EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
In this case we review a strange record of delay and nonfeasance on the part of administrators charged with enforcing a regularly adopted statute of the United States.
In 1966, after years of legislative consideration, the Congress of the United States adopted and the President signed a bill known as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1970). Section 203 of that statute provided:
In order to assist the consumer to make an informed choice in the purchase of motor vehicle tires, within two years after September 9, 1966, the Secretary shall, through standards established under subchapter I of this chapter, prescribe by order, and publish in the Federal Register, a uniform quality grading system for motor vehicle tires. Such order shall specify the date such system is to take effect which shall not be sooner than one hundred and eighty days or later than one year from the date such order is issued, unless the Secretary finds, for good cause shown, that an earlier or later effective date is in the public interest, and publishes his reasons for such finding. The Secretary shall also cooperate with industry and the Federal Trade Commission to the maximum extent practicable in efforts to eliminate deceptive and confusing tire nomenclature and marketing practices.
Pub.L. 89-563, Title II, § 203, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 Stat. 729,15 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970).
The Act was to become effective in 1968. In fact, the agency charged with formulating the § 203 regulation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, did not promulgate it until May 20, 1975. This regulation finally established effective dates of January 1, 1976, July 1, 1976, and January 1, 1977, for the grading and labeling of radial-ply, bias-belted and bias-ply tires, respectively — ten years after adoption of the statute.1
It is not pertinent to our problem of judicial review to assess blame for this procrastination. We note that the agency’s [1181] brief strongly implies that at least some of the delay was due to the hostility of the industry which Congress proposed to regulate. We also note that the assignment of responsibility for administering § 203 has been changed a number of times.2 It may also be that among the many problems of the United States of America in the last decade, providing reliable information to consumers so that they could make better decisions in buying tires appeared to be a low priority item to those responsible.
Whatever the reasons, it is a sad fact that a law of the land was allowed to lie unheeded until a consumer organization headed by Ralph Nader hailed the agency into a federal court to account for its nonfeasance. Nash v. Brinegar, No. 177-73 (D.D.C., May 2, 1974). The regulation now being tested as to legal validity gives every appearance of being adopted somewhat hastily on the heels of the consent decree which terminated that litigation. The consent decree provided for the promulgation (at long last) of a proposed rule on or before June 15, 1974, and a final rule “as expeditiously as possible.”
To turn now to the specific facts of this case, Goodrich and seven other major tire companies in two petitions seek review of the validity of a regulation issued May 20, 1975, by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration establishing uniform tire quality grading standards for pneumatic passenger tires, 49 C.F.R. § 575.104 (1975). The regulation requires grading tires for three performance qualities: treadwear, traction, and temperature resistance. It requires that this information be molded into the tire sidewalls, printed on paper labels affixed to the treads, and kept available in writing by the tire dealer.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Petitioners’ first two issues in this case invite us to write a treatise on the applicable standard of review of the administrative regulations under attack herein. We decline the invitation to write exhaustively on this subject since we are convinced that these arguments do not in any event control the results of this case.
Petitioners insist that we employ the “practicable” and “objective terms” language which Congress applied to “motor vehicle safety standards” in § 103(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a), and the “substantial evidence” standard of review applicable to formal rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). The agency, on the other hand, insists that the regulations we review herein are not “motor vehicle safety standards” under § 103 of the Act and that they were properly adopted in informal rule-making under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) and that this court must affirm the Administrator, unless his actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
As to this argument, we hold that the procedures employed by the agency were informal rule-making procedures authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Since we find no statutory language requiring a hearing, we believe that the agency regulation is reviewable under the “arbitrary and [1182] capricious” standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972). In perhaps an excess of caution, we shall express our view also under the “substantial evidence” standard urged upon us by petitioners and claimed by them to be mandated for this circuit by this court’s opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
We turn then to consideration of petitioners’ claim that the regulations under review are “motor vehicle safety standards” and hence must be reviewed by this court under the language of § 103(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a), which follows:3
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
In this case we review a strange record of delay and nonfeasance on the part of administrators charged with enforcing a regularly adopted statute of the United States.
