Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
October 7, 2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA No. 59724-1-II THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS, CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2007-OA9 MORTGAGE PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATE, SERIES 2007- OA9,
Respondents,
v.
CAMEO H. EDWARDS (FKA CAMEO UNPUBLISHED OPINION MCCALPINE & FKA CAMEO MORCK),
Appellant,
LOVELL MCCALPINE JR; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (“MERS”) SOLELY AS NOMINEE FOR AEGIS FUNDING D/B/A AEGIS HOME EQUITY; and VIRGIL DEAN VESTAL & SHIRLEY VESTAL,
Defendants.
GLASGOW, J.—The Bank of New York Mellon mistakenly issued a reconveyance of a deed
of trust on Cameo Edwards’ real property, releasing the bank’s security interest in the property. At
the time of the mistaken reconveyance, Edwards still had an outstanding balance of over $330,000
on the mortgage on her property, and the bank was pursuing foreclosure.
After taking no further action for several years, the bank apparently realized its mistake
and recorded a document rescinding its prior reconveyance. The bank then filed a complaint stating
that Edwards had stopped making payments and was treating the deed of trust and underlying note No. 59724-1-II
as unenforceable. The bank sought declaratory judgment that the recorded document rescinding
the reconveyance was effective, the bank’s security interest was valid, and it was the first-position
lienholder as it was before the reconveyance.
Edwards moved for summary judgment dismissal because the bank’s complaint was filed
after the statute of limitations expired. The trial court granted summary judgment to Edwards but
denied Edwards’ request for attorney fees and costs under the deed of trust, reasoning that the
bank’s action did not attempt to construe or enforce a term of the deed of trust as required.
Edwards argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her claim for attorney fees.
Edwards relies on the attorney fee provision in the deed of trust and RCW 4.84.330, which makes
unilateral attorney fee provisions in a contract bilateral. Because language in the bank’s complaint
established that its declaratory action was prompted by a dispute as to the enforceability of the
deed of trust and this declaratory judgment action was a necessary first step in achieving
enforcement of the deed of trust, the attorney fee provision in the deed of trust and RCW 4.84.330
apply, entitling Edwards to attorney fees.
We reverse the trial court’s denial of attorney fees and costs, and we remand to the trial
court to award attorney fees and costs to Edwards consistent with this opinion. We also award
Edwards attorney fees and costs on appeal in an amount to be determined by this court’s
commissioner.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
In early 2007, Edwards signed and executed a promissory note and deed of trust in favor
of a lender and secured by her home. The deed of trust contained a provision unilaterally entitling
2 No. 59724-1-II
the lender to attorney fees and costs if it prevailed in any action “to construe or enforce any term”
of the deed of trust. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 636. In 2009, the deed of trust was assigned to the bank.
Edwards took out additional loans using her home as collateral and entered into two other
promissory notes and deeds of trust around this time, but they were subordinate to the bank’s
security interest. In 2009, Edwards discharged all of her personal liability for her home loans under
bankruptcy, totaling over $385,000.
In 2015, the bank filed for judicial foreclosure on Edwards’ property. The bank apparently
took no further action for several years, and a trial court eventually dismissed the foreclosure case
without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
In September 2016, the bank issued a reconveyance relinquishing its security interest in
the property to Edwards. At this time, Edwards had an outstanding balance of over $331,762.43,
and the reconveyance was a mistake. Edwards was confused so she called her loan servicing
company to confirm that the reconveyance of the deed of trust was intentional. The company
confirmed the reconveyance and even helped Edwards obtain the keys to the house. At that time,
neither the bank nor the loan servicing company took any steps to correct or rescind the
reconveyance, and neither one told Edwards the reconveyance had been a mistake. It was not until
2021 that the bank recorded a rescission of reconveyance with the county auditor to make its
attempt to cancel the reconveyance, a matter of public record.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The bank filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment that its rescission was effective
and its security interest in Edwards’ property was “valid and of the same priority status as if the
erroneous reconveyance had never occurred.” CP at 7. The bank explained that its “mistaken
3 No. 59724-1-II
reconveyance jeopardize[d] [its] primary, first lienholder position on the [p]roperty, necessitating
this action to obtain [the court’s] declaration confirming: (a) its rightful and equitable status as
first-position lienholder as well as of (b) its continued encumbrance of the [p]roperty by its . . .
[d]eed and corresponding [n]ote.” CP at 5. The bank sought “to establish and affirm its position as
the primary, first-position lienholder.” Id. The complaint alleged that Edwards had stopped making
payments and was no longer responding to the bank at all. Id. The bank expressly acknowledged
that the complaint was prompted by the fact that Edwards had stopped treating the deed of trust
and underlying note as “valid and enforceable.” Id. The bank stated that Edwards’ change in
position as to the enforceability of the deed and underlying note “led to a ripe dispute” between
the parties that should be resolved with this lawsuit. Id. The bank also sought a judicial
determination that its rescission of reconveyance was enforceable.
The bank then moved for summary judgment and asked for the trial court to confirm and
validate the rescission of the reconveyance of the deed of trust and reinstate the bank’s deed of
trust “to the same valid priority lien position on the [p]roperty, upon the same terms that the deed
of trust enjoyed before the [r]econveyance.” CP at 11. All of the lower priority lenders agreed to
accept the bank’s return to first position and to act as if the reconveyance never occurred.
Edwards filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that the bank failed to allege
a viable cause of action and the statute of limitations barred the bank’s claim. The trial court
ultimately denied the bank’s motion for summary judgment and granted Edwards’ cross motion
for summary judgment in part because the bank’s complaint was untimely. CP at 608-10.
Edwards then filed a motion for attorney fees and costs based on the attorney fee provision
in the deed of trust allowing the lender to collect attorney fees if it prevailed in any action “to
4 No. 59724-1-II
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
October 7, 2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA No. 59724-1-II THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS, CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2007-OA9 MORTGAGE PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATE, SERIES 2007- OA9,
Respondents,
v.
CAMEO H. EDWARDS (FKA CAMEO UNPUBLISHED OPINION MCCALPINE & FKA CAMEO MORCK),
Appellant,
LOVELL MCCALPINE JR; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (“MERS”) SOLELY AS NOMINEE FOR AEGIS FUNDING D/B/A AEGIS HOME EQUITY; and VIRGIL DEAN VESTAL & SHIRLEY VESTAL,
Defendants.
GLASGOW, J.—The Bank of New York Mellon mistakenly issued a reconveyance of a deed
of trust on Cameo Edwards’ real property, releasing the bank’s security interest in the property. At
the time of the mistaken reconveyance, Edwards still had an outstanding balance of over $330,000
on the mortgage on her property, and the bank was pursuing foreclosure.
After taking no further action for several years, the bank apparently realized its mistake
and recorded a document rescinding its prior reconveyance. The bank then filed a complaint stating
that Edwards had stopped making payments and was treating the deed of trust and underlying note No. 59724-1-II
as unenforceable. The bank sought declaratory judgment that the recorded document rescinding
the reconveyance was effective, the bank’s security interest was valid, and it was the first-position
lienholder as it was before the reconveyance.
Edwards moved for summary judgment dismissal because the bank’s complaint was filed
after the statute of limitations expired. The trial court granted summary judgment to Edwards but
denied Edwards’ request for attorney fees and costs under the deed of trust, reasoning that the
bank’s action did not attempt to construe or enforce a term of the deed of trust as required.
Edwards argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her claim for attorney fees.
Edwards relies on the attorney fee provision in the deed of trust and RCW 4.84.330, which makes
unilateral attorney fee provisions in a contract bilateral. Because language in the bank’s complaint
established that its declaratory action was prompted by a dispute as to the enforceability of the
deed of trust and this declaratory judgment action was a necessary first step in achieving
enforcement of the deed of trust, the attorney fee provision in the deed of trust and RCW 4.84.330
apply, entitling Edwards to attorney fees.
We reverse the trial court’s denial of attorney fees and costs, and we remand to the trial
court to award attorney fees and costs to Edwards consistent with this opinion. We also award
Edwards attorney fees and costs on appeal in an amount to be determined by this court’s
commissioner.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
In early 2007, Edwards signed and executed a promissory note and deed of trust in favor
of a lender and secured by her home. The deed of trust contained a provision unilaterally entitling
2 No. 59724-1-II
the lender to attorney fees and costs if it prevailed in any action “to construe or enforce any term”
of the deed of trust. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 636. In 2009, the deed of trust was assigned to the bank.
Edwards took out additional loans using her home as collateral and entered into two other
promissory notes and deeds of trust around this time, but they were subordinate to the bank’s
security interest. In 2009, Edwards discharged all of her personal liability for her home loans under
bankruptcy, totaling over $385,000.
In 2015, the bank filed for judicial foreclosure on Edwards’ property. The bank apparently
took no further action for several years, and a trial court eventually dismissed the foreclosure case
without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
In September 2016, the bank issued a reconveyance relinquishing its security interest in
the property to Edwards. At this time, Edwards had an outstanding balance of over $331,762.43,
and the reconveyance was a mistake. Edwards was confused so she called her loan servicing
company to confirm that the reconveyance of the deed of trust was intentional. The company
confirmed the reconveyance and even helped Edwards obtain the keys to the house. At that time,
neither the bank nor the loan servicing company took any steps to correct or rescind the
reconveyance, and neither one told Edwards the reconveyance had been a mistake. It was not until
2021 that the bank recorded a rescission of reconveyance with the county auditor to make its
attempt to cancel the reconveyance, a matter of public record.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The bank filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment that its rescission was effective
and its security interest in Edwards’ property was “valid and of the same priority status as if the
erroneous reconveyance had never occurred.” CP at 7. The bank explained that its “mistaken
3 No. 59724-1-II
reconveyance jeopardize[d] [its] primary, first lienholder position on the [p]roperty, necessitating
this action to obtain [the court’s] declaration confirming: (a) its rightful and equitable status as
first-position lienholder as well as of (b) its continued encumbrance of the [p]roperty by its . . .
[d]eed and corresponding [n]ote.” CP at 5. The bank sought “to establish and affirm its position as
the primary, first-position lienholder.” Id. The complaint alleged that Edwards had stopped making
payments and was no longer responding to the bank at all. Id. The bank expressly acknowledged
that the complaint was prompted by the fact that Edwards had stopped treating the deed of trust
and underlying note as “valid and enforceable.” Id. The bank stated that Edwards’ change in
position as to the enforceability of the deed and underlying note “led to a ripe dispute” between
the parties that should be resolved with this lawsuit. Id. The bank also sought a judicial
determination that its rescission of reconveyance was enforceable.
The bank then moved for summary judgment and asked for the trial court to confirm and
validate the rescission of the reconveyance of the deed of trust and reinstate the bank’s deed of
trust “to the same valid priority lien position on the [p]roperty, upon the same terms that the deed
of trust enjoyed before the [r]econveyance.” CP at 11. All of the lower priority lenders agreed to
accept the bank’s return to first position and to act as if the reconveyance never occurred.
Edwards filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that the bank failed to allege
a viable cause of action and the statute of limitations barred the bank’s claim. The trial court
ultimately denied the bank’s motion for summary judgment and granted Edwards’ cross motion
for summary judgment in part because the bank’s complaint was untimely. CP at 608-10.
Edwards then filed a motion for attorney fees and costs based on the attorney fee provision
in the deed of trust allowing the lender to collect attorney fees if it prevailed in any action “to
4 No. 59724-1-II
construe or enforce any term” of the deed of trust, CP at 636, combined with RCW 4.84.330, which
makes any unilateral attorney fee provision in a contract bilateral. CP at 613. Edwards argued that
the ultimate purpose of the bank’s claim was to reinstate its security interest and enforce the deed
of trust through foreclosure. CP at 615. After conducting a hearing on this issue, the trial court
held that the bank’s claim was “not brought to construe or enforce terms of the deed of trust. The
claim was downstream from that, focusing on the rescission and reconveyance.” Report of
Proceedings (RP) at 1, 11. The trial court denied Edwards’ request for attorney fees. RP at 10-11,
CP at 650.
Edwards appeals the denial of attorney fees at the trial court. She also seeks attorney fees
on appeal.
ANALYSIS
Edwards argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for attorney fees and costs.
Specifically, Edwards contends the bank’s lawsuit can only be interpreted as a necessary step
toward the bank’s ultimate goal of enforcing the terms of the deed of trust—a contract under RCW
4.84.330. Thus, Edwards argues attorney fees are warranted under the attorney fee provision in the
deed of trust and application of RCW 4.84.330. We agree.
We review de novo the scope and application of an attorney fee provision because
interpretation is a question of law. King County v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projects/Parsons
RCI/Frontier-Kemper, JV, 188 Wn.2d 618, 625, 398 P.3d 1093 (2017). The deed of trust in this
case allowed attorney fees and costs for the lender “in any action or proceeding to construe or
enforce any term” of the deed of trust. CP at 636.
5 No. 59724-1-II
RCW 4.84.330 makes a one-sided attorney fee provision in a contract benefit both sides by
operation of the statute. For RCW 4.84.330 to apply, the action must be “on a contract,” the
contract must contain a unilateral attorney fee or cost provision, and the party seeking fees must
be a prevailing party in an action incurred to enforce the provisions of the contract. RCW 4.84.330;
Wachovia SBA Lending v. Kraft, 138 Wn. App. 854, 859, 158 P.3d 1271 (2007). An action is “on
a contract if the action arose out of the contract and if the contract is central to the dispute.” Seattle
First Nat. Bank v. Wash. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 116 Wn.2d 398, 413, 804 P.2d 1263 (1991).
Here, Edwards is correct that there would be no dispute without the deed of trust. First, the
reconveyance could not have occurred without the deed of trust. The only conceivable purpose of
seeking to revive the deed of trust would be to reinstate the bank’s security interest so that the deed
of trust could be enforced. While the bank repeatedly asserts this action only sought to correct the
reconveyance, it fails to offer an alternative reason for correcting the reconveyance besides
enforcing the deed of trust.
Second, the bank acknowledged in its complaint that the lawsuit was prompted by
Edwards’ change in position as to the enforceability of the deed of trust. And the bank emphasized
in its complaint that it sought not only to confirm the validity of its reconveyance, but to obtain a
declaration that the bank was returned to its status as first-position lienholder, which could only
benefit the bank in a foreclosure action to enforce the deed of trust. In other words, the bank made
statements in its complaint acknowledging that enforcement of the deed of trust was the bank’s
ultimate goal. It expressly stated that the parties’ disagreement as to the enforceability of the note
was what made the current action ripe.
6 No. 59724-1-II
Under these circumstances, the bank’s declaratory judgment action was an action or
proceeding to enforce the deed of trust, invoking the deed of trust’s attorney fee provision, and it
was an action on a contract sufficient to trigger application of RCW 4.84.330.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s denial of attorney fees and costs and remand for the trial court
to award attorney fees and costs to Edwards consistent with this opinion. We also award Edwards
attorney fees on appeal in an amount to be determined by a commissioner of this court.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J. We concur:
CRUSER, C.J.
PRICE, J.