The George W. Elder

196 F. 137, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1535
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedApril 22, 1912
DocketNo. 4,879
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 196 F. 137 (The George W. Elder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The George W. Elder, 196 F. 137, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1535 (D. Or. 1912).

Opinion

WOEVERTON, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). All the questions of legal import except one have been practically determined upon the exceptions to the libel. 159 Fed. 1005. The remaining question now presented is whether the Elder was a “vessel” within the meaning of the maritime law, rendering her subject to libel in rem for dry-dock charges, although she had been wrecked, abandoned by her owners and underwriters, and her register dosed.

Besides this, there is a question of fact to be determined, which is whether the work of docking the vessel and placing her in alignment suitable to receive her repairs was so negligently and unskillfully done as to delay the contractor in making the repairs, and thus add! to the time which the ship was required to be held in dry dock; the claimants claiming that they should have a reduction of the dry-dock charges on that account.

[1] It cannot well he claimed that the Elder in her wrecked condition was not yet a vessel. She was not destroyed as a vessel; she was simply wrecked by a hole being stove in her bottom so that she sank. She was still susceptible of being raised and towed for a number of miles, and placed in a dry dock, where she received her repairs, and henceforth was a ship ready for navigation. Her model was preserved in every -way. Neither did she lose any of her propelling machinery or equipment. In the case of Hardy et al. v. The Ruggles, Fed. Cas. No. 6,062, the Ruggles, a steam propeller enrolled and owned in New York, while on a voyage to North Carolina, was burned to the water’s edge. The hull, with steam machinery andi propelling wheel on board, was towed to Smithfield, Va., and there rebuilt, the old hull being used, with engine frame and boilers standing, but the length of the vessel was somewhat increased; and it was held that this was an old vessel rebuilt, and not a vessel constructed anew. She did not therefore lose her identity, but continued to be a foreign vessel, and not a domestic vessel in Virginia. The court, quoting from Mollov, says:

“If a ship be ript up in parts, and repaired in parts, and taken asunder in parts, yet she remains the same vessel and not another: nay, though she hath been so often repaired that there remains not one stick of the original fabric.”

In the case of The Progresso (D. C.) 46 Fed. 292, the facts were these: The steamer in question, while a British vessel registered under the name of “Wells City,” sank in the harbor of New York. She was abandoned by her owner, and her registry as a British vessel closed. Being raised by the underwriters, she was purchased by the claimant, with the purpose of procuring for her a register as a vessel of the United States under the name “Progresso.” Certain services were rendered the vessel while afloat in the Atlantic basin, before she had obtained an American register, and the question was urged whether she was a vessel in the maritime sense, and whether the services rendered her were maritime. It was held that the Progresso was no less a ship or vessel because she had no national character and was without a name, that she could navigate and would be subject to salvage, and that, while she may not have been [140]*140entitled! to the rights and privileges of a vessel of the United States, she was nevertheless a vessel capable of being employed in commerce as a ship and a subject of maritime service.

[2] The fact that a vessel is not enrolled or licensed does not affect the question of jurisdiction. The General Cass, Fed. Cas. No. 5,307. And it makes no difference whether a ship is unfit for sea at the time a contract is made in her behalf; if the object and effect of it be to enable her to pursue her business upon the sea, it is in its nature maritime. The Marion S. Harris, 85 Fed. 798, 29 C. C. A. 428.

True, the Elder after her wreck was not a vessel capable of navigation by her own motive power, but she had not been destroyed as a vessel; she was still possessed! of her hull, though damaged,-and all of her engines, boilers, and equipment were aboard of her, so that, save for the damage, she was still a vessel capable of navigation, and the very purpose of placing her in dry dock was to make suitable repairs so that she might again navigate by her own motive pcfwer as she had! done before. That her registry was closed for the time being does not, as we have seen, affect the case, and I hold therefore that she w;as a vessel in the maritime sense receiving repairs, and was subject to reasonable dry-dock charges, and to a maritime lien on account of such charges.

[3] As to the question of fact, the evidence shows that the Elder was lifted in the dry dock on Sunday, May 27, .1906; the work being completed at 5:30 Monday morning, May 28th. The Elder is charged with 1st day May 29, 27 cents per ton (gross tonnage), $461.70; then for 5 days at 10 cents per day per ton, aggregating $855.00; 'and then for 88 days at 7 cents per day per ton, aggregating $10,533.60; the vessel being released from the dry dock September 18, 1906. Sundays and holidays are excluded from the account. After the ship, was put in dry dock, her owners were engaged until June 20th in unloading her damaged cargo, such as was on board when brought to the dock, and in taking out the cement which had been used' in great quantities for the purpose of making her rigid and tight so. that she could be pumped out, raised, and towed to a suitable place for making her repairs. The .cement was poured in, over and about the rent made in her hull, and about the broken keel and keel-plates, and allowed to hfirden, so that it became necessary to remove the same before the work of repairing could be entered upon. The libelant had nothing to do with removing the cement and cargo, and the actual work of repair began on June 20th. This appears from the Port of Portland’s log, and it is not seriously contradicted.

Mr. Doe describes fairly well the damage sustained by the Elder, which is in effect that she was humped up immediately over the place where she struck the rock. The rock, being a large one, the ship settled on top of it, and the rock pushed its way up through her bottom, carrying up the keel, frames and plates, stanchions and deck-beams, and everything with it. When she was put in dry dock and her damaged parts removed, she was in a measure broken in two, or to be more accurate, perhaps, greatly weakened at the point of in[141]*141jury. When she went into dry dock, she was out of line because of her injury, which necessitated putting her into line again, so that her keel might be put in true, and frames, keel-plates, and other adj ustments properly fitted and made fast and strong.

Now, the principal complaint is that the Port of Portland, by negligent and unskillful management of the dry dock, delayed the work to the extent of 14 or 15 days, resulting in a loss by the amount of the dry-dock charges for that length of time.

The controversy may be solved, I think, by what was done as it respects the keel, and the skill and diligence exercised on the part of the Port of Portland in doing the work of lining up the vessel. It seems that it was necessary to readjust the broken portion of the keel accurately and precisely before the further work of repairs could be proceeded with. The molds or templets were to be taken for the other parts of the ship to be put in place after the keel was adjusted and its exact length ascertained, as the length of the keel-plates and other adjustments depended on that.

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Bluebook (online)
196 F. 137, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1535, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-george-w-elder-ord-1912.