In 1966, after years of legislative consideration, the Congress of the United States adopted and the President signed a bill known as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1970). Section 203 of that statute provided:
In order to assist the consumer to make an informed choice in the purchase of motor vehicle tires, within two years after September 9, 1966, the Secretary shall, through standards established under subchapter I of this chapter, prescribe by order, and publish in the Federal Register, a uniform quality grading system for motor vehicle tires. Such order shall specify the date such system is to take effect which shall not be sooner than one hundred and eighty days or later than one year from the date such order is issued, unless the Secretary finds, for good cause shown, that an earlier or later effective date is in the public interest, and publishes his reasons for such finding. The Secretary shall also cooperate with industry and the Federal Trade Commission to the maximum extent practicable in efforts to eliminate deceptive and confusing tire nomenclature and marketing practices.
Pub.L. 89-563, Title II, § 203, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 Stat. 729,15 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970).
The Act was to become effective in 1968. In fact, the agency charged with formulating the § 203 regulation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, did not promulgate it until May 20, 1975. This regulation finally established effective dates of January 1, 1976, July 1, 1976, and January 1, 1977, for the grading and labeling of radial-ply, bias-belted and bias-ply tires, respectively — ten years after adoption of the statute.1
It is not pertinent to our problem of judicial review to assess blame for this procrastination. We note that the agency’s [1181] brief strongly implies that at least some of the delay was due to the hostility of the industry which Congress proposed to regulate. We also note that the assignment of responsibility for administering § 203 has been changed a number of times.2 It may also be that among the many problems of the United States of America in the last decade, providing reliable information to consumers so that they could make better decisions in buying tires appeared to be a low priority item to those responsible.
Whatever the reasons, it is a sad fact that a law of the land was allowed to lie unheeded until a consumer organization headed by Ralph Nader hailed the agency into a federal court to account for its nonfeasance. Nash v. Brinegar, No. 177-73 (D.D.C., May 2, 1974). The regulation now being tested as to legal validity gives every appearance of being adopted somewhat hastily on the heels of the consent decree which terminated that litigation. The consent decree provided for the promulgation (at long last) of a proposed rule on or before June 15, 1974, and a final rule “as expeditiously as possible.”
To turn now to the specific facts of this case, Goodrich and seven other major tire companies in two petitions seek review of the validity of a regulation issued May 20, 1975, by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration establishing uniform tire quality grading standards for pneumatic passenger tires, 49 C.F.R. § 575.104 (1975). The regulation requires grading tires for three performance qualities: treadwear, traction, and temperature resistance. It requires that this information be molded into the tire sidewalls, printed on paper labels affixed to the treads, and kept available in writing by the tire dealer.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Petitioners’ first two issues in this case invite us to write a treatise on the applicable standard of review of the administrative regulations under attack herein. We decline the invitation to write exhaustively on this subject since we are convinced that these arguments do not in any event control the results of this case.
Petitioners insist that we employ the “practicable” and “objective terms” language which Congress applied to “motor vehicle safety standards” in § 103(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a), and the “substantial evidence” standard of review applicable to formal rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). The agency, on the other hand, insists that the regulations we review herein are not “motor vehicle safety standards” under § 103 of the Act and that they were properly adopted in informal rule-making under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) and that this court must affirm the Administrator, unless his actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
As to this argument, we hold that the procedures employed by the agency were informal rule-making procedures authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Since we find no statutory language requiring a hearing, we believe that the agency regulation is reviewable under the “arbitrary and [1182] capricious” standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972). In perhaps an excess of caution, we shall express our view also under the “substantial evidence” standard urged upon us by petitioners and claimed by them to be mandated for this circuit by this court’s opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
We turn then to consideration of petitioners’ claim that the regulations under review are “motor vehicle safety standards” and hence must be reviewed by this court under the language of § 103(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a), which follows:3
(a) The Secretary shall establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Each such Federal motor vehicle safety standard shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.
15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970).
Our consideration of the legislative history of this Act shows that in the Senate this legislation originated as two wholly separate bills. One was a general automobile safety law. S. 3005, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The other was a consumer protection bill concerned with tire quality grading. S. 2669, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The House bill, however, encompassed both subjects. H.R. 13228, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). After each originating body had passed its bill or bills, the joint Conference Committee saw fit to merge them under one title. This last process may have served to help produce the ambiguity in the final product which plagues us in this appeal. The conferees failed to clarify their conflicting views on the question of whether the tire quality grading standards are also safety standards.
