLR article 78 proceeding and further granted in part and denied in part the parties’

motion and cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that the effect of

Retirement and Social Security Law § 513 (c) (2) was “to create equivalence between [t]ier

2 and [t]ier 3” for the purpose of obtaining credit for prior service, “but frozen in time so

that [t]ier 3 members receive the same creditable service benefits as [t]ier 2 members in

1 For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that “police service” includes service as a firefighter.

-2- -3- No. 39

1976” (2019 Slip Op 32092[U], *7 [Sup Ct, NY County 2019]). Thus, the court held that

the post-1976 provisions on which the PBA relied did not apply to tier 3 officers. But the

court also ruled that the City was required to permit tier 3 officers to transfer non-police

service toward their retirement eligibility under a pre-1976 provision of the Administrative

Code (see id. at *8-9). Finally, the court held that the 2002 settlement agreement did not

extend any benefits to tier 3 officers because there were no such officers at the time of the

agreement (see id. at *13).

The Appellate Division modified, holding that Retirement and Social Security Law

§ 513 (c) (1) set forth, for tier 3 members, the same eligibility requirements “for prior

service in defined public employment” as provided in article 11 for tier 2 members, and

that the effect of section 513 (c) (2) is to exclude tier 3 police members “from those broader

eligibility requirements” (194 AD3d 416, 417 [1st Dept 2021]). The Court concluded that

the language of section 513 (c) (2) “does not conflict” with the statutes on which the PBA

relied, and the City therefore was required by those statutes to allow tier 3 officers to credit

non-police service toward their retirement eligibility (id. at 417-418). The Court agreed

with Supreme Court that the 2002 agreement did not extend benefits to tier 3 members (see

id. at 418).

We granted the parties’ motions for leave to appeal (see 37 NY3d 918 [2022]).

II.

The PPF is the retirement program for police officers employed by the NYPD (see

Administrative Code of City of NY § 13-214 et seq.). PPF membership and the

corresponding benefits are divided into tiers. Police officers who became members

-3- -4- No. 39

between July 1, 1973, and July 1, 2009, are in tier 2. Their benefits are governed by title

13 of the Administrative Code and article 11 of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

To address steeply mounting pension costs and budget constraints, the legislature

created tier 3, “a comprehensive retirement program designed to provide uniform benefits

for all public employees and eliminate the costly special treatment of selected groups

inherent in the previous program” (Lynch v City of New York, 23 NY3d 757, 765 [2014]

[Lynch I] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Although established in 1976, the legislature

passed a series of two-year extensions that afforded tier 2 rights and benefits to police

officers joining the PPF until June 2009, when Governor Paterson vetoed the bill that would

have again extended tier 2 coverage (see id. at 766-767). Police officers who joined the

PPF after July 1, 2009, are thus members of tier 3, and their rights and benefits are governed

by Retirement and Social Security Law article 14 (see Lynch v City of New York, 35 NY3d

517, 527 [2020] [Lynch II]).

Although article 14 “provide[s] uniform benefits for all public employees” in tier 3

(Lynch I, 23 NY3d at 765), it is not “a stand-alone retirement structure of benefits and

contributions” (Lynch II, 35 NY3d at 527). Under Retirement and Social Security Law §

519 (1), tier 3 members may enjoy benefits established in title 13 of the Administrative

Code or elsewhere so long as those benefits are consistent with the provisions of article 14.

However, “[i]n the event that there is a conflict between the provisions of [article 14] and

the provisions of any other law or code, the provisions of [article 14] shall govern”

(Retirement and Social Security Law § 500 [a]).

-4- -5- No. 39

As relevant to this appeal, article 14 provides that tier 3 officers are eligible for

retirement after 22 years of service without regard to their age (see generally Retirement

and Social Security Law §§ 503 [d]; 505). The issue before us is whether a tier 3 police

officer’s prior non-police service “qualifies to be counted as credited service pursuant to

[Retirement and Social Security Law § 513]” (Retirement and Social Security Law § 501

[4]).

III.

“When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary

consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the [l]egislature” (Matter of

DaimlerChrysler Corp v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660 [2006] [internal quotation marks

omitted]). “The starting point for discerning legislative intent is the language of the statute

itself” (Yatauro v Mangano, 17 NY3d 420, 426 [2011]). That is, “the literal language of a

statute controls ‘unless the plain intent and purpose of [the] statute would otherwise be

defeated’ ” (Lynch II, 35 NY3d at 523, quoting Matter of Anonymous v Malik, 32 NY3d

30, 37 [2018]). We must also consider the statute as a whole, “ ‘and effect and meaning

must, if possible, be given to the entire statute and every part and word thereof’ ” (People

v Pabon, 28 NY3d 147, 152 [2016], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1,

Statutes § 98 [a]).

Under article 14, all tier 3 members “shall be eligible to obtain retirement credit

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