The John M. Horn Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, Ohio Valley Carpenters, Intervenor

859 F.2d 1242, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2608, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14256
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedOctober 20, 1988
Docket86-6209, 87-5143
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 859 F.2d 1242 (The John M. Horn Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, Ohio Valley Carpenters, Intervenor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The John M. Horn Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, Ohio Valley Carpenters, Intervenor, 859 F.2d 1242, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2608, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14256 (6th Cir. 1988).

Opinions

ENGEL, Chief Judge.

The John M. Horn Lumber Company petitions for review of a National Labor Relations Board order, finding that it violated sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (a)(5)) by refusing to bargain with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Ohio Valley Carpenters District Counsel, Local Union No. 415, AFL-CIO (Union), as the certified representative of its employees. Horn Lumber admits that it has refused to bargain with the Union but claims that the Union was improperly certified by the Board. The Board cross-petitions for enforcement of its order. We deny enforcement.

Horn Lumber, an Ohio corporation, manufactures wood products in its factory located in Hamilton, Ohio. The union filed a petition with the Board seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for a bargaining unit consisting of thirty-six production employees, maintenance employees and all truck drivers employed by Horn Lumber at its Hamilton facility. In an election held on May 23, 1985 nineteen employees voted for the union while seventeen cast ballots against it.

Horn Lumber filed timely objections to the election claiming that the union had created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation which prevented a fair election. Hearings were held on July 11 and 17, 1985. The hearing officer issued a report [1243]*1243and recommendation to the Board on October 11, 1985 listing several problems in the election process (described in more detail below) but ultimately recommended that the Board not set aside the election. Horn Lumber filed its exceptions to the hearing officer’s report and recommendation, arguing that based upon the hearing officer’s findings of fact, the election should be set aside.

On June 24, 1986 the Board adopted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendations and certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the bargaining unit. The Board’s chairman, however, dissented, finding that two of Horn Lumber’s objections were grounds for setting the election aside. 280 N.L.R.B. 69 (1986).

The Union filed a refusal to bargain charge with the Board on July 11,1986. In August of 1986, General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint against Horn Lumber alleging that Horn Lumber had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the NLRA. Horn Lumber admitted in its answer that it had refused to bargain with the Union but defended its action on the basis that the Union was improperly certified. General Counsel moved for summary judgment. The Board granted the General Counsel’s motion on November 13, 1986. The Board’s order required Horn Lumber to cease refusing to bargain with the Union, cease interfering with employees’ exercise of rights guaranteed them by section 7 of the NLRA, and to bargain with the union on request.

Horn Lumber filed its petition for review of the Board’s order with us on November 18, 1986. The Union filed a motion to intervene which we granted. The Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order.

Our standard of review is whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Board’s finding of fact that there was not an atmosphere of tension and coercion preventing a fair and free election must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. Upon consideration, however, we find that the Board’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence and hold that a new election must be held.

The cross-petitions focus particularly upon two incidents discussed in the hearing officer’s report and recommendation to the Board. The first incident concerns a confrontation between Andrew Secrest, a member of the Union’s in-plant organizing committee, and Kenneth Sutherland, an employee within the bargaining unit.

About three weeks before the election, Sutherland was operating a small electric saw in the main work area of Horn Lumber’s facility, approximately fifty feet away from other employees. Sutherland heard someone behind him say “There’s a m— f — , I’m gonna blow his brains out and I'm looking straight at him.” Sutherland turned and saw Secrest standing fifteen to twenty feet away looking at him. Secrest said nothing further but stood and stared at Sutherland for another thirty seconds. Two or three days prior to this incident Sutherland had made some anti-union statements in Secrest’s presence. Sutherland testified that he believed that he had been threatened by Secrest because Secrest supported the union while he did not. During this confrontation Secrest was wearing a committeemen’s button which was distinct from the type worn by general union supporters. The proof further indicated that Sutherland and Secrest had not spoken to each other before this confrontation and that there was no history of prior animosity between the two men. While the hearing officer specifically credited Secrest’s testimony, he nonetheless rejected Horn Lumber’s objection that this incident prevented a fair and free election. The hearing officer’s conclusion that there was no evidence supporting Sutherland’s belief that Secrest’s comments were union related is inconsistent with his own credibility findings and with ordinary experience. The hearing officer’s factual finding that the impact of this statement had dissipated and that no connection with the Union was shown is unreasonable in light of the evidence and testimony presented [1244]*1244below. See Hickman Harbor Service v. N.L.R.B., 739 F.2d 214, 219 (6th Cir.1984).

The second incident involved James Roach, another member of the in-plant organizing committee and Jerry Gray, another member of the bargaining unit. This incident occurred in the employee’s restroom two to three weeks prior to the election. Gray and another employee, Rickie Messelling, were discussing the pros and cons of union representation. At some point in the conversation Gray announced that he was not going to vote for the union. Roach then approached Gray, and swung at Gray striking his hat with sufficient force to knock it off his head. Roach told Gray that Gray had “better vote for the f— union.” As he made the statement Roach was wearing a “throwing knife” which is distinct from the type of tools commonly worn within the plant. The hearing officer found that Roach appeared serious during this incident. Gray considered the incident serious enough to report it to his supervisor. Messelling testified that he related the incident to two other unit employees. It was also possible that Roach’s remarks could have been overheard by a third person who was in the restroom at the time. The hearing officer expressly found that Roach’s threat was known to at least four and possibly five bargaining unit employees and was not isolated. The hearing officer, however, found that in light of the rough language and horseplay tolerated in this shop that she was unable to conclude that this incident was of such an aggravated nature that, standing alone it created a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal which rendered a free election impossible.

The hearing officer’s conclusion is unreasonable in light of the evidence and testimony below. In this case there was a threat accompanied by an assault and clear evidence that information about the incident was not isolated.

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859 F.2d 1242, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2608, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-john-m-horn-lumber-co-v-national-labor-relations-board-ohio-valley-ca6-1988.