Section 103(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a), upon which petitioners rely for a more restrictive review standard, refers specifically to motor vehicle safety:
(a) The Secretary shall establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Each such Federal motor vehicle safety standard shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.
Section 203, 15 U.S.C. § 1423, on the other hand, provides:
In order to assist the consumer to make an informed choice in the purchase of motor vehicle tires, within two years after September 9, 1966, the Secretary shall, through standards established under subchapter I of this chapter, prescribe by order, and publish in the Federal Register, a uniform quality grading system for motor vehicle tires.
Legislative history discloses that two of the chief Senate sponsors for the tire grading system made it clear that, to them, the purpose of tire grading had little if any relationship to safety. Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the Commerce Committee, said:
It should be absolutely clear that the grading system has very little to do with minimum safety standards. Confusion in tire marketing is certainly an irritable and undesirable condition, but it does not involve the safety feature. 112 Cong. Rec. 6915 (1966).
Senator Ribicoff, another sponsor, said:
There is absolutely no way to know the value you are getting for your money; and while the chairman is absolutely cor[1183] rect, that the grading has nothing to do with minimum safety standards, yet from the consumer’s standpoint, I think he should be aware of what type of tire he is getting, and whether he is paying a proper price for it. Id.
The House Committee Report, however, took a different point of view:
Although some have argued that [tire] quality grading is solely an economic problem, the committee is satisfied this is not so and that it has a direct relationship to safety. Standards as to grading are necessary to assure safety. Grading standards, as well as any other tire standards related to safety, are within the scope of the authority of the Secretary under title I of the bill. H.R.Rep.No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1966). (Emphasis added).
For purposes of this case we assume, without finally deciding, that the language of Section 103 is applicable to the instant regulation. Section 203, of course, specifically provides for establishment of the uniform quality grading system “through standards established under subchapter I of this chapter.” Subchapter I contains both the section which provides for review by this court (§ 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1394) and the section (§ 103) which provides that motor vehicle safety standards shall be “practicable” and “stated in objective terms.” We leave to a future case, where this language might make a critical difference in decision, consideration of the government’s argument that the subchapter I standards referred to are those contained in Section 112(d) of the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1401(d), rather than those contained in Section 103.
Turning now to the merits of this case, we find that petitioners have attacked the agency regulation on every possible front. Their claims include the following:
1. The agency in adopting its Regulation failed to follow the procedures required by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and by the Administrative Procedure Act.
2. The grading information system required by the regulation is unreasonable, impractical and inconsistent with the Act.
3. The grading standards in the Regulation do not comply with the Act and are not supported by substantial evidence. In particular petitioners claim that traction, tread-wear and temperature resistance tests devised by the'-agency do not correlate with tire performance on the road and do not produce uniform and reliable results.
4. The lead time specified by the Regulation is arbitrary, unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence.
THE PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS
We have searched this voluminous record for evidence to support petitioners’ complaints of procedural abuses and have found none. As we have already noted, the industry which Congress and the President decided to regulate in this consumer information provision has known for ten years that this form of regulation was coming. Further, the industry has been on notice of the pendency of the instant informal rule-making proceeding since at least 1971. It has had more than ample opportunity to offer comment and, indeed, the record is full of comment by the Rubber Manufacturers Association and many individual rubber companies.
This said, we recognize that we have not met precisely the procedural objections raised by petitioners. Their claim is that (although they were thoroughly familiar with the agency’s proposed informal rule-making concerning testing by use of control tires4) • the agency abruptly shifted to a regulation calling for use of a tire testing ground near San Angelo, Texas, and course monitoring tires for measuring the changes in the course itself caused by weather, temperature or wear. Petitioners also claim that this change was occasioned by [1184] the Nader litigation, Nash v. Brinegar, supra, to which we have already referred.
We find no reason to invalidate the Regulation or remand it for further proceedings on any of these grounds. As we have indicated, we have no doubt that Nash v. Brine-gar did help to spur this reluctant dragon into some increased regulatory activity. But, surely, such was needed. In addition, the failure of the industry to produce viable bids for a control tire coincided in time with the Nash v. Brinegar litigation. It is this failure which the agency points to as occasioning its abrupt change.
