Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-1241 ____________
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
vs.
ALEJANDRO L. MARRIAGA, Respondent.
September 18, 2025
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that
Respondent, Alejandro L. Marriaga, be found guilty of professional
misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and
suspended from the practice of law for three years. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations
of guilt but disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline. A
three-year rehabilitative suspension is unfit given the intentional misconduct at issue. It is also inadequate to protect the public and
preserve the profession’s integrity. Instead, we order disbarment.
I
Alejandro L. Marriaga’s actions as a purportedly “neutral
settlement agent” led The Florida Bar to file a four-count complaint
against him. It said he intentionally misdirected funds from real
estate closings, failed to advise buyers of his conflicts of interest,
and failed to comply with trust accounting rules. The Chief Judge
of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit appointed a referee who
conducted guilt and discipline hearings and submitted a report with
findings and recommendations.
Marriaga was a sole practitioner at Marriaga Law Group, P.A.,
doing business as Lawyers Title Network. Steel X Homes, LLC
marketed house designs for construction but lacked its own
construction license. From 2018 until November 2022, Marriaga
served as Steel X’s attorney. Steel X’s corporate filings with the
State of Florida listed Marriaga as its manager from 2021 to 2022
and as its registered agent from 2020 to 2023.
Marriaga testified that he had a verbal agreement with Steel X
to handle its real estate closings, but that he did not represent
-2- Steel X at those closings.1 Instead, he served as a “neutral
settlement agent” and ran closing transactions between buyers and
Steel X, the seller. Buyers in these transactions understood
Marriaga to be responsible for reviewing and signing documents,
holding their funds in escrow, and disbursing those funds
according to the closing disclosure documents. The buyers paid
Marriaga a fee for his work as settlement agent and escrow holder.
A
In 2021, Marriaga acted as both escrow and settlement agent
in a series of four real estate closings involving Steel X. He told
buyers he was a neutral third party while concealing his roles as
Steel X’s attorney, manager, and registered agent. Three buyers
purchased vacant lots from Steel X; the fourth already owned a
vacant lot. Each hired Steel X to build a home and signed separate
construction agreements with one of two builders since Steel X itself
lacked a construction license.
1. The referee’s report mentions no other evidence of that agreement.
-3- In each transaction, the buyer wired closing funds directly to
Marriaga, who deposited them into his Interest on Lawyer Trust
Account2 rather than his real estate closing escrow account. The
closing disclosures in each case allocated specific amounts to the
builder as initial draws for construction, but neither builder
received what was due. Instead, Marriaga deviated from the closing
disclosure documents and diverted the builder draws to Steel X, its
affiliated entities, and, in one instance, to his own law firm.
In one case, Marriaga paid inflated real estate commissions to
the seller’s real estate broker, Ruth Miranda.3 The closing
documents listed Miranda’s entity variously as “Solar X Realty” and
“Steel X Homes.” Her email address linked her to “Solar X Homes”
and the construction contract identified her as the “Steel X Homes
Xpert.” Marriaga admitted that these entities were connected to
2. A lawyer’s Interest on Lawyer Trust Account is an interest- or dividend-bearing trust account for holding small or short-term client funds. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1. Instead of earning interest for the client, the interest goes to Funding Florida Legal Aid, formerly known as The Florida Bar Foundation, Inc. See id.
3. The referee’s report does not say whether Marriaga and Miranda operated independently or shared a coordinated role in diverting closing proceeds.
-4- Steel X. He testified that the same individuals operated both
Steel X and Solar X Homes, LLC (Solar X Homes), and that Solar X
Homes was the predecessor entity to Steel X. State filings listed
Marriaga as Solar X Homes’s registered agent in 2021, and Solar X
Realty and Solar X Homes shared the same principal address. The
buyer sued Steel X, Marriaga, and Marriaga Law Group. Marriaga
represented all three defendants in the suit, and claimed no conflict
existed because his interests aligned with Steel X’s.
