The Coal Creek Company v. Anderson County, Tennessee

546 S.W.3d 87
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedOctober 5, 2017
DocketE2017-00661-COA-R3-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 546 S.W.3d 87 (The Coal Creek Company v. Anderson County, Tennessee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Coal Creek Company v. Anderson County, Tennessee, 546 S.W.3d 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

10/05/2017 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE August 10, 2017 Session

THE COAL CREEK COMPANY v. ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County No. 190298-1 John F. Weaver, Chancellor

No. E2017-00661-COA-R3-CV

This appeal concerns whether a tax on certain property containing oil and gas deposits constitutes an unlawful additional severance tax. The Coal Creek Company (“Coal Creek”) appealed the tax assessments of various county property assessors (“Assessors”). After administrative proceedings and appeals, the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission reinstated the original assessments. Coal Creek filed suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking judicial review of the Appeals Commission’s decision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing Coal Creek’s complaint. Coal Creek appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the taxes assessed upon Coal Creek’s property relative to oil and gas remaining in the ground are property taxes, not a severance tax. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Lewis S. Howard, Jr. and Erin J. Wallen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, The Coal Creek Company.

Robert T. Lee, Mt. Juliet, Tennessee, for the appellee, Anderson County, Tennessee.

Joseph G. Coker, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Campbell County, Tennessee.

Andrew N. Hall, Wartburg, Tennessee, for the appellee, Morgan County, Tennessee. John Sharpe, Assistant General Counsel for the appellee, Tennessee Division of Property Assessments.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General, and, Mary Ellen Knack, Senior Counsel, for the appellees, State Board of Equalization and Assessment Appeals Commission.

OPINION

Background

Coal Creek owns the subject real property in Anderson, Campbell, and Morgan Counties. This property contains oil and natural gas deposits, which Coal Creek also owns in fee simple. The majority of Coal Creek’s oil and gas operations are centered in Anderson County, Tennessee. Coal Creek receives royalty payments from lessees who remove the oil and gas. This case has its origin in a 2009 change in how the Coal Creek property was classified for tax purposes. Before 2009, Coal Creek’s property had been classified as farm property and assessed at a 25% rate. Beginning in 2009, the Assessors assessed the property’s mineral value at the industrial or commercial rate of 40%. From 2009 through 2014, Coal Creek paid these additional taxes to Anderson County in the amount of $122,742.59; Morgan County in the amount of $27,408; and, Campbell County in the amount of $1,662. The Tennessee Division of Property Assessments assisted the Assessors in their work valuing the mineral interests. An income approach was utilized in the valuations.

Coal Creek appealed the assessments to the State Board of Equalization. In October 2013, Coal Creek filed a motion for summary judgment. In January 2014, the Administrative Judge entered an initial decision and order granting Coal Creek’s motion for summary judgment. In finding for Coal Creek, the Administrative Judge stated in part:

The Administrative Judge finds that the Assessors’ methodology for estimating the contributory value of the oil and gas reserves does not comport with Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-602(a) insofar as the dictates of the Assessment Manual have been ignored. For example, the portions of the depositions summarized or quoted above make clear that the Assessors have no knowledge of, and make no meaningful attempt to obtain, information concerning the quantity of the reserves and the remaining economic life of the reserves. Moreover, no attempt is made to obtain information from the operator concerning its plans, income from royalties etc. -2- ***

The Assessors have absolutely no information to support the assumption that the prior year’s production is a reliable indicator of future production. Indeed, if a producer chooses to cease production for a year in hopes that the price of oil and gas will increase, the Assessors would assign no value to the oil and gas reserves for the current year because of no production the prior year. This valuation method quite clearly results in nothing more than an additional severance tax on oil and gas production that is purported to be an ad valorem tax on property containing oil and gas reserves. Consequently, the Assessors’ methodology for valuing the mineral component of subject parcels violates the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 60-1-301 against taxing oil and gas removed from the ground except for a severance tax as set forth in that statutory provision.1

(Footnote added). In February 2014, the Tennessee Division of Property Assessments, acting on behalf of the counties, appealed the Administrative Judge’s decision to the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission. In April 2015, a hearing was conducted before the Appeals Comission.

Keith Gibson, an area supervisor for the Tennessee Division of Property Assessments, testified regarding the methodology used in valuing mineral interests:

I’ve been with the Division for 32, 33 years, started doing the mineral valuation probably in 2006 or 7. I had done it previously years ago as a young staff member that basically just plugged in a few numbers but just kind of took over this aspect of it in 2007 or 8. Since that time, I have been promoted up to supervisor, the current position that I’m in. I have not been directly involved with these appraisals, but I oversee each and every one of them. Therefore, I have the most knowledge. But what we’re trying to do is, we contend that it’s not a severance tax, that all we’re doing is just valuing an income stream. If you take two like properties, exactly like Mr. Howard suggested awhile ago, where you have a property that does not have a known mineral reserve and then you have another one that does, all we’re doing is just looking at the royalty that they received from that one year and then projecting a lifetime in saying, you know, what is that income stream worth over a period of time. If you

1 Ad valorem is Latin for “according to the value,” or as meant specifically in this instance, “proportional to the value of the thing taxed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 53 (7th ed. 1999). -3- receive $5,000.00 one year and you’re expecting to receive that for an additional five or six years, what is that worth today? So that’s all we’re trying to do as far as valuing an income stream. It’s not a severance tax. It’s just saying that if you have two exact properties and both were up for sale, you know, what would you prefer to have, one that you’re going to receive a royalty check for the next duration period of time or would you rather have the other one that you don’t have a known reserve? We’re very conservative whenever we make all these estimates. On coal, we receive the Office of Surface Mining Permit which has not only reserve studies, but they have projections on what they’re to receive each year. We look at that. We only put an economic life up to their legal use. In other words, if that permit even said that they had a 20-year life on it, they don’t have a legal use to permit it for 20 years. They only give a five- year permit; so we’re very conservative on coal by using only that legal use of the property.

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546 S.W.3d 87, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-coal-creek-company-v-anderson-county-tennessee-tennctapp-2017.