The Avid Group, LLC v. Arixa Animal Diagnostics, Inc.

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5

6 THE AVID GROUP, LLC, Case No. 2:24-cv-01470-JCM-NJK 7 Plaintiff(s), Order 8 v. [Docket No. 52] 9 ARIXA ANIMAL DIAGNOSTICS, INC., et 10 al.,

11 Defendant(s). 12 Pending before the Court is a stipulation to extend case management deadlines by 90 days. 13 Docket No. 52. 14 A request to extend deadlines in the scheduling order must be premised on a showing of 15 good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Local Rule 26-3. The good cause analysis turns on whether 16 the subject deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the exercise of diligence. Johnson v. 17 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “The diligence obligation is 18 ongoing.” Morgal v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 284 F.R.D. 452, 460 (D. Ariz. 2012). 19 “The showing of diligence is measured by the conduct displayed throughout the entire period of 20 time already allowed.” Williams v. James River Grp. Inc., 627 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1177 (D. Nev. 21 2022). The Court considers whether relief from the scheduling order is sought based on the 22 development of matters that could not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the schedule 23 was established. Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Courts may 24 also consider other pertinent circumstances, including whether the movant was diligent in seeking 25 modification of the scheduling order once it became apparent that the movant required relief from 26 the deadline at issue. Sharp v. Covenant Care LLC, 288 F.R.D. 465, 467 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 27 “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of 28 relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. When diligence has not been shown in support of an extension 1 request, “the inquiry should end.” Id.1 Although the Court may consider the joint nature of a 2 stipulation to extend, “[t]hat a request is made jointly neither mandates allowance of the extension 3 sought nor exempts parties from making the necessary showings to justify that relief.” Williams, 4 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1178. 5 Although discovery has been open for many months, the parties have completed no 6 affirmative discovery of any kind. See Docket No. 52 at 3-4.2 Conducting no discovery for months 7 on end is, obviously, antithetical to the required showing of diligence. The reasons advanced for 8 this shortcoming are meritless. For example, the stipulation represents that the parties chose to 9 forego (without judicial approval) their discovery efforts to discuss settlement, Docket No. 52 at 10 5, but “it is well-settled that the existence of settlement talks or the potential for alternative dispute 11 resolution is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish good cause for an extension of the case 12 management deadlines,” Williams, 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1181. The stipulation also references the 13 pendency of a motion to dismiss counterclaims, see Docket No. 52 at 5, but the mere pendency of 14 a partially dispositive motion is not a proper basis to delay discovery, see Tradebay, LLC v. eBay, 15 Inc., 278 F.R.D. 597, 600 (D. Nev. 2011) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide 16 for automatic or blanket stays of discovery when a potentially dispositive motion is pending”); see 17 also Flynn v. Nev., 345 F.R.D. 338, 345 (D. Nev. 2024) (explaining that a partially dispositive 18 motion is not generally grounds to stay discovery). The stipulation also references a change in 19 counsel, see Docket No. 52 at 3, but that event is not grounds to modify the scheduling order when 20 incoming counsel did not seek such relief at the time of substitution, see, e.g., Local Rule IA 11- 21 6(c).3 22 1 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized the importance of scheduling orders, see Desio v. State 23 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 339 F.R.D. 632, 641 (D. Nev. 2011) (collecting cases), and has stated bluntly that Rule 16 scheduling orders must “be taken seriously,” Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 24 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994). The stipulation’s reliance on more lenient case law outside the Rule 16 context is not persuasive. See, e.g., Williams, 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1177 n.3. 25 2 Initial disclosures were exchanged and one set of written discovery was propounded, but 26 a response has apparently not been provided to date. See id. 27 3 The feeble reasoning advanced is all the more notable given the earlier admonition in this case that “counsel and the parties must ensure that they take all reasonable steps to meet applicable 28 deadlines.” Docket No. 14 at 1. ] In short, the diligence required to extend case management deadlines is lacking. 2|| Nonetheless, the stipulation also represents that the parties have now reached a tentative settlement 3] agreement. See, e.g., Docket No. 52 at 6. As a one-time courtesy to the parties, the Court will 4! allow a modest extension to accommodate the effort to finalize that settlement. Given the lack of 5| diligence to date, however, the Court is not inclined to extend these deadlines further. 6 Accordingly, the stipulation to extend is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Case management deadlines are RESET as follows: 8 e Amend pleadings/ add parties: closed, except that Arixa may file amended counterclaims 9 by August 21, 2025 10 e Initial experts: September 22, 2025 11 e Rebuttal experts: October 22, 2025 12 e Discovery cutoff: December 8, 2025 13 e Dispositive motions: January 7, 2026 14 e Joint proposed pretrial order: February 6, 2026, or 30 days after resolution of dispositive 15 motions 16 In addition to the above deadlines, a joint status report regarding settlement must be filed 17] by August 14, 2025. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: August 4, 2025 UZ. Nancy J. Koppe 21 United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28