The B. F. Goodrich Company v. Department of Transportation, Uniroyal, Inc. v. Department of Transportation

541 F.2d 1178
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit·Decided October 8, 1976·No. 75-1568 and 75-1785·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinions

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

In this case we review a strange record of delay and nonfeasance on the part of administrators charged with enforcing a regularly adopted statute of the United States.

In 1966, after years of legislative consideration, the Congress of the United States adopted and the President signed a bill known as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1970). Section 203 of that statute provided:

In order to assist the consumer to make an informed choice in the purchase of motor vehicle tires, within two years after September 9, 1966, the Secretary shall, through standards established under subchapter I of this chapter, prescribe by order, and publish in the Federal Register, a uniform quality grading system for motor vehicle tires. Such order shall specify the date such system is to take effect which shall not be sooner than one hundred and eighty days or later than one year from the date such order is issued, unless the Secretary finds, for good cause shown, that an earlier or later effective date is in the public interest, and publishes his reasons for such finding. The Secretary shall also cooperate with industry and the Federal Trade Commission to the maximum extent practicable in efforts to eliminate deceptive and confusing tire nomenclature and marketing practices.
Pub.L. 89-563, Title II, § 203, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 Stat. 729,15 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970).

The Act was to become effective in 1968. In fact, the agency charged with formulating the § 203 regulation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, did not promulgate it until May 20, 1975. This regulation finally established effective dates of January 1, 1976, July 1, 1976, and January 1, 1977, for the grading and labeling of radial-ply, bias-belted and bias-ply tires, respectively — ten years after adoption of the statute.1

It is not pertinent to our problem of judicial review to assess blame for this procrastination. We note that the agency’s [1181] brief strongly implies that at least some of the delay was due to the hostility of the industry which Congress proposed to regulate. We also note that the assignment of responsibility for administering § 203 has been changed a number of times.2 It may also be that among the many problems of the United States of America in the last decade, providing reliable information to consumers so that they could make better decisions in buying tires appeared to be a low priority item to those responsible.

Whatever the reasons, it is a sad fact that a law of the land was allowed to lie unheeded until a consumer organization headed by Ralph Nader hailed the agency into a federal court to account for its nonfeasance. Nash v. Brinegar, No. 177-73 (D.D.C., May 2, 1974). The regulation now being tested as to legal validity gives every appearance of being adopted somewhat hastily on the heels of the consent decree which terminated that litigation. The consent decree provided for the promulgation (at long last) of a proposed rule on or before June 15, 1974, and a final rule “as expeditiously as possible.”

To turn now to the specific facts of this case, Goodrich and seven other major tire companies in two petitions seek review of the validity of a regulation issued May 20, 1975, by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration establishing uniform tire quality grading standards for pneumatic passenger tires, 49 C.F.R. § 575.104 (1975). The regulation requires grading tires for three performance qualities: treadwear, traction, and temperature resistance. It requires that this information be molded into the tire sidewalls, printed on paper labels affixed to the treads, and kept available in writing by the tire dealer.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Petitioners’ first two issues in this case invite us to write a treatise on the applicable standard of review of the administrative regulations under attack herein. We decline the invitation to write exhaustively on this subject since we are convinced that these arguments do not in any event control the results of this case.

Petitioners insist that we employ the “practicable” and “objective terms” language which Congress applied to “motor vehicle safety standards” in § 103(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a), and the “substantial evidence” standard of review applicable to formal rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). The agency, on the other hand, insists that the regulations we review herein are not “motor vehicle safety standards” under § 103 of the Act and that they were properly adopted in informal rule-making under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) and that this court must affirm the Administrator, unless his actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).

As to this argument, we hold that the procedures employed by the agency were informal rule-making procedures authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Since we find no statutory language requiring a hearing, we believe that the agency regulation is reviewable under the “arbitrary and [1182] capricious” standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972). In perhaps an excess of caution, we shall express our view also under the “substantial evidence” standard urged upon us by petitioners and claimed by them to be mandated for this circuit by this court’s opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).

We turn then to consideration of petitioners’ claim that the regulations under review are “motor vehicle safety standards” and hence must be reviewed by this court under the language of § 103(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a), which follows:3

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The B. F. Goodrich Company v. Department of Transportation, Uniroyal, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976).

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