Marriaga also failed to render timely accounting ledgers to
three of the buyers. In one case, the buyer repeatedly emailed
Lawyers Title Network for a full accounting ledger after the builder
notified the buyer that it had not been paid. Marriaga’s nonlawyer
employee sent copies of the closing documents to the buyer, stating
that they were all she was authorized to release. When the buyer
continued to seek a full accounting, the employee told the buyer
that the ledger balance was zero, no funds remained, and he should
contact his builder. Nearly three months after the buyer filed a
grievance with the Bar, and almost a year after closing, Marriaga
finally produced the ledger, which revealed discrepancies between
the closing disclosure documents and actual disbursements.
-5- Across all these transactions, Marriaga failed to follow the
closing disclosures, diverted escrow funds without consent, and
concealed his significant ties to Steel X and its affiliates. None of
the promised homes were built, and, in each case, buyers lost tens
of thousands of dollars.
According to the referee’s report, Marriaga was entrusted with
$221,365.37 in funds from the four buyers, not including amounts
paid directly to Steel X in one transaction. At least $41,389.56 4 of
that was designated for the builders in the closing disclosure
documents but never reached them. Instead, Marriaga transferred
the funds without the buyers’ authorization to Steel X and its
affiliated entities, with which he maintained direct ties as legal
counsel, registered agent, and manager. He did so with the intent
to conceal those connections from the buyers and to reroute their
escrow funds in violation of the closing disclosures, for his own
4. The referee’s report did not compute the builder payment owed under the closing disclosure documents in one of the cases. This figure also does not include additional funds that Marriaga improperly diverted to Steel X, its affiliates, and Miranda.
-6- benefit and to the detriment of his clients, without notice or
consent.
B
The referee recommended that Marriaga be found guilty of:
four counts of violating rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor
Misconduct); three counts of violating rule 4-1.4(a) (Informing Client
of Status of Representation); three counts of violating rule 4-1.4(b)
(Duty to Explain Matters to Client); four counts of violating rule
4-1.7(a) (Representing Adverse Interests); four counts of violating
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Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-1241 ____________
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
vs.
ALEJANDRO L. MARRIAGA, Respondent.
September 18, 2025
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that
Respondent, Alejandro L. Marriaga, be found guilty of professional
misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and
suspended from the practice of law for three years. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations
of guilt but disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline. A
three-year rehabilitative suspension is unfit given the intentional misconduct at issue. It is also inadequate to protect the public and
preserve the profession’s integrity. Instead, we order disbarment.
I
Alejandro L. Marriaga’s actions as a purportedly “neutral
settlement agent” led The Florida Bar to file a four-count complaint
against him. It said he intentionally misdirected funds from real
estate closings, failed to advise buyers of his conflicts of interest,
and failed to comply with trust accounting rules. The Chief Judge
of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit appointed a referee who
conducted guilt and discipline hearings and submitted a report with
findings and recommendations.
Marriaga was a sole practitioner at Marriaga Law Group, P.A.,
doing business as Lawyers Title Network. Steel X Homes, LLC
marketed house designs for construction but lacked its own
construction license. From 2018 until November 2022, Marriaga
served as Steel X’s attorney. Steel X’s corporate filings with the
State of Florida listed Marriaga as its manager from 2021 to 2022
and as its registered agent from 2020 to 2023.
Marriaga testified that he had a verbal agreement with Steel X
to handle its real estate closings, but that he did not represent
-2- Steel X at those closings.1 Instead, he served as a “neutral
settlement agent” and ran closing transactions between buyers and
Steel X, the seller. Buyers in these transactions understood
Marriaga to be responsible for reviewing and signing documents,
holding their funds in escrow, and disbursing those funds
according to the closing disclosure documents. The buyers paid
Marriaga a fee for his work as settlement agent and escrow holder.
A
In 2021, Marriaga acted as both escrow and settlement agent
in a series of four real estate closings involving Steel X. He told
buyers he was a neutral third party while concealing his roles as
Steel X’s attorney, manager, and registered agent. Three buyers
purchased vacant lots from Steel X; the fourth already owned a
vacant lot. Each hired Steel X to build a home and signed separate
construction agreements with one of two builders since Steel X itself
lacked a construction license.
