The Egypt

17 F. 359, 1883 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Virginia
DecidedJuly 2, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 17 F. 359 (The Egypt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Egypt, 17 F. 359, 1883 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105 (circtedva 1883).

Opinion

Hughes, J.

This case corresponds so nearly in its general character and iu its details with that of The Sandringham, 10 Fed. Rep. 556; S. C. 5 Hughes, 316, decided by this court a year ago, that I do not feel called upon to deal particularly with every question of law arising in it. There was no appeal from my decision in the case of The Sandringham, and the questions of law therein decided must be regarded, until reversed by some appellate court, as the law of tills court and of this port.

The present is a case of salvage of the most meritorious character. The service was rendered under all the circumstances which constitute merit in a salvage enterprise. There was (1) great danger, from which the property of respondents was rescued; (2) groat value in the property saved; (3) serious and continual risk incurred by the salvors and their property; (4) great value in the property that was put at risk and employed in saving the ship; (5) extraordinary skill and success in rendering the service; and (6) much time and labor spent in the enterprise). These, the six ingredients usually hold to constitute a salvage service of the highest merit, all entered conspicuously into tho enterprise under consideration. In these respects the case is, I repeat, so like that of The- Sandringham, that I need only refer to the reasons I then gave for granting a liberal award in the present case. Adopting that decision as furnishing the rule of decision here, 1 will do no more on the present occasion than treat one or two questions which have been elaborately discussed at bar, and review the authorities cited by counsel for respondents in opposition to a large award.

I shall treat as settled law the point that an incorporated company, organized for the purpose of engaging in the meritorious work of saving ships in distress, and devoting themselves diligently to that pursuit, may be granted salvage reward as liberally as natural persons so engaged may be. The Camanche, 8 Wall. 448. This being assumed, I will first consider one of the principal questions of law discussed at bar. Let it be premised that it has been the habit of a dmiralty courts for centuries to estimate their awards of salvage by proportions of the value of the property saved. This practice arose [368]*368in those tithes when there often was no other practicable method of bestowing salvage rewards than by a division in kind of the property saved. That reason having now ceased, the courts in modern times are more and more abandoning that method of distribution. They ascertain the value of the property saved. They grant such a sum in reward as they deem proper; and if this sum is not paid, they decree a sale of the ship, or of so much other of the saved property, if there be any, as shall be necessary to satisfy the award. But they still adhere in general to the practice of measuring the amount of their rewards by some proportion of the aggregate value of property saved. It thus happens that where this value proves to be very large, as in the present case, respondents in admiralty suits object to the practice; urging that the awards being in great excess of what the labor of effecting the salvage is worth, the owners of the property in such eases are made to pay indirectly for services rendered in cases where the amount saved is small and the compensation received by the salvors inadequate. I am inclined to believe that the courts will in time.come to fix the amount of their awards with very little reference to proportions. But if they do, I am sure the reason of so doing will be founded on some other objection than the one which has been indicated. The defense in the present case is only nominally made by the owners of the Egypt. It is really made by the agent in this country of the Board of Foreign Underwriters. Now, the practice of determining salvage rewards by proportions is really based on the principle of contribution from the fortunate for the benefit of the unfortunate; which is the principle on which all insurance is based. It is but another application of that principle; and I am inclined to think that insurers, if no other class, are, morally estopped from objecting to its application in salvage cases! It is for the advantage of commerce, and certainly in the interest of human life risked at sea, that respectable and thoroughly organized and equipped wrecking companies should be encouraged and sustained on the wild and stormy coast which stretches from the Delaware capes to the Gulf of Mexico. The danger of this coast is so great that many vessels are lost in spite of the most arduous and expensive exertions of the wreckers, who lose their labor and property, and risk their lives, in fruitless attempts to save them. In other cases the total value of property saved, after great labor and risk, is often far below the cost of rendering the service. When, therefore, a valuable ship and cargo is rescued from the jaws of destruction by this same class of men, would it be just or wise to deprive them of the benefit of an ancient rule of maritime reward, and cut them down to a sum not greatly exceeding a quantum meruit pro opere et labore ? Surely, if this be done, the change of rule ought to have some better justification than the objection that the old rule required contribution from the fortunate for the benefit of the unfortunate. For one, I am unwilling to be instrumental in inaugurating the new rule on this dangerous coast, where [369]*369it may bo said, I think, with truth, that a majority of salvage services bring" either no compensation at all to the salvors, or compensation far inadequate to reimburse them for the work and labor and risk attending their enterprises. Passing to another question, I think the present case furnishes a fit occasion for repeating what I said in the case of The Mary E. Dana, decided last year, 5 Hughes, 369; [S. C. ante, 353.] I there said:

« Salvage services rendered on the long and dangerous coast which stretches from tiie Delaware capes to Florida, ought to be more liberally rewarded than on oilier coasts. It is not a seaboard studded with harbors and prosperous commercial cities and towns, from which salvors may run out short distances along shore, and render successful services in a few hours. It is a long coast, dangerous and barren, constantly swept by strong winds and currents; whore the ordinary tide varies only three feet, and on which wrecking enterprises cannot he successfully accomplished by individual exertions and capital. Wrecking service here can only be successfully performed by organized capital, enterprise, and skill,—by capita], skill, and enterprise so organized as to be capable of maintaining a constant provision of experienced mariners, powerful wrecking vessels, and ample wrecking implements and material ready at ell hours for immediate service. The business cannot sustain itself in the hands of reputable men and companies, unless the admiralty courts shall give exceptionally liberal awards in all cases of meritorious and successful service on this sea-board. And surely it is in the interest of commerce to sustain the wrecking business in these waters and latitudes. For these reasons, I repeat, salvors on this coast must be more liberally dealt with by the admiralty courts than on other coasts.”

What I then said I have found sanctioned and sustained, by anticipation, in a passage quoted in Cohen’s Admiralty Law, 131, from a publication of Judge Mabvecí, printed in 1861, in which that able admiralty judge is shown to have-said, while judge of the southern district of Florida, in the case of the ship Belle Ocean and Cargo:

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Bluebook (online)
17 F. 359, 1883 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-egypt-circtedva-1883.