Our examination of this record convinces us that the problems likely to develop from testing tires on the San Angelo course as a result of the use of course monitoring tires will be minor compared to those which would have accompanied control tire testing without a standard course.
More importantly, of course, as to appellants’ procedural complaints, our examination of the schedule of published notices indicates that notices were published giving adequate time for industry response. Indeed, industry responses were many and detailed. The first notice of proposed rule-making was published on September 21, 1971. It received considerable negative industry response and was withdrawn on April 21, 1972. The agency then determined that the three consumer information aspects which should be tested were tread-wear, traction and high speed performance. A proposed regulation oriented toward these objectives was issued March 7, 1973, and the regulation using the control tire approach was issued as a “final rule” on January 4, 1974. It was withdrawn in May of 1974 after agency advertisement for competitive bids for control tires produced only two proposals, neither of which the agency considered responsive or legal.
Notice 12 which involved the San Angelo course testing approach and the use of a course monitoring tire was published June 14, 1974, with revisions on August 9, 1974. Timely comment on the proposed rule closed on September 12, 1974. At the request of the industry, however, comment upon the whole rule and its revisions was reopened for ten days beginning April 14, 1975, with the agency assurance that comments received after that date would be given full consideration. The rule itself was published May 20, 1975.
We will deal separately under the Grading Standard section of this opinion with petitioners’ attacks upon the agency’s selection (and failure to select) course monitoring tires. This issue excepted, we are able to find no abuse of informal rule-making in the procedure followed by the agency.
The industry also asserts that its procedural rights have been abused by the fact that the agency “dumped” documents into the record after the final closing date for public comment. The agency answers that the documents complained about were simply part of the administrative record which had to be prepared for this court as a result of the industry’s petition for review. The Administrative Procedure Act does not require that every bit of background information used by an administrative agency be published for public comment. Our review of this issue indicates that it is lacking in merit. The basic data upon which the agency relied in formulating the regulation was available to petitioners for comment.
THE GRADING INFORMATION SYSTEM
Petitioners attack the grading information system principally upon two grounds. First, they alleged that the information provided is not meaningfully related to safety and “will in many instances be affirmatively misleading.” Second, they assert that the informational requirements are unnecessarily and unreasonably expensive and in regard to the paper label requirement, impossible to perform to a satisfactory degree so as actually to reach the consumer.
Section 203, 15 U.S.C. § 1423, is not primarily a safety law. It is designed, as its language and its history show, primarily to provide information to tire buyers from which they can tell something about the product they are buying. It is related to [1185] safety in the sense that an owner can know whether his tires are good, average or poor in relation to three safety related characteristics.
Important industry representatives either proposed or agreed with the three tire characteristics of treadwear, traction and temperature resistance5 as to which the agency intends to offer information. In this proceeding, although appellants’ attack is upon the Regulation as a whole, there is no real dispute about the three tire characteristics which it seeks to measure. Measured by any standard of review to which we have previously referred, there is “ample evidence” in the whole record to require us to uphold the agency’s choice of tire characteristics to be measured. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 515 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975).
MISLEADING INFORMATION
Appellants’ point concerning possible misleading effect of the information provided does, however, raise a question to which we do not find adequate answers. They assert with regard to temperature resistance information: “There is no qualifying language of any kind which would indicate that the grade is based only on heat resulting from high speed at proper loads and inflation. . . . ” (Emphasis added.) Obviously a satisfactory grade on temperature resistance is no guarantee against blowouts due primarily to a combination of high speed and either underinflation or excess loading. A simple warning to this effect would seem to be in order. We believe that this issue should be remanded for agency consideration.
Similarly appellants note that traction grading is based only upon straight ahead stopping tests. Their claims include the suggestion that “lateral” traction characteristics are likewise important but not covered. The agency’s response on this score is that thus far no practical test for lateral traction has been devised and that the agency is working to devise one. There is no industry response to the contrary. Nonetheless, it may be desirable to point out the traction test’s limitation in this regard. We recognize that adding such warnings to the information molded into the tire wall would be highly impractical. But on this record we cannot see any similar impracticality in adding them to the proposed tire labels and- dealer (point of sale) information sheets. The issue of warning tire consumers that lateral traction is not covered by the traction test is remanded for consideration by the agency.