1. The referee’s report mentions no other evidence of that agreement.
-3- In each transaction, the buyer wired closing funds directly to
Marriaga, who deposited them into his Interest on Lawyer Trust
Account2 rather than his real estate closing escrow account. The
closing disclosures in each case allocated specific amounts to the
builder as initial draws for construction, but neither builder
received what was due. Instead, Marriaga deviated from the closing
disclosure documents and diverted the builder draws to Steel X, its
affiliated entities, and, in one instance, to his own law firm.
In one case, Marriaga paid inflated real estate commissions to
the seller’s real estate broker, Ruth Miranda.3 The closing
documents listed Miranda’s entity variously as “Solar X Realty” and
“Steel X Homes.” Her email address linked her to “Solar X Homes”
and the construction contract identified her as the “Steel X Homes
Xpert.” Marriaga admitted that these entities were connected to
2. A lawyer’s Interest on Lawyer Trust Account is an interest- or dividend-bearing trust account for holding small or short-term client funds. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1. Instead of earning interest for the client, the interest goes to Funding Florida Legal Aid, formerly known as The Florida Bar Foundation, Inc. See id.
3. The referee’s report does not say whether Marriaga and Miranda operated independently or shared a coordinated role in diverting closing proceeds.
-4- Steel X. He testified that the same individuals operated both
Steel X and Solar X Homes, LLC (Solar X Homes), and that Solar X
Homes was the predecessor entity to Steel X. State filings listed
Marriaga as Solar X Homes’s registered agent in 2021, and Solar X
Realty and Solar X Homes shared the same principal address. The
buyer sued Steel X, Marriaga, and Marriaga Law Group. Marriaga
represented all three defendants in the suit, and claimed no conflict
existed because his interests aligned with Steel X’s.
Marriaga also failed to render timely accounting ledgers to
three of the buyers. In one case, the buyer repeatedly emailed
Lawyers Title Network for a full accounting ledger after the builder
notified the buyer that it had not been paid. Marriaga’s nonlawyer
employee sent copies of the closing documents to the buyer, stating
that they were all she was authorized to release. When the buyer
continued to seek a full accounting, the employee told the buyer
that the ledger balance was zero, no funds remained, and he should
contact his builder. Nearly three months after the buyer filed a
grievance with the Bar, and almost a year after closing, Marriaga
finally produced the ledger, which revealed discrepancies between
the closing disclosure documents and actual disbursements.
-5- Across all these transactions, Marriaga failed to follow the
closing disclosures, diverted escrow funds without consent, and
concealed his significant ties to Steel X and its affiliates. None of
the promised homes were built, and, in each case, buyers lost tens
of thousands of dollars.
According to the referee’s report, Marriaga was entrusted with
$221,365.37 in funds from the four buyers, not including amounts
paid directly to Steel X in one transaction. At least $41,389.56 4 of
that was designated for the builders in the closing disclosure
documents but never reached them. Instead, Marriaga transferred
the funds without the buyers’ authorization to Steel X and its
affiliated entities, with which he maintained direct ties as legal
counsel, registered agent, and manager. He did so with the intent
to conceal those connections from the buyers and to reroute their
escrow funds in violation of the closing disclosures, for his own
4. The referee’s report did not compute the builder payment owed under the closing disclosure documents in one of the cases. This figure also does not include additional funds that Marriaga improperly diverted to Steel X, its affiliates, and Miranda.
-6- benefit and to the detriment of his clients, without notice or
consent.
B
The referee recommended that Marriaga be found guilty of:
four counts of violating rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor
Misconduct); three counts of violating rule 4-1.4(a) (Informing Client
of Status of Representation); three counts of violating rule 4-1.4(b)
(Duty to Explain Matters to Client); four counts of violating rule
4-1.7(a) (Representing Adverse Interests); four counts of violating
rule 4-1.15 (Safekeeping Property); four counts of violating rule
4-8.4(c) (Misconduct); four counts of violating rule 5-1.1(b)
(Application of Trust Funds or Property to Specific Purpose); and
three counts of violating rule 5-1.1(e) (Notice of Receipt of Trust
Funds; Delivery; Accounting).
