The Liverpool Football Club And Athletic Grounds Limited v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified On Schedule A

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedMay 7, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-21463
StatusUnknown

This text of The Liverpool Football Club And Athletic Grounds Limited v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified On Schedule A (The Liverpool Football Club And Athletic Grounds Limited v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified On Schedule A) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Liverpool Football Club And Athletic Grounds Limited v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified On Schedule A, (S.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION

CASE NO. 1:25-cv-21463-GAYLES

THE LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL CLUB AND ATHLETIC GROUNDS LIMITED,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE “A,”

Defendants. _____________________________________/ ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon The Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds Limited’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Entry of a Preliminary Injunction (the “Motion”). [ECF No. 9]. In the Motion, Plaintiff moves for entry of a preliminary injunction against the Defendant Identified on Schedule A (“Defendant”) and entry of an order restraining the financial accounts used by Defendant, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, Section 32 of the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1114, and The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The Court previously entered an order granting Plaintiff’s ex parte Motion for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). [ECF No. 15]. Upon Plaintiff’s showing of good cause, the Court extended the TRO to expire on May 7, 2025. [ECF No. 23]. The Court convened a public hearing on May 7, 2025. Plaintiff certified that it served Defendant with notice of the hearing on May 1, 2025. [ECF No. 30-1]. Only counsel for Plaintiff appeared at the hearing on the Motion. As represented by Plaintiff's counsel at the hearing and reflected on the docket of this case, Defendant has not made an appearance, indicated an intention to challenge the TRO, or otherwise answered and/or defended against the Complaint. The Court heard argument from Plaintiff and reviewed the evidence that Plaintiff's counsel presented to the Court. Upon due consideration of the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, the relevant authorities, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED in its entirety. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following background is taken from Plaintiff's Complaint, [ECF No. 1], the Motion, and supporting evidentiary submissions and exhibits. Plaintiff alleges it is the owner of the following trademarks, which are valid and registered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “LFC Trademarks”). [ECF No. 9-2 at § 7].

6,816,910 LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL CLUB 6,762,837 LIVERPOOL FC

6,749,353 YOU'LL NEVER WALK ALONE

5,089,345 THE NORMAL ONE

piety ma ry vets BAAS e]e) 5 3,307,401 ap WFOOTBALL CLUB II y —

wSliy

Registration No. Trademark

□ be Aa = □□□ yee a Bea ae) 3,867,538 i FOOTBALL CLUB i Nx) =

ZO 4,169,888

YZ 6,742,770 go

6,756,306 Ny)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, through a fully interactive, e-commerce store1 operating under the seller alias identified on Schedule “A” to the Complaint and attached hereto (the “Seller Alias”), has advertised, promoted, offered for sale, sold, or imported goods bearing and/or embodying what Plaintiff has determined to be counterfeits, infringements, reproductions, or

colorable imitations of the LFC Trademarks. See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶ 3, 5. Plaintiff alleges that it has not licensed or authorized Defendant to use any of the LFC Trademarks, and Defendant is not an authorized retailer of genuine Plaintiff’s products. ECF No. [9-2] at ¶¶ 15, 17. Plaintiff attests that it investigated the promotion and sale of infringing and counterfeit versions of its branded products by Defendant. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that it analyzed the e- commerce store operating under the Seller Alias and determined that Counterfeit Products were being offered for sale to residents of the United States. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 16. In addition, the e-commerce store offered shipping to the United States. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff attests that it conducted a review and visually inspected the purchased products using infringing and counterfeit versions of the LFC Trademarks, and determined said products were non-genuine, unauthorized versions of Plaintiff’s

products. Id. at ¶ 15. II. LEGAL STANDARD To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l. Trading Inc.,

1 Defendant’s e-commerce store URL is listed on Schedule A hereto under the Online Marketplaces. 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying the test to a preliminary injunction in a Lanham Act case). III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The declarations Plaintiff submitted in support of its Motion support the following

conclusions of law: A. Plaintiff has a strong probability of proving at trial that consumers are likely to be confused by Defendant’s advertisement, promotion, sale, offer for sale, and/or distribution of products using infringing and/or counterfeit versions of the LFC Trademarks, and that the products Defendant is selling and promoting for sale are copies of Plaintiff’s respective products that bear and/or use infringing and/or counterfeit versions of the LFC Trademarks; B. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant directly targets its business activities toward consumers in the United States. Specifically, Defendant has targeted sales to United States residents by setting up and operating

e-commerce stores that target United States consumers using the Seller Aliases, offer shipping to the United States, and/or have sold products using infringing and/or counterfeit versions of the LFC Trademarks. C. Because of the infringement of Plaintiff’s LFC Trademarks, Plaintiff is likely to suffer immediate and irreparable injury if a temporary restraining order is not granted. The following specific facts, as set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Motion, and accompanying declarations, demonstrate that immediate and irreparable loss, damage, and injury will result to Plaintiff and to consumers unless Plaintiff’s request for relief is granted: i. Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls a fully interactive, e-commerce store operating under the Seller Alias which advertises, offers for sale, sell, and/or ships products to customers in the United States using infringing and/or counterfeit versions of the LFC Trademarks; and

ii. There is good cause to believe that Defendant’s products using infringing and/or counterfeit versions of the LFC Trademarks will appear in the marketplace; that consumers are likely to be misled, confused, and disappointed by the quality of these products; and that the Plaintiff may suffer loss of sales for its genuine products and an unnatural erosion of the legitimate marketplace in which it operates. D. The potential harm to Defendant in restraining its trade in counterfeit and/or infringing goods through its e-commerce stores and freezing ill-gotten profits if a preliminary injunction is granted is far outweighed by the irreparable harm Plaintiff, its reputation, and its goodwill has suffered and will continue to suffer if

a temporary restraining order is not granted. E.

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The Liverpool Football Club And Athletic Grounds Limited v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified On Schedule A, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-liverpool-football-club-and-athletic-grounds-limited-v-the-flsd-2025.