The Jacobs Manufacturing Company v. Sam Brown Co.

19 F.3d 1259, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5620, 1994 WL 96308
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 28, 1994
Docket92-1834
StatusPublished
Cited by50 cases

This text of 19 F.3d 1259 (The Jacobs Manufacturing Company v. Sam Brown Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Jacobs Manufacturing Company v. Sam Brown Co., 19 F.3d 1259, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5620, 1994 WL 96308 (8th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

This lawsuit arises from the breakdown- of a distributor relationship between the Jacobs Manufacturing Company (Jacobs), a manufacturer of truck engine brakes, and Sam Brown Company (Brown), its largest distributor. After the relationship ended, Jacobs brought this diversity action for its unpaid account balance, and Brown counterclaimed asserting Jacobs made fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations. Brown appeals the district court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law (JAML) to Jacobs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

In 1976 Jacobs’s representatives approached Brown’s chief executive- officer (CEO) to solicit Brown as a Jacobs distributor. Brown’s CEO expressed concern about the - distributorship agreement’s one-year term -and Jacobs’s right to sell directly to original equipment manufacturers. The representatives responded the agreement would last a “lifetime” if Brown performed well, the only original equipment manufacturer integrating Jacobs’s products in Brown’s territory would be Brown’s account, and Jacobs would refer to Brown all original equipment manufacturer inquiries from Brown’s exclusive territory. Assured this oral understanding was also part of the agreement, Brown’s CEO signed the annual distributorship agreement. Brown became Jacobs’s top distributor in North America. Each year after 1976, Jacobs sent Brown a new agreement with a letter from Jacobs’s general sales manager stating that he was “sure [their] continued association [would] be long term and mutually beneficial.” Brown signed the agreements each year until 1984. Jacobs repeatedly reassured Brown it would be a long-term distributor and promised to inform Brown about any developments affecting Brown’s distributorship and expansion effort. With borrowed money, Brown invested more than one million dollars in. developing its Jacobs distributorship to comply with Jacobs request that Brown have suitable physical facilities and trained service personnel available around the clock.

Contrary to its representations to Brown, Jacobs was considering changes to its distribution system. As early as 1974, Jacobs’s five-year marketing plan called for an analysis of the advantages of directly marketing and servicing its products. In 1979, Jacobs hired a consultant to develop alternative distribution plans. Without disclosing this purpose, Jacobs’s vice president asked Brown to give the consultant unlimited access to Brown’s premises and business records. The vice president told Brown the reason for the consultant’s visit was to allow the consultant to find out how a Jacobs distributor operated. With Brown’s cooperation, the consultant obtained knowledge of Brown’s production and marketing practices and other confidential information, but assured Brown the information would not be disclosed.

*1262 Later, in June 1981, Jacobs received a commissioned report from a different consulting firm, Bain and Company. The Bain report stated that “[w]ith a very carefully staged, time-phased program, Jacobs could gradually eliminate almost all of the distributors.” The Bain report recommended that Jacobs pursue the fleet program, eliminate the original equipment manufacturer distributor segment first, bring the distributor role in-house, and fully eliminate all external distributor segments by 1984. The report warned that to avoid loss of sales, goodwill, and image, distributors would have to be kept in place until Jacobs had its own direct sales system ready. A few days after receiving the Bain report, Jacobs executives studied the report at a hotel.

In July 1981, a month after receiving the Bain report, Jacobs encouraged Brown to continue financially supporting its Jacobs distributorship through a trucking industry recession that began in May 1980, promising Brown would be rewarded by future business when the recession ended. Jacobs’s regional representative also assured Brown that their relationship was “like a marriage” and the distributorship would “go on and on.” In September 1981, however, Jacobs’s in-house counsel sent a written inquiry to a Jacobs executive asking whether Jacobs was “still considering a change in its distribution system [that] will enable Jacobs to go direct and eliminate all distributors and middlemen.”

Behind its false front of assurances to Brown, Jacobs began to implement the Bain report’s recommendations. In 1982 Jacobs started a program of direct sales to Brown’s truck fleet customers. After Brown sent Jacobs a letter complaining about the program, Jacobs responded that the new program was merely a special promotion. Jacobs reassured Brown that Jacobs’s short-range and long-range marketing strategies were not affected and that distributors would continue as the backbone of Jacobs’s sales effort. Despite its assurances, however, Jacobs was analyzing a “Single Price Strategy” under which Jacobs would sell its products directly to any customer at the same price Jacobs charged its distributors, destroying the value of the distributorships. Nonetheless, Jacobs continued to urge Brown to maintain its distribution efforts through the recession, claiming both companies would benefit when the market rebounded. Jacobs’s general sales manager admitted he knew about the Bain report and that Jacobs was considering changing its basic method of distribution as early as 1974, but never disclosed this information to Brown.

Consistent with the Bain report, when the recession ended in 1983 Jacobs unveiled its “Single Price Strategy,” which Jacobs implemented by changing the annual distributorship agreements. Jacobs informed Brown in September 1983 that effective January 1, 1984, Jacobs would accept direct orders from original equipment manufacturers at the same prices offered to distributors, eliminate the distributors’ exclusive territories, and reserve the right to sell directly to anyone at one price. Jacobs expanded its own sales and service force and in November 1983 directly solicited Brown’s original equipment manufacturer and truck fleet customers, which together constituted 90% of Brown’s customers for Jacobs’s brakes. Jacobs fully realized the consequences of the distribution changes: Jacobs’s 1983 Eastern Regional Annual Report declared, “[Jacobs’s] announcement ... of the 1984 Single Price Strategy irrevocably has changed the traditional role of our distributors. [They] must either change or die. Most will probably die.”

In December 1983 Brown sent Jacobs a letter complaining that Jacobs’s new policy would effectively destroy Brown’s distributorship, and reminding Jacobs that Brown had incurred heavy losses during the recession based on Jacobs’s assurances Brown would benefit when the market improved. Brown also stated it would be unable to recover the one million dollars it had invested in facilities and marketing for Jacobs’s brakes. Jacobs did not respond to Brown’s letter in writing, but a Jacobs manager noted on the letter that Jacobs should send “someone with rapport [to] visit [Brown’s CEO and] give him a crumb.” Because Brown could not profitably sell Jacobs’s products to customers who could buy directly from Ja *1263 cobs at the same price, Brown refused to sign Jacobs’s 1984 distributorship agreement,

II.

Jacobs filed this diversity action against Brown for the unpaid account balance owing for products sold to Brown when the distributor relationship ended.

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19 F.3d 1259, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5620, 1994 WL 96308, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-jacobs-manufacturing-company-v-sam-brown-co-ca8-1994.