For discipline, the referee recommended that this Court
suspend Marriaga for three years with proof of rehabilitation
required for reinstatement, a three-year nonreporting probation
period upon reinstatement, and payment of the Bar’s costs. The
referee found as aggravating factors that Marriaga demonstrated a
pattern of misconduct, had a “dishonest motive” (but not “a selfish
-7- motive”), had substantial experience in the practice of law,
committed multiple offenses against vulnerable victims, and refused
to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct. In mitigation, the
referee found that Marriaga had no prior disciplinary record and
noted that “while [his] misconduct was dishonest, it was not
unlawful.” The referee, in his review of case law, distinguished
Marriaga’s case from our disbarment of the attorney in Florida Bar
v. Dominguez, No. SC20-0621, 2021 WL 5493095 (Fla. Nov. 23,
2021) (unpublished), because Dominguez embezzled money.
The referee also noted Marriaga’s long-standing business
relationship with Steel X, its owners, and its other business
entities. While considering Florida’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (Standards), the referee analyzed the knowledge and
intent definitions found within and stated that Marriaga “clearly
knew disbursements were being made contrary to the disclosure
statements . . . and that the disbursements were being made to the
benefit of Steel X and/or its owners.” The referee concluded that
Marriaga’s conduct was “deliberate and knowing,” citing Florida Bar
v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999) (“[I]n order to
-8- satisfy the element of intent it must only be shown that the conduct
was deliberate or knowing.”).
Neither party challenged the referee’s findings or
recommendations. We nevertheless issued an order directing
Marriaga to show cause why the referee’s recommended sanction
should not be disapproved and a more severe sanction, including
disbarment, be imposed. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.7(c)(6)(A)
(“If no review is sought of a referee’s report . . . the findings of fact
are deemed conclusive, and the referee’s recommended disciplinary
measure will be the disciplinary measure imposed by the court,
unless the court directs the parties to submit briefs or conduct oral
argument on the suitability of the referee’s recommended
disciplinary measure.”).
In his response, Marriaga concedes that enhancements could
be added to the referee’s recommended discipline. He suggests that
his sanction include a reporting probation and a trust accounting
workshop.
-9- II
This Court gives deference to the referee’s factual findings
regarding each rule violation and will not reweigh the evidence or
override the referee’s conclusions, so long as those findings are
supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record.
Fla. Bar v. Schwartz, 382 So. 3d 600, 608 (Fla. 2024). As for the
referee’s recommendations as to guilt, “the referee’s factual findings
must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the
recommendations.” Fla. Bar v. Jacobs, 370 So. 3d 876, 883 (Fla.
2023). Neither party contests the referee’s findings of fact or
recommendations of guilt. We therefore approve the referee’s
findings of fact and recommendations of guilt without further
discussion. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Watson, 405 So. 3d 338, 343 (Fla.
2025) (approving the referee’s unchallenged factual findings and
recommendations of guilt).
We disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline. Attorney
discipline must shield the public from unethical conduct while
ensuring penalties are fair and proportionate; hold attorneys
- 10 - accountable for misdeeds yet encourage their rehabilitation; and
communicate that violations of our self-governing standards result
in predictable punishment. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Dupee, 160 So. 3d
838, 853 (Fla. 2015); Fla. Bar v. Lord, 433 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla.
1983). “In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this
Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s
findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility
to order the appropriate sanction.” Fla. Bar v. Strems, 357 So. 3d
77, 90 (Fla. 2022); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. Generally, we
“will not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long
as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.” Fla. Bar v. Swann, 116
So. 3d 1225, 1237 (Fla. 2013).
Here, Marriaga knew disbursements were wrongly made to
benefit Steel X or its owners. The referee determined that
Marriaga’s conduct was deliberate and knowing, which the referee
identified in his report as sufficient to meet the definition of “intent”
under the Standards. See Fredericks, 731 So. 2d at 1252.
Contrary to the referee’s ultimate recommendation, the
Standards dictate disbarment for Marriaga’s intentional conduct.
- 11 - See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.3 (Failure to Avoid Conflicts
of Interest) (proscribing disbarment “when a lawyer causes serious
or potentially serious injury to the client and, without the informed
consent of the affected client(s) . . . engages in representation of a
client knowing that the lawyer’s interests are adverse to the client’s
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another”); 4.6 (Lack of
Candor) (“[W]here the lawyer engages in fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation directed toward a client . . . [d]isbarment is
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly or intentionally deceives a
client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another regardless of
injury or potential injury to the client.”); 7.1 (Deceptive Conduct or
Statements and Unreasonable or Improper Fees) (“[I]n cases
involving deceptive conduct or statements, improper division of fees,
or unreasonable or improper fees . . . [d]isbarment is appropriate
when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of
a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for
the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”).
Disbarment, as the presumptively appropriate sanction for the
intentional misappropriation of funds, is also supported by our
- 12 - cases. “The Court has repeatedly stated that misuse or
misappropriation of funds held in trust is one of the most serious
offenses a lawyer can commit and that disbarment is the
presumptively appropriate sanction.” Fla. Bar v. Johnson, 132 So.
3d 32, 38 (Fla. 2013). We have allowed rebuttal of this presumption
only “in very limited situations on ‘a showing of substantial
mitigating circumstances.’ ” Fla. Bar v. Bander, 361 So. 3d 808,
818 (Fla. 2023) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 84 (Fla.
2018)); see also Fla. Bar v. McFall, 863 So. 2d 303, 309 (Fla. 2003)
(imposing a three-year suspension followed by three years’
probation for attorney who suffered impaired judgment due to
medications and mental health). We have recognized that this
presumption of disbarment “is especially weighty when the
misconduct is intentional rather than negligent or inadvertent.”
Johnson, 132 So. 3d at 38-39 (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Fla.
Bar v. Wolf, 930 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla. 2006) (imposing a two-year
suspension with one year of probation for inadvertent
misappropriation of trust funds); Fla. Bar v. Mason, 826 So. 2d 985,
990 (Fla. 2002) (same); Fla. Bar v. Whigham, 525 So. 2d 873, 874
(Fla. 1988) (imposing a three-year suspension for gross negligence
- 13 - in the absence of willful misappropriation and client financial
injury). But see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Rousso, 117 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2013)
(disbarring two attorneys who were grossly negligent in
mismanaging trust accounts, resulting in employee embezzling over
four million dollars). “Indeed, the overwhelming majority of cases
involving the misuse of trust funds have resulted in
disbarment . . . .” Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d 333, 338
(Fla. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Alters, 260 So. 3d at 84
(collecting cases). We have also disbarred attorneys who create
conflicts of interest in violation of rule 4-1.7. See, e.g., Bander, 361
So. 3d 808; Swann, 116 So. 3d 1225; Rousso, 117 So. 3d 756.
When we consider Marriaga’s mishandling of trust funds
together with his other rule violations, we find that disbarment is
the appropriate sanction. Although Marriaga claimed to not
represent Steel X in the real estate transactions and portrayed
himself as a “neutral settlement agent,” he was far from an
uninterested party. The referee’s report offers no meaningful
distinction between Marriaga and Steel X. Throughout the
transactions, Marriaga acted as Steel X’s attorney, registered agent,
and corporate manager while simultaneously serving as the escrow
- 14 - and settlement agent for buyers contracting with Steel X. His dual
roles placed him on both sides of each transaction, undermining
any pretense of neutrality. He did not disclose these overlapping
roles to the buyers or obtain their consent. The referee’s findings
depict a pattern of self-dealing that undermines the foundational
duties of loyalty and integrity required of Florida lawyers.
III
Accordingly, Alejandro L. Marriaga is hereby disbarred from
the practice of law in the State of Florida. The disbarment will be
effective 30 days from the filing of this opinion so that Marriaga can
close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If
Marriaga notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer
practicing and does not need the 30 days to protect existing clients,
this Court will enter an order making the disbarment effective
immediately. Marriaga must fully comply with rule 3-5.1(h) and, if
applicable, rule 3-6.1.
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from
Alejandro L. Marriaga in the amount of $7,979.01, for which sum
let execution issue.
- 15 - It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT.
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Laura N. Gryb, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Orlando, Florida,
for Complainant
Barry Rigby of Law Offices of Barry Rigby, P.A., Orlando, Florida,
for Respondent
- 16 -