By these remands we do not purport to adopt appellants’ arguments. Rather, we remand simply because we do not find any adequate answer to them in this record and we feel that they have sufficient public interest merit to require agency review.
COSTS
Appellants also attack as arbitrary and unreasonable in cost the regulations on informational requirements — particularly that which requires that all tires (except original equipment tires) carry a paper label supplying the required grading information. The record shows that information pertaining to tires is, according to widespread industry practice, currently 1) molded into tire sidewalls, 2) furnished to dealers, and 3) printed on labels pasted to tires. Adding the § 203 information will undoubtedly add some costs — but hardly ones which are beyond the contemplation of Congress when it passed the statute.
The industry’s particular attack is centered upon the paper label required to be pasted to each tire. Appellants claim that the paper label requirement will add 15 to 17 million dollars of cost, that the label is impossible to keep affixed to every tire, and that, anyhow, less than a majority of prospective purchasers will ever see the label.
The agency responses include the following paragraphs from the Federal Trade Commission’s submission in this record:
[1186] Finally, the Commission is aware of the sharply divided views in the docket on the subject of paper tread labels. The argument has been raised that the tread label will not be seen by many consumers because the labels are attached to tires which are usually installed in the garage of the tire store. This argument has some merit, but labels on tires which are on display, or on tires purchased without mounting services, will be readily seen by the consumer.
The alternative to the paper tread labels — point of sale materials — would not be as reliable a method of communicating the desired information to the consumer. From an enforcement standpoint, we have been advised that it is beyond the power of NHTSA to require dealers to have point of sale materials available in a conspicuous place; whereas NHTSA has clear authority over requiring labels on tires up to time of sale.
In these circumstances, the Commission would suggest that tread labels be required, although we would encourage tire manufacturers and dealers to use point of sale materials as well.
Additionally, the agency has commented on this topic:
Tread labels are presently used to identify tires throughout the tire industry. If labels should be detached, manufacturers can furnish dealers with replacement labels which they can affix before a tire is sold. Although the actual tires a motorist purchases may not be seen by him prior to delivery, representative tires are usually displayed in most locations where tires are sold. Such display tires would have labels affixed to their tread surface, and the information would thus be available to purchasers before sale in an obvious and conspicuous location. (Emphasis added). 39 Fed.Reg. 20810 (1974).
We find these responses to be convincing and supported by “ample evidence” in this record. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 515 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975).
As to petitioners’ protests about the cost of the tire labels, it seems obvious to us, as it does to the agency, that full information (as contrasted to the minimum information supplied on the tire wall) can be cheaply provided to the ultimate consumer merely by some expansion of the tire label now in widespread use in the industry. The agency cites a three cent per label cost estimate by Uniroyal for this expansion. Its own estimate as shown in the Inflation Impact Review, parts of which we reproduce as Appendix B to this opinion, gives an overall estimate of five cents per tire for all labeling costs. While we have noted the largely unsupported estimate in petitioners’ brief of $17 million cost per year for tire labels, even that figure would produce a per tire cost of only 12-plus cents when adjusted to the 133-plus million tires to which labels would need to be affixed.
Thus we find “ample evidence” to support the portion of the agency’s Regulation pertaining to grading information and no violation of the standards of § 103 of the Act.
THE GRADING STANDARDS AND TESTS
Petitioners attack all three grading standards as unrelated to highway safety. As noted above, we have already rejected this argument. Petitioners’ heaviest fire, however, is reserved for the test procedures established by the rule for each standard and particularly for the claimed variations in the testing devices which they assert are sufficient to invalidate at least the traction and treadwear tests.
The agency has provided a summary of the grading standard and tests established by the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standard Rule:
Treadwear
Treadwear grades are based on a tire’s projected mileage (the distance which it is expected to travel before wearing down to its treadwear indicators) as tested on a single, predetermined test run of approximately 6400 miles. The test course has been established by the agency [1187] in the vicinity of San Angelo, Texas. The course is approximately 400 miles long, and each treadwear test will require 16 circuits. A tire’s tread depth is measured periodically during the test and, then, based upon these measurements, its projected mileage is calculated. A tire’s treadwear grade is expressed as the percentage which its projected mileage represents of a nominal 30